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Abstract. 
It is argued that the banking crisis in Chile had its 
origin in the deterioration of key macroeconomic variables 
and that financial liberalisation played a secondary role. 
Proponents contend that no financial system can be expected 
to withstand a fall in output of nearly 15% in 1982 and they 
draw parallels here with the banking crisis of the 1930's in 
the US. On the other side, it is argued that the ability of 
the financial system to withstand any macroeconomic shock 
have been shaped by the financial liberalisation which took 
place in the years before the collapse of the macroeconomy. 
Conduct derived from ownership concentration and "related 
portfolios", sharp deregulation on interest rates, belief in 
an implicit bail-out provision, and the ineffective and 
inadequate prudential regulation led to pervasive banking 
structure and a pattern of behaviour marked by moral hazard. 
As a result, banks exhibited excessive risk taking with a 
deterioration of banks' financial position. Only the prompt 
rescue by the Central Bank of leading financial institutions 
averted a massive loss of confidence and a bank run. 
This thesis examines the evolution of the Chilean 
financial system during the period of economic reforms and 
banking failures. Three specific questions are examined and 
evaluated empirically: How important was the adverse 
macroeconomic environment relative to the banking conduct 
and management which exhibited considerable moral hazard and 
adverse selection type of behavior in the banking failures 
in Chile ? Secondly, in what ways might a more favorable 
general economic conditions and/or a more effective 
prudential regulation have helped to reduce the likelihood 
of bank failures? Finally, might some of the bank failures 
been anticipated years before the crisis by an early warning 
system ? 
In order to answer these questions this thesis develops 
a logit model for cross-section and panel data with 
information from banks' balance sheets to estimate the 
probability of bank failure/problem for the period between 
1979 and 1983. 
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Chapter ~ ~ Introduction. 
(1.1) Background to the study. 
This thesis discusses and evaluates empirically the 
Chilean experience with financial liberalisation during the 
1970's and early 1980's. Special consideration has been 
given to the study of the origins and the magnitude of the 
collapse of the banking system in 1982-83. 
The Chilean liberalisation programme, which included the 
deregulation and the opening-up of the goods and financial 
markets as well as a package for macroeconomic stabilisation 
has been of considerable interest to economists and 
researchers working in the areas of economic development, 
international trade, and finance. 
There are several reasons why the Chilean case is been 
of great interest. First, the Chilean economy pursued two 
distinctly different development strategies. From the 1930's 
to the early 1970's the economy followed inward-looking 
strategies which included a financially repressed financial 
system; and from the late 1973 onwards an outward-looking 
strategy which included financial liberalisation and 
stabilisation policies. This sharp and sustained changes in 
policy implies that the links between policy and performance 
may be more clearly discernible in the Chilean case than 1n 
most others. 
1 
Secondly, the process of liberalisation after the 
military coup of September 1973 was considered to be a "pure 
monetarist strategy" as the economy was subject to free 
market oriented policies under the guidance of the military 
government and Chicago-trained economists. The performance 
of the economy under the influence of Chicago liberalism 
provided evidence for their detractors particularly with the 
debacle of the banking system in 1982-83. 
Finally, the performance of the Chilean economy both 
during and 
completed 
still are 
after the liberalisation reforms have been 
contained some dramatic change of fortunes which 
considered rather puzzling. Chile's economic 
performace between 1973 and 1983 shows sharp contrasts. For 
instance, the average growth rate of real GDP between 1976 
and 1981 was 7.1% and the inflation rate was less than 10% 
by 
and 
1981. However, by 1982 and 1983 
3% respectively. At the 
GDP fell by nearly 
same time, once 
14% 
the 
liberalisation of trade was completed on schedule in 1979 
which among other things meant the attainment of a uniform 
nominal tariff of 10%, and the financial system was open to 
flows of foreign capital in 1982 the whole process was 
stopped and reversed during the second half of 1982. The 
trade regime was restricted with the rise in tariffs and 
controls and the financial system was overhauled and its 
losses socialised to avoid its inminent collapse. Although 
the collapse of the economy in 1982 and the abandonment of 
the Neo-Liberal approach have been subject to considerable 
2 
scrutiny, some of the issues, particularly the debacle of 
the banking system and its empirical verification, remain 
largely unsettled. 
During the mid-1970's, Chile adopted a new approach to 
policy-making. This new strategy consisted of a combination 
of measures to deal with macroeconomic instability as a 
short-run objective and economic growth as a long-run 
objective. 
initially 
The new package of 
of traditional 
economic 
orthodox 
policies consisted 
monetarism for 
stabilisation and liberalisation reforms in the goods and 
financial markets. The liberalisation of the financial 
market was considered one of the backbone of the Neo-liberal 
reforms. Indeed, in retrospect, it could be argued that the 
success or failure of financial liberalisation was 
paramount in the overall result of this new approach of 
economic development in Chile. 
The authorities were absolutely committed to short run 
stabilisation as a pre-condition for the introduction of 
long run structural and institutional reforms. At the 
beginning, the lack of success in reducing the inflation 
rate and the high cost in terms of output and employment, 
particularly in 1975 as output fell by nearly 13%, forced 
the authorities to overhaul closed economy monetarism. 
Instead, an open economy approach was introduced in 1978 
where the exchange rate became the nominal anchor of the 
economy as well as the key variable in expectations 
3 
formation. This approach was desirable and necessary as the 
economy was becoming more integrated to the international 
world markets. 
The itinerary of liberalisation was on schedule and with 
no political opposition. The goods market was deregulated 
domestically 
restrictions. 
and 
The 
followed by the removal 
financial market was 
of trade 
deregulated 
simultaneously with the goods market although it remained 
closed to external capital flows until the last stage of the 
reform package. This order and timing of liberalisation was 
considered theoretically sound and accepted by economists 
and policy-makers working in Chile and other developing 
countries. 
The acceptance of the Neo-Liberal approach was based on 
economic, social, and political factors. The performance of 
the Chilean .economy was unsatisfactory, particularly during 
the Allende's social government between 1970 and 1973. The 
economy was suffering from hyperinflation induced by the 
financing of large fiscal deficits. At the same time, the 
balance of payments deficit and the shortage of 
international reserves was becoming symptomatic of the 
fiscal deficit and especially of the inward-looking 
strategy. Obviously some action was required to correct 
these macroeconomic disequilibria. 
The rate of growth of real GDP was poor relative to 
other Latin American and East Asian economies during the 
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1950's and the 1960's. This gap widened during the early 
1970's. For instance, the average annual rate of growth of 
GOP between 1965 and 1973 was 10% and 10.4% for Korea 
and Taiwan. Brazil and Mexico also exhibited impressive 
growth rates with 9.8% and 7.9% respectively. In contrast, 
Chile shows a poor performance with only 3.4% over the same 
period. 
It could be argued that much of the difference in 
performance can be attributed to the fact that the East 
Asian countries were pursuing outward-looking strategy and 
by promoting a well developed financial markets. In 
contrast, Chile followed a systematic inward-looking 
strategy and financially repressed financial market as the 
industrialisation strategy. It must be said in retrospect 
that East Asian countries have continued outperformed Latin 
American countries during the second half of the 1970's and 
during the 1980's even though the latter countries have 
pursued very aggressive liberalisation strategies. 
It is clear by now that economic factors such us 
macroeconomic instability, the failure of inward-looking 
strategy, and the superior performance of those countries 
following a more open strategy towards international trade 
and financial markets motivated the Chilean authorities to 
embrace a Neo-Liberal approach. At the same time, the 
political turmoil during the socialist government produced a 
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climate for the establishment of both, a military 
dictatorship and the economic regime. 
It must be said that, at least in the economic front, 
Chile's economic liberalisation accomplished many positive 
achievements. Trade liberalisation made a significant 
contribution to the rate of economic growth during 1976-81. 
Some sectors were sufficiently flexible to react to changes 
in relative prices resulting from trade reforms. In fact, 
resource reallocation from import sUbstitution to the export 
sector was possible. Furthermore, there was a change in the 
pattern of production in the export market as non-
traditional exports such as agricultural products, timber, 
and fishing expanded relative to traditional exports such as 
copper. 
Similarly, financial liberalisation brought about 
significant benefits by expanding the level of financial 
intermediation through the formal banking system. At the 
same time, the rise in the number of financial institutions 
produced significant improvemement in operative efficiency 
and financial widening. However, in spite of these positive 
results, these reforms produced other unexpected and 
undesirable outcomes. High and stubborn interest rates, lack 
of effective supervision, imprudent practices by banks and 
non-banks financial institutions conspired against the 
establishment of an efficient and stable liberal financial 
market. The debacle of the banking system in 1982-83 is the 
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reflection of the effects of an ill-designed and mistaken 
implemention of financial liberalisation. Admittedly, the 
completation of financial liberalisation and the collapse of 
the banking system coincided with the economic recession of 
1982 when output fell by nearly 15%. 
The Chilean experience is still a contentious issue in 
spite of the substantial literature on this topic. This is 
more significant when we attempt to explain the debacle of 
the Chilean banking system. On one side, it is argued that 
the financial crisis in Chile had its origin in the 
deterioration of key macroeconomic variables and that 
financial liberalisation played a secondary role. Proponents 
contend that no financial system can be expected to 
withstand a fall in output of nearly 15% in 1982 and they 
draw parallels here with the banking crisis of the 1930's in 
the US. On the other side, it is argued that the ability of 
the financial system to withstand any macroeconomic shock 
will depend on the structure of the banking system. This had 
been shaped by the financial liberalisation which took place 
in the years before the collapse of the macroeconomy. 
Conduct derived from ownership concentration and "related 
portfolios", sharp deregulation of interest rates, belief in 
an implicit bail-out provision, and the ineffective and 
inadequate prudential regulation led to a pattern of 
behaviour marked by moral hazard and to a l -oo-r ~ . J 1 - · e e -at-lot e '"L e 1 .: 
adverse selection problems. As a result, banks exhibited 
excessive risk taking with a deterioration of banks' 
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financial position. Only the prompt rescue by the Central 
Bank of leading financial institutions averted a massive 
loss of confidence and a bank run. 
If we accept that both arguments have some merits, the 
question is the relative weight of these hypotheses. The 
relative importance of macro and micro as causal factor in 
bank failures and the implications for the failure rates in 
a more stable macroeconomic environment and/or less risky 
bank management are important empirical questions which 
remain unanswered in the literature on Chile. 
(1.2) Aims, Methodology and structure of the study. 
This thesis examines the evolution of the Chilean 
financial system during the period of economic reforms and 
banking failures. Three specific questions are examine and 
evaluated empirically: How important was the adverse 
macroeconomic environment relative to the banking conduct 
and management which exhibited considerable moral hazard 
type of behavior in the banking failures in Chile ? . 
Secondly, in what ways might more favorable general 
economic conditions and/or different implementation of 
financial reforms including a more effective prudential 
regulation have helped to reduce the likelihood of bank 
failures ? Finally, might some of the bank failures have 
been anticipated years before the crisis by an early warning 
system 7 
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In this thesis, I develo l't d 1 f P a Ogl mo e or cross-
section and panel data with information from banks' balance 
sheets to estimate the probability of bank failure/problem. 
Banks are classified in two groups. The first group 
corresponds to those financial intermediaries with no 
problems and 
problems/failed. 
the 
In 
second group 
the latter, I 
includes banks with 
have followed a wide 
definition of problem/failure to conform to the list which 
includes problem banks which sold bad debts to the Central 
Bank, and those institutions in which the authorities 
intervened directly. 
At a first stage, I use symptomatic variables derived 
from banks' balance sheets among them I include a broad 
categories of financial and accounting ratios assessing a 
bank's liquidity, credit risk, liability risk, capital 
adequacy, and profitability. This model will enable me to 
estimate the ex ante probability of bank failure/problem and 
to evaluate whether the model was providing an early warning 
signal at least with a year or more. At the same time, the 
use of these symptomatic variables will permit the 
constructing of a banks's ex ante classification on 
quarterly basis. 
In the second stage of the empirical work, I proceed to 
the logit model with quarterly panel data against 
model will help to test macro and micro 
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the probability of bank failure/problem and to simulate 
different 
likelihood. 
environments to assess its impact on the 
Specifically, this thesis is composed of ten chapters, 
including the introduction and the conclusions. Following 
the introduction, chapter 2 provides a background on the 
Chilean financial reforms and the institutional structure. 
It also contains an assessment of the results which were 
expected a priori. 
The first section begins with an account of the 
theoretical underpinnings of financial liberalisation and 
the case against financial repression. In addition, it is 
shown what is regarded to be desirable and acceptable in 
terms of the dynamics and the transition involved in the 
path from financial repression to a deregulated financial 
market. Some evidence from selected countries is presented 
to support financial liberalisation. 
The second section contains a detailed description of 
the package of financial reforms implemented between 1973 
and 1983. This includes reforms towards the liberalisation 
of the domestic banking sector as well as the opening to 
external capital inflows. This description follows the 
chronological order adopted by the monetary authorities. 
Finally, this chapter ends with a general evaluation of 
the effects of financial liberalisation. It provides 
rn 
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evidence on financial deepening and widening, the pattern of 
interest rates, the effect on savings and investment, and 
the allocation of financial resources. At first Bight a 
significant expansion of the peso and dollar liabilities 
occurred along with increases in intermediation and the 
number of financial institutions, both domestic and foreign. 
But deregulation and increasing competition meant an 
alarming deterioration of banks' asset portfolios and 
profitability during 1981-83. Several financial institutions 
were rescued in 1981 and in particular in 1983 to avert a 
contagious panic and a bank run. 
Chapter 3 is a continuation of chapter 2 as it gives an 
overview of the different episodes of financial difficulties 
during the period of liberalisation, although the emphasis 
is put on the banking crisis of 1981-83. Moreover, it 
discusses the magnitude of the collapse and the measures 
taken by the authorities. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The 
first one carries out an autopsy of the banking system and 
some financial institutions. By means of financial data from 
annual banks' balance sheets and income statements we 
construct financial indicators on performance and fragility 
to study the evolution of the banking system between 1977 to 
1983. Moreover, the data enable us to estimate indicators 
for individual banks and thus compare their individual 
performance. Clearly, according to the indicators there are 
-
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marked differences between those banks which experienced 
intervention and/or sold bad debts to the Central Bank and 
those intermediaries which remained healthy. Such comparison 
were also made between the group of domestic banks and 
foreign banks where the latter group suffered minor 
distresses during this period. 
The second section shows the magnitude of the 
intervention in terms of the rescue package enacted by the 
monetary authorities. One of the most important mechanisms 
in aid of those in financial distress was the agreement 
number 1.555. This enabled banks to sell bad debt to the 
Central Banks. 
Following the description and evaluation of the banking 
crisis, chapter 4 reviews the theories of bank failures and 
banking instability. After providing a theoretical 
justification for the existence of financial intermediaries 
as information producers and liquidity insurers, the 
analysis passes to the explanation for bank failures. One 
can identify three factors which explain banks failures, 
namely external factors like the macroeconomic environment, 
industry-changes as a result of financial liberalisation, 
and internal factors such as fraud, and the banks' attitude 
towards risk-taking. It is suggested that two testable 
hypotheses can be conducted to explain the failures of the 
Chilean financial institutions. That is, adverse 
macroeconomic changes which are external to the banks, and 
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excessive risk-taking and moral hazard by bankers responding 
to industry changes from financial liberalisation. 
Chapter 5 discusses the econometric methodology applied 
to study the banking crisis in Chile. This includes a 
revision of some previous empirical studies and the use of 
logit models. 
The first section contains a review of some of the early 
studies available in this area using particularly binary 
choice models. This literature contains special reference to 
the failures of US financial institutions, including Saving 
and Loan Associations. One observes that binary-choice 
models, especially logit models, have been used very 
successfully to explain financial failure/problems of the 
1930's, early 1970's and 1980's. 
The following section presents a brief discussion of a 
univariate dichotomous model with special reference to the 
logit model. I concentrate on the model estimation procedure 
which involve a non-linear maximum likelihood estimation 
technique. Also, there is a review of the hypothesis testing 
procedure and the development of model selection criteria 
for alternative specifications. This section is completed 
with the inclusion of specific econometrics difficulties 
for the case of panel data. 
Chapter 6 deals specifically with the issue of 
developing an appropriate bank classification technique 
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using financial information from banks' balance sheets and 
income statements. One of the limiting problems to estimate 
the logit model using quartely panel data is the fact that 
we do not have information available on the banks' financial 
strength prior to 1983. In order to overcome this difficulty 
we construct an early warning system to predict the ex ante 
probability of bank failure/problem. 
This chapter is organised in three main sections. The 
first one contains a description of the model in terms of 
definitions concerning bank failure/ problem and their 
relative merits. This section is follows by a description of 
the different categories of independent financial and 
accounting variables which will help us to discriminate and 
classified financial institutions into the two broad groups. 
Finally, the last section reports and assesses the empirical 
findings using univariate and multivariate 
techniques. 
statistical 
Chapter 7 contains three main sections. Section 1 
introduces the hypothesis concerning the role played by the 
macroeconomic environment and the proponents who sustain 
this view. This section is followed by an evaluation of the 
prevailing macroeconomic environment in Chile between 1977 
to 1983. There are two phases identified in terms of the 
boom-bust cycle. It is shown the severe misalignment of some 
key macro prices such as the real exchange rate, the real 
interest rate, and the sharp and unexpected changes in the 
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stock prices and capital inflows. Other studies are cited to 
stress the importance of these factors on the recession of 
1982-83. 
The third and final section reports the empirical 
results from the econometric analysis. I run regressions 
between the discrete dependent variable and a set of chosen 
macroeconomic variables using quarterly panel data. This 
exercise aims to assess empirically the relevance of 
macroeconomic factors in determining the likelihood of bank 
problems/failure. 
Chapter 8 reports the results from the estimation of 
the logit model as we regress the discrete dependent 
variable against microeconomic variables as proxies for 
excessive risk-taking. There is a discussion of the 
hypothesis which relates the banking crisis to moral hazard 
type of behaviour by bank management. 
My main concern is to evaluate how moral hazard 
problems could have affected the likelihood 
failure/problem. It is argued that much of the 
conduct was affected by the implementation of 
liberalisation per see These results are 
independently of any macroeconomic shock. 
of bank 
banking 
financial 
estimated 
In order to test for moral hazard I have used some 
proxies and measuring any deviation of the proxy from its 
trend. Furthermore, we include some dummy variables to 
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capture some specific banks characteristics such us "related 
portfolios". 
Chapter 9 offers a comparison between the regression 
results of chapter 7 and 8 in terms of the robustness 
of each model. At the same time, it shows some of the 
results from some simulation exercises conducted by assuming 
different scenarios. Specifically, I simulate changes in the 
macroeconomic environment and liberalisation reforms. We 
offer some comparisons by introducing some hypothetical 
question such us what would have happen to the likelihood of 
bank failure/problem if we simulate the model with a more 
stable macroeconomy or if more effective prudential 
regulation was introduced to influence more conservative 
bank management and risk taking ? 
Finally, chapter 10 sets out the main conclusions from 
this empirical study. At the same time, it highlights the 
limitations of this study and venues for further reserach. 
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Chapter 2. From Financial Repression to Financial 
Liberalisation: Chile in 1970-1983. 
(2.1) Introduction. 
This chapter provides a background on how the Chilean 
financial system evolved from a financially repressed to an 
unregulated and more competitive market. It discusses and 
evaluates the impact of both, repressive financial policies 
and financial liberalisation reforms. 
Although this thesis focuses on the bankruptcy of the 
banking system, it is important to place the banking failure 
of 1983 against the backcloth of the financial 
reforms implemented during the 1970's. Apart of providing 
both, some of the theoretical underpinnings and the evidence 
against financial repression, this chapter also presents a 
detailed description of the Chilean banking system and the 
itinerary of financial liberalisation between 1973 and 1983. 
Financial liberalisation was undertaken within a broader 
development strategy including trade liberalisation and 
stabilisation policies. The development of an efficient and 
a stable financial system and its opening-up to the world 
financial market was the backbone of the overall package of 
the structural reforms from the very beginning. The 
elimination of interest rates disequilibrlum, selectlve 
credit controls, non-interest reserve requirements, and 
inflation tax combined with institutional changes such as 
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the privatisation of financial institutions, the lifting of 
entry barriers, and the establishment of a multi-purpose 
banking was expected to produce some positive benefits. 
Specifically, it was expected that there would be an 
increase in financial deepening (financial savings), a rise 
in the level of domestic savings, increases in the volume 
and quality of investment, and an improvement in resource 
allocation and operative efficency. At the same time, there 
was the belief that a market oriented financial system would 
promote and secure financial stability. 
As we will see in this chapter, financial liberalisation 
partially achieved the objective set originally. However, 
the most worrying sign which emerged from the financial 
liberalisation experience was the rise in financial 
instability as the private financial system ended 
practically bankrupt and experienced considerable 
intervention by the economic authorities. 
In developing countries the terms financial system and 
banking system are used interchangeably since banking 
dominates financial intermediation. As we will see from 
chapter 3, the case of Chile is no the exception to this 
rule. 
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(2.2) The Banking System ~ ~ Financial Repression in Chile: 
The Pre-Liberalisation Period. 
(2.2.1) Financial Repression and Economic D e v e l o p m ~ n t . .
As we will see shortly the government of Chile undertook 
a comprehensive programme of economic liberalisation. One of 
the central components of the economic strategy was a 
drastic overhaul and the deregulation of the country's 
financially repressed banking system. This reform clearly 
reflected the spirit of the Mckinnon-Shaw prescription that 
abolishing financial repression is essential for a sustained 
economic development. 
Before we procede to assess the empirical relevance of 
financial repression and the process of financial 
liberalisation in Chile, a revision of the main theoretical 
underpinnings will be provided. 
In retrospect, one observes that the literature on money 
and finance have gone considerable changes since the Great 
Depression of the 1930's. To begin with, Friedman and 
Schwartz's reinterpretation of the US depression and the 
collapse of the US banking system has revindicated the role 
of money after the challange of the Keynesian Revolution 
where money did not matter. In the monetarist counter-
revolution, money was important as much as it was the role 
of the Federal Reserve when failed to supply liquidity as a 
result of the fall in the currency-deposit ratio and hence 
the money supply. 
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The second major revision in monetary theory has been on 
the role of finance in the economy. The terms money and 
finance have been used almost interchangeably during many 
years. This can be explained partly by the fact that the 
financial system was dominated by both, commercial banks and 
the Central Bank. The former accepted demand deposits and 
the latter issued currency as their key liabilities. Money, 
defined as currency plus demand deposits, was the only 
acceptable asset as a medium of exchange. However, the 
evolution and innovation of the financial system was 
materialised in terms of the introduction of new 
intermediation services and the supply of new financial 
instruments and institutions. This led to a redefinition of 
money and the nature of the financial services provided by 
financial institutions. Indeed, today currency and demand 
deposits constitute only a fraction of the total assets 
(liabilities) of the financial system. In addition, an 
increasing number of economists have given a greater weigh 
to the role played by the contraction of banks' 
intermediation services during the episodes of the Great 
1 
Depression. 
While money and finance have been recognised as having 
an effect on the output cycle, it also began to emerge a 
body of the literature where money and financial 
intermediation have been incorporated into growth models. 
This direction has had important theoretical as well as 
practical implications, especially among developing 
20 
countries which over the years have been striving to achieve 
a higher rate of economic growth. 
Tobin (1965) introduced a modified version of the 
Harrod-Domar growth model which incorporated money as 
outside or deadweight money. Tobin considered money as 
wealth and hence as an alternative asset to savers. The 
substitutability between money and physical capital implied 
that any increase in the real return of money, other things 
being equal, would generate a portfolio shift away from 
capital and towards money. This in turn will reduce the 
accumulation of physical capital and hence the rate of 
output growth. 
The neoclassical monetary growth theory can be condensed 
in the following expressions. The production function 
Y=F(K,L) is assumed to be linearly homogeneous with constant 
return to scale. It is also assumed that the marginal 
product of capital (MPk) and labour (MPl) are both positive 
and subject to diminishing returns. Moreover, the model 
considers the quantity of labour growing at a constant rate 
of n. It is possible to write the production function in per 
capita terms by dividing through by L as shown by (la). 
(la) y = (k) 
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where y=Y/L and k=K/L 
2 2 
dy/dk>O and dy/dk <0 
The demand for money function shown in (lb) suggests 
that money is held as a medium of exchange. The neoclassical 
assumption of perfect capital market (i.e. homogeneity and 
perfect divisibility of capital, no transaction and 
informational costs) leaves the monetary system as 
performing a payment function with no comparative advantage 
on intermediation. According to (lb) an increase in r 
relative to (d-p) will produce a portfolio shift from money 
to physical capital and viceversa. This substitution 
dominates the neoclassical monetary growth theory. 
(lb) M/P = H(Y,r,(d-p» 
where Y = real income 
r = real rate of return 
on capital 
(d-p)= real deposit rate of 
interest 
and 6H/6Y>O 6H/6r<O 
6H/6(d-p»O 
Expression (Ic) represents the rate of capital 
accumulation (investment function) and shows the 
substitution between money and aggregate investment in the 
steady state. Given that the marginal propensity to save 
(MPS) is taken as a constant then actual savings are 
allocated between real money balances (M/P) and physical 
capital. 
(le) I = dK/dt = s(k) + (s-l)[d(M/P)/dtJM/P 
where s = MPS 
K = capital 
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(1d) (d-p) = r where r=dy/dk 
Given that 0(s(1 and in a growing monetary economy 
d(M/P)/dt > 0 then it follows that (s-1)[d(M/P)/dtJ is 
clearly negative. Thus, money competes with capital. If the 
equilibrium condition in (Id) is disturbed then a portfolio 
adjustment will take place. 
It follows from this model that the accumulation of 
2 
money holdings will retard the growth of output. If the rate 
of capital accumulation is low and the authorities wish to 
accelerate the rate of output growth then they must make the 
holding of money unattractive by introducing ceilings on 
interest rates (d) and/or increasing the rate of inflation 
(p) • 
One aspect of the neoclassical monetary growth theory 
which is puzzling if not inconsistent concerns the reason 
of why will people hold money at all. Indeed, the underlying 
assumptions of the model, particularly the homogeneity of 
output, the perfect divisibility of capital, and perfect 
information which are explicitly or implicitly incorporated 
into the model does not provide, if we follow the logic, any 
justification for holding money. On this point, Levhari and 
Patinkin (1968) have incorporated money in the utility 
function as part of the services rendered by money balances, 
particularly liquidity services. Similarly, Mckinnon (1973) 
also presented, as we will see shortly, a critique to the 
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neoclassical monetary growth model and a modified version of 
the model for a developing economy in which there is a 
rationale for holding money. 
Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) have challanged the 
central implications of the traditional growth model by 
questioning the model's assumptions and rejecting the role 
of financial restriction as an output's enhancing strategy 
for a developing economy. Mckinnon and Shaw provided a 
theoretical framework to show that misguided government 
financial policies, especially ongoing price inflation 
combined with low or even negative real interest rates, 
would be conducive to a repressed financial sector, low 
investment and economic growth. 
Mckinnon kept the outside (deadweight) money assumption 
while he advanced some institutional features inherent to 
developing economies. One of the most important 
characteristics of these economies is the existence of a 
3 
significant fragmentation in the economy. All economic units 
are confined to self-finance, and investment is assumed to 
be indivisible and lumpy. This implies that any potential 
investor must accumulate money balances or inventories to 
carry out its investment plans. This is a sufficient reason 
for holding money balances in comparison to the neoclassical 
model where the assumption of perfect capital market leaves 
4 
the demand for money indetermined. These assumptions were 
fundamental to conform the Mckinnon's complementary 
hypothesis between money and physical capital. The 
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complementary hypothesis condradicts the neoclassical model 
in the sense that, the more attractive money balances 
greater the incentive to invest in productive capital, 
the 
The Mckinnon's complementary hypothesis is stated in the 
demand for money and investment functions defined in 
expressions (2a) and (2b) respectively. 
(2a) M/P = hey, I/Y, (d-p» 
where 
and 
(2a) I/Y = m(r,(d-p» 
where 
I/Y= gross investment 
GNP ratio. 
6h/6Y)O 6h/6(I/Y»O 
6h/6(d-p»O 
6m/6r)O and 6m/6(d-p»O 
The complementary hypothesis between money and capital 
is shown by the derivatives 6h/6(I/Y»O, 6m/6r)O, and 
6m/6(d-p»O. That is, the average real cash balance of a 
small saver-investor will rise as a result of the increase 
in the desirable rate of capital accumulation which in turn 
respond to increases in the real return of capital and/or 
money. 
Thus, in the Mckinnon model financial savings determines 
the supply of funds. Savings are distributed between 
tangible assets and interest-earning deposits. The views of 
Mckinnon and Shaw differ on the process by which bank 
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deposits are transformed into investment. In the Mckinnon 
model investment is self-financed so that in a segmented 
economy investor need to accumulate real balances to finance 
lumpy investment projects. In consequence, a rise in the 
real return from money will enable savers to accumulate 
money and invest into higher-yield physical assets. It could 
be argued from Mckinnon's view that in an economy with no 
money, the introduction of fiat money as opposed to 
commodity money will serve as a "conduit" for capital 
formation by making money and capital complementary assets. 
A similar conclusion is obtained if we include further 
development of financial instruments such as bank deposits 
and so on. Mckinnon described an extreme case of financial 
repression with no possibilities for external finance in the 
form of bank credit. The process of saving and investment 
involves a single and dual individual. In contrast, Shaw has 
emphasised the role of external financing as the effective 
constraint on capital formation. Like Mckinnon, Edward Shaw 
in his book Financial Deepening and Economic Development 
published in 1973 questioned the benefits from low interest 
rates and inflation, and stressed the negative effect of 
financial repression on economic growth. 
In Shaw's monetary model, there are two important 
modifications with respect to the definition and meaning of 
money. Firstly, the model describes an inside money economy 
where money is treated as debt. This clearly contradicts the 
Mckinnon's outside money assumption which recognise money as 
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wealth. In Shaw's debt-intermediation view, an asset such as 
money is cancelled out against financial liabilities. In 
other words, money and demand deposits which correspond the 
liabilities issued by commercial banks and the Central Bank 
are backed by productive investment loans. Thus, the 
remaining asset in this economy's aggregate balance sheet is 
physical capital. In consequence, the accumulation of money 
neither is a substitute nor a complement of capital. 
Secondly, money is seen as one of many financial assets. 
Moreover, the financial system is considered as a provider 
of financial services which is included directly as a factor 
input in the production process. Thus, policies which limits 
the quantity and quality of financial assets and hence the 
supply of this intermediate factor input in less than 
optimal quantities should be avoided. 
The Shaw's demand for money function is despicted in 
expression (3) 
(3) M/P = h(Y,Z,(u-p» 
where 6h/6Y>O 6h/6Z<O 
and 6h/6(u-p»O 
Expression (3) differs only slightly with Mckinnon's 
demand for real balances given by (2a). Shaw included an 
opportunity cost of money defined by Z which includes a set 
of inflation hedges such as precious metals, pieces of arts, 
and land and properties. At the same time, the relevant rate 
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of return of money is the real rate of interest in all 
financial assets (u) rather than the narrow real deposit 
rate (d-p). The term I/Y which reflects the complementary 
hypothesis is not included in expression (3) since investors 
are not constrained to self-finance. In fact, if 
institutional credit is not available then an informal 
credit market will emerge. 
Although both theoretical framework were conceived under 
different assumptions they have thrown a similar policy 
implications. They both challanged the conventional wisdom 
of a low interest rates, higher price inflation, and 
government intervention in the financial system to enhance 
growth. Instead, they emphasise the importance of financial 
liberalisation and the effect of financial deepening in 
accelerating the rate of economic growth in a developing 
economy. Specifically, they advocate low inflation and 
positive real interest rate policies for developing 
economies. 
Fry (1982a) argued that many developing countries have 
apparently slipped into financial repression inadvertenly. 
Indeed, 
unintended 
financial repression was the result of 
consequences of taxing and regulating 
the 
the 
financial system to obtain resources to finance government 
deficits. Most governments in developing countries have been 
technically constrained with respect to the amount of tax 
revenues can be rise from direct and indirect taxation. The 
problem of tax evasion and the existing lags in collecting 
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tax revenues (Olivera-Tanzi effect) are quite significant. 
Moreover, the absence of well established and developed open 
market in primary securities had ruled out the possibility 
of issuing government securities to finance government large 
5 
deficits. 
Another motivation for repreSSing the financial sector 
is explained by the fact that regulation of financial 
institutions and their influence on the allocation of 
resources via selective credit allocation has enhanced the 
government's ability to channel financial resources into 
specific sectors of the economy as part of the overall 
development and political strategy. As we have seen in 
chapter 1, Chile as well as many other developing economies 
were pursuing inward-looking strategies since the 1930's. 
This policy package included both a highly protectionist 
foreign trade policies among them tariffs, subsidies, 
quantitative restrictions, and an overvalued real exchange 
rate. This trade regime was complemented with a selective 
credit allocation and disequilibrium interest rates to 
6 
promote import-substitution. 
The public finance hypothesis and the inward-looking 
strategy seems as two equally plausible explanations of 
financial repression in Chile as well as other developing 
economies. However, in my view is equally true that the 
simplistic view of the neoclassical monetary growth model 
has driven policy-makers in LDC's to readily accept the 
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recommendations from this model and hence to overlook the 
implications of money and finance on capital accumulation 
and economic growth. 
Whichever the reasons for the acceptance of financial 
repression, governments had an ample list of instruments at 
their disposal to serve its objectives. In order to collect 
revenues to finance the government's uncovered budget 
deficit, they explicitly and/or implicitly tax the financial 
system by means of a compulsory reserve requirement on 
bank deposits and inflation tax on currency and reserves 
7 
respectively. Similarly, the introduction of usury 
restrictions on interest rates and selective credit 
allocation have enabled governments to extend subsidies to 
specific sectors. Ceilings are set deliberately below 
equilibrium interest rates so that credit can be allocated 
8 
following non-price criteria. Moreover, Nichols (1974) 
maintained that restricting the interest rates payable on 
private assets has been helpful in curtailing the 
availability of good substitutes and hence making the demand 
for money more inelastic with respect to inflation. 
All in all, one may conclude that introducing an 
explicit and implicit taxation in the form of non-interest 
reserve requirements, and price inflation respectively, 
and/or usury restrictions on interest rates will contribute 
to exacerbate both interest rate disequilibrium and the 
burden of taxation on the banking system. The overall impact 
will fall upon the resource allocation and the development 
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and maturity of the banking system. The shrinking of the 
amount of loanable funds and introduction of a non-price 
rationing of financial resources will affect adversely the 
amount of investible funds and the quality of investment in 
the economy. Therefore, financial repression will be 
conducive to slow or retard the rate of economic growth in 
developing countries. As we will see from next section, 
these conclusions are supported by the evidence from Chile 
and some selected countries. 
(2.2.2) The Evidence of Financial Repression for Chile and 
Some Selected Countries. 
This section presents simple calculations of both the 
magnitude of the explict and implict tax levied on the 
Chile's banking system as well as the degree of interest 
rates disequilibrium during the decade of the 1970's. These 
results are compared with the estimates of the list of 
selected countries. Although this is not a comparative study 
it was thought that the inclusion of a selected list of 
countries would be helpful to make even a strong case 
against financial repression. 
I have included the US, Germany, and Japan as 
industrialised and non-inflationary economies. At the same 
time, among the newly industrialised countries (NrC's), 
Korea and Singapore are the most appropiate representatives 
from this region. Singapore and to a lesser extend Korea had 
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consistently deregulated and liberalised their financial 
9 
system. Finally, Mexico was incorporated in the list of 
selected countries representing those less developed and 
inflationary economies. The Mexican banking system has long 
been financially repressed, a syndrome which became more 
acute during the nationalised era between 1982 and 1989. 
Although there are substantial structural differences 
among the selected countries which makes detailed comparison 
somewhat cumbersome, the fact that the financial system in 
these economies was dominated by organised banks, state 
and/or private ownership, still provides an angle for useful 
comparisons. 
The evidence from Chile during the 1970's shows the 
detrimental effects of government interference in the 
banking system. Explicit and implicit taxes on financial 
intermediation and disequilibrium interest rates have 
affected adversely the financial deepening in Chile 
measured by the M2/GDP ratio. This proxy for financial 
intermediation indicates the amount of loanable funds 
intermediated through the organised banking system. Those 
countries which have levied a heavy tax burden in their 
banking system and accepted disequilibrium interest rates in 
the form of negative real deposit interest rates exhibit low 
M2/GNP ratios. 
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Table 2.1 Indicator of Financial Deepening for Chile and 
Selected Countries. (a) (b) 
--------
-------------------
---------------------------------M2/GDP 70 71 72 
----------------------
USA 
FRG 
Japan 
.62 
.50 
.74 
Korea .33 
Singap .. 66 
Mexico .16 
Chile 
.65 
.45 
.83 
.32 
.61 
.16 
.67 
.52 
.91 
.35 
.65 
.16 
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Av 
---------------
-----------------------
.64 .62 .64 .66 
.51 .51 .54 .53 
.87 .82 .85 .85 
.36 
.60 
.17 
.32 
.55 
.15 
.31 .30 
.61 .63 
.15 .18 
.65 .62 
.55 .57 
.85 .87 
.32 .35 
.61 .61 
.28 .30 
.60 .64 
.55 .52 
.87 .85 
.31 .33 
.63 .62 
.31 .20 
.13 .06 .07 .08 .10 .12 .14 .10 
---------------------------
---------------------------------
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
(a) M2 and GOP are measured at current prices. 
(b) M2 is the sum of money plus quasi-money. 
Table 1 exhibits the estimates of the ratio of the 
broad money supply (M2) to gross national product (GNP) for 
Chile and some selected countries. Chile's estimates of the 
M2/GDP ratio indicates that the average holdings of broad 
money as percentage of GDP was 10% per annum during the 
decade of the 1970's. This figure is comparatively small to 
those from industrialised and non-inflationary economies. 
For instance, Japan and US exhibit a ratio of 85% and 64% 
respectively. In addition, developing countries such as 
Korea and particularly Singapore also show high M2/GOP 
ratios. It appears that the flow of loanable funds grew more 
rapidly in industrial and rapidly emerging developing 
economies than in slow growth economies such as those in 
Latin American. As we will see shortly, these results are 
also confirmed by the evidence available from wider cross-
country comparisons. 
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Chile's financial deepening is well below those 
selected countries and similar to Mexico. There are two 
inmediate questions which arise from the evidence. How can 
we explain the magnitude of financial repression in Chile ? 
. 
And are there common factors between Chile and Mexico and 
differences with industrialised and rapidly-growing 
economies to explain their relative financial performances? 
It can be proven that those countries which implicitly 
and/or explicitly tax their banking system, and 
deliberately choose disequilibrium interest rates, should 
have a lower M2/GDP ratios than those economies which 
present a more deregulated financial sector and have levied 
a lower tax burden on financial intermediation. 
The imposition of a high reserve requirement on bank 
deposits is equivalent, as we have seen from the theory, to 
a explicit tax on deposits and lending. Similarly, the 
inflation tax on currency holdings and on bank reserves can 
be seen as an implicit tax on intermediation. The 
hypothesis is that both forms of taxation should affect 
adversely financial deepening. 
I have estimated an effective reserve ratio and the 
magnitude of the inflation tax on currency and reserves for 
Chile and the selected countries. These results are 
presented in table 2,3, and 4 respectively. 
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The effective reserve ratio is calculated from the 
following expressions and expressed as a percentage of bank 
deposits. These estimates are shown in table 2. 
(4) Rr = RID 
(4a) Rr = (H - C)/(M2 - C) 
where Rr= Effective Reserve Ratio 
R = Bank Reserves 
D = Bank Deposits 
H = Monetary Base 
C = Currency Held Outside Banks 
M2= Money plus Quasi-Money. 
Table 2.2 Effective Reserve Ratios for Chile and Selected 
Countries. 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Av 
USA 5.2 5.4 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.6 4.3 
FRG 10.5 11.2 13.7 13.9 11.8 10.1 10.8 10.1 10.5 10.5 11.3 
Japan 2.2 1.8 1.9 3.5 3.6 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 
Korea 21.7 13.6 17.0 18.8 18.0 21.5 21.5 22.7 22.0 22.5 19.9 
Singap 5.2 5.6 6.8 13.3 9.6 8.5 8.5 8.7 9.5 9.0 8.5 
Mexico17.5 20.8 47.7 50.6 64.8 79.1 31.2 47.3 45.4 45.3 45.0 
Chile 24.7 49.8 57.0 55.8 37.2 63.9 68.3 54.3 46.4 35.6 49.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
The evidence from table 2 supports the hypothesis that 
high reserve requirements inhibit the flow of loanable funds 
through the formal banking system. For instance, the 
estimate on Chile's effective reserve ratio was on average 
nearly 50% of total bank deposits during the 1970·s. A 
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similar result was obtained for the case of Mexico where on 
average 45% of bank deposits were held as legal reserve with 
the Central Bank. In contrast, the evidence from industrial 
countries and emerging developing economies shows high 
M2/GDP ratios with low effective reserve ratios. For 
instance, Japan's effective reserve ratio was only 2.5% of 
bank deposits and M2/GDP ratio of 0.85 during the 70's. 
Identical conclusions were obtained from the newly 
industrialised countries (NIC's) such as Singapore and 
10 
Korea. 
With respect to the implict tax on currency and on bank 
reserves, the simplest method to calculate the total tax 
revenue obtained by the authorities is to use the change in 
the monetary base over the entire year. As we know the 
monetary base consist of currency and bank reserves held 
with the Central Bank. The choice of the monetary base as 
the inflation tax base for my estimates was considered 
superior and simpler over other monetary variables. For 
instance, M1 which includes currency and sight deposits is 
not accurate to estimate the magnitude of the revenue from 
inflation tax since commercial banks capture most of the 
revenues from sight deposits. Therefore, the monetary base 
which is the monetary liability of the Central Bank should 
11 
be more accurate. 
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The method of calculating the ratio of nominal change in 
the money base to the annual nominal GNP can seriously 
overstate the seigniorage in high inflation countries. 
Moreover, if interest are paid on reserves then it should be 
discounted to obtain an unbiased estimate of the 
government's seignorage. Unfortunately, this data is not 
available for some countries and also very few 
12 
developing economies actually pay interest on reserves. 
Beyond the specific issues concerning the accuracy of 
government's seigniorage and the simplicity of the model, 
the results from the estimation should help us to highlight 
any difference among the selected countries. I have proceded 
by estimating the total revenues from inflation tax using 
separate components of the model. The estimates of the 
inflation tax on currency are obtained from expression (5) 
and reported in table 3. 
(5) Cs = (ct - Ct-1}/GDP 
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where Cs = Revenues from Inflation 
Tax on Currency 
C = Currency Held Outside 
Banks 
Table 2.3 Revenues from Inflation Tax on Currency. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Av 
------------------------------------------------------------
USA 0.3 
FRG 0.3 
Japan 1.0 
0.3 0.4 
0.4 0.6 
1.0 1.9 
0.3 0.5 
0.2 0.4 
1.2 1.2 
0.4 0.5 
0.5 0.3 
0.6 0.8 
0.5 0.5 
0.5 0.6 
0.7 1.0 
0.4 
0.2 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
1.0 
Korea 0.8 0.8 
Singap 1.9 1.1 
Mexico 0.4 0.3 
1.3 1.7 1.3 0.9 
2.4 1.0 1.5 2.5 
0.9 1.1 0.9 0.9 
1.2 1.5 1.7 0.8 1.2 
2.1 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.8 
2.0 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.9 
Chile 2.0 3.6 8.0 5.6 2.8 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.5 1.1 3.1 
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
(a) Revenues express as a % of GOP. 
The revenues from inflation tax on reserves were 
obtained from expressions (6) and (6a) and presented in 
table 4. 
(6) Rs = (Rt - Rt-1)/GNP 
(Ga) Rs = [(H - C)t - (H - C)t-11/GNP 
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where Rs = Revenues from 
Inflation Tax 
on Reserves 
Table 2.4 Revenues from Inflation Tax on Bank Reserves. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Av 
------------------------------------------------------------
USA 0.1 
FRG 1.4 
Japan 0.1 
0.5 -0.2 
0.9 1.8 
0.05 0.3 
Korea 2.2 -1.2 2.0 
Singap 0.3 0.4 1.2 
Mexico 0.1 0.5 3.4 
0.4 0.1 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.3 
0.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 0.2 0.6 
1.5 0.3 -0.2 0.0 0.05 0.2 
0.1 0.1 
0.2 0.5 
0.3 0.3 
1.9 0.7 
3.7 -1.0 
1.5 2.4 
2.0 1.4 
0.1 0.4 
2.3 -2.7 
2.0 
0.3 
8 • 4 
1.3 1.4 
0.7 0.5 
2.5 3.2 
1.4 
0.7 
2.2 
Chile 0.5 7.3 8.1 15.1 4.8 4.4 6.5 3.2 2.7 1.3 5.4 
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
(a) Revenues express as a % of GDP. 
Finally, total government seignorage can be calculated 
from (7)-(7b). It is simply the sum of the inflation tax on 
both currency and reserves. These estimates are shown in 
table 5. 
(7) st = Cs + Rs 
(7a) st = (ct - ct-1)/GNP + (Rt Rt-1)/GNP 
(7b) st = (ct - Ct-1)/GNP + [(H - C)t - (H - C)t-l]/GNP 
where st= Total Seignorage 
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Table 2.5 Total Revenues from Inflation Tax.(a) 
------------------------------------
------------------------
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Av 
------------------------------------------------------------
USA 
FRG 
Japan 
O. 5 
1.7 
1.2 
0.8 
1.3 
1.1 
Korea 3.1 -0.4 
Singap 2.1 1.5 
Mexico 0.4 0.8 
0.1 
2.4 
2.2 
3.4 
3.7 
4.3 
0.7 0.6 
0.8 -0.1 
2.8 1.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
3.6 
4.7 
3.3 
2.0 2.9 
0.6 2.6 
3.2 -0.7 
0.4 
0.9 
0.8 
0.5 0.8 
0.5 1.2 
0.7 1.3 
2.6 3.5 3.0 
2.5 2.1 2.6 
8.9 3.6 4.3 
0.5 
0.4 
0.7 
2.1 
2.3 
4.9 
0.5 
0.9 
1.3 
2.6 
2.5 
3.3 
Chile 10.9 16.1 20.7 7.5 7.2 8.9 4.9 4.1 2.4 2.3 8.5 
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
(a) Total Revenues as a % of GDP. 
The estimates from tables 3-5 suggest that Chile has 
severely taxed its banking system in comparison to 
industrial countries and emerging developing economies. In 
effect, the average total revenues collected by the Chilean 
government during the 1970's was 8.5% of GDP per annum. This 
figure greatly exceeds the estimates for developed economies 
which hardly reached in most cases the figure of 1%. At the 
same time, economies like Singapore and Korea exhibit a low 
dependence on inflation tax although it is still higher than 
the US and Japan. 
Another important observation from the data is that 
Chile collected a larger proportion of the inflation tax 
from bank reserves than from domestic currency. The currency 
component of the inflation tax accounted only 3.1% per annum 
during the 1970's whereas the reserve component was nearly 
5.5%. This result is also true for Mexico and to a lesser 
extent Korea. In contrast, US, Germany , Japan I and 
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singapore show a reversal in the relative importance of 
currency and reserve as a source of 
13 
inflation tax. 
revenues from the 
The evidence from the estimates of governments' 
seignorage gives support to the hypothesis that those 
countries which have collected a substantial revenues from 
inflation tax from depositors and borrowers as well as from 
currency holders coincide with low M2/GDP. According to the 
data, Chile did indeed systematically burden the banking 
system with heavy taxes contributing partly to financial 
repression and a low M2/GDP ratio. 
Finally, as we have seen in the previous section interest 
rates disequilibrium can also contribute to curtail the 
amount of loanable funds through the formal banking system. 
Low or even negative real yields on money and particularly 
on quasi-money should discourage the demand for financial 
assets. Negative real deposit rates will be consistent with 
a portfolio shift away from financial assets, measured by 
the growth of broad money (M2), and towards inflation hedges 
such us real estate, gold, foreign currency, and even 
consumption of durable goods. In contrast, countries that 
have sustained positive real interest rates had exhibited 
both a high growth of financial savings and rising flow of 
loanable funds through the formal banking system. 
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Table 6 provides estimates of the ex post real deposit 
rates for Chile and selected countries. 
Table 2.6 Real Deposit Rate in Chile and 
Countries.(%) 
Selected 
------------------------------------------------------------
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
------------------------------------------------------------
USA 0.03 0.74 0.78 2.81 -3.00 -0.41 -0.86 0.55 -0.08 
FRG 1.90 0.09 4.76 2.71 -0.85 0.00 0.67 0.35 1.00 
Japan 4.73 3.05-10.26-19.84 2.26 -0.57 1.89 5.86 -3.71 
Korea 6.17 0.26 8.52 -7.48 -8.22 0.78 3.81 3.58 0.25 
Singap 1.44-11.5 -11.03 1.75 6.16 0.83 0.04 2.11 
Mexico ... -14.37 -6.42 -3.55 
Chile -16.60 8.60 18.50 24.90 4.40 
Source:IMF,Internationa1 Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
Real Deposit Interest Rate = {[(1+i)/1+%CPI)]-1}*100 
The evidence suggest that those countries which have 
maintained positive or moderate negative real yield on 
deposits show high M2/GDP ratios. In contrast, countries 
with severe and systematic negative real deposit rates 
exhibit relatively low deepening ratios. 
According to the data from table 6, the real deposit 
interest rate for Chile in 1975 was minus 16.6%. Moreover, 
judging from the inflation data in table 7a and the 
existence of interest ceilings, one can assert that 
interest rates were also negative during the early 1970's. 
In effect, the average rate of inflation between 1972 and 
1974 was nearly 350% per annum with a peak of 508% in 1973. 
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In the absence of data for nominal deposit interest rate, we 
observe that nominal lending interest rate did not adjust in 
line with price inflation. The average nominal lending rate 
between 1972-74 was only 100% per annum with a peak of 200% 
in 1974. It is not unrealistic to expect real deposit 
interest rates were much lower than lending rates as much as 
it was the flow of loanables funds during the first half of 
the 1970's. Indeed, the M2/GDP ratio should not be that 
different from the 1974's estimate of 6.5%. 
As we will see later in the paper, the phasing out of 
interest rates control in October 1974 contributed to a 
rapid transformation of negative to positive interest rates 
from 1976 onwards as shown in table 6. This in turn 
coincided with an increasing demand for financial savings 
intermediated through the banking system. In fact, the 
M2/GDP ratio was continuously climbing and by 1979 was at 
14%. The positive correlation between financial savings and 
the real deposit interest rate appears to be valid for the 
case of Chile according to this preliminary examination. 
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Table 2.7a Interest Rates, Inflation Rates, and Financial 
Savings in Chile and Selected Emerging Economies. 
------------------------------------------------------------
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 
--------------------------------
----------------------------
Korea 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
Singapore 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
Mexico 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
Chile 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
20.4 
13.4 
32.1 
9.2 
1.8 
61.6 
12.5 
12.0 
11.7 
34.8 
5.9 
3.5 
2.1 
64.7 
13.4 
12.0 
3.2 
36.4 
14.4 
11.6 
26.2 
59.7 
11.5 
15.0 
24.3 
32.1 
7.9 
8.9 
22.4 
55.2 
6.3 
15.0 
25.3 
30.8 
7.1 
4.4 
2.6 
61.0 
4.1 
16.2 
15.3 
30.0 
12.9 
4.1 
-1.9 
62.8 
7.5 
5.0 4.7 13.6 24.0 16.1 13.8 
15.8 16.1 16.6 15.4 14.9 17.7 
4.2 8.5 8.4 6.1 5.6 4.2 
22.1 163 508 
9.0 -1.2 -5.6 
267 
375 340 
6.5 
1.0-12.9 
197.7 
174.3 
6.8 
3.5 
14.4 
10.2 
32.5 
10.1 
4.0 
3 . 2 
61.1 
7.8 
10.6 
29.2 
28.4 
3. 4 
93.7 
63.5 
9.2 
9.9 
18.6 
14.5 
35.5 
9.7 
4.7 
4.7 
60.9 
8.6 
11.1 
18.8 
29.9 
8.3 
62.8 
30.3 
12.1 
8.2 
18.6 
18.3 
31.5 
7.6 
6.2 
4.0 
62.8 
9.3 
13.2 
17.4 
30.9 
9.2 
45.0 
38.9 
14.0 
8.3 
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
The estimates for industrialised and the rapidly 
emerging economies have consistently showed positive yields 
on bank deposits and coincided with a large flow of loanable 
funds through their organised banking system. However, the 
M2/GDP ratio fell somewhat during the unexpected oil shocks 
during 1973-74 and 1978-79. Inflation accelerated rapidly 
and nominal interest rates failed to adjust fully producing 
negative deposit interest rates as shown by table 7b. 
This evidence confirms the hypothesis that positive 
yields on financial savings defined in terms of broad money 
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(M2) should increase its demand and intermediation through 
the organised banking system. Countries such as Chile which 
have consistently inhibited nominal intere5t rate from 
adjusting to price inflation have paid a cost in terms of 
small flow of loanable funds and an immature and repressed 
banking system. 
Table 2.7b Interest Rates, Inflation Rates, and Financial 
Savings in Selected Industrialised Economies. 
US 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
Germany 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
Japan 
Interest Rate 
Inflation Rate 
M2/GDP 
GOP Growth 
71 
4.3 
4.3 
65.3 
3.2 
7.2 
5.2 
35.0 
3.0 
4.0 
-0-7 
83.6 
4. 3 
72 
4.0 
3.3 
67.1 
4.8 
5.6 
5.5 
36.0 
4.3 
3.8 
0.8 
91.2 
8.4 
73 
7.0 
6.2 
64.0 
5.4 
12.1 
7.0 
36.0 
4.8 
4.0 
15.9 
87.6 
7.6 
74 
7 • 8 
11.0 
62.3 
-0.5 
9.9 
7.0 
35.0 
0.1 
5.3 
31.4 
81.9 
-0.8 
75 
5.8 
9.1 
64.5 
-1.1 
5.0 
5.9 
37.0 
-1.3 
5.3 
3.0 
84.6 
2.9 
76 
5.2 
5.7 
65.8 
5.1 
4.3 
4 . 3 
38.0 
5.5 
4.5 
5.1 
85.5 
4.2 
77 
5.5 
6.5 
65.2 
4.6 
4.4 
3.7 
39.0 
2.6 
3.8 
1.9 
85.2 
4.8 
78 
8.2 
7.6 
62.2 
4.8 
3.0 
2.7 
39.0 
3 • 4 
2.6 
-2.5 
87.4 
5.0 
79 
11.2 
11.3 
59.5 
2.8 
5.1 
4.1 
38.0 
4.0 
3.3 
7.3 
87.5 
5.6 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
One could conclude from the evidence that a heavily 
taxed banking system and substantial interest rate 
disequilibrium should have an adverse impact on the return 
to savers, the accumulation of financial savings and the 
maturity of the banking system. 
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Another significant finding from the data suggests that 
a repressive financial system was also consistent with low 
rate of economic growth. The real deposit rate as a return 
for financial savings is paramount for higher volumes of 
investment as well as increasing the average efficiency of 
investment. As we have seen from the theory, real deposit 
rate affects the accumulation of financial savings, 
investment, and growth either through the Mckinnon's 
complementary hypothesis or Shaw's financial deepening 
approach. 
If we look at the data on M2/GOP ratios and real growth 
rates for Chile and selected countries in tables 7a and 7b 
we observe an apparent positive correlation between high 
financial deepening ratios and real GOP growth rates. For 
instance, Chile presents a M2/GOP ratio well below 10% and 
an average real growth rate of nearly minus 2% during the 
period of severe interest rate disequilibrium. In contrast, 
industrialised economies and the NIC's which systematically 
showed positive and in some years moderately negative real 
interest rates they also exhibit high M2/GDP ratios and 
high real GOP growth. Indeed, for the group of industrial 
nations the average M2/GDP ratio during the 70's was 67% and 
coincided with an average real GOP growth of 3.8% .. Similar 
results are found with rapidly emerging developing countries 
where an average of 48% on the M2/GOP ratio was associated 
with a GDP growth rate of 9.3%. 
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These results and conclusions concerning the 
relationship between interest rates, financial savings, and 
economic growth are consistent with other empirical findings 
using a wider cross-country analysis. For instance, Mckinnon 
(1980,1988) using cross-country comparisons between semi-
industrial less developed countries and rapidly growing 
economies also found that the former group have fairly low 
M2/GDP ratios as compared with the latter. 
Similarly, Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) provides a study 
on four member countries: Argentina, Brazil, Korea, and 
Turkey. In fact, countries such us Brazil and Korea which 
maintained positive real interest rates throughout the 
1970's enjoyed a rapid expansion in financial assets, 
measured by the real growth rate of money plus quasi-money 
(M2). Argentina and Turkey were example of financially 
repressed economies with negative yields on financial assets 
and low and even negative real growth rate of financial 
assets. The econometric verification was done by classifying 
a larger list of countries in three groups. Group A which 
included countries with positive real deposit rates and was 
allocated a value of 1. Group B was conformed by countries 
with moderate negative interest rate and assigned the value 
of O. Finally, group C was integrated by countries with 
severe negative yields on deposits and given a value of -1. 
They regressed the growth rate of financial savings (M2) 
against the interest rate policy indicator defined for each 
group with sample data for the period between 1970 to 1980. 
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The interest rate coefficient turned up very large, 
positive, and statistically significant. Similar results 
were obtained by replacing M2/GOP ratio for the growth rate 
of M2. At the same time, they also found that interest rate 
coefficient was positive and significant when regressing 
against the rate of growth of GOP. 
Equally, Fry (1978,1988) was also interested in the 
empirical assessment of the impact of financial conditions 
on aggregate savings, but in a much wider framework 
including variables such as income, terms of trade, 
population, and branching among others. According to Fry 
(1988), most of the evidence for LOC's pointed out that real 
deposit rates were statistically significant although with a 
small positive coefficient. For example, Fry (1978) 
estimated a general aggregate saving equation in order to 
test how changes in financial conditions affect savings and 
economic growth. He pooled together annual observations for 
Taiwan, Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Phillipines, India, and 
Burma. The aggregate saving function Sd/Y=f(g,y,r,Sf/Y,Sd/Y) 
where Sd,Sf,g,y,and r are defined as gross national savings, 
foreign savings, income growth, real per capita income, and 
the real deposit rate of interest respectively, was 
estimated by a two-stage least square method and have thrown 
the following results: Firstly, the signs of all coefficient 
were consistent with a priori expectations and statistically 
significant. Secondly, the coefficient of the real deposit 
rate of interest was found positive and significant. 
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Fry using the same series of observations also tested 
the significance of real deposit rate of interest on the 
rate of growth of GDP. The ordinary lea5t 5quare e5timate 
was significant and consistent with a priori expectations. 
The empirical results of this section and existing 
evidence should be treated with caution. Firstly, in 
relation to the importance of the rate of interest on 
financial deepening, it could be argued that although the 
estimates are significant its magnitude was rather small. 
Moreover, even if financial savings have risen substantially 
the increase in the overall savings was not granted. The 
case of Chile is an example of this puzzle. 
Secondly, more recent findings have questioned the 
significance of interest rates. Giovannini (1985) rejected 
some of the existing findings on the interest elasticity of 
savings, particularly those by Fry (1978). He argued that in 
Fry's sample two observations of Korea's financial reform 
period had a disproportionately large influence. The re-
estimation of the Fry's saving function with the omission of 
1967 and 1968 observations for Korea showed that the 
interest elasticity was insignificant. Similar results were 
obtained with a larger sample to demonstrate the importance 
14 
of the choice of the sample period in the results. 
However, Fry (1988) challanged Giovannini's results by 
excluding Korea altogether from the sample and reporting 
that the significance as much as the coefficient of the real 
deposit interest rate became even larger. Equally, Gupta 
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(1987) has challanged Giovannini's findings as well as those 
by Fry (1978) on the grounds that both studies includes 
Asian and Latin American countries. As a result of large 
differences in the effects of various variables including 
interest rates, a disaggregation between these two groups 
was seen as most desirable. The coefficient of the nominal 
interest rate for the pooled sample was found 
and the restriction that nominal interest 
expected inflation did not hold either. In 
nominal rate of interest was significant 
equality condition did not hold for the 
insignificant 
rate equal 
contrast, the 
although the 
Asian sample 
(Malaysia, Sri-Lanka, Singapore, Taiwan, Phillipines, India, 
Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan). For Latin America 
(Venezuela, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, EI Salvador, 
Paraguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, 
Rep. Dominicana) the equality condition was not met and the 
coefficient of nominal interest rate, although correctly 
signed, was not significant. 
Thirdly, the relationship between financial deepening 
and growth runs in both ways. A high rate of economic growth 
may be the result of high and rising flows of loanables 
funds but rising M2/GDP ratios may also be the result of the 
economy's growing output. Therefore, the question of 
deciding between exogeneous and endogenous variables is far 
from being a trivial issue. Furthermore, different 
interpretations 
output growth 
may arise from regression results 
and real deposit interest rate. On 
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between 
the one 
hand, positive interest rates may increase financial 
deepening and the rate of economic growth or increase the 
quality of investment and the rate of output growth on the 
other. 
King and Levine (1993) introduced an endogenous growth 
model in which the financial system evaluate 
entrepreneurs, mobilised savings to finance 
prospective 
the most 
promising productivity-enhancing activities, diversify the 
risk associated with these innovative activities, and reveal 
the expected profits from engaging in innovation rather than 
the production of existing goods using established 
techniques. Thus a more developed and mature financial 
system stimulate 
productivity growth 
growth by accelerating 
via innovation. Their 
the rate of 
evidence from 
cross-country analysis and case studies support the positive 
correlation between financial deepening and economic growth. 
At the same time, they found that financial distortions 
reduce the rate of economic growth by reducing the rate of 
innovation. Indeed, implict and explicit taxes on 
intermediation rises the cost of innovation (higher costs 
of evaluating and financing entrepreneurs) and hence a lower 
rate of return at any given growth rate. 
Although this paper confirms the importance of financial 
deepenning 
as well 
financial 
on productivity growth and economic development 
as rejecting those policies which distort the 
system the issue of causality still remain 
unanswered. 
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(2.3) The Banking System and Financial Liberallsatloo in 
Chile:1973-1983. 
(2.3.1) Financial liberalisation in Chile: What was done? 
This section presents and discusses the liberalisation 
reforms introduced between 1973 and 1982. A chronological 
synthesis with the principal liberalisation reforms is shown 
in table 8. The itinerary of financial liberalisation is 
included with the rest of the market liberalisation reforms 
of Chile's new development strategy, including economic 
stabilisation and the liberalisation of other specific 
markets. The process of financial liberalisation began 
shortly after the military coup of September 1973. The 
itinerary of financial reforms was accompanied by other 
equally important liberalisation reforms and economic 
stabilisation. At the same time, financial liberalisation 
reforms included institutional, regulatory, and 
international changes aiming at the achievement of a more 
competitive, mature, efficient, stable, and liberal 
financial order. 
The financial reforms started in May 1974 with a set 
institutional changes which included the privatisation of 19 
nationalised banks with the exception of Banco del Estado. 
The privatisation also included the 259 intervened and/or 
nationalised enterprises during Allende's government as well 
as 183 firms with minority or majority stake shareholding. 
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At the same time, the lowering of barriers to entry for 
both foreign and domestic financial institutions and the 
elimination of interest rates for non-bank financial 
institutions encouraged the establishment of foreign banks 
and "financieras". 
This first phase of financial liberalisation was 
undertaken almost simultaneously with the deregulation of 
domestic goods prices which began in October 1973. 
Table 2.8 
Date 
1973 
1973 
1973-74 
1974 
1974 
1974 
Economic Reforms in Chile 1973-83. 
Reforms 
Domestic Goods Market: Many product prices 
deregulated. (October) 
Exchange Rate Policy: Multiple exchange rate 
reduced to three-rate system; 300% devaluation 
and the establishment of crawling peg. 
(October) 
Foreign Trade Market: The authorities removed 
quotas and reduce average tariff from 105% to 
69%; maximum tariff rate cut from 750% to 140% 
Privatisation: Sale of publicly 
financial and non-financial firms. (May) 
Domestic Financial Market: Interest 
freed for capital market transactions of 
Bank Financial Institutions. (May) 
Domestic Financial Market: Interest 
freed for commercial banks. A maximum 
capital ratio set at 20% (October) 
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owned 
rates 
Non-
rates 
debt-
Table 2.8 (continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Date Reforms 
- - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1974 
1975 
1976 
1976 
1976 
1977 
Domestic Financial Market: Minimum capital 
limits were established together with 
specifications of operations that were 
permitted. Limits on investment and credits to 
any individual or legal entity are imposed. No 
individual could own more than 1.5% of a 
bank's capital and 3% for a legal entity. For 
newly established bank, this limit would be 
enforced five years after operations started. 
Commercial, Development, and Mortgage banks 
were not allowed to acquire shares of small 
financial institutions. Foreign banks were 
permitted to establish branches and offices. 
(December) 
Taxation: Extension of the value-added tax 
coverage; one-year surcharge on personal 
income tax; and 10% consumption tax on luxury 
goods. The improvement in tax collection was 
complemented with 19% cut of government 
spending on goods and services. The reduction 
of the fiscal deficit from 30.5% of GDP to 
only 2.6% in one year was complemented with a 
tight monetary policy. 
Domestic Financial Market: Central Bank began 
paying competitive interest rates on reserve 
requirements starting in May. Subsequently, 
reserve requirements were gradually lowered 
from 47% in 1977 to 20% in December 1978. By 
December 1980 the legal reserve requirement 
was 10% for sight deposits and 4%/ for time 
deposits. Also interest payments on reserves 
were phased out. 
Exchange Rate 
unified exchange 
Policy: Introduction of a 
rate was reached by August. 
Foreign Trade Market: New tariff structure 
proposed with rates of 25%,30%, and 35% for 
primary, semimanufactured, and manufactured 
goods respectively. 
Domestic Financial Market: A free state 
deposit insurance was introduced equivalent 
to a maximum of U$ 2.789. However, depositors 
in general thought that there was a de facto 
100% guarantee as a result of the government 
bailout of Banco Osorno a day before the 
introduction of the limited explicit 
guarantees for small depositors. (January) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Date Reforms 
------------------------------------------------------------
1977 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1979 
External Financial Market: Commercial banks 
authorised to intermediate capital inflows up 
to monthly ceilings of inflows of 5% of bank's 
capital and reserves under the articule 14 of 
the foreign exchange law. (a) (September) 
Foreign Trade Market: Following Chile's 
withdrawal from the Andean Pact, effective 
tariffs of 10%-35% proposed for implementation 
Exchange Rate Policy: The government 
announced that the devaluation rate would 
exceed the inflation rate to compensate for 
tariff reductions. (December) 
Exchange Rate Policy: A formal 
consisting of devaluations at a 
rate was introduced. (February) 
"tablita" 
decreasing 
External Capital Market: Global limit on debt 
under the articule 14 was set at 25% of 
capital and reserves and raised to 160% in 
March and again raised to 180% with a sub-
limit of 160% in April. By December, the stock 
limit was set at 215% with a sub-limit of 
180%. Monthly limits was raised to 45% and 60% 
in April and December respectively. 
Exchange Rate Policy: The exchange rate was 
fixed at a rate programmed for December 1979 
with the objective that its fixing will last 
until February 1980. In December of this year, 
the fixed rate was extended indefinitely at 
$39. 
Labour Market: Collective bargaining 
authorised at plant level; Backward wage 
indexation with respect to the consumer price 
index. 
Foreign Trade Market: A uniform tariff of 10% 
set (except for automobiles with engine larger 
than 850cc. (June) 
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Table 2.8 (continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Date Reforms 
------------------------------------------------------------
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1982 
1982 
1982 
External Financial Market: In April global 
limits on external borrowing was raised again 
to 225% with a sub-limit of 215%, and a 
monthly limit of 70%; a variable reserve 
requirement was set for external credits 
depending on the lenght of maturity of the 
loans: 10% for 48-66 months, 15% for 36-48 
months, and 25% for 24-36 months. In June, 
global limits and and debt limits under 
articule 14 were eliminated. The only 
limitation on bank indebtedness was the 20% 
debt-capital ratio. Monthly limits was reduced 
to 5%. 
External 
monthly 
Financial Market: In 
limits were eliminated. 
April all 
External Financial Market: In December 
commercial banks were allowed to lend short-
term (180 days) with external credit for 
purposes other than financing commercial 
operations. 
External Financial Market: Commercial 
were permited to obtain external credits 
a maturity under two years subject 
reserve requirement of 20%.(May) 
banks 
with 
to a 
Exchange Rate Policy: The fixed rate regime 
was abandoned in June. An 18% devaluation 
was enacted and followed with a floating rate 
in August. 
External Financial Market: Commercial banks 
were allowed to use part of their short-run 
foreign credits to lend in pesos with a limit 
of 50% of capital and reserves. (July) 
Rate Policy: A new "tablita" 
devaluations equivalent to 
month's inflation rate minus 1% 
Exchange 
monthly 
previous 
announced. 
restricted. 
Access to the exchange market 
with 
the 
was 
was 
------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: Corbo (1987), Corbo and De Melo (1987) 
(a) Articule 14 refers to the permission given by the 
Central Bank to the borrowers for future access to the 
exchange rate market to serve a foreign debt. 
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The second 
deregulation of 
interest rates 
and 
phase consisted of the financial 
the domestic capital market. 
were lifted in october 1974 
Controls in 
and by 1975 
qualitative restrictions on credit were quantitative 
phased out. At the end of 1974, requirements on 
banks'capital were increased to take into account past 
inflation and thereafter were automatically adjusted once a 
year according to the increase in the CPl. Moreover, Maximum 
debt-capital ratio and limits on individual ownership of 
banks' shares and credit concentration were introduced 
during the same year. For instance, in October 1974 the 
maximum leverage ratio was set at 20% and the individual 
ownership of banks' shares could not exceed 1.5% of bank 
capital. Commercial, Development, and Mortgage banks were 
not allowed to own shares of small financial institutions. 
In May 1976, the Central Bank began paying a competitive 
interest rate on reserve requirements. By the end of 1980, 
reserve requirements were significantly lowered and the 
interest payments phased out. For instance, reserve 
requirements were gradually lowered from 47% in 1977 to 20% 
in December 1978. By December 1980 the legal reserve was set 
at 10% for sight deposits and 4% for time deposits. 
As we notice from the summary of liberalisation reforms, 
interest rate deregulation and the significant reduction in 
reserve requirements coincided with fiscal reforms to 
eliminate the fiscal deficit. Cuts in government spending 
combined with an improvement in tax collection were decisive 
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in the marked reduction in the government's deficit from 
1975 onwards. In fact, table 9 shows that the fiscal deficit 
as a percentage of GDP fell from 10.5% in 1974 to 2.6% in 
1975. By 1980, the government exhibited a fiscal surplus of 
3.1%. This enabled the financial system to escape from 
financial repression by reducing both the inflation tax and 
reserve requirements, and also interest rate controls. 
The last phase of financial liberalisation focused on 
the liberalisation of the external capital market. 
International capital inflows were deregulated gradually and 
mainly on medium and long-run maturities, that is over two-
year maturity. Initially, banks' access to external credit 
was severely limited and permitted to finance foreign trade 
operations. However, from September 1977 to April 1980, 
access to medium and long-run foreign credit was allowed but 
with specific limits on global and monthly indebtness as 
percentage of banks' capital and reserves. According to the 
summary in table 8, the 5% monthly limit on foreign 
indebteness under article 14 of the foreign exchange law was 
raised to 45% and 60% of bank capital between April and 
December of 1978. Also, as we can see in table 8, global 
limits were continuously relaxed from 25% in 1978 to 225% in 
April 1979. By June of the same year, global limits and 
limits on indebtness under article 14 were eliminated and by 
April 1980 all monthly limits left were eliminated. 
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Banks were allowed to borrow abroad in foreign currency 
(dollars) but not to assume the exchange risk. Later in 
December 1981, commercial banks were authorised to lend on a 
short-term basis with external credit for purposes other 
the than financing foreign trade transactions. 
middle of 1982, short-term capital inflows were 
but subject to a reserve requirement of 20%. 
Towards 
liberalised 
Finally, in 
July 1982 commercial banks were permitted to assume the 
exchange risk so that a portion of their short-run foreign 
credit was lent in pesos with a limit of 50% of capital and 
reserves. 
There are important points to make on the 
deregulation of international capital flows 
process of 
in Chile: 
Firstly, the opening of the capital account was complemented 
with the introduction of a preannounced exchange rate 
"tablita" which culminated with a fixed exchange rate. 
Although, the exchange rate regime made investing in Chile 
very appealing by reducing the exchange rate risk still 
domestic interest rates remained stubbornly high. 
Secondly, the liberalisation of short-term capital inflows 
was responding to a growing financial distress from the 
sudden and rapid reduction in the rate of capital inflows 
during 1981-82 rather than a pre-conceived policy_ Table 9 
provide some evidence on the magnitude of capital inflows, 
an issue which will be raised shortly_ 
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All in all, the itinerary of liberalisation of the 
domestic capital market was preceded by a significant 
progress in the government's public finance. In addition, 
the liberalisation of the banking system to capital inflows 
was conceived gradually and only after the domestic capital 
market was fully deregulated. With respect to financial 
liberalisation inserted within the overall liberalisation 
strategy, domestic capital market was freed simultaneously 
with the goods market. The liberalisation of capital inflows 
lagged substantially behind the liberalisation of trade. 
The itinerary of the Chilean liberalisation appeared to 
be consistent with what appears to be the consensus among 
theorists. However, there were two issues overlooked by the 
authorities in the liberalisation of the financial system. 
Firstly, the 
establishment 
process of privatisation 
of large and powerful economic 
led to 
groups 
the 
which 
controlled both commercial and financial institutions. In 
fact, Dahse (1979) argued that no more than fifty 
individuals owned the entire financial system. The structure 
of bank holding companies and high bank concentration in 
Chile were an undesirable and negative for the success of 
financial liberalisation. 
Secondly, financial liberalisation did not involve the 
modernisation of the existing regulatory framework in order 
to ensure the bankers' compliance with ownership and credit 
concentration limits of the new bank legislation. The 
combination of bank holding company structure and an 
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effective prudential regulation have played an important 
part in the ex post results of financial liberalisation , 
particularly with the debacle of the banking system in 198), 
The issues concerning bank holding company structure, 
credit concentration and related portfolios, and the role of 
prudential regulation, will be addressed in more detail in 
chapters 4 and 8. The following sub-section will address 
and evaluate the ex post results of financial 
liberalisation. 
(2.3.2) The Impact of Financial Liberalisation in Chile. 
The central objective of financial liberalisation was to 
develop and modernised the financial 
the banking sector which represented 
system, particularly 
the most important 
segment of the financial system. As I have argued earlier, 
positive real yields on domestic financial assets, the 
establishment of a competitive multi-purpose banking, and 
a market allocation of bank credits was thought to be 
paramount in both raising financial deepening and widening 
(financial savings) and the quantity and quality of 
investment, including the allocation of loanable funds. At 
the same time, the integration of domestic financial market 
to world financial market was bound to generate a rapid 
convergence of domestic financial prices to those prevailing 
in world markets. Equally, it was expected that the role 
played by the increasing competitive forces should 
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contribute to some gains in operative efficiency. However, 
above all there was a conviction among "liberalisationists" 
and policy-makers that the liberal financial arrangements 
were bound to promote ultimately financial stability. 
Before we begin with the assessment of the impact of 
financial liberalisation, it has to be said that there were 
also a series of additional factors. As we have seen in 
table 8, financial liberalisation was implemented together 
with anti-inflationary policies given the initial 
macroeconomic disequilibrium on both fronts internal and 
external. Both the inflation rate and the current account 
deficit were very high. In effect, Table 9 indicates that 
consumer price inflation was 358% per annum between 1971 and 
1975. At the same time, the current account deficit was 
getting bigger and unmanageable at 4.5% of GOP in 1975. 
Table 2.9 Economic Indicators For Chile. 
71-73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 
------------------------------------------------------ ------
GOP(a) 0.7 1.0 12.9 3.5 9.9 8.2 8.3 7.5 5.3 
GOPp(b) 1438 1345 1152 1172 1266 1347 1434 1516 1568 
VCPI 231.2 375.9 340.1 174.3 63.5 30.3 38.9 31.2 9.5 
FOf/GOP 15.1 10.5 2.6 2.3 1.8 0.8 -1.7 -3.1 -1.6 
CAcc/GOP 2.9 4.5 -0.9 3.7 5.3 5.5 7.8 16.5 
Unemp. 4.6 9.7 16.2 16.8 13.2 14.0 13.6 11.8 11.1 
---------------------------------------------------------------_. 
Source:Banco Central de Chile,Boletin Mensual,Various Issues 
Banco Central de Chile, Cuentas Nacionales 1960-80 
(a) The rate of growth of GOP are estimated at 1977 prices. 
(b) GOPp correspond to real per capita GOP express in US 
dollars 
Notes: VCPI=variation of the consumer price index. 
FOf/GOP=fiscal deficit as a proportion of GOP. 
CAcc/GOP=curret account deficit as proportion of GOP 
Unemp. = Correspond to the unemployment rate. 
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Furthermore, with financial liberalisation other reforms 
such as the deregulation of the goods market and the opening 
of the trade regime, changes in labour legiBlation, and 
privatisation were undertaken during this period. In 
consequence, it is difficult to isolate and identify the 
specific impact of the financial liberalisation vis a vis 
other reforms and to link them with the ex post results. 
(2.3.2.1) Financial Deepening, Saving, and Investment in 
Chile. 
As it was expected financial deepening increased 
strongly during the liberalisation period. The evidence from 
table lOa provides different measures which account for the 
spectacular expansion in financial intermediation 
(deepening). 
The degree of financial deepening measured by the M2/GNP 
ratio shows that it increased from its lowest figure of 6.4% 
in 1974 to nearly 32% in 1982. More importantly, there was a 
remarkable increase in the proportion of GNP held in the 
form of time and saving deposits. In effect, the ratio of 
quasi-money to GNP went from 1.1% in 1974 to 25.3% in 1982. 
Similar results were obtained from the non-monetary 
assets/total financial assets ratio (NMA/TA) which shows a 
marked increment between 1974 and 1982 of 14% to more than 
70% of total assets respectively. This portfolio shift away 
from money was responding to the upward trend observed in 
short-term interest rate paid on quasi-money following 
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interest rates deregulation, and to the availability of a 
wider options of financial assets. The average ex post real 
deposit rate between 1975 and 1982 was 15.2 per annum with 
a peak of 25.4 in 1981 in comparison to the negative rates 
which prevailed during 1970-73. 
Table 2.10a Indicators of Financial Deepening and Growth of 
Financial Assets. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
M1/GNP QM/GNP M2/GNP TFA/GNP MA/TA NMA/TA 
------------------------------------------------------------
1973 10.6 2.3 12.9 14.9 53.0 14.3 
1974 5.3 1.1 6.4 20.0 27.7 14.0 
1975 4.5 2.6 7.1 19.7 26.1 16.2 
1976 3.9 3.7 7.6 19.0 25.4 25.0 
1977 4 . 5 6.0 10.5 21.0 24.1 38.6 
1978 4.8 7.7 12.5 23.0 24.6 48.6 
1979 4.9 9.7 14.6 29.6 21.1 50.1 
1980 5.5 10.7 16.2 34.9 19.8 59.8 
1981 5.0 14.6 19.6 39.0 14.7 69.8 
1982 6.6 25.3 31.9 48.1 14.0 70.7 
Source:Banco Central Chile,Month1y Bu11etin,Various Issues 
(a) Share of GDP on amounts in pesos each year. 
Notes: M1= notes and coins+demand deposits 
QM= quasi-money defined as time and savings deposits 
M2= M1+quasi-money 
TFA= total financial assets defined as M1 plus 
deposits in banks,non-bank financial 
institutions, saving and loans institutions. 
i.e.total liabilities of the financial system 
MA= MI 
NMA= non-monetary assets which includes paper issued 
by commercial and development banks as well as 
non-bank financial institutions. 
The total financial asset/GNP ratio (TFA/GNP) which is 
estimated at constant 1977 peso prices in order to eliminate 
the inflationary distortions and which comprise a wider 
definition of financial assets have also thrown similar 
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results. By 1973, the ratio was indicating that total 
financial assets was nearly 15% of GNP and by 1982 was more 
than 48%. 
The thesis on the spectacular rise in financial 
deepening (financial savings) came out mainly from a change 
in wealth composition has been challanged by some 
commentators of the Chilean economy. For instance, 
Barandarian (1983) sustained the view that expectations of 
buoyant future of the economy generated a rise in perceived 
wealth. Indeed, financial deepening grew along side private 
sector wealth as capital gains in booming stock market were 
capitalised through the banking system. The evidence shows 
that real stock prices between 1977 to 
15 
more than 320%. 
1981 grew 
Similarly, Arellano (1983) maintained that changes in 
wealth composition were small and the rise in financial 
savings came mainly from the privatisation of the 
government social security in May 1981 and the rise in 
external liabilities. The excess of external financing over 
the current account deficit was destinated towards the 
accumulation of international reserves and deposits in the 
domestic financial system. 
The impressive rise of financial deepening was also 
accompanied by a growing number of participants In the 
financial system. According to table lOb the number of 
domestic banks increased from 20 to 27 between 1974 to 1981 
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although it began to fall in 1982 after the liquidations of 
financial institutions beginning in 1981-82. This syndrome 
became more acute after the banking crisis of 1983 as it 
will be shown in chapter 3. 
With respect to foreign financial institutions, the 
number of foreign commercial banks have been continuously 
rising from a single foreign entity in 1974 to 19 in 1983. 
It appears that the expansion in the number of foreign 
banks remained untrammel despite the banking crisis of 1983. 
After an auspicious start of non-bank financial 
institutions several "financieras" were liquidated 
particularly from 1981-82 onwards. The number fell from 17 
between 1977 and 1980 to only 7 in 1983. As we will see in 
chapter 3, although there was a large number of 
"financieras" many of which experienced financial 
difficulties during the early 1980's, their share of total 
liabilities and assets of the system was very small as 
compared with banks. In general, the number of total 
financial institutions went from 21 in 1974 to its highest 
number of 60 in 1981 with a predominance of domestic banks 
16 
over foreign banks and financieras. 
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Table 2.10b Financial Institutions in Chile. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Domestic Banks Foreign Banks Financieras Total 
------------------------------------------------------------
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
20 
21 
21 
22 
22 
25 
25 
27 
19 
19 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
10 
13 
17 
19 
19 
17 
17 
17 
17 
16 
9 
7 
21 
23 
23 
42 
44 
52 
55 
60 
47 
45 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
However, despite the spectacular growth of financial 
intermediation financial liberalisation did not contribute 
to deepen the maturity of financial assets hold by economic 
agents. The evidence in table 10c shows that assets with 
maturities of less than 90 days were dominant in the 
holders' portfolio although maturities beyond 1 year also 
experienced an important increase between 1979 and 1982. For 
instance, financial assets with maturities of less than 90 
days were accountable for 48.1% of total financial assets 
during 1981. Those assets with maturities of more than 90 
days and less than a year exhibited a continuous decline. 
However, there was a positive rise in the share of assets 
with maturities over a year from 3.4% in 1973 to 25.3% in 
1982 although still was well below the assets' share with 
short-term maturity. 
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Table 2.10c Maturities of Financial Assets in Chile. 
------------------------------------------------------------
MAlTA 0<Fa<90 90<Fa<365 365<Fa 
------------------------------------------------------------
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
53.0 
27.7 
26.1 
25.4 
24.1 
24.6 
21.1 
19.8 
14.7 
14.0 
3. 1 
18.3 
19.9 
27.2 
38.0 
44.7 
37.6 
35.8 
48.1 
44.0 
40.5 
47.2 
39.0 
28.8 
25.4 
19.5 
20.6 
22.7 
13.3 
16.7 
3 . 4 
6.8 
15.0 
18.6 
12.5 
11.2 
20.7 
21.7 
23.9 
25.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Arellano (1983) 
Notes: Monetary assets = private money holdings (Ml) 
Less than 90 days (0<Fa<90) = include deposits in banks and 
financieras,short-term savings,Central Bank promissory notes. 
90 days to 1 year (90<Fa<365) = includes deposits in banks 
and financieras, time savings, deposits in Saving & Loan 
institutions, adjustable mortgages, time deposits with Banco 
del Estado. 
More than 1 year(365<Fa) = Adjustable savings 
accounts, adjustable treasury promissory notes, bonds from 
mortgage coys.,debentures, 
High interest rates on short-term assets combined with 
high and variable rate of inflation made it very difficult 
to attract borrowers to hold longer run assets, although 
towards the end of the 1980's when the inflation rate was 
rapidly falling towards one-digit the holding of long-run 
assets was picking-up. 
As second important observation is that despite the 
impressive growth of financial deepening (financial savings) 
and high nominal and real interest rates, gross national 
savings dropped substantially during the liberalisation 
period. 
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Table 10d presents some evidence on the evolution of 
savings in Chile. The comparison between the peak of 20.7% 
in 1974 and the trough of 2.1' in 1982 serve to illuBtrate 
the pattern of the gross national savings. At the same time, 
by excluding the observations for the recession years of 
1975 and 1982 we observed that the average gross national 
savings ratio remained stagnant around 12% per annum. This 
figure hardly differs from the average for the periods 
between 1960-65 and 1966-70 corresponding to 11% and 15% per 
annum. 
Table 2.10d Savings and Investment in Chile. 
------------------------------------------------------------
GNS/GOP 
60-65 11.0 
66-70 15.0 
1974 20.7 
1975 7.9 
1976 14.5 
1977 10.7 
1978 12.6 
1979 12.4 
1980 13.9 
1981 8.2 
1982 2.1 
FS/GOP GOS/GOP 
0.4 
5.2 
-1.7 
3.7 
5.2 
5.4 
7.1 
14.5 
9. 2 
21.1 
13.1 
12.8 
14.4 
17.8 
17.8 
21.0 
22.7 
11.3 
GFCF/GOP 
15.1 
14.5 
17.0 
17.7 
13.3 
13.3 
14.7 
14.9 
16.6 
18.4 
14.0 
GCFg/GOP GCFp/GOP TGCF 
10.5 3.8 14.3 
11.3 4.7 16.0 
12.8 8.4 21.2 
8.5 4 . 6 13.1 
5.4 7 . 4 12.8 
6.7 7.7 14.4 
6.2 11.6 17.8 
5.2 12.6 17.8 
5.4 15.6 21.0 
5.1 15.6 20.7 
11.3 
Source: Banco Central de Chile, Cuentas Nacionales 1974-85. 
Notes: 
Share of GOP on amounts in pesos of each year. 
GNS= Gross national savings,FS=Foreign savings,GDS=gross 
domestic savings 
GFCF= Gross fixed capital formation, GCFg= gross capital 
formation public sector,GCFp=gross capital formation 
private, TGCF= total gross capital formation. 
There are two general points to make on the evolution of 
national savings. As we have already seen, the spectacular 
growth in financial savings appears to have resulted from 
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changes in the composition of wealth rather than from a 
significant change in consumption and saving patterns. This 
substitution may had included a shift away from informal 
capital markets towards the organised capital market. 
The second point is that overall savings may have also 
been influenced by several factors depending of course on 
17 
theoretical framework being used. Harberger (1982) for 
instance, identified three contributing factors on the 
dismal performance of Chile's savings. Firstly, a 
substantial rise in asset prices by more than 320% between 
1977 and 1980, measured by the real index of stock prices, 
and consequently a perceived wealth by forward looking 
consumers. This was leading to higher consumption and thus 
dissavings. This effect takes place as part of the 
adjustment of actual wealth holdings back to the desirable 
level in a Meltzerian fashion. 
Secondly, private sector used funds which otherwise 
might have augmented the national capital stock to buy back 
part of the existing capital stock during the privatisation 
phase. Edwards (1985) argued that the government used the 
proceeds from privatisation to finance current expenditure. 
Thus, the private savings used in acquiring these firms were 
matched by a negative government savings. 
Thirdly, the recession of 1975 and the fall in real GDP 
by 14.3% was also important particularly if the 
circumstances were thought to be transitory. In consequence, 
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a transitory fall in income should have produced an 
important shift in the pattern of savings. 
Dornbusch (1985) maintained that there appeared to be a 
strong real exchange rate effect on the composition and 
level of spending. As it is show in chapter 7, by 1981 the 
sustainability of the increasingly overvalued exchange rate 
was becoming uncertain so that a sharp increase in the 
demand for imported durables took place with the subsequent 
deterioration in the trade balance. In fact, the data from 
table 9 shows that the deficit of the current account was 
16.5% of GDP during 1981. 
The series on foreign savings in table 10d appears to be 
negatively correlated with national savings. In other words, 
external savings substituted domestic savings. Abundant 
world liquidity and external financial liberalisation 
stimulated capital inflows to finance higher consumption 
levels. 
In general, it could be argued that the evolution of 
national savings was strongly influenced by the incentives 
toward consumption from the misalignment of key 
macroeconomic prices particularly the real exchange rate and 
real stock prices, the economic recession of 1975, 
institutional and structural changes, and the degree of 
substitution between domestic and external savings. The role 
of financial liberalisation was indirect as its incidence 
was felt on the explosive rise in the stock prices, the 
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failure of supervision to avoid this speculative bubble 
financed by bank credits, and the undesirable ownership 
concentration from privatisation. Further disccussion of 
these issues will be provided shortly. 
Finally, table 10d presents evidence on the performance 
of investment during the liberalisation period. The rate of 
gross investment measured by the gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) was 15.5% of GOP between 1974 and 1982. 
This figure appears to be slightly above the figures for the 
period of 1960-65 and 1966-70 with 15.1% and 14.5% 
respectively. 
This stagnant performance of investment in Chile during 
the liberalisation period can be explain by the concurrence 
of two factors. Firstly, public sector investment was 
severely curtailed. The public sector gross domestic capital 
formation fell from 12.8% of GOP in 1974 to 5.1% in 1981. 
The fiscal stabilisation enacted in 1975 and the ideological 
bias against the public sector conspired against any 
initiative to encourage public investment particularly on 
public infrastructure. 
Secondly, 
sufficiently 
private sector investment did 
to offset the reduction in public 
not rise 
investment. 
In effect, if we look at the series between 1974 and 1977 
private sector gross domestic capital formation never 
exceeded the 1974 value of 8.4% of GOP. This performance can 
be explain partly by the 1975 recession, and in my view from 
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the fact that for many decades private sector investment was 
led indirectly by actual and expected public sector 
investment. 
However, in 1978 private investment started to rise from 
11.6% to 15.6% in 1981. This performance was superior to the 
period of 1960-65 and 1966-70 and even outstripped the 
figures for public sector gross domestic capital formation 
during the 1960's. 
As a whole, the rate of investment remained poor even 
during the liberalisation period. Additional factors such as 
the short-term maturity of the asset structure, asset 
speculation in the stock exchange, and as we have seen the 
incentive towards consumption conspired against private 
investment. At the same time, as we will see later high ex 
post real domestic lending interest rates was also important 
for those who did not have access to a much cheaper credit 
such as foreign lending at least before 1978. I have 
estimated that average domestic real lending interest rate 
between 1975 and 1977, date at which the authorities began 
the process of dismantling controls in capital inflows, was 
70% per year. The liberalisation of capital inflows 
contributed to reduce domestic interest rates, and to rise 
foreign savings. In fact, lending rates have fallen to 15.5% 
and 11.3 in 1979 and 1980 respectively. Also foreign savings 
accounted by 7.1% in 1980 and 14.5% in 1981. This figure is 
important if we also considered that that gross fixed 
capital formation was 18.1% during 1981. This is a clear 
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indication that the increase in investment during the late 
1970's was financed by foreign savings. 
Even if the rate of capital accumulation did not exhibit 
a significant increment during the liberalisation period, it 
was expected a sUbstantial improvement in the allocation and 
quality of investment as result of financial deregulation 
and price allocation. In relation to credit allocation, 
there are two proxies which serve to reject the view that an 
improvement in credit allocation occurred during the 
liberalisation period. The first one was the emergence of 
two related issues: a high credit concentration and the 
"related portfolio problem". 
By 1980 the Superintendency of banks started showing 
some concern on the levels of credit concentration among 
bank holding companies (groups). This credit concentration 
on related firms occured despite the existence of legal 
norms for credit concentration and beyond any doubts it was 
exacerbated by an inadequate supervision. 
As it will be argued in chapter 3, the first 
intervention action in 1981 and particularly in 1983 enabled 
the Superintendency to have a glimpse of the magnitude of 
credit concentration among economic conglomerates. Table 10e 
shows the magnitude of the loan portfolios allocated in 
affiliated firms. The most dramatic cases correspond to 
Banco Chile and Banco Santiago, the two largest banks in 
Chile. 
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Table 2.10e Related Portfolios In Chl1e.(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
1982 1983 1984 
------------------------------------------------------------
Banco Chile 
Banco Santiago 
Total 
39.369(19.3) 
51.360(42.9) 
141.307(13.9) 
56.272(23.8) 
70.858(61.8) 
183.493(16.7) 
50.618 
85.907 
202.734 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) The data is express in millions of pesos.The figures in 
brackets correspond to the related portfolio/total loans 
ratio. 
Indeed, by 1983 Banco Chile and Banco Santiago had 
nearly 24% and 62% of their loan portfolio allocated into 
affiliated firms. Moreover, this ratio for the overall 
financial system was nearly 14% and 17% in 1982 and 1983 
respectively. Clearly, this does not suggest an efficient 
allocation of investible resources nor an efficient 
allocation of risk. At the same time, it surpasses the 5% 
limit established by the Superintendency in June of 1982. 
Further analysis of the related portfolio problem is 
provided in chapter 8. 
Another proxy for the allocation of investible resources 
is the data on the GDP growth by sector. According to the 
data from the Central Bank, construction rose by an annual 
average of 18.5% between 1978 and 1981. Most of the 
investment on construction was concentrated in large and 
expensive shopping centres and luxury flats. Similarly, the 
data available on commerce and financial services also 
confirms a rapid expansion rates of 11.9% and 19.7% 
respectively over the same period. These figures are well 
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above of the 7.3% overall GDP growth per annum during these 
four years. This evidence against the background of a per 
capita GDP of U$1500, and an unemployment rate of over 13% 
during the second half on the 70's and early 80's as 
despicted by table 9, can hardly be seen as rational 
priority in the allocation of investible resources. 
(2.3.2.2) Financial Indebtness, and Interest Rates in Chile. 
It is evident from the discussion of the evidence that 
financial liberalisation did contribute to the expansion of 
the number of intermediaries and financial intermediation. 
The counterpart of this spectacular growth of financial 
assets (liabilities of the financial system) was the strong 
financial indebtness of the private sector. Increasing 
private sector debt was not a worrying issue per se but the 
terms and the structure of the private sector's liabilities 
were a matter of greater concern. Such debt was acquired at 
extremely high interest rates, predominantly short-term, and 
denominated in dollar terms particularly during 1981-82. 
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Table 2.11a Loans of the Financial System to the Private 
Sector. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Loans/GDP Loans $ LO.j.rtB tJ$ 
L<365 L>365 Total L<365 L>365 Total 
------------------------------------------------------------
1973 4.4 
1974 5.0 
1975 8.3 
1976 10.4 
1977 16.6 
1978 23.2 65.5 19.2 84.7 45.1 31.8 76.9 
1979 28.2 120.7 41.0 161.7 71.6 55.1 126.7 
1980 37.6 238.9 90.9 329.8 116.1 107.1 223.2 
1981 50.4 328.6 164.6 493.2 143.3 163.3 306.6 
1982 71.2 283.3 236.6 519.9 147.1 306.3 453.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Arellano (1983). 
According to table l1a, total loans to the private 
sector exhibited a substantial increment as a percentage of 
GDP. In 1973 the private sector indebtness was only 4.4% as 
compared with 1982 which reached 71.2% of GDP. At the same 
time, the evidence shows that the rising debt was 
predominatly short-term although it was beginning to show 
some decline relative to longer term liabilities. In effect, 
between 1978 and 1981 the share of short-term debt as a 
proportion of the total went from 77.3% to 66.6%. Moreover, 
we observed that loans were predominantly in pesos although 
dollar loans also had a significant share. For instance, in 
1981 nearly 62% of total loans were denominated in pesos and 
38% in dollar terms. It is clear that the short term nature 
of peso loans and increasing share of dollar loans can be 
regarded as two factors which have enhanced the weakness of 
the banking system especially during the collapse of Chile's 
economic activity in 1982. At the same time, high real 
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interest rates and the forced maxi-devaluation in June 1982 
have also proven to be paramount. 
As we have already seen, one line of reasoning relates 
the increasing financial indebtness with the incentives 
toward consumption financed mainly by bank credit. At the 
same time, euphoric expectations on the future prospects of 
the economy may have played an important role in the 
increasing demand for credit despite extremely high lending 
interest rates. However, it could be argued that demand for 
bank credit was actually responding to ex ante interest 
rates which were much lower than the ex post rates. To 
reconcile this story with the data we have to assume that 
economic agents 
inconsistent with 
were making systematic mistakes 
the rational expectation 
which is 
hypothesis. 
However, it is equally true that rational individuals could 
have also be financing imports while correctly perceiving 
the exchange rate as being unsustainable in the medium and 
longer run. 
A second line of enquiry relates to some institutional 
features which emerged after the privatisation of the 
financial system. As we recall from table 8, the process of 
financial reforms started with the return of financial and 
non-financial institutions to their previous owners and/or 
auctioned to the highest bidder. However, differential 
access to domestic and foreign credit determined that banks' 
assets were acquired by economic conglomerates (group) which 
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already had a large ownership of non-financial firms. By the 
time of privatisation, high real domestic interest rates, 
tight monetary policy, and controls on capital inflows 
made peso borrowing too expensive to the general public and 
encouraged economic groups to borrow at cheaper rates by 
exploiting their private contacts abroad. The access to low 
cost foreign credit by a minority coupled with the lack of 
effective monitoring on assets acquisition led to a large 
ownership concentration and as we have already seen, to the 
problem of "related portfolios". As the control of the 
economic conglomerates increased over financial institutions 
they were able to increase their economic power by buying 
out those firms which were under severe financial strain 
after the recession of 1975. Also, they were capable of 
raising their capital values on the stock exchange by 
lending to themselves and by buying shares from affiliated 
firms. Clearly, financial indebtness was used to finance the 
expansion of economic groups as well as to inflate stock 
prices. In turn, this sharp increment in assets' prices 
permitted a more "solid" borrowing capacity by offering 
overpriced collaterals and guarantees. At the same time, as 
pointed out by Luders (1986), this credit was also devoted 
to purchase banks themselves in a process that he called 
"the bicycle": that is, a bank would grant a loan to a 
corporation controlled by the new owner of the same bank and 
this entity would use the proceeds of the loan to pay for 
the shares it was acquiring. 
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In consequence, bank credit was partly used to finance 
the speculative bubble in stock prices and to finance the 
consolidation and/or expansion of economic groups. The 
increasing indebtness and particularly the emergence of 
vulnerability from systemic risk was becoming a time bomb. 
Another complementary hypothesis which explains private 
sector indebtness highlights the importance of certain 
banks' practices involving the rolling-over of bank credit 
and the capitalisation of the interest. As it will be 
thoroughly reported in chapter 3 and particularly chapter 7, 
sustained high real interest rates, and the accumulated 
appreciation of the real exchange rate between 1978 and 1982 
became major sources of difficulties for the tradable 
sector. At the same time, the estimates of non-performing 
loans/total loans and non-performing loans/capital ratios 
rose alarmingly from 1981 onwards. In order to stave-off 
bankruptcies, banks were willing to rollover what were 
essentially bad loans. Arellano (1983), Harberger (1985a), 
Zahler (1985), and Luders (1986) maintained that the 
rolling-over of bad debts created a false demand for loans 
and hence such practices accounted for a large share of the 
expansion of bank credit (private sector indebtness). 
In general, I would agreed that the institutional 
features which emerged as a result of 
liberalisation was 
certain practices 
extremely important in 
conducive to a dangerous 
financial 
encouraging 
rise in 
indebtness. Moreover, it led, as it will be shown in 
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chapters 3 and 8, to excessive risk-taking and unsound 
lending practices which ultimately caused the debacle of the 
banking system in 1983. 
However, there was something more specific behind 
private sector indebtness, the rapid expansion of banks' 
loans, and excessive risk-taking which directly concerned 
banking firms. In my opinion, banks' attitudes and conducts 
should be considered as the centre-piece of most of the 
hypotheses which explain the rapid bank credit expansion and 
the collapse of the banking system. As stated by Barandiaran 
(1983), the banking system was determinant in the collective 
euphoria as they aggresively promoted different lines of 
businesses. Indeed, banks actively sought borrowers on a 
door to door basis. This strategy clearly contradicted a 
more conservative approach where borrowers seek funds and 
banks acting as lenders would carry out a complete 
evaluation of the borrower's profile in terms of its 
projects, assets, and personal wealth. The critical factor 
which induced this type of banks' behaviour was the 
structure of incentives which arose from financial 
liberalisation. Among them we include the development of 
close ownership links between financial and non-financial 
firms, the implicit government insurance on domestic and 
foreign liabilities, and increasing competition among 
financial institutions. Chapter 8 will provide a an 
empirical evaluation of these specific issues. 
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Although some measures were adopted in 
order to limit banks' exposure and some 
practices, there was a total failure 
late 1981 in 
other risky 
to introduce 
comprehensive and effective steps to supervise banks' 
conducts and management. The failure of prudential 
regulation combined with those institutional features which 
emerged from financial liberalisation facilitated and 
excerbated risky and unconservative conduct of financial 
institutions. Indeed, in chapter 6, I have found econometric 
evidence which indicates that the likelihood of bank 
problems was becoming evident as early as 1979. Therefore, 
an early warning mechanism and an effective credit 
classification combined with publicly provided information 
would had averted this type of conduct. 
What remains to be discussed is one of the most puzzling 
aspect of financial liberalisation which concerns the 
behaviour of interest rates. As we have seen previously, 
increasing private sector indebtness occurred 
extremely high lending interest rates. 
despite 
As expected, financial deregulation brought about 
initially an overshoot of nominal and real interest rates. 
However, they remained too high and volatile as well as they 
failed to converge toward international level. Moreover, the 
spread between lending and borrowing rates remained 
stubbornly high. These unexpected results occurred in spite 
of both substantial increases in peso liabilities as shown 
in table lOa and a spectacular rise in capital inflows after 
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restrictions on long and medium run capital inflows were 
lifted. According to data exhibited in table lIb, capital 
inflow5 and the capital account surplus attained its peak in 
1981 with 16.2% and 26.4% of GOP respectively. This 
impressive performance in attracting foreign capital 
occurred despite the remaining restriction on short-term 
capital inflows. 
Table 2.11b Capital Inflows in Chile. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Capital Inflows 
K(a) K/GOP(b) Capital Account(c) KAccount/GOP 
------------------------------------------------------------
1975 57.9 0.5 491.0 4.1 
1976 238.0 1.9 -148.0 1.2 
1977 240.2 1.8 551.4 4.0 
1978 678.7 4.6 1088.0 7 . 3 
1979 921.8 5.8 1189.0 7 .4 
1980 1809.0 10.5 1971.0 11.4 
1981 2947.5 16.2 4814.0 26.4 
1982 859.5 5.5 2382.0 15.2 
Source:Banco Central de Chile,Boletin Mensual,Various Issues 
(a) Correspond to net capital inflows through articule 14 in 
millions of US dollars. 
(b) GOP is express in millions of dollars at 1989 prices. 
(c) In millions of US dollars. 
The evidence from table 11c shows that the peso lending 
rate exhibited a continuous reduction from 498.3% to 51.9% 
between 1975 and 1981. This gradual reduction in nominal 
lending rates was expected as the rate of domestic inflation 
was gradually falling during the liberalisation period. In 
fact, the rate of increase of the CPI went from 340.1% to 
9.5% between 1975 to 1981. At the same time, we saw that 
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peso liabilities and capital inflows experienced a 
spectacular growth during the liberalisation period. 
Table 2.11c Interest Rates in Chile. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Lending Rates Deposit Rates 
Nominal(a) Real(b) Dollar(c) Nominal Real Dollar Infl 
------------------------------------------------------------
1975 498.3 114.8 11.4 234.0 18.6 96.8 340.1 
1976 350.7 51.3 -27.4 197.9 8.6 45.4 174.3 
1977 156.4 45.9 -7.6 93.7 17.1 20.7 63.5 
1978 85.3 35.8 -4.0 62.8 22.5 34.1 30.3 
1979 62.0 15.5 -7.4 45.1 4.4 26.2 38.9 
1980 46.9 11.3 -12.8 37.4 4 .6 37.4 31.2 
1981 51.9 33.1 6.4 40.8 25.4 40.8 9.5 
1982 63.1 30.6 77.0 47.8 20.5 -21.5 20.7 
Av 164.3 42.2 4.4 94.9 15.2 34.5 88.5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:Banco Central de Chile,Boletin Mensual,Various Issues 
IMF,International Financial Statistic, Various Issues 
(a) Nominal interest rates both deposit and lending 
correspond to short-term interest rate (30-90 days) 
(b) Real interest rates correspond to ex post rates which 
are estimated by deflating short-run interest rates by the 
variation of the consumer price index. That is 
{[ (l+i)/(l+CPI) ]-1}*100 
(c) The ex post real dollar lending interest rates were 
obtained deflating LIBOR by nominal devaluation and 
variations in the consumer price index. That is 
{[(1+LIBOR)(1+e)/(1+CPI)]-1}*100. 
(d) The ex post dollar deposit interest rates were obtained 
by deflating the short-run nominal deposit interest rate by 
the nominal devaluation. That is {[(1+i)/(1+e)]-1}*100. 
Also the data shows a downward movement of the real 
lending rate from 114.8% to its lowest level of 11.3% in 
1980. There are two observations from the data which is 
worth looking at with some care. Real lending rate in 1979 
and 1980 were well below in comparision with both the 
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average for the whole period and with the previous year and 
the two following years. While it coincided with the lifting 
of restrictions on capital inflows, changes in international 
conditions also had played an important part on the 
behaviour of real interest rates. Sjaastad (1985, 1989) and 
Cortes Douglas (1985) argued that the fluctuations in real 
interest rates between 1979 and 1982 can be explained by 
sharp changes in the value of the dollar. They maintained 
that in a small open economy with fully integrated capital 
and goods markets, domestic nominal interest rates will be 
fairly well arbitraged with external rates. However, real 
interest rates would be affected by fluctuations in the 
exchange rate of major currency countries whereby such 
fluctuations will be transmitted into the inflation rate via 
price of traded goods. 
Table lId provide some useful evidence to support the 
international influence on real interest rates. Firstly, the 
fluctuations in real lending rates between 1979-80 and 1981-
82 does not come from similar fluctuations in LIBOR nor in 
nominal peso lending rate which still remain too high. 
Secondly, if we compare the movements of real and nominal US 
exchange rates with the dollar price of Chilean tradables we 
observe some correlation. In effect, between 1977 and 1979 
we see that there was a dollar inflation as the US currency 
depreciated 7.4% in real terms during these three years. 
This coincided with both a sharp rise in tradable prices in 
us dollars by 34.3% and the significant fall in the real 
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lending rate over the same period. The process is reversed 
from the late 1980 onwards as the dollar began appreciating 
very rapidly. The collapse of the Chilean inflation 
coincided with the appreciation of the US dollar followed by 
a rise in real lending rates. 
Table 2.11d US Exchange Rates, Tradable Prices, and 
Interest Rates. (a) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
77 78 79 80 81 82 
------------------------------------------------------------
NEFF EX. Rate 124.0 111.2 108.3 108.3 121.1 135.2 
REFF EX. Rate ( b ) 117.6 108.6 108.9 110.0 125.2 134.7 
Tradable Price(c) 183.5 196.4 246.5 296.8 297.3 266.7 
LIBOR (d) 6.1 8.8 12.1 14.2 16.8 13.2 
Nominal LendingR 156.4 85.3 62.0 46.9 51.9 63.1 
Real Lending Rate 45.9 35.8 15.5 11.3 33.1 30.6 
Source:Banco Central de Chile,Boletin Mensua1,Various Issues 
IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
ECLA, Statistical Yearbook, Various Issues. 
(a) Indices were constructed with 1970=100 
(b) Real effective exchange rate (REFF EX.Rate) was 
obtained by deflating the nominal effective exchange rate 
(NEFF.EX.Rate) with the WPI. 
(c) The average dollar price of tradables was calculated as 
follows 0.5Px+0.5Pm where Px=unit value of exports and 
Pm=unit value of imports. 
(d) Nominal LIBOR is the three months Eurodollar rate. 
While this argument seems logically correct the question 
which remains to be answered is why nominal domestic 
interest rate failed to return to market equilibrium. As we 
will see shortly, the reduction in inflation during 1980-81 
coincided with both a drop in the rate of capital inflows 
particularly in 1981, and the belief that the level of 
capital inflows were not sustainable in the long-run. Rising 
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devaluation expectations, country-risk premium, and credit 
demand affected nominal interest rates. 
Another important observation from the data in table 
1lc and 11e is that domestic interest rates failed to 
converge to international levels particularly during the 
period in which the exchange rate was being devalued 
according to a pre-announced "tablita" and large capital 
inflows were flooding the economy. 
Table 2.11e Spreads of Interest Rates. 
------------------------------------------------------------
1 2 3a 3b 
------------------------------------------------------------
1975 228.9 83.9 264.3 67.1 
1976 62.1 37.7 152.8 20.7 
1977 50.6 13.9 62.7 30.8 
1978 40.4 23.3 22.5 15.5 
1979 25.9 12.7 16.9 9.2 
1980 28.5 20.1 9.5 5.9 
1981 30.4 20.8 11.1 8.9 
1982 -23.7 -30.8 13.3 11.8 
Source:Banco Central de Chile,Boletin Mensual,Various Issues 
IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
Arellano (1983) 
Note: Spread l=Difference between the interest paid by the 
domestic debtor who borrows in the domestic 
market and the interest paid if he borrows in 
the international financial market. That is, 
{[(l+real lending rate)/(1+LIBOR)(1+e)]-1]}*100 
Spread 2= Difference between interest in dollar terms 
received by a foreign creditor that lends in 
the domestic market and LIBOR rate. That is, 
{[[(l+deposit rate)/(1+e)]/(1+LIBOR)]-1}*100 
Spread 3a= Correspond to the gross spread between nominal 
peso lending rate and deposit rate. 
Spread 3b= Correspond to the net spread between lending 
and deposit interest rates including the cost 
of legal reserve requirements 
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For instance, table 11c shows real peso lending rate 
proved to be well above LIBOR adjusted for devaluation. The 
annual average real peso lending rate was 42.2% between 1975 
and 1982 whereas the adjusted LIBOR was as low as 4.4%. If 
we exclude the observation for 1982 the cost of dollar 
lending was minus 6%. Moreover, the deposit rate adjusted 
for devaluation was 34.5% per annum over the same period. 
This rate is definitely superior to the return from three 
month Eurodollar rate which hardly exceeded 12% per annum 
between 1977-82 as shown in table 11c. Similar conclusions 
are obtained by looking at the calculations for spread 1 and 
spread 2 in table 11e. In consequence, this differential 
was very attractive to foreign capital as much as it was for 
resident to borrow in foreign currency. 
Several hypothesis have been introduced to explain why 
interest parity did not hold in Chile. A useful way to 
assess those factors affecting the parity is setting the 
interest parity condition for an open economy as follows: 
* e 
(8) i = i + e + ~ ~
In an economy where foreign and domestic assets are 
close substitute and where the financial market is fully 
integrated with the world financial market, domestic 
interest rate (i) should equal the yields on comparable 
* foreign assets (i ) plus the expected rate of exchange rate 
e 
depreciation (e). This uncovered interest rate parity will 
88 
not hold so long as the domestic interest rate will deviate 
from the foreign rate adjusted for expected depreciation by 
three additional factors. Country-specific institutional 
factors such as tax regimes, reserve requirements, and 
limits on exchange-risks; country-specific risks among them 
the imposition of exchange rate controls at the time of 
repatriation, and political risks; and exchange risks which 
arises from the fact that assets are denominated in 
different currencies, and there is uncertainty about future 
value of the exchange rate. These factors will lead to a 
premium (¢) on the yield on domestic assets to compensate 
risk-averse economic agents which in turn results in a 
differential between domestic and foreign rates after 
18 
adjusting for expected exchange movements. Thus, the 
answers for the spread between domestic and foreign interest 
rates lies with the concurrence of some of these factors 
and/or the relaxation of the underlying assumptions of the 
parity condition. 
Sjaastad (1982) maintained that lack of correlation 
between the large inflows of capital and the spread, which 
for the periods between August 1979 to December 1980 and 
January 1981 to March 1982 was -0.53 and -0.12 respectively, 
can be explained by country-specific institutional factors. 
He argued that if the spread remained unaffected by 
increases in peso deposits, inflows of capital, and/or 
devaluation risk then the explanation should lie in the cost 
of arbitrage. This cost arose from the restrictions imposed 
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on Chilean commercial banks to take positions in foreign 
currency. They could not borrow dollars abroad and lend 
pesos in Chile. Some non-bank institutions converted dollars 
into pesos and lent the proceeds in pesos which subsequently 
returned to banks in the forms of peso deposits and back 
again to non-bank entities in the form of loans. Given the 
transaction costs and the risk of default, this indirect 
arbitrage mechanism proved to be very expensive as compared 
with a case where banks were permitted to arbitrage 
directly. Although it was considered as theoretical 
possibility, its empirical relevance was insignificant. 
With respect to country-specific risk, Edwards (1986) 
argued that only a small fraction of the spread can be 
explained by the premium over LIBOR charged by world 
financial markets. In effect, he showed that average premium 
charged on loans hardly exceeded 1% between 1979 to 1982. 
For instance in 1979 and 1980 the premium was 0.99%. 
Instead, Edwards and Cox (1988) maintained that the role 
of exchange risk started playing an increasing role from 
1980 onwards during the fixed exchange rate regime. As we 
have seen in table 8, after nearly two years of a "tablita" 
regime the exchange rate was fixed at $39 in 1979. The 
expectations of devaluation increased steadily as the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and its effects on 
the current account deficit made the fixed exchange rate 
regime unsustainable. According to the data presented in 
chapter 7, the accumulated real appreciation between 1978 
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and 1981 was more than 30%. At the same time, the evidence 
from table 9 suggest that the current account deficit was 
nearly 10% of GOP per annum. With rising expectations of 
devaluation of the peso so did domestic nominal interest 
rates. At the same time, some firms and households began 
substituting foreign credit for domestic credit putting more 
pressure on domestic rates. As we will see shortly, there is 
evidence to support the validity of this hypothesis. 
other authors have questioned the validity of the 
underlying assumptions of the parity conditions. The work of 
Corbo and Matte (1984) indicates that Chilean assets and 
foreign assets were imperfect substitutes. In an economy 
with perfect capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate regime, 
perfect substitution between assets, and no sterilisation, 
the money supply is endogenous. Thus, a reduction in credit 
expansion is matched by a rise in foreign exchange reserves 
19 
so that the monetary base remains unchanged. In Corbo and 
Matte's model, the coefficient of compensation which relates 
the net flow of private capital as dependent variable with 
the internal credit of the Central Bank as independent was -
0.24 for a sample period between 1975-83. This result 
suggest that asset substitution was between 0 and 1 so that 
it was less than perfect. Although this evidence is useful, 
the model itself does not relate directly to the issue of 
interest rates nor does it identify those factors which 
determine the low substitutability found for the case of 
Chile. 
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There are other studies which have questioned the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility. In fact, as we have 
seen from the itinerary of financial reforms, the 
liberalisation of the economy to capital inflows was gradual 
and initially it focused on the elimination of restrictions 
on long and medium run flows. Short-term borrowing in 
foreign currency was allowed as late as 1982. Edwards and 
Khan (1985) provide a very handy theoretical framework for 
interest rate determination for a semi-open economy. For 
example, in the case of fully open capital account the 
domestic rate of interest depends on the three elements 
stated in the parity condition stated by expression (1) that 
o * e 
is i = i + e + ¢. In contrast, in a closed economy interest 
rate determination is influenced by domestic monetary 
conditions (demand and supply of money) and the expected 
e c e 
rate of inflation (rr) that is i = r + rr where r is the 
actual real interest rate. The value of r is determined by 
the excess liquidity in the economy that is r= k + ~ E M S + u u
where k is the long-run real interest rate, EMS is the 
20 
excess of money supply and u is random term. Thus, in the 
semi-open economy both external as well as domestic factors 
interact in the interest rate determination. Expressions (9) 
and (9a) correspond to the nominal interest rate 
determination for a semi-open economy. 
0 c 
( 9 ) i = €>i + ( 1 €» i 
* 
e e 
(9a) i = ct + £H i + e ) + T10g m + 0"10g Y + 6Tt + r¢ + E. 
t-1 
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If B=l and ~ = ~ = d = O O then expression (9a) becomes the 
interest rate determination for an open economy. Moreover, 
if B and ~ ~ are found statistically significant it would 
indicate that external and domestic factors are important in 
the interest rate determination. Edwards (1986) reports the 
results from the estimation of (2a) using quarterly data for 
the period 1977-82 and applying the OLS corrected for serial 
* e 
correlation. He found that the coefficient for (i + e) and 
log(m)t-l was significant and with the correct sign. This 
gives support to the view that internal monetary conditions 
played a decisive role affecting nominal interest rate in 
Chile. At the same time, it gives empirical support to the 
expected devaluation hypothesis discussed earlier. The 
coefficient measuring the risk premimum was found 
insignificant. These result should be treated with caution 
given some the simplication introduced into the model. 
e 
Firstly, it assumes that ~ ~ = ~ ~ under rational expectations. 
Secondly, ¢ was express as constant plus a serially 
correlated random term. However, in practice this premium 
depends among other things on the stock of debt/GDP, 
political factors, and government assets etc. 
Finally, the proxy for expected devaluation was 
estimated as the difference in percentage points between 
that quarter's effective real exchange rate and the one 
prevailing in June 1979 when the nominal rate was fixed. 
This expected realised real devaluation is an ex post rate 
rather than an ex ante rate. 
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Looking at the demand factors, we have seen that the 
rolling-over of bad debts and the interest rate 
capitalisation increased the demand for credit generating as 
suggested by Harberger (1985a) a false demand for credit. 
From his view, this problem started at very early stage as a 
result of loss-making enterprises which were privatised and 
continued generating losses afterwards. He maintained that 
as early as in 1976 the rolling-over was a significant 
factor raising both the demand for credit and interest 
rates. We also saw that most of the demand pressure for 
credit came from the action of economic conglomerates to 
boost their assets prices and continue their expansion. The 
empirical verification of these hypotheses is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
The final query from the behaviour of interest rates is 
the spread between the lending and deposit interest rates. 
Table 11e column 3a presents the estimates of the gross 
spread between lending and deposit rates. The spread was 
extremely large in 1975 and 1976 with 264.3% and 152.5% per 
annum respectively. The magnitude of this spread can be 
explained by high reserve requirements and high inflation 
rates. Recalling the evidence from tables 9, the inflation 
rate in 1975 and 1976 was 340% and 174% and the effective 
reserve ratio estimated in table 2 was nearly 64% and 68.3% 
respectively. The spread began falling very rapidly from 
62.7\ in 1977 to 9.5% in 1980. These results coincided with 
the payments of a competitive interest rates on reserve 
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requirements from 1976 onwards and the gradual reduction of 
the legal reserve as we have seen in table 8. At the same 
time, inflation dld experlenced a significant but gradual 
drop to 9.5% in 1981. 
However, the lowest spread attained in 1980 was still 
too high even when inflation rate was reduced to one digit 
in 1981 and the legal reserve requirement were set at 10% 
for sight deposits and 4% time deposits in 1980. Even worse, 
the gross spread began rising in 1981 and 1982. 
The data of column 3b in table lIe shows the estimates 
of the net spread (adjusted for reserve requirements). The 
net spread fell from 67.1% in 1975 to its lowest value of 
5.9% in 1980 and thereafter it began rising again. These 
results would indicate that much of the explanation of the 
spread adjusted for reserve requirements lies in structural 
characteristics of the banking system particularly between 
1980 and 1982. 
The answer to this puzzle should be found in the 
oligopolistic structure of the Chilean financial system. As 
we have seen earlier, a liberalisation of the financial 
market with high concentration and bank holding company 
structure could also explain high interest rates and a large 
spread. It appears that the restoration of a bank holding 
company structure that resulted from the privatisation of 
the Chilean banking system together with increasing pressure 
from domestic and foreign competitors drove the newly 
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established "groups" to compete for market shares. This in 
turn should account for high interest rates and a large 
spread between asset and liabilities rates throughout the 
liberalisation period. Indeed the evidence from chapter 3 
suggest that the bulk of intermediation was concentrated in 
three major commercial banks and the share of non-bank 
financial institutions and foreign banks 
small. Also, table 10e confirms that two 
was extremely 
of these three 
large financial entities had over 50% of the loan portfolios 
in affiliated firms. 
The effect of rising non-performing loans and increasing 
provision on the spread can also be taken as an equally 
possible explanation. Table 12 shows that the portfolio 
expenditure/total asset ratio support this assertion as it 
went up from 1.3% in 1980 to 6.7% in 1982. Chapter 3 
provide more detailed evidence on the behaviour of the non-
performing loans and the provisions for bad debts 
particularly between 1982-83. 
Finally, it could be argued that the Chile's 
system did not exhibit any significant gain in 
efficiency and hence it can held accountable for 
financial 
operative 
relatively 
high net spread. The evidence from next sUb-section does not 
give much support to this hypothesis. 
All in all, it could be argued that the hypotheses 
introduced to explain the behaviour of interest rate in 
Chile are valid according to the point in which the economy 
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was located in the itinerary of economic reforms. Probably 
the role of expected devaluation was even more important 
than a credit crunch between 1979-1982. At the same time, 
external shocks such as a dollar appreciation became more 
serious as the economy was totally integrated to the world 
economy in both trade and finance. In contrast, high 
interest rates during the period 1974-1978 can be better 
explained by initial deregulation of interest rates, tight 
restriction of capital inflows, the fiscal austerity and 
particularly the monetary tightening during 1975-76, and the 
lack of credibility of the anti-inflationary programme. 
However, one factor which appears systematically in both 
period is the excess demand for loans. It was argued that 
the purchase of assets from privatisation during 1974-78 was 
financed by bank credit and the rolling-over of bad loans 
specially during 1979-82 contributed to the excess demand 
and high interest rates. In addition, the financing of both 
the expansion of economic conglomerates and the stock 
exchange's speculative bubble became decisive factor which 
went totally unnoticed and uncontrolled by the authorities. 
In my view, this issue was paramount in the behaviour of 
private sector indebtness and interest rates. The conduct 
of banks and banks managers in response to the incentives 
from financial liberalisation and the relaxation of 
supervision were at the centre of this story and as it will 
tested in Chapter 8 on the debacle of the banking system. 
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(2.3.2.3) Operative Efficiency in Chilean Banks. 
One of the expected results from financial 
liberalisation particularly the lifting of restrictions for 
entry into the financial system and the establishment of a 
multi-purpose banking system was a rise in the level of 
operative efficiency. The significant reduction of the net 
spread between 1975 to 1980 confirms this result although 
still remained significantly large for international 
standards. 
One indicator of operative efficiency is the salaries 
and administrative expenses/total asset ratio shown in table 
12. This ratio was estimated using information from banks' 
balance sheets and income statements. 
Table 2.12 Salaries and Administrative Expenses in Chile. 
NFOEx/TA AdEx/TA SEx/TA PortEx/TA 
1975 8.5 8.8 
1976 8.1 1.8 
1977 7.3 1.1 
1978 5.4 1.8 
1979 5.0 1.04 2.83 2.0 
1980 4.3 1.06 2.65 1.3 
1981 3.7 1.14 2.42 4.3 
1982 3.4 0.86 1.95 6.7 
Sources: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Chamorro (1985a) 
Notes: NFOEx/TA=Non-financial operative expenses/total asset 
ratio includes administrative expenses and 
salaries 
AdEx/TA = Adminitrative expenses/total asset ratio 
SEx/TA = Salaries/total asset ratio 
PortEx/TA= Portfolio expenses including provision 
relative to total assets. 
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The evidence suggest that the non-financial operative 
- '·1"" ""1- Q - -It -tal e. ••• I:'c: l ~ ~ e::i _" '-> "._ asset ratio continously fell from 8.5% to 
3.5% between 1975 and 1982. These results prompt us to 
confirm a significant gains in operative efficiency. 
However, these figures are still above those of a more 
competitive banking system. For instance, Chamorro (1985a) 
found that this ratio for the US was only 2.5% between 1979 
and 1983. 
The largest component of the non-financial operation 
expenses correspond to salaries. For instance, in 1981 
salaries were 2.42% of total assets as compared with 1.14% 
for administrative expenses. 
The evidence indicates that financial liberalisation 
contributed to a significant increases in operative 
efficiency although it remained somewhat higher than a more 
competitive financial system such as the US. These results 
tend to over estimate the efficiency gains as the value of 
total assets goes in the denominator. As we have seen in 
previous sections, the growth of financial assets was 
spectacular during this period. Indeed, if we observe the 
growth of nominal non-financial operative expenses we obtain 
a different conclusion. Between 1978 and 1982 these 
expenditure item grew by 325% with salaries having the 
biggest share. 
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(2.3.2.4) Financial stability in Chile. 
The single most puzzling and disturbing issue of 
Chile's financial liberalisation was the collapse of the 
banking system in 1983. A large number of both private banks 
and non-bank financial institutions were liquidated, 
intervened, and/or supported with public money. As we will 
see in chapter 3, Banco del Estado (state bank) and Banco 
Industrial and Comercio Exterior remained the only 
exceptions which did not required any financial support. 
It could be argued that as much as financial liberalisation 
affected the performance of the financial system, the focus 
should be placed on the new incentives to bankers which 
emerged from an unregulated financial market. They became 
the main actors in affecting some of the unexpected ex 
results of financial liberalisation, particularly 
financial crisis of 1983. The deterioration of 
post 
the 
the 
macroeconomic environment although important as a triggering 
mechanism, should not be considered as the central 
hypothesis to explain the performance of the financial 
sector. Indeed, according to the early warning model 
estimated in chapter 6, the ex ante probability of bank 
failures/problems was 
financial debacle. 
significant three years 
Internal influences from 
before the 
financial 
liberalisation and external factors from adverse changes in 
some key macroeconomic variables are two testable hypotheses 
which will be studied and empirically evaluated in chapters 
7 and 8. 
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In general, one would conclude that the expected results 
from financial liberallsatlon were achieved only partially. 
Although, the evidence indicates a sUbstantial increase in 
financial intermediation (deepening), and a marked gains in 
operative efficiency, the level of savings and investment 
remained stagnant. There were no clear signs of an 
improvement in both resource allocation and the quality of 
investment. Instead, the banking system was fostering an 
unsustainable private sector indebtness, a risky 
concentration of loan portfolios with their affiliate firms, 
and financing stock market bubbles and the consolidation of 
economic "groups". All this behaviour occurred in spite of 
stubborn high interest rates, and a significant 
deterioration of the macroeconomic environment. Finally, the 
collapse of the banking system in 1983 is clear evidence of 
the unsuccessful liberalisation of the financial system in 
Chile. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the magnitude of the banking 
failures in Chile and the steps taken by the authorities in 
order to avoid the total collapse from widespread panic. At 
the same time, it will provide a glimpse at the measures 
introduced to rehabilitate the financial system. 
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Endnotes. 
(1) Bernanke (1983) was one of the first in introducing a 
link between financial disruption and output decline. This 
came to complement the monetary forces behind the repression 
of the 1930's. In Bernanke's view, in an imperfect capital 
market banks perform a real service by differentiating good 
from bad risk borrowers. 
(2) Tobin also showed that the steady-state value of k in 
the monetary growth model was smaller than in a model with 
no money. In other words, the monetary model exhibits a 
smaller output per capita. This is shown by the equilibrium 
condition for k which is given by [s-(l-s)xn]f(k)=nk which 
is smaller than sf(k)=nk where x is the fraction of f(k) 
held in the form of real money balances. 
(3) The coexistence of small and large firms producing a 
similar product but with a different factor proportion, an 
unequal access to technology, and a different growth and use 
of human capital confirm the degree of fragmentation in 
underdeveloped economies. However, most of this 
fragmentation has been largely the outcome of misguided 
government policies which have condemned some sectors of the 
economy to be technologically backward. For instance, Galbis 
(1977) modelled a fragmented economy with two sectors: one 
with a modern technology and the other with a backward 
technology. The lack of well developed financial market 
permitted the coexistence of these two sectors, the 
disparities in the rate of return of capital in the economy, 
and a lower rate of economic growth. 
(4) The homogeneity and perfect divisibility of capital 
enable households to use only fractions of their capital to 
carry out their transactions and settle their debts 
obligations. 
(5) Most governments of developing countries have been 
technically constrained in the amount of fiscal resources 
they could rise from direct and indirect taxation, 
especially the problem of tax evasion and existing lags in 
collecting tax revenues or known as the Olivera-Tanzi 
effect. In addition, the absence of well established and 
developed open market in primary securities has ruled out 
the possibility to issue and trade government and private 
sector paper. For Mckinnon and Mathieson (1981) the absence 
of open markets for primary security has little to do with a 
distortion and more with a low level of income per capita 
and the resulting small scale of savers and investors. 
Transaction costs and information asymmetries would be 
unmanagable in LDC's. However, Fry (l982a) maintain that 
private bonds and equity markets are supressed as a result 
of government taxation such as transaction taxes, stamp 
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duties, taxes on capital gains. The government's rationale 
to supress these markets lies on the fact that seigniorage 
cannot be taken easily from bonds and equities. 
(6) ACcolding to Mckinnon and Mathieson (1981), firms in the 
import-substitution sector which were protected from 
potential imports normally they were granted official bank 
credits at negative real interest rate. Indeed, official 
intervention in the allocation of credit were so pervasive, 
detailed, and bewildering as much as the restrictions on 
foreign trade policies. 
(7) Authorities tend to place a heavy reserve requirements 
on most liquid monetary assets and it gradually falls as the 
assets is less liquid. In effect, one should find that 
reserve requirements on time deposits is smaller than demand 
deposits. In addition, the effective reserve requirement in 
a liberalised and financially matured economy should be 
lower than in a less developed economy. 
(8) In his review of disequilibrium interest rates in 
developing countries, Fry (1982b) argues that the prevalence 
of interest rate ceilings has a number of explanations. To 
begin with, he identifies the Keynesian liquidity preference 
as a floor for nominal interest rate and an above-
equilibrium for the real interest rate. Unless the 
opportunity cost of holding money and/or real income fall 
the disequilibrium will persist. Beside the Neoclassical 
monetary growth theory and the substitution of money and 
capital, there are also political and religious factors 
which explain these ceilings. 
(9) The list of selected countries both, developed and 
developing were chosen in order to compare their financial 
development with the Chilean's case. Among developed 
economies, the US, Germany, and Japan correspond to growing 
economies with a developed and mature financial system. 
Korea and Singapore represent rapidly growing developing 
economies where a mature banking system have emerged as 
result of financial liberalisation during the 1960's and 
1970's. Among repressed developing countries, it was 
included the case of Mexico, although the peak of financial 
repression was reached during the nationalisation period 
between 1982-89. This list of countries is by no mean 
exhaust so further result from other studies will be 
address. 
(10) However, the exactitude of these estimates should be 
treated with caution since no adjustments were made for any 
interest paid on bank reserves. Lack of data on interest 
payments precluded any attempt to obtain more accurate 
calculations. 
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(11) The empirical investigations on government seignorage 
suggest that the choice of a monetary aggregate depends on 
the nature of the empirical investigation. If we are 
interested in estimating how much the non-financial private 
sector pays to use money then M1 will suffice. However, if 
we want to assess how much the government collects from 
the inflation tax then the monetary base should be 
considered more useful. Equally, if the object of the study 
is to establish the amount of inflationary finance in the 
long-run then M1 is preferable to M2. For instance, any loss 
in financial assets from expectation errors or policy 
surprises on inflation and hence ex post real interest rates 
will be rapidly corrected. This effect has indeed short run 
implications. Also, it will probably involve transfers among 
private agents without the government's involvement. 
(12) More sophisticated models enable us a more accurate 
estimation of the seignorage. An alternative specification 
of the government seignorage can be stated as Ss=M/P=Mt-Mt-1 
plus Mt-1(Pt/1+Pt) where M is a well defined monetary 
aggregate and P the inflation rate. This gross estimate of 
the real seignorage can be adjusted in order to include the 
revenue losses from the time lag on tax collection. This is 
known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect. Thus, net government 
seignorage can be written as follows Ss=Mt-Mt-1+Mt-
1(Pt/1+Pt) - Tt-1(Pt/1+Pt). 
(13) Similar results and conclusions were found by Brock 
(1984). He also used the monetary base to estimate a nominal 
seignorage from the inflation tax on intermediation during 
the 1970's. In his sample apart from US, UK, and Mexico, his 
study also included Germany, Colombia, and Brazil. 
(14) Giovannini also questioned the empirical results with 
respect to the econometric problems of specifying and 
estimating the aggregate saving functions. Due to lack of 
disaggregated data on private and government savings, the 
use of total domestic savings as a dependent variable was 
not satisfactory. The aggregation of savings is satisfactory 
only under the Ricardian-Equivalence Theorem. The 
exogeneity assumptions of the explanatory variables of the 
model was also challanged. Looking at the consumption-saving 
relationship as an intertemporal optimisation, approach he 
estimated and tested the coefficient of intertemporal 
substitution of consumption over time for a group of 
countries. Using annual data, he found that in 5 out of 18 
countries does the expected path of consumption changes at 
all with changes in the real interest rate. Indeed, in most 
case the interest rates is insignificant. 
(15) Meller and Solimano (1983) provided econometric 
evidence which support the view that asset prices were 
unrelated to fundamentals ( flow of future dividends) even 
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under rational expectations and full information efficiency 
(arbitrage) conditions. Instead its value was determined by 
a speculative bubble. 
(16) The predominance of domestic banks over foreign banks 
and financieras is even more significant as measured in 
terms of liabilities and assets. This evidence is presented 
in chapter 3. Additional information with respect to the 
size of the financial sector measured in terms of its 
contribution to GDP is shown in chapter 7. 
(17) If we start from the basic proposition that savings is 
the difference between income and consumption then the 
theoretical and empirical differences on approaches will be 
centered on the definition of income and consumption and 
some of the underlying assumptions concerning some 
institutional and structural characteristics. The 
Modigliani's life-cycle hypothesis and the Friedman's 
permanent income hypothesis is confined within a Fisher's 
intertemporal optimisation model where intertemporal 
consumption (optimal) depends on current income but more 
important on long-run income. In addition, wealth, 
demographic variables, factors afecting the present value of 
income such as the rate of interest should be also 
considered. These models contrast with the traditional 
Keynesian model where household consume a fraction of 
current disposable income and thus changes in both current 
income and the MPC would affect consumption and henceforth 
savings. The introduction of assumptions specially 
imperfect capital markets and credit rationing will ample 
and transform this framework into liquidity constraint 
models. Another type of theoretical framework is the 
generational model. The time horizon exceed one generation 
so that factors affecting optimal consumption and hence 
savings pattern are also influenced by pensions and 
insurance, magnitude of transfers, and uncertainty. 
(18) The dynamic of the adjustment of the parity condition 
can be stated as follows. Suppose that we start from 
equilibrium where the interest rate parity does hold. 
Suppose that the risk premium (¢) fall as a result of a pre-
announced "tablita" for the future path of nominal exchange 
rate. It follows that a fall in the exchange rate 
uncertainty will reduce the risk premium on domestic assets. 
A positive spread between domestic and foreign rates will 
emerge and, other things being equal, capital inflows should 
increase forcing domestic interest rates to fall until the 
differential is consistent with the new and lower risk 
premium. 
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(19) The adjustment of the model comprise an excess demand 
for money over its supply which rises the domestic rate of 
interest and accelerate the purchase of assets in domestic 
currency. This portfolio adjustment will put pressure on the 
exchange rate so that under a fixed regime the authorities 
would need to defend the fixed regime by purchasing dollars 
and accumulating them as reserves. 
(20) The excess money supply over the demand for money is 
given by EMS=log(m)t-log(md)t so that when EMS)O then r<k in 
the short run. In the long run EMS=O so that r=k+u. The real 
demand for money is given by log(md)t= a+blog(y)t-c(k+rre)-
drre where y is real income and rre is expected inflation 
rate. Finally the stock of real money balances adjust 
according to the variation in [log(m)t-Iog(m)t-l]= 
Z(10g(md)t-log(m)t-1 where Z is the adjustment coefficient 
and lies between 0 and 1. If EMS)O because m is greater than 
the long-run money demand then short run nominal interest 
rate will be below equilibrium. The market will be 
equilibrated via a fall in real money balances. 
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Chapter 3. Banking Failures in Chile during 1981-83. 
(3.1) Introduction. 
This chapter provides an evaluation of the magnitude of 
the banking crisis in Chile. It analyses the performance and 
the degree of vulnerability of financial institutions by 
examining balance-sheet data. Moreover, there is a 
description and an assessment of the mechanisms to rescue 
and to rehabilitate the Chilean financial system. As it will 
be shown the banking crisis in Chile which began to unfold 
in 1981 involved a large number of bank failures which 
required an aggressive handling to avoid the total collapse 
of the financial system and the whole economy. The 
authorities have chosen the intermediate solution by letting 
shareholders and the government absorb the losses. 
From a theoretical point of view, a bank fails just like 
any other enterprise if its net worth becomes negative or if 
it is unable to continue its operations without incurring 
losses that would immediately result in a negative net 
worth. 
In practice, however, most bank failures do not occur at 
the precise time when the value of the bank reaches zero or 
negative. In fact, most situations are resolved in ways that 
do not entail bankruptcy. Thus, the authorities may 
encourage a merger between a sound financial institution and 
a problem bank. Alternatively, the authorities may 
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introduce emergency measures like the transitory 
substitution of bad assets for cash and/or other government 
assets. As we will see this is the approach followed by the 
monetary authorities in Chile. Chapter 5 discusses further 
the issue of a working definition of bank failures. 
(3.2) The Stylised Facts and the Magnitude of the Banking 
Failures in Chile 1981-83. 
As we have seen from the previous chapter, the measures 
enacted by the government in order to liberalise the 
financial system did yield initially some positive and 
encouraging results. The banking sector experienced a period 
of rapid growth and it showed some signs of increased 
efficency. Among the most encouraging signs the M2/GDP ratio 
rose, the spread between lending and borrowing rates 
declined, lending rates showed some steady decline although 
they remain high relative to world interest rates. In this 
more deregulated environment increasing competition and the 
introduction of new products from new banks and non-bank 
financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, were 
providing savers and investors with a wider range of 
financial services. However, after 6 years of sustained 
financial growth and stability, the banking system 
experienced one of the worst financial crises in the 
country's history starting in 1981 and reaching its peak of 
intensity in 1983. Severe solvency and profitability 
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problems came to affect a large segment of the banking 
sector which overshadowed the performance of the banking 
sector during the late 1970'5. 
(3.2.1) The Chronology and the Stylised Facts of the Crisis. 
The period of financial liberalisation which ran from 
1974 to 1982 contains several financial episodes involving 
the failure and/or problem of some financial institutions. 
The first financial disorder occurred in 1974-75 with the 
insolvencies of a number of non-bank financial institutions, 
both formal and informal. Unlike commercial banks, this form 
of financial intermediary flourished as a result of the lack 
of any capital requirement and supervision. They were soon 
discouraged with the introduction of a minimum capital 
1 
requirement. 
During the mid-seventies we also witnessed a process of 
transformation, fusion, and the closed down of the Saving 
and Loan Associations (SINAP). The establishment of a multi-
banking financial system which enabled banks to enter into 
the mortgage business and the introduction of some 
restrictions on the asset and liability composition of the 
SINAP resulted in a rapid fall in the numbers of this type 
of institution as they began merging among themselves. By 
the end of 1978 there was one left 
2 
years later this finally closed its doors. 
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and two 
These financial disorders did not pose any real threat 
to the stability of the financial system nor required the 
intervention of the Superintendency of Banks and Financial 
Institutions (SIBF) which were in charge of regulating and 
supervising the system. However, the 1977 rescue of Banco 
Osorno not only was the exception to the rule but also it 
left a dangerous precedent to the public as whole. Given 
that there were clear signs that this important bank was 
threatened by bankruptcy, the authorities, who also feared 
the drain of the internal and in particular external 
confidence in the financial system, rescued all depositors 
3 
and the institution. 
Although we cannot trace the origin of the banking 
crisis to this single financial episode, one could equally 
maintain that the decision to bailout the bank produced 
lasting effects in terms of the expectations of the public 
on the safety of the system. 
The Chilean banking crisis began to unfold in late 1981. 
The failure of CRAV in May 1981, a large sugar refinery, was 
causing concern to the public and the authorities as some 
domestic commercial banks made loans without collateral. By 
December 1981, the government decided to intervene in order 
to liquidate 4 banks and an equal number of non-bank 
financial institutions. As we see from table 1 and the 
financial institution involved were Banco Talca, Banco 
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Linares, Banco Espanol, Banco de Fomento de Valparaiso, and 
Financieras Cash, de Capitales, Compania General Financiera, 
and Finansur among non-bank financial institutions. 
Altogether, they accounted for 10.2% of the total loans of 
the financial system. 
Rumours and fears of a rapid deterioration of the 
banking system were taking place as a result of the 
growing number of firms' bankruptcies during 1982 The 
evidence indicates that the number of bankruptcies among 
corporate enterprises and general establishments went from 
314 in 1978 to 885 in 1982. These worries were confirmed 
with the emergence of an acute banking crisis and the 
intervention of the banking authorities in January 1983. 
The evidence from the tables indicates that 5 banks had to 
be intervened, and 2 banks and 1 financiera had to be 
liquidated. Among those financial entities which were 
intervened we include Banco de Chile, Banco de Santiago, 
Banco de Concepcion, Banco Internacional, and Colocadora 
Nacional de Valores. They accounted for 43% of the total 
loans of the system. Moreover, the liquidation of Banco 
Hipotecario de Chile, Banco Unido de Fomento, and Financiera 
Ciga corresponded to nearly 6% of total loans of the system. 
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Table 3.1 Private Domestic Banks Intervened 
Liquidated. 
and/or 
------------------------------------------------------------
Banks Year Process Size ( d) 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Osorno 1976 Capitalised 2.0 
Espafio1(a) 1981 Liquidated & Sold 2.4 
Talca (b) 1981 Liquidated & Sold 4.0 
Linares 1981 Liquidated 0.1 
Fomento Valp. 1981 Liquidated 1.1 
Austral 1981 Liquidated 0.8 
Fomento Bio Bio 1981 Liquidated 0.3 
Hipotecario Chile 1983 Liquidated 3.4 
Unido de Fomento 1983 Liquidated 2.2 
Chile 1983 Capitalised & Sold 20.4 
Concepcion 1983 Capitalised & Sold 4.1 
Internacional 1983 Capitalised & Sold 1.1 
Santiago 1983 Capitalised & Sold 12.0 
Colocadora Nac. (c) 1983 Merged 2.0 
Hipotecario Fomento(d) 1983 Capitalised & Sold 3.3 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Ca) This bank was sold to the Spanish Santander Group. 
(b) Banco Talca became in Centrobanco 
(c) It was merged with Morgan Finanza 
(e) This bank was considered to be linked to Banco Santiago. 
Cd) Measured as % of total loans of the system. 
Appendix 1 provides a complete list of the number of 
financial institutions both banks and non-banks entities 
which were part of the financial system and experienced 
financial difficulties. 
Table 3.2 Non-Bank Financial Institutions Liquidated. 
Institution 
Cia.Gral. Financiera 
Cash 
De Capitales 
Del Sur 
Adelantos & Creditos 
Ciga 
Year 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Process 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Liquidated 
Size(a) 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) Measured as % of the total loans of the system. 
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All in all, the total sum added up to around 50% of 
total loans which were at stake and Banco de Chile and Banco 
de Santiago were the two largest banks in Chile with 20% and 
nearly 12% of loans relative to the total intermediation in 
December 1982. According to Arellano (1985) the support of 
the Central Bank for those financial institutions in 
liquidation and in emergency loans added up to more than 15% 
of GDP of 1982. Although the government was not forced to 
intervene by the existence of an explicit deposit 
arrangement, they had to pick-up the bill 
insurance 
to avoid 
systematic panics and bank runs, together with a deeper 
financial crisis. 
However, the dimensions of the 1983 banking crisis were 
much wider if we also include those financial intermediaries 
which, although they were not intervened by the SIBF, had to 
sell part of their nonperforming loans to the central Bank. 
Table 3 contains information about the institutions which 
made use of the Central Bank's directives number 1.450 and 
1.555 authorising banks to sell nonperforming loans to the 
Central Bank. These two directives from the Central Bank 
permitted both banks subject to intervention (intervened 
banks), and 
banks) to 
promissory 
later. 
non-intervened vulnerable banks (non-intervened 
substitute non-performing assets for cash and 
notes issued by the Central Bank as we will see 
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The data from table 3 points out three important issues 
which will be a matter of a closer scrutiny later on the 
paper. Firstly, those banks which were subject to 
intervention show a significant proportion of loans as 
nonperforming. This is quite evident in Banco de Chile, and 
Santiago, the two largest commercial banks in the system, 
with nearly 40% and 60% of their total loan portfolio 
respectively. 
Table 3.3 Nonperforming Loans Sold to the Central Bank.(a) 
Intervined Banks NPL/TL(b) Non-Intervined Banks NPL/TL Size 
------------------------------------------------------------
Chile 39.0 O'Higgins 14.2 2.9 
Continental 18.0 1.1 
Concepcion 55.8 Sudamericano 14.8 4.7 
Credito e Inversion 12.0 5.2 
Internacional 60.0 Trabajo 12.3 2.9 
Morgan(c) 11.8 1.6 
Santiago 52.5 Pacifico(d) 15.1 0.6 
Nacional(e) 16.2 1.9 
Colocadora Nac. 10.0 Edwards(f) 20.2 3.1 
Desarrollo(g) 19.5 0.4 
Hipotecario F. 26.0 Estado(h) 0.0 14.9 
BICE(i) 0.0 1.2 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) It corresponds to the highest value of NPL/TL between 
1984 and 1986 
(b) The ratio nonperforming loans (NPL) to total loans (TL) 
is expressed in % terms. 
(c) Ex Colocadora Nacional de Valores. 
(d) Ex Agrobanco. 
(e) Ex Banco Curico 
(f) Ex Banco de Constitucion 
(g) This bank was open only in 1983. 
(h) This is the only State Bank in the financial system. 
(1) Banco Industrial y de Comercio Exterior. 
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Secondly, the problem of non performing loans also 
emerged among non-intervened banks with ratios above the 10% 
and just below the 21% mark. Additional evidence from SIBF 
and Held (1989) shows that the total nonperforming loans 
sold to the Central Bank was equivalent to 27.7% of total 
loans of the system and 18.2% of GDP of 1985. 
Thirdly, the evidence also showed that there were only 
two domestic banks, Banco del Estado and BlCE, which did not 
need to transfer a proportion of their nonperforming loans 
to the Central Bank. 
Thus, between 1981 and 1983 the SIBF intervened 14 
domestic banks and 6 non-bank financial institutions from a 
total of 26 banks and 17 financieras, excluding the state 
bank Banco del Estado. From there the authorities liquidated 
a total of 8 banks and all the intervened financieras. 
The present empirical study on the banking crisis will 
be centered in the 1983 period. Although the beginning of 
the Chilean banking crisis can probably be dated in 1981, 
the crisis really came to a head in 1983. As we saw already, 
it did compromise a significant proportion of the 
intermediation and involved the two largest banks. In 
addition, the rescue package involved a substantial amount 
of public money. There are two additional justifications for 
concentrating on studying those institutions who failed or 
showed problems during 1983. The first one is that our 
interest is to test how important were the macroeconomic 
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environment relative to the bank management in the debacle 
of the banking system. As we have seen from chapter 2, 1982 
and 1983 were years where output fell dramatically. 
Secondly, as explained in chapter 6, data limitations 
force me to consider a sample of data between 1979 to 1983. 
The alternative would restrict the sample to a period 
between 1979 to 1981, and hence drawing inferences on 8 
quarterly observations and with a smaller sample of 
individual banks. 
(3.2.2) An Autopsy of the Banking Sector. 
The next step is to carry out an autopsy of the 
banking system and each individual financial institution in 
order to assess the magnitude of the crisis and to establish 
some tentative differences in their relative performance. 
The tables are constructed from the information obtained 
from the banks balance sheets and the income statements 
published by the SIBF. Appendix 2 provides a sample of the 
format and structure of a balance sheet and income statement 
of a Chilean bank. 
The data from tables 4 and 5 give evidence of the change 
of fortunes of the financial sector . 
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Table 3.4 Indicators of the Financial System Boom in 
Chi Ie. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
77 78 79 80 81 Av 
------------------------------------------------------------
Growth Bank Assets(b) 50.4 41.3 29.6 40.3 11.3 34.5 
Loans/GOP 16.6 23.2 28.2 37.6 50.4 31.2 
Growth Bank Liability(c) 47.8 51.0 29.9 42.8 11.6 36.6 
Gross Profits/Capital 8.7 18.5 23.0 23.5 11.4 17.0 
Sector GOP Growth 14.5 20.1 28.0 24.7 14.2 20.3 
GDP Sector/GOP 6.3 7.0 8.1 9.5 10.6 8.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Sources: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) It includes banks and non-banks financial institutions. 
(b) Wide definition of bank assets i.e. loans+financial 
investment+accrued interest and available funds+ Central 
Bank note from the selling of nonperforming loans. All in 
nominal terms. 
(c) Total obligations with third parties. 
The data on GDP growth for the financial sector show a 
significant increase with an average annual growth rate of 
20% and with a peak of 28.0% in 1979. The share of the 
financial sector GOP growth relative to the overall GOP of 
the economy was 8.3% per annum. Looking at the profitability 
and the rate of return of bank capital measured by the gross 
profits/capital ratio shows a marked rise from 8.7% to 
nearly 24% in 1980 with an annual average of 17%. These 
impressive results are not surprising given the high growth 
rate in bank assets and growing value of total loans 
relative to GOP. In fact, the data shows that the annual 
average growth rate of bank assets was 37.5 and the 
loans/GDP ratio over 31%. The peak of the loan/ GOP ratio 
occurred in 1981 with a 50% ratio during a period where 
output was still expanding very fast. At the same time, as 
we have seen from the previous chapter, the abnormal high 
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nominal and real lending rates as well as the persistence 
and ever increasing spread between lending and deposit 
intereBt rateB In the face of Increasing demand for credIt 
should explain the astonishing profitability and growth of 
the banking sector. This rapid growth in bank assets took 
place in an environment of falling inflation. As we have 
seen from chapter 2, the rate of inflation went from 
approximately 30% p.a in 1978 to 9.5% in 1981. 
However, the financial boom turned sour from the last 
quarter of 1981 onwards. The evidence from table 5 give an 
indication of the magnitude of the change between 1982 and 
1983 years at which the full blow of the emerging banking 
crisis was felt and the authorities inmplemented the 
rehabilitation programmes. 
Table 3.5 Indicators of the Financial Sector Collapse in 
Chile. 
Growth Bank Assets 
Loans/GOP 
Growth of Bank Liabilities 
Gross Profits/Capital 
Sector GOP Growth 
GOP Sector/ GOP 
1982 
22.6 
71.2 
24.7 
4.1 
-4.4 
11.7 
1983 
12.3 
72.4 
11.8 
-24.0 
-40.5 
7.5 
1984 
19.0 
74.5 
19.8 
-24.7 
-9.2 
6.5 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Av 
17.9 
72.7 
18.7 
-14.8 
-18.0 
8.5 
The evidence from table 5 shows the magnitude of the 
deterioration of the financial system between 1982-84. For 
instance, the GOP growth of the financial sector fell by an 
annual average of 18% during those three years with a trough 
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of nearly 41% in 1983. Equally dramatic was the return on 
bank capital which shows a significant fall in 1982 and 
becomes more acute in 1983 and 1984 with minus 24%. This 
performance coincided with the large fall in GDP in 1982 and 
1983 of 14% and 0.7% respectively. Given the increasing 
financial fragility of firms, we observe a rise in the 
loan/GOP ratio in the face of falling output and increasing 
real lending rates which indicates some form of distress 
borrowing. 
Further evidence from banks' balance sheets shows the 
increasing vulnerability and insolvency of the financial 
system. Looking at the risk exposure, table 6 shows that the 
amount of nonperforming loans grew very dangerously during 
1982,1983, and 1984. For instance, in 1983 nonperforming 
loans almost reached 50% of the capital of the financial 
system and by 1984 was still rising to 60%. However, these 
figures underestimate the magnitude of the exposure since as 
we will see in the next subsection, the authorities allowed 
more flexible accounting procedures which among other things 
permitted banks longer recogniton time of nonperforming 
loans and the constitution of provisions. In addition, the 
authorities enabled banks to remove from their balance sheet 
nonperforming and risky loans using the agreement 1.450 in 
1982 and later on the agreement 1.555 of 1983. Therefore, 
the indicator which accounts for the nonperforming and risky 
loans sold to the Central Bank should be more meaningful and 
accurate. 
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Table 3.6 Financial Indicators of Vulnerability and 
Insolvency of the Financial System in Chile.(%) 
------------------------------------------------------------
81 82 83 84 Av 
-----------------------------------------
-------------------
NP Loans/Loans 2.9 7.5 5.5 3.8 4.9 
NP Loans/Capital 24.4 41.9 49.5 60.0 44.0 
NP Loans Sold/Loans 6.8 9.6 14.2 10.2 
NP Loans Sold/Capital 67.1 95.4 
NP& Risky Loans Sold/Capital 78.8 158.1 186.3 141.0 
Bank Liabilities/Capital 10.6 11.0 11.4 12.0 11.2 
Gross Profits/Total Assets 1.0 0.3 -1.7 -1.5 0.4 
Provisions/Total Assets 1.1 3.6 4.3 4.8 3.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various issues. 
NP= Nonperforming 
By 1983 and 1984, the selling of nonperforming loans and 
risky assets reached 158% and 186% of capital respectively. 
At that time, the amount of bad and risky credit purchased 
by the Central Bank had exceeded the capital of the 
financial system, thus showing the full extent of the 
banking crisis. Equally, we see the deterioration of the 
average return of each asset unit in 1983 and 1984, measured 
by the negative figures of the gross profit/total asset 
ratio. 
The growing vulnerability and the poor profitability 
combined with a relaxation on the constitution of provisions 
and capital requirement forced the authorities to rescue 
those institutions, as we have seen in tables 1-3, which 
were facing insolvency and/or experiencing a severe 
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deterioration of their asset quality. Disaggregated data 
will show the financial vulnerability of each individual 
institution which was rescued and/or required some financial 
aid. The individual data will produce some interesting clues 
on the comparative performance and their state of financial 
health. 
Tables 7 to 13 are organised as follows. The first 8 
financial institutions in the first group correspond to 
those which were liquidated and intervened in 1983. The 
second group is composed by those banks which sold 
nonperforming and risky loans to the Central Bank. Finally, 
the two remaining institutions correspond to those which 
were not required to participate in any of the initiatives 
enacted by the authorities to rescue the banking system. 
They both remained healthy throughout the period of study. 
This configuration not only shows the increasing 
deterioration of each individual financial institution but 
also permit us to compare at first sight marked differences 
in the ratios between groups. Chapter 5 provides a more 
thorough and sophisticated statistical analysis for groups 
differences. 
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Table 3.7 Financial Indicator of Vulnerability: Asset 
Quality. 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) NPL/Loans NPL/Capital 
------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions 80 81 82 83 80 81 82 83 
------------------------------------------------------------
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga (b) 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
29.2 
1.6 
1.5 
1.8 
0.6 
0.3 
1.2 
2.0 
1.2 
2.2 
1.3 
1.4 
1.7 
0.1 
1.5 
0.5 
4.1 
1.4 
2.0 
2.0 
1.0 
0.5 
0.8 
1.6 
2.1 
2.5 
1.3 
1.7 
2.2 
0.7 
0.7 
1.0 
O. 4 
2.0 
1.9 
4.2 
3.0 
7.2 
3.5 
6.2 
5.2 
1.2 
4.1 
2.9 
4.2 
5.2 
5.0 
3.9 
0.3 0.2 6.4 
4.8 2.9 9.0 
11.3 
14.5 
11.1 
30.7 
3.6 
7.4 
17.0 
2.7 
3.2 
2.0 
2.0 
3.9 
4.8 
2.8 
5.3 
407.1 
22.5 
14.1 
27.1 
6.9 
4 . 7 
20.8 
3.4 
12.3 
18.9 
15.0 
17.0 
22.8 
0.4 
7.3 
6.5 
57.9 
25.1 
23.5 
28.4 
12.2 
6.3 
14.8 
12.3 
22.7 
26.5 
19.3 
24.7 
29.0 
7.3 
7.1 
13.0 
93.0 
68.0 
68.9 
45.3 
66.8 
18.6 
33.0 
35.8 
42.9 
89.0 
38.1 
57.3 
45.1 
38.4 
44.1 
40.4 
177 
175 
102 
297 
147 
76 
182 
39 
43 
25 
21 
37 
72 
1.8 2.0 15.2 36 
31.7 15.4 33.5 28 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) NPL= Nonperforming Loans in the balance-sheet. 
(b) Non-bank financial institution. 
Table 7 contain individual data on the deterioration of 
the quality of banks' loan portfolios. The NPL/Loans ratio 
begin to show a notorious rise in 1983 in particular among 
those banks which were intervened in the same year. Banco 
Chile, Banco Santiago, and Banco de Concepcion present the 
largest deterioration of their loan quality in particular as 
we measure it against their capital and reserves. For 
instance, the worst case of all correspond to the Banco 
Santiago as the amount of nonperforming loans is nearly 
three time its capital. According to the preliminary 
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estimates, some worrying signs started to emerge in 1982 
although it became quite obvious during the intervention 
year. Similar observations can be made on those entities in 
the second group, although their capital obligation were 
less serious at least with respect to the first group. 
As we argued earlier, the accounting of nonperforming loans 
could be a misleading indicator given the recognition lag, 
the unwilligness to report, and above all its usefulness is 
seriously limited as an early indicator of those 
institutions which should be monitored. Nor may it provide 
evidence of the real magnitude of the deterioration of bank 
assets. 
Table 8 provides a better measure of the magnitudes 
involved for each institution as well as an ex post 
indicator of the actual deterioration of banks' asset 
quality. It should be pointed out that any difference 
between the values of NPL and loans sold to the Central Bank 
demonstrate the effect of under-reporting of the former. The 
data for 1982-83 begin to show the magnitude of the fall in 
the quality of banks' credit and the extent of the rescue 
operation. Individual banks were allowed 
nonperforming and risky loans to the Central Bank 
through the agreement 1.450 enacted in 1982 and 
1983 the agreement 1.550. 
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to sell 
initially 
later in 
Table 3.8 Additional Financial Indicator of Asset Quality. 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Loans Sold/Loans Loans Sold/Capital 
------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions 81 82 83 84 81 82 83 84 
------------------------------------------------------------
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
o . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
9.7 
4.8 
4.0 
6.1 
9.1 
1.5 
2.4 
9.4 
2.5 
0.0 
6.5 
8.0 
11.4 
8.1 
1.9 
6.2 
0.0 
0.0 
9.3 
13.1 
10.9 
20.1 
9.0 
5.8 
9.2 
7.4 
15.0 
10.5 
8.5 
6.7 
10.8 
0.0 
0.0 
7.7 
11.0 
8.6 
19.0 
11.4 
14.2 
18.0 
14.1 
12.0 
9.6 
15.1 
16.2 
15.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
176.0 
75.1 
64.5 
74.2 
89.4 
14.6 
43.9 
73.9 
25.5 
0.0 
100.1 
112.7 
154.3 
101.1 
18.8 
97.5 
0.0 
0.0 
148.8 
164.1 
104.2 
166.3 
165.3 
58.5 
93.2 
116.1 
210.8 
140.1 
88.0 
65.5 
156.7 
0.0 
0.0 
------------------------------------------------------ ------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) Loans sold to the Central Bank includes nonperforming 
and risky loans 
There are two interesting observations from the data 
which is worth to comment on. Firstly, the ratio of 
NPL/Capital in the case of the intervened banks is similiar 
to the ratio Loans Sold/Capital in spite of a wider 
definition of the latter. Secondly, the largest quantities 
of loans sold is concentrated in the second group of the 
table and exceed the banks capital. We also observe that in 
1982 the second group of banks sold a larger quantities of 
loans to the Central Bank than the first group. The answer 
lies in the fact that, unlike the second group, the 
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agreement 1.555 restricted intervened banks from selling 
nonperforming and risky loans until they were recapitalised. 
In general, the asset deterioration which according to 
NPL/Capital ratio was somewhat submerged in the case of 
Banco Continental, Sudamericano, Credito, Trabajo, Pacifico, 
and Edwards emerged with a full blast in 1982-83. At the 
same time, Banco del Estado and Banco Industrial y de 
Comercio Exterior remained as the only two exceptions which 
did not sell any nonperforming and risky loans to the 
Central Bank. 
With respect to the profitability, the data should 
reflect the overall performance of a bank. An inadequate 
profitability will give a signal of the vulnerability and a 
high likelihood of a bank insolvency as the bank net worth 
start falling. The profit/asset ratio shows the average 
return of each unit of bank asset and it can also be 
interpreted as a proxy for the quality of bank assets. The 
data on the average return on assets not only shows that the 
trend in profitability has been downward but also its lowest 
values occurred in 1983. For instance, Banco Santiago is the 
worst performer with a negative average return of almost 7% 
followed by Banco Concepcion and Banco Chile with minus 5.4% 
and 2.6% respectively. The same conclusions are reached 
for the second group in the tables although the fall in 
profItabillty was more moderate than in the first group. 
Banco Continental is the only comparable case as the figures 
shows a marked deterioration which had started in 1982. 
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Table 3.9 Financial Indicators of Vulnerability: 
Profitability. 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Profits/Assets Profits/Capital 
------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions 80 81 82 83 80 81 82 83 
------------------------------------------------------------
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
0.4 
0.9 
1.4 
o . 4 
0.6 
0.2 
0.3 
0.0 
1.0 
0.7 
o . 3 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
0.8 
0.1 
0.3 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.7 
-1.0 
0.1 
-0.5 
0.6 
0.1 
0.4 
-0.3 
0.5 
0.3 
0.6 
0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.4 
0.5 
0.1 
0.5 
0.3 
-0.7 
0.9 
-2.1 
0.2 
0.4 
0.0 
0.1 
0.5 
-0.1 
-2.6 
-5.4 
-2.3 
-6.9 
-0.1 
0.0 
-5.1 
-0.1 
-0.6 
0.0 
-0.7 
-0.1 
-0.1 
0.4 0.6 0.3 0.1 
0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 
5.4 
16.8 
17.8 
8.3 
9.0 
4.0 
5.6 
0.1 
12.6 
8.5 
5.8 
4.9 
8.2 
1.6 
5.3 
1.3 
4 • 6 
3.9 
5.1 
4.1 
4.7 
3.4 
9.9 
-15.1 
2.0 
-5.0 
-0.1 
1.2 
6.3 
6.6 
1.5 
5.4 
6.6 
-7.6 
8.0 10.7 
1.1-23.1 
7.6 2.5 
-4.7 5.4 
7.2 -0.3 
3.8 1.1 
7.1 6.2 
2.2 -1.1 
-54 
-77 
-26 
-77 
-1 
o 
-68 
-1 
-14 
o 
-9 
-1 
-1 
8.3 4.3 1.2 
5.7 3.5 3.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) Bank Assets includes loans, financial investment, and 
cash. Also profits are defined as the difference between 
the total income account and the total expenses account. 
The profit/capital ratio which is the more traditional 
measure of the rate of return on investment also presents 
evidence of the fall in profitability. The same conclusions 
emerge from the profit/capital ratio. Individual banks 
exhibit both a declining trend in the rate of return of 
capital and the lowest figures in 1983. Among the largest 
banks Banco Chile and Banco Concepcion showed the best and 
the worst rates of return of capital with 17.8% and 8.3% in 
1981 and -54% and -77% in 1983 respectively. In addition, 
Banco Santiago systematically showed the worst performance 
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between 1981 to 1983. Again in the second group, Banco 
Continental shows a comparable performance with the largest 
banks with a negative rate of return in two consecutive year 
with -23% in 1982 and 
-68% in 1983. Again, BrCE and Banco 
del Estado were the only two exceptions as they remain 
profitable even in the worst year of the banking crisis. 
If we look at the NPL/capital, loans sold/capital and 
profit/assets ratios the downward trend in profitability 
which started to emerge in 1982 and fully developed in 1983 
coincide with the worsening in the quality of the banks loan 
portfolios over any significant increase in operating costs. 
The estimated ratios for both intervined banks and those in 
the second group consistently showed a deterioration in 
these three ratios in particular in 1982 and 1983. Banco 
Santiago, Banco Concepcion, and Banco Chile were the worst 
cases in the former group and Banco Continental and Banco 
Credito in the latter. 
The provision/loans ratio and the liabilities/capital 
ratio are additional indicators of increasing vulnerability. 
The former attempt to measure the provisions made in order 
to cover any potential losses from any expected and 
unexpected deterioration of the loan portfolio. In this 
case, the numerator reflects the bank's total provision. As 
we will see later much of this figure is determined by the 
country's banking regulation on specific and global 
provision. There are two general observations to be inferred 
from this data exhibited in table 10. 
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Table 3.10 Additional Indicators of Vulnerability. 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Provision/Loans Liabilities/Capital 
------------------------------------------------------------
Institutions 80 81 82 83 80 81 82 83 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
9.8 
9.4 
7.6 
5.0 
6. 5 
5.0 
5.6 
10.9 
8.7 
6.1 
5.0 
6.0 
5.3 
14.5 
6.3 
3.2 
1.2 
1.1 
0.9 
1.1 
1.8 
1.1 
0.8 
0.9 
1.6 
0.2 
1.1 
0.8 
1.5 
0.8 
1.1 
0.8 
4 . 4 
4.7 
3.2 
2.4 
3.2 
3.1 
1.4 
3.5 
2.8 
3.1 
1.7 
2.1 
2.1 
1.1 
2.2 
1.3 
5.6 
5.5 
6.9 
8.0 
3.0 
3.9 
12.3 
2.4 
3.0 
2.7 
3.0 
3.5 
2.4 
5.0 1.1 1.9 3.8 
14.3 5.2 7.1 10.5 
17.0 
19.5 
15.2 
15.3 
13.6 
15.3 
17.5 
9.8 
13.8 
10.7 
16.9 
16.1 
13.6 
13.0 
13.8 
14.4 
15.6 
14.1 
20.5 
15.5 
11.5 
11.0 
19.2 
0.9 
12.9 
11.6 
17.9 
16.6 
15.8 
13.5 
11.3 
17.8 
24.0 
18.3 
10.6 
9.3 
17.4 
8.7 
24.3 
17.1 
15.2 
14.4 
9.5 
11.1 
15.3 
13.3 14.5 14.4 
7.0 7.3 7.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) These estimates were elaborated with the data available 
for December. 
Firstly, the lower provision made in 1981 as compared 
with 1980 can be explained by the change in regulation. As 
we will see in the next section, the requirements for the 
constitution of a global provision were reduced from 2% to 
0.75%. In addition, the accounting flexibilities gave banks 
more time to build up individual provision for each type of 
credit classification. 
Secondly, the low values coincide with very rapid 
expansion in the growth rate of loans as shown by table 11. 
In both the first and second group of banks a low 
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provision/loans ratio coincided with a rapid expansion of 
bank loans, in particular in 1980 and 1981. For instance, 
according to my estimations, in 1981 Banco Chile experienced 
a loans growth of 102% combined with a provision/loan ratio 
of 0.9 % . The same is true in the cases of Banco Concepcion 
and Banco Santiago. Among the second group, Banco Pacifico 
and Banco Naciona1 exhibited the highest growth rate among 
its group and the whole banking system for the period of 
1981 with figures reaching 313% and 178% respectively. These 
figures for both banks coincided with a low values for the 
provision ratio of 0.8% and 1.1% in each case. 
Table 3.11 Financial Indicator of Bank Expansion.(%) 
(a) Loans Growth 
Institutions 
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
80 
84.7 
198.4 
95.1 
39.2 
110.2 
129.2 
141.8 
85.9 
48.5 
67.9 
69.0 
43.1 
42.8 
47.5 
95.6 
198.9 
81 82 
104.9 1.1 
143.7 18.6 
102.1 17.0 
95.5 -0.2 
59.5-13.6 
81.6 62.5 
108.1 3.4 
70.5-11.1 
61.6 
54.2 
74.3 
73.7 
36.9 
313.7 
178.1 
111.5 
10.7 
5.0 
1.5 
-8.3 
1.8 
18.6 
3.7 
52.6 
83 
16.8 
18.7 
19.1 
-4.3 
17.2 
15.8 
10.4 
26.2 
13.9 
23.3 
25.0 
16.8 
8.7 
268.4 164.3 22.5 22.3 
45.9 79.2 4.9 21.7 
Liabilities Growth 
80 
5.8 
9.2 
4.9 
3.2 
7.0 
6.6 
7.8 
6.8 
2.5 
4.2 
3.9 
3.0 
2.3 
4.7 
5.8 
8.9 
81 
4.8 
6.2 
4.5 
4.0 
2.0 
4.4 
4 • 4 
4.1 
4.4 
1.8 
3.0 
3.1 
1.4 
11.1 
7.2 
4.9 
12.0 5.7 
4.1 1.9 
82 
3.6 
4.9 
4.5 
4.0 
1.7 
6.4 
3.0 
1.6 
2.4 
3.1 
3.9 
2.8 
4.0 
3.4 
3.4 
6.7 
83 
2.7 
3.0 
3.1 
3.0 
3.6 
3.9 
5.6 
4.4 
3.9 
3.9 
4.0 
4.6 
3.5 
5.8 8.2 
3.3 24 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) It refers to the rate of change from December to 
December measured in nominal terms. 
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On the liabilities side of the banks balance sheet we 
see that deposits became the principal source of funds of 
the rapid growth of bank credit. This is the result of the 
financial liberalisation reforms to increase the financial 
deepening and widening of the financial system. The data on 
the banks' liability growth rate and the deposit/liabilities 
ratio from tables 11 and 12 provide support to this 
assertion. The evidence does not suggest very large 
differences in the monthly annual average growth rate of 
liabilities among the two groups in the table, although the 
case of exception again correspond to Banco del Estado. One 
point is worth mention from the data for 1983. We observe 
that the growth of liabilities in the two big groups 
which experienced some fall unlike Banco del Estado 
exhibited a significant rise in their liabilities by 
This can be interpreted as a run to safety, although not 
24%. 
in 
a massive shift reflecting a widespread panic. 
By examining the liabilities/capital ratio of individual 
banks in table 10, we observe no significant differences in 
their leverage although it was almost doubled as compared 
with the 1978 average ratio for the financial system which 
was estimated at 8.1%. The two opposite exceptions 
correspond to Banco Chile and Banco del Estado. The former 
bank presents a leverage ratio of 20.5% and 24% in 1982 and 
1983 while the latter bank shows a leverage ratio of around 
7% for 1981 to 1983. 
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Table 3.12 Financial Indicator of Vulnerability: 
Liability Quality.(%) 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Deposits/Liabilities (b) Lbts FC/Lbts 
------------------------------------------------------------
InstItutions 80 81 82 83 80 81 82 83 
------------------------------------------------------------
Unido de Fomento 
Hipotecario Chile 
Chile 
Concepcion 
Internacional 
Santiago 
Hipotecario Fto. 
Ciga 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
BICE 
Estado 
8.2 
33.1 
37.6 
49.2 
47.0 
45.3 
29.4 
90.6 
42.1 
38.7 
40.9 
41.0 
47.1 
65.2 
54.1 
52.1 
16.2 14.0 
36.4 27.7 
39.7 36.6 18.9 
46.3 48.9 26.3 
61.4 63.9 32.9 
41.4 36.6 14.0 
32.1 22.8 14.3 
87.0 91.6 
44.5 40.2 27.7 
39.5 46.5 24.6 
39.3 30.8 22.4 
49.4 49.7 37.5 
45.6 52.3 35.0 
59.5 64.9 50.8 
51.3 53.8 42.7 
49.5 45.7 35.7 
24.4 31.6 32.7 23.5 
75.3 76.0 63.5 87.7 
34.1 31.7 58.1 
28.5 26.7 42.0 
38.4 47.1 55.1 50.3 
22.5 28.8 38.5 33.7 
21.5 18.4 22.8 23.6 
26.2 37.5 46.5 41.2 
9.6 14.0 23.3 25.5 
31.2 37.3 46.6 46.3 
25.3 30.0 40.0 35.9 
32.4 39.9 52.0 51.3 
26.7 31.2 36.9 33.9 
30.9 39.1 40.9 37.5 
9.5 12.0 20.9 20.6 
18.3 19.1 29.9 33.7 
25.1 35.8 43.9 40.9 
31.8 43.0 52.5 46.8 
13.8 12.0 19.6 48.3 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) Liabilities are defined as total deposits, foreign and 
domestic loans, contingent and mortgage liabilities 
(b) Liabilities in foreign currency (Lbts FC) correspond to 
total deposits in foreign currency and loans obtain 
abroad. 
One interesting and worrying observation can be 
established from the estimates of table 12. It appears to be 
a large change in the composition of the banks' liabilities 
as the restriction on foreign credits were phased out 
gradually from 1978 onwards. For instance, Banco Chile and 
Banco Santiago show a growing share of liabilities in 
foreign currency relative to domestic currency. By 1982 and 
1983 the former had more than 50% of its liabilities 
denominated in foreign currency. Among the banks in the 
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second group, Banco Sudamericano had shown a systematic rise 
in foreign indebtness with a Lbts FC/Lbts ratio of 52% and 
51.3 for the years 1982 and 1983 respectively. 
As a whole, the evidence does not suggest that the 
vulnerability comes from the liabilities side of the banks 
balance sheet nor support the view that the differences 
among the three groups in the liabilities composition may be 
regarded as important. As a matter of fact, BICE exhibited 
higher liability ratios than the intervened banks. Moreover, 
the evidence from chapter 6 supports this conclusion and 
also finds that any difference in foreign indebtness between 
sound banks and problem/failed banks is statistically 
insignificant and thus an unreliable early warning variable. 
It is clear from the evidence that all those 
institutions which exhibited spectacular growth rates in 
their loan portfolios were later intervened and/or forced to 
sell bad credits to the Central Bank. Furthermore, the 
higher were the growth rate of loans, then the higher the 
ratios measuring the deterioration in asset qualities, in 
particular the loans sold/ capital. In contrast, Banco 
Industrial y de Comercio Exterior (BICE) and Banco del 
Estado which clearly grew at a relatively lower rate and 
exhibited better performance in terms of the other financial 
indicators remained healthy. On this issue, their relatively 
superior profitability, in particular towards 1982 and 1983 
enabled these two banks to build up higher provision. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of Banco del Estado. 
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Finally, table 13 present a simple estimation of the 
banks of the net capital ratios (NCR). The most important 
oomponent of the NCR is the nonperformlng loans which is 
substracted from bank's capital and reserves. As reported 
in chapter 5, banks that failed in recent years in the US 
almost invariably had low or even negative NCR months before 
the failure. According to the evidence for Chile, those 
institutions which were intervened clearly exhibited a 
negative or extremely low positive NCR. The ratio indicate a 
fall in the ratio from 1981 onwards in particular in the 
cases of Banco Chile, Banco Internacional, Banco O'Higgins 
and Banco Continental. 
Table 3.13 Banks Net Capital Ratio. 
Net Capital/Assets Net Capital/Liability 
Institutions 80 
Unido de Fomento -19.1 
Hipotecario Chile 4.7 
Chile 7.5 
Concepcion 3.8 
Internacional 7.0 
Santiago 5.3 
Hipotecario Fto. 4.3 
Ciga 11.9 
O'Higgins 
Continental 
Sudamericano 
Credito 
Trabajo 
Pacifico 
Nacional 
Edwards 
7.2 
7.3 
11.1 
5.7 
4.8 
12.2 
13.4 
6.3 
81 
2.5 
4.1 
5.3 
4.6 
5.9 
6.0 
4.7 
9.5 
6.1 
6.3 
4.9 
4.7 
4.7 
8.9 
8.9 
5.7 
82 
0.4 
2.0 
1.9 
4.2 
3.0 
7 . 2 
3.5 
6.2 
5.2 
1.2 
4.1 
2.9 
4.2 
5.2 
5.0 
3.9 
BleE 
Estado 
9.3 7.9 6.4 
8.4 10.3 9.0 
83 
-3.8 
-5.3 
-0.5 
-17.2 
1.2 
-0.5 
-6.5 
3.4 
3.4 
4.9 
6.2 
5.5 
1.6 
3.6 
7.7 
80 
-19.7 
4.8 
7.6 
3.8 
7.1 
5.5 
4.2 
12.9 
7.4 
7.6 
11.0 
5.7 
4.8 
12.1 
14.0 
6.4 
81 82 
2.3 0.4 
3.9 1.8 
5.4 1.7 
4.3 3.6 
5.7 2.6 
5.9 6.8 
4.6 3.4 
9.2 5.6 
5.9 4.7 
6.1 1.2 
4.7 3.6 
4.5 2.5 
4.4 3.4 
8.8 4.8 
8.9 4.6 
5.5 3.6 
83 
-3.2 
-3.8 
-0.4 
-13 
1.1 
1.5 
-5.2 
2.4 
2.6 
3.5 
5.2 
3.9 
1.2 
9.7 8.1 6.1 2.7 
9.0 10.5 9.3 8.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
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The data produced from the banks' balance sheet and 
income statement not only had permitted to see the move from 
a boom to a bust of the whole financial system but also 
enabled us to assess and identify those banks in 
difficulties which later on were intervened and/or required 
the support from the banking authorities. At the same time, 
these results are serving as a useful agenda of research to 
establish statistical differences between healthy and 
unhealthy banks for classification purposes and the 
estimation of an early warning function. This will allow us 
to draw inferences on the likelihood of failure from 
external and internal factors affecting the banks odds. 
These issues will be part of chapters 6,7,8, and 9. 
(3.3) The Rehabilitation of the Banking System: A Quick 
Glimpse on the Treatment and its Results. 
The intervention and the rehabilitation of the banking 
system became a pressing need for two different but equally 
important reasons. Firstly, the intervention of the banking 
authorities avoided the total disruption of the 
intermediation and payment mechanisms from the contagious 
lack of confidence and prevented a further deepening of the 
economic recession. Secondly, the measures taken to 
rehabilitate the banking system not only can be seen as a 
short run strategy but also as an aid to reactivate the 
economy in a longer run perspective. 
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The rehabilitation of some of t ~ l e e b a ~ k Q Q t t d t [ d oJ :3 ar_e .:t .... the 
end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982. That is right at the 
beginning of the banking crisis. However, in spite of this, 
it seems to me that the extent of the crisis was overlooked 
and even perhaps considered as a transitory phenomenon. 
Moreover, just as goverment officials were a firm believers 
in an automatic adjustment for any macroeconomic 
disequilibrium, so they were at the microeconomic level in 
5 
the case of a bankruptcy. 
At first, the Superintendency of Banks and Financial 
Institutions (SIBF) responded by introducing more 
flexibility in the accounting procedures applied by those 
banks with problems, in particular with the losses which 
started to emerge from nonperforming loans. Among the most 
important changes in the banking accounting procedures were 
the recognition of losses, the instruction guiding the 
provision for risky loans and losses, the purchase of 
nonperforming loans, and the limits on banks leverage. Also, 
this approach included the payment of interest on bank 
reserve requirements. 
The SIBF (1982,1983) reported that banks were authorised 
to consider as outstanding all those loans that had been in 
arrears for 90 days rather than 30 days. Consequently with 
the previous measure, the SIBF also extended the time 
available to make provisions to cover potential losses from 
their loans portfolio. For instance, the time limit to build 
up the global provision was extended from 36 to 60 months. 
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By the same token, banks were instructed to make 
individual provision depending on the risk classification of 
6 
bank loans. At the same time ,the rules governing the 
composition of provisions also demanded additional coverage 
in the case of nonperforming loans. For instance, for all 
those loans covered partially by collateral and entered as 
nonperforming, full provision was required at the end of 
each year of an amount equal to the uncovered portion of the 
loan. This percentage was reduced to only half for all those 
nonperforming loans recognised during the second semester of 
each year. Initially, this provisions had to be made within 
the year. But later on, the more flexible and gradual 
approach in the constitution of provisions meant the 
extension of this prudent time to 2 years. 
Moreover, it was stated that the period to write off a 
bad loan against profits or provision, which originally was 
set at 13 months after becoming outstanding, was extended to 
18 months. For those credits with collateral, the time was 
increased from 24 to 36 months. 
In 1982 the Central Bank introduced an accounting 
procedure contained in the directive 1.450 which allowed 
banks to sell nonperforming loans in return for a Central 
Bank note (letra de cambio) and with a repurchase agreement 
with 10 years' limit and a minimum of 5% repurchase of sold 
loans hold by the Central Bank in each semester. The 
repurchase of nonperforming and risky loans was carried out 
with the bank's financial surpluses. This mechanism did 
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not involve Central Bank resources as compared with its twin 
directive 1.555 enacted in 1984 but just to deferred banks' 
losses. The mechanism adopted in 1982 also included the 
relaxation on the banks leverage which before it was set 
with a maximum debt to capital ratio of 20. 
As whole the mechanism adopted in 1982 was basically 
giving a greater flexibility in order to defer any bank 
losses and as such it did not involve any significant 
transfer of financial resources from the Central Bank to the 
banking system. At the same time, it did not tackle the root 
of the problem which, as will be argued and evaluated 
empirically, revolved around the excessive laxity in the 
banks' management, in particular on those decisions 
concerning risk taking and credit allocation. Instead, the 
mechanism came to relax even further the accounting 
regulation and hence the recognition of nonperforming loans. 
I would agree with the assertion of Barandiaran (1983). He 
maintained that by mid-1981 firms' and banks' problems were 
still of a magnitude that a wave of liquidation would have 
been feasible. Moreover, the empirical evidence from chapter 
6 not only supports this assertion but also shows that the 
banking difficulties were predictable with three years in 
advance, that is as early as 1980. 
These accounting flexibilities were phased out during 
1984 and 1985 soon after the positive effect of a more 
direct package of measures were having its impact in the 
rehabilitation of the banking system. By mid-1982 the self-
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correcting mechanism introducing more flexibilty was not any 
more a viable solution as the magnitude of both the banking 
crisis and the economic recession was getting worse. At that 
time, a macroeconomic initiative and the rehabilitation of 
the banking sector was called for in order to set the 
condition to activate the economy and reinitiate the 
economic growth. 
More radical steps were needed to rehabilitate and 
strenghten the banking system. The increasing volume of 
nonperforming loans endangered a large number 
institutions with insolvency which, as we have 
previously, accounted for a large proportion of 
intermediation and also included the two largest banks 
the system. 
of 
seen 
the 
of 
There were two mechanisms to rehabilitate the banking 
system in 1983: a indirect one which contained an aid 
package of different debt relief measures to banks' debtors, 
and a direct mechanism which comprised both the purchase of 
nonperforming loans by the Central Bank, and a mechanism of 
recapitalisation of those banks intervened in January 1983. 
One of the first initiative taken by the SIBF was the 
intervention of 6 major banks in January 1983, including the 
two largest entities. The main objective of this approach 
apart from rescuing the system from a major collapse was to 
replace the management before any other palliative actions 
were introduced. 
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This was followed by the indirect mechanism which 
comprised measures of debt relief included a preferential 
exchange rate to reduce the increasing costs on foreign 
currency borrowers after the devaluation of the peso in June 
1982. This subsidy which initially was paid in cash and 
later on paid with negotiable interest bearing bonds came 
as valuable relief to the borrowers 
profitability, although at a cost to 
solvency and 
the 
7 
Central 
Bank as we will see at the end of this section. 
Debtors in domestic currency also had access to some 
financial relief as they were able to reschedule the 
maturity and the cost of their debts. As we have seen in 
chapter 2 , although interest rates were gradually 
converging to lower values after deregulation, lending rates 
were still significantly high and loans were mainly on a 
short-term basis. With regards to the cost of borrowing, the 
Central Bank extended funds to banks in order to cover the 
difference between the market-prevailing lending rate and 
the 7% real lending rate set as a maximum by the monetary 
authority in June 1983. In addition, maturities were 
extended to 10 years and included a 5 years and 1 year grace 
on the principal and the interest. Later in June 1984, the 
reference lending rate was reduced to 5% for the same year 
and 1984, 6% from 1985 to 1988, and 7% for thereafter. At 
the same time, the maturities could not exceed 15 years and 
8 
fall below a minimum maturity of 5 years. 
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According to the report of SIBF (1984), they estimated 
that 35% of total loans in the system were covered by some 
form of reprogramming of the original terms of repayment and 
with Central Bank resources accounting more than $470.000 
millions which was equivalent to U$ 7.8 billion at a 
9 
exchange rate of $60 per US dollar. 
The effects of the debt relief mechanism was expected to 
be reflected in the improvement in the debtor financial 
obligations, in particular lower financial costs and longer 
maturities to settle their debts. As a result, it was 
expected that banks' balance sheet would show an improvement 
in the quality of their loan portfolios and thus lower 
provision requirements. Equally, bank profitability was also 
expected to show some improvement as a result of the payment 
corresponding to the differential between the rate of 
interest of the Central Bank promissory notes 
10 
(pagares) and the corresponding obligation of the debtor. 
However, the magnitude of the banking crisis was 
becoming deeper and more widely spread in particular with 
respect to the quality of banks' assets so that any bank 
rehabilitation using their own means was unthinkable. A 
direct mechanism was required to enhance the solvency, 
liquidity, and profitability of non-intervined banks. 
In December 1983 the Ministry of Finance (Hacienda) 
announced a mechanism to improve the asset position of the 
banks by substituting the bad quality assets with Central 
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Bank resources (cash and assets). This recognised the fact 
that the decapitalisation of the banking system was underlay 
on the significant deterioration of the banks loan 
portfolios. At the same time, there was an implicit 
recognition that a prompt and durable rehabilitation of the 
banking system was a necessary condition for sustainable 
11 
recovery of the economy as a whole. 
In order to recapitalise the problem banks, the 
authorities permitted non-intervened but vulnerable banks to 
sell nonperforming loans to the Central Bank according to 
the directive 1.555. This enabled non-intervened banks to 
sell bad credits at face value up to 1.5 time their capital 
and reserves. This percentage was raised to 2.5 for those 
banks which required to increase their capital. In return 
the Central Bank paid 60% in cash and the rest by means of a 
noninterest-bearing Central Bank note (letra) which is 
adjusted according to inflation. 
In order to reduce the impact on the monetary growth, 
banks were instructed to use the cash proceeds to repay the 
outstanding emergency loans made by the Central Bank and the 
purchase promissory notes (pagares) which carried a 7% real 
return and 4 years' maturity. Although this represented an 
important financial support, the agreement contained a 
clause which forced banks to repurchase their nonperforming 
loans using any financial surplus. This meant that 
shareholders had to retain their dividends in order to pay 
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for their obligations with the Central Bank. The price to 
buy back the nonperforming loans was adjusted in line with 
12 
inflation and carried an additional 5% surcharge. 
For those banks which were intervened in January 1983, 
the mechanism introduced by the agreement 1.555 did not 
allow them the sale of nonperforming loans and even if they 
could, it was clearly insufficient to restore their normal 
functioning. In fact as we have seen in the previous 
section, the amount of risky and nonperforming loans 
exceeded several times their capital. 
Initially, the law 18.401 passed in February 1985 
allowed the SIBF to enforce among intervened banks a rise in 
their capital base to make them financially viable. The new 
stock should be offered to the existing shareholders and 
after a short time to the public in general, including the 
government. As reported by Velasco (1988) and Larrain 
(1989), a government development agency (CORFO) could buy 
any stock left over although with some restrictions. They 
should not hold these equities for more than 5 years and 
should not exceed 49% of the intervened bank's capital. In 
order to make this recapitalisation option attractive in 
particular to small investors, the government offered an 
attractive package of incentives such as credit facilities 
13 
and subsidies. 
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According to Feller (1987), the mechanism for 
rehabilitation based in the agreement 1.555 was the pillar 
in the government's strategy. The debate as to whether or 
not the programme was merely a cosmetic accounting trick 
which provided generous subsidies has to be settled 
according to the empirical evidence. Although this issue is 
not part of the agenda of the study, some evidence will 
corroborate the magnitude of the crisis by looking at the 
numbers involved in the rescue and the effect from the 
rescue. 
Chamorro (1985b) and the SIBF (1984) reported that 20 
financial institutions, among them 12 commercial banks, 3 
foreign banks, 
subscribed to 
and 5 non-bank financial institution, 
the agreement 1.555. The amount of risky 
loans net of provisions was 156% of capital and reserves and 
the banks' losses reached 6.6% of capital at the end of 
December 1983. By June of 1984, the ratio of risky loans to 
capital and reserves felt from 156% to only 50%. 
Table 14 taken from Chamorro's paper shows the effect of 
the Central Bank directive number 1.555 on non-intervened 
but vulnerable bank. There are some interesting results 
which is worth mentioned. 
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Table 3.14 Income statement from 
Institutions. 
the Non-Intervened 
------------------------------------------------------ -------
(a) 1983 April 1984 to 1985 
------------------------------------------------------------
1 Operating Surplus 
2 Adm. Expenses 
3 Operating Margin(1-2) 
4 Other Net Income 
5 Monetary Correction 
6 Surplus before provision(3+4+5) 
7 Provisions & Reduction 
- Loans Provision 
- Other Provision 
- Reductions from Bad Loans 
- Reduction from Bad Investment 
- Other Reductions 
8 Surplus (6-7) 
9 Surplus Allocation 
- Paying Losses 
- Making Provisions 
- Repurchase of Risky Loans 
10 Net Profits (8-9-10-11) 
34.578 
28.784 
5.795 
6.198 
4.236 
16.200 
19.339 
13.174 
3.117 
2.625 
33 
390 
-3.140 
1.054 
1.054 
-4.194 
54.013 
28.721 
25.293 
9.971 
7.789 
43.084 
19.800 
10.568 
4.805 
1.779 
1.322 
1.325 
23.251 
21.497 
1.490 
16.198 
3.089 
1.754 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Chamorro (1985b). 
(a) Expressed in millions of pesos at July 1985. 
Firstly, there is a marked increase in the operating 
surplus and given that administrative expenses remain 
constant, is reflected directly in the operating margin. 
This can be explained by the positive effect derived from 
the replacement of nonperforming and risky assets (loans) 
which were generating no income, by government's documents 
which were producing a return of 7% in real terms. At the 
same time, the quality of the banks' loan portfolio improved 
as a result of both the debt relief scheme and the 
improvement in economic activity. 
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secondly, the sale of risky and nonperforming loans 
resulted in a reduction in the required provision. The 
agreement 1.555 enabled these entIties to dispose from the 
asset side of their balance sheet risky and nonperforming 
credit and thus contribute to a reduction in risk and 
provisions. 
Thirdly, the financial surplus was allocated to the 
absorption of accumulated losses and the purchase of loans 
from the Central Bank. 
With respect to the intervened banks, although the 
agreement 1.555 restrained them from selling loans to the 
Central Bank at least before their recapitalisation, it was 
soon modified by the agreement 1.632. They could sell risky 
and nonperforming assets under the authority of the SIBF. 
The situation of the two largest commercial banks 
intervened was quite dramatic as we have seen in the 
previous section. During 1983 the Bank of Chile and Bank of 
Santiago had a risky loan portfolio of 14.5% and 30.7% of 
their loan portfolios respectively. These values with 
respect to capital were even more dramatic. By December 1984 
the ratio of risky loans to capital for Banco Chile and 
Banco Santiago reached 633% and 513% respectively. Moreover, 
these losses of each bank represented more than 150% and 
145% of the bank's capital respectively. By April 1985 they 
14 
were authorised to sell loans to the Central Bank. 
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The effects of the rehabilitation programme were felt 
almost 
felt 
immediately as the ratio of risky loans to 
to 160% for Banco de Chile and 117% for 
capital 
Banco de 
santiago. In addition, it is reported that in July these 
two entities generated financial surpluses equivalent to 17% 
and 113% of capital respectively. It is clear that the 
effect of selling risky loans to the Central Bank and the 
recapitalisation showed some positive result in terms of 
improvement in capital as well as profitability. Perhaps the 
most important evidence of success was the return to the 
private sector of the 5 intervened banks during 1986. They 
were fully recapitalised and sold to the public, including 
Banco de Chile and Banco de Santiago, the two largest 
financial institutions. The objective behind the banks' 
obligation to repurchase those loans in the Central 
portfolio was to impose a discipline by forcing banks 
accept a liability. 
As a whole one would agree that the effect of 
indirect and direct measures adopted by the authorities 
rehabilitate the banking system were aimed at raising 
banks' net worth and their solvency condition. 
Bank 
to 
the 
to 
the 
The 
replacement of unproductive assets for government paper and 
the debt relief measures improved the banks' income which 
combined with the retention of dividends and the 
recapitalisation improved the banks' net worth. In this 
respect one would argue that the Chilean banking crisis was 
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managed very successfully by the SIBF and the central Bank. 
The overall result from the rescue package was helped by a 
5ignlflcant improvement in the the overall economic activity 
as GDP grew by 6.3%, 2.7%, and 5.7% between 1984 to 1986 
respectively. At the same time, the international scenario 
in terms of world interest rates, and economic growth was 
becoming more favourable. These views are also shared by 
Larrain (1989). 
Although the evidence has shown some encouraging signs 
on the rehabilitation of the banking system after the rescue 
programmes we should not stop short from asking how much did 
the intervention cost and whether the authorities are at 
fault for not being able to detect banks' problems at an 
early stage and thus prevent the crisis from happening. If 
the answer to the second part of the question is affirmative 
then an early reaction would have reduced significantly the 
cost and perhaps even the need of a massive rehabilitation 
programme. As we will see in chapter 6 the empirical 
evidence point in that direction. 
Table 15 will give some idea of the cost of the 
rehabilitation programme. As we have seen the direct and 
indirect mechanism involved a large amount of Central Bank 
resources. 
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Table 3.15 Operation of Central Bank and other 
Indicators.(%) 
------------------------------------------------------------
1982 1983 1984 1985 
------------------------------------------------------------
Net Domestic Credit 
Credit Private Sector 
Credit Financial Entities 
Other Assets 
Liabilities to Private Sector 
Currency 
Others (a) 
Inflation Rate (b) 
94.4 
-0.4 
167.0 
26.7 
-6.4 
-1.6 
-4.9 
20.7 
433.4 
21.2 
375.8 
75.9 
105.2 
18.0 
87.2 
23.1 
174.3 
-0.9 
-30.4 
62.8 
27.5 
10.6 
17.0 
23.0 
199.6 
0.4 
18.6 
239.6 
89.7 
10.9 
78.8 
26.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Banco Central de Chile 
(a) Include medium term notes issued by the Central Bank to 
finance the subsidies in the preferencial exchange rate. 
(b) Measured by the consumer price index. (CPI) 
The evidence from the table indicates that net domestic 
credit increased very rapidly between 1983 to 1985. This 
coincided with the beginning of the mechanism whereby the 
Central Bank bought nonperforming and risky loans from 
problem banks. At the same time, the government was granting 
subsidies as part of the debt relief scheme, including the 
preferential exchange rate. For instance, net credit to 
financial intermediaries in 1983 increased by nearly 376% as 
part of the programme of purchasing loans. At the same time, 
the item "other assets" which reflects the losses arising 
from preferential exchange rate and the subsidies on debt 
restructuring rose by nearly 76% and by 1985 it became the 
main factor in the rise of domestic credit by almost 200%. 
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Although the evidence does show a rapid and significant 
growth of Central Bank credit to the banking system, its 
impact on the monetary aggregates appears to be somewhat 
lower than expected. The data show that most of the credit 
increases was financed by Central Bank paper and hence 
limiting the liquidity effect from subsidies. The 
liabilities to the private sector increased by nearly 90% in 
1985 which is much lower than the figure of 1983. Further 
evidence is provided in table 16 which includes the rate of 
growth financial assets holding by the private sector. 
The data shows that the money growth was moderate over 
these 4 years. If we deflate theses figures by the rate of 
inflation they become negative. Thue the impact of the 
Central Bank credit facilities on money growth has been 
moderated by the massive issue of Central Bank paper, in 
particular Central Bank notes and treasury notes which is 
quite significant in 1983 and 1985. 
Table 3.16 Holding of Financial Assets. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
1982 1983 1984 1985 
------------------------------------------------------------
Money 7.3 27.7 12.0 11.3 
Other Assets 14.9 20.2 33.8 58.2 
Quasi-Money (b) 11.1 1.3 36.4 48.9 
Central Bank Notes 38.5 424.0 32.5 144.5 
Treasury Notes 263.8 -0.4 22.7 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Banco Central de Chile. 
(a) These percentual changes are expressed in nominal terms. 
(b) Includes time and savings deposits, mortgage bonds, and 
foreign currency deposits. 
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Equally, the data on the inflation rate do not show an 
explosive growth. It never exceeded 27% during 
half of the 1980's. In fact, the peak occurs in 
a rate just above 26%. However, this is not a 
thought if the fight against inflation to reach a 
the second 
1985 with a 
comforting 
one digit 
figure in 1982 required nearly 10 years and two severe 
recessions. But above all, the progress made was suddenly 
thrown over board in order to rehabilitate the banking 
system and the economy as a whole. 
It seem reasonable to conclude with two assertions: 
Firstly, the 
spread the 
impact 
impact of 
of the rehabiliation 
the banking crisis 
programme had 
over time in 
particular the costs of such intervention. Above all, the 
rescue operation mounted by the authorities left a precedent 
which will last for a very long time and it will pose a 
formidable obstacle to the establishment of a free banking 
system. 
Secondly, fluctuations in exchange rates, interest 
rates, and the overall recovery of the economy made the 
costs and the fortunes of the banking system very uncertain. 
If these variables would have turned against them then it 
would have created strong pressures for further 
reprogrammings, and concessions. 
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Although in retrospect the evidence had shown that the 
overall economic condition did move in the desirable 
direction and banks became profitable, efficient, and 
stable, the issues relating to what caused the banking 
crisis and whether it was possible to recognise it in an 
early stage and prevent it from happening still is a highly 
inconclusive issue and lacking of any empirical 
verification. The answer to these queries will be the la 
"raison d' etre" of this study. 
In the next chapter, a review of the theories of bank 
failure and banking instability will be provided to 
identified some testable hypothesis for the bank failures in 
Chile. 
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Endnotes. 
(1) By the end of 1976, the banking authorities decided to 
introduce and increase the capital requirement by 7 times 
and introduce supervision. This marked the end of the 
episode with free banking in Chile. 
(2) The authorities introduced restrictions on the SINAP 
asset composition as well as restricting assets below 
year maturity. The first restriction was responding to 
mismatching between assets and liabilities during 
collapse of the construction industry in the recession of 
1975. The second measure however, made things worse and set 
the fortunes of the SINAP. 
one 
the 
the 
(3) At this time as we have seen in chapter 2 
authorities were gradually liberalising the 
capital inflows. 
the monetary 
economy to 
(4) This does not mean that banks were passive victims of 
the adverse general economic climate but merely a 
symptomatic description of crisis. 
(5) According to Velasco (1988), the government's early 
reaction to the mounting macroeconomic disequilibrium, quite 
evident in the last quater of 1981 and throughout 1982 was 
resting on the belief of an automatic adjustment. High real 
interest rates will reduce demand pressures on both 
tradables and non-tradables, the overvalued real exchange 
rate will be transitory and the accumulated trade deficit 
will be corrected via a monetary approach. 
(6) The global provision consists of 0.75% of total loans. 
The individual risk classification of bank loans carries 
different provision requirements. For instance A and B plus 
carries no provision. In contrast, B minus , C, and D 
carries 20%, 40% and 100% provision respectively. 
Nonperforming credits not cover by any collateral partially 
or totally require 100% provision. 
(7) The subsidy was equal to the difference between the 
higher official exchange rate prevailing at the moment of 
the debt repayment and the level of the preferencial 
exchange rate. 
(8) These measures were available to small borrowers in 
domestic and foreign currency as well as productive 
borrowers. Larger debtors were subject to additional 
restrictions concerning the use of company profits. A 
productive borrower is defined as a debtor other than 
consumption and mortgage debtor, and a debtor involved in 
foreign trade. For a more detail see SIBF (1983). 
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(9) This estimate include the data for 1983 and 1984 as 
well as a projection for the next 3 years. 
(10) It was argued that the steps taken to reprogramme 
debts have been important in alleviate the debtors dlstres5 
and indirectly to smooth out the effect of the banking 
crisis. However, it was also argued that the speed of the 
reactivation of the economy was going to be equally 
important. Therefore, the Central Bank introduced different 
credit lines during the second semester of 1983 among them 
we include subsidised credit on working capital, hiring 
labour, housing and infrastructure, reforestry, and for 
refinancing of wages and salaries. See SIBF 1983. 
(11) The existence of a stable, solvent, and efficient 
banking system should affect directly the confidence of the 
public, and thus the magnitude of the financial saving both 
internal and external for productive investment. 
(12) There were two exceptions to this obligation. Firstly, 
unless there were no financial surplus, the obligation 
continued until all loans were acquired back. Secondly, 
unless the bank has boosted its capital base. Thus, all 
preferential shares were exempted from the repurchase 
obligations. 
(13) As part of an incentive mechanism applicable to shares 
of effectively bankrupt banks, investors were allowed to pay 
only 5% as a down payment and the outstanding sum in a 
period which will not exceed 15 years. Also, there was a 5% 
surcharge in real terms and fiscal exemptions such us tax 
free for dividends and a tax credit equivalent to 20% of the 
values of the shares purchased. 
(14) According to Chamorro (1985b), Banco Chile sold a 
total of $ 127.000 millions and in return he received $ 
32.000 millions in promissory notes of the Central bank and 
repaid $ 42.700 millions in emergency loans. Banco Santiago 
sold $ 95.000 millions and in return he recieved $ 24.000 
millions in promissory notes and he repaid $ 33.200 millions 
in emergency loans. 
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Chapter 4. The Theory of Bank Failures and Banking 
Instability: A Review of the Literature. 
(4.1) Introduction. 
The previous chapter provided an evaluation of the 
dismal performance of the Chilean banking system, 
particularly between 1982-83. By 1983 a large majority of 
commercial banks technically failed or were considered as 
problem banks. Its intervention meant that an important 
amount of public money was used to avert a complete 
financial collapse, as well as growing doubts on the effect 
of financial liberalisation in LDC's. 
In this chapter, I will review the literature on banking 
instability and bank failures in order to cast light on the 
hypotheses which could explain what caused the increasing 
number of bank failures. It will be argued that any theory 
which could explain banking instability should also provide 
a reason for the existence of financial intermediaries 
(banks). 
Two general testable hypotheses will be derived by 
reviewing the theories on banking instability and bank 
failures. On the one hand, external factors to the banks 
such as the general economic environment could affect the 
likelihood of bank failures. On the other hand, equally 
important is the banks' response to changes in the industry 
shaped by financial liberalisation reforms. 
154 
Most of the literature on banking instability and bank 
failures has been developed as part of the study of the 
Great Depression of the early 1930's and its aftermath on 
the US banking system. In consequence, many of the 
references will involve different features of the US banking 
system. 
(4.2) The Issue of Existence of Financial Intermediaries. 
It could be argued from a positivist point of view that 
if a theory of bank failure and instability is to explain 
this phenomena as well as to derive some normative 
propositions regarding the policy implications, the models 
involved must explain why financial intermediaries exist in 
the first place. 
Lewis (1994) shows that a financial intermediary acts 
actively as a third party in the process of lending and 
borrowing as well as undertaking the purchase and sale of 
financial securities. Moreover, financial intermediaries 
exhibit as characteristics a high financial assets/real 
assets ratio and a high gear ratio (liabilities/capital 
ratio). This is particularly true in the case of a mutual 
fund and deposit-taking institutions (banks) as they hold 
claims on the borrower and issue claims to the lender 
(portfolio transformation) as opposed to the simple case of 
a broker which merely facilitates transactions between the 
two parties and does not hold and issue claims. Thus, 
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financial intermediation needs to be justified and proven to 
be a superior mutually beneficial voluntary arrangement 
between the parties compared to the voluntary 
unintermediated market alternative. In other words, any 
explanation on the existence of financial intermediaries 
needs first to show why it is not possible for lenders and 
borrowers to mutually benefit from a direct contract between 
them and why a financial intermediary, particularly a 
deposit-taking institution (bank), can indeed resolve this 
1 
problem. 
According to Dowd (1992) one of the reasons behind the 
need to establish the existence question as a first step is 
to leave out those theories of bank instability which 
predict that there should be no intermediaries in the first 
place. It could be argued that in an ideal and perfectly 
competitive financial market with full and symmetrical 
information, no transaction costs, divisible capital, and 
complete spot and future markets there is no need for a 
2 
financial intermediary. Indeed, Benston and Smith (1976) 
stated that in a frictionless economy, with no transaction 
costs, information costs, and indivisibilities, financial 
intermediaries would not exist. Even if a bank is introduced 
into this economy, Fama (1980) expects this financial 
institution to act as another trader or equity-financed 
mutual fund and perform as the economy's accountant. That 
is, to register the changes in both liabilities and assets 
after a transaction has taken place in the economy. 
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In order to justify the presence of a financial 
intermediary and avoid relying on an ad hoc approach which 
treats the existence of banks as given, we have to depart 
from the ideal and perfect economy and to accept the 
inherent imperfections which exist in the economy. In a less 
than an ideal world, surplus units (lenders) will need to 
search for potential borrowers, verified borrowers' 
credentials and project proposal, introduced optimal 
financial contracts, and to monitor and enforce borrowers' 
efforts and willingness to comply with their financial 
obligations. The existence of asymmetrical information among 
market transactors and hence high search, verification, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs should lead to significant 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Left to their 
own devices, lenders and borrowers will fail to undertake 
mutually beneficial exchanges which can be considered a 
Pareto superior state. 
Moreover, the existence of uncertainty as a result of 
incomplete information about future outcomes will also 
explain the existence of financial intermediaries. For 
instance, the need for liquidity in the case of an 
unexpected shock in consumption on risk-averse depositors 
should also be considered. 
Therefore, as Lewis (1992) had clearly pointed out the 
existence 
endogenous 
providing 
of financial 
response to 
information as 
intermediaries emerge as an 
these market imperfections by 
well as liquidity insurance. 
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(4.3) Financial Intermediaries ~ ~ Information Producers and 
Liquidity Insurers. 
Before we look at these two strands of the new theory of 
financial intermediation, some reference should be made on 
the transaction approach to financial institutions. Benston 
and Smith (1976) maintained that the raison d' etre for a 
financial institution is the existence of transaction costs. 
Their model suggests that these institutions should possess 
some scale economies in dealing with transaction costs. 
However, this theory on the existence of financial 
institutions is incomplete as it fails to explain the 
sources from which the cost-advantage of financial 
institutions arise. 
(4.3.1) Banks as Information Producers. 
One strand of the new literature views banks as 
producers of information. Information asymmetries between 
lenders and borrowers combined with a high information cost 
and the public good nature of information production are 
intrinsic features in any organised financial market, and 
hence the raison d' etre for the existence of financial 
intermediaries (e.g. bank). 
Stiglitz (1991) maintained that while the existence of 
an organised financial market enable both a voluntary 
agglomeration and transfer of financial resources, it would 
also contribute to an appropiate allocation and management 
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of those resources. Specifically, in a process of capital 
accumulation those firms who are in the best position to 
invest in large scale projects would normally lack 
sufficient resources of their own while the availability of 
capital (savings) from a single surplus unit would fall 
short of the firm's investment requirement. However, in 
atomistic economy with several competing investment projects 
and management teams the agglomeration and transfer will 
also need to be complemented with the screening and 
monitoring of the best alternatives. 
In this type of contingent market where money today is 
exchanged for a promised return in the future, an 
entrepreneur raising capital (borrower) has more information 
than the provider of capital (lender). This information 
asymmetry is manifested in two ways: Firstly, the borrower 
knows better the probability of loss from its investment 
project (i.e ex ante asymmetrical information). 
Secondly, once the investment project has been selected 
the provider of capital will be unable to assess the 
entrepreneur's quantity and quality of its effort and 
resources put into the project (i.e ex post asymmetrical 
information) 
Therefore, the screening and monitoring activities which 
may involve significant evaluation and monitoring costs will 
be necessary to distinguish between good and bad projects 
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(borrowers). Financial intermediaries will exist as a result 
of the need to monitor individual lender. 
The reliance on equity financing is very limited as a 
result of information imperfections, particularly 
informational asymmetries. In the absence of any signalling 
activity, entrepreneurs and existing shareholders have more 
information than outsiders. Greenwald,Stiglitz,& Weiss(1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984) have shown that under ex ante 
asymmetrical information and a large number of 
informationally indistinguishable projects (firms) the 
market interprets equity issues as an adverse signal about 
the firm's market value. This may deter any issue of 
equities to raise resources to finance what could be a 
3 
profitable project. 
Moreover, imperfect information and the nature of the 
contractual relationship between the provider of capital 
(lender) and the user of capital (borrower) also introduces 
incentive effects which will further discourage equity 
financing. To begin with, an equity contract introduces an 
enforcement problem as the fraction of profits paid to a 
shareholder is under the manager's discretion. Moreover, the 
return from any managerial effort is shared with 
shareholders so that it dilutes the manager's incentive to 
maximise shareholders' return. At the same time, there is an 
increasing scope for the diversion of the firm's resources 
4 
towards the manager's own uses. The nature of the equity 
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contract and the presence of asymetrical information 
produces a conflicting interest between the supplier and 
user of capital. This explains both why managers act with 
considerable autonomy and the lack of market discipline from 
5 
take-over bids, shareholder voting, and other schemes. 
Despite the existence of some advantages in rising 
capital by means of equity issue, particularly the 
possibility of a better risk-sharing between the provider 
and the user of capital, and the existence of no fixed 
committment to repaying the funds, information limitations 
undermine its use. 
The reliance on bank debt to rise capital suggests that 
banks may have advantages over equity financing in dealing 
with selection and control functions (i.e screening and 
monitoring) under the assumption of information asymmetries. 
For instance, Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that if economies 
of scale are available then a gathering information 
organisation could sell information about particular classes 
of assets so long as it could internalise the return from 
information which by its nature is a public good. 
Specifically, a financial intermediary which buys assets 
from the entrepreneur on the basis of specialised 
information will internalise the benefit in terms of 
increased value of his portfolio. 
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While the Leland and Pyle's model addresses the problem 
of ex ante information asymmetries, Diamond (1984) deals 
with e } ~ ~ POBt .:t5ymlTtetrlc.:il Inforrnatlon. He developed a model 
where a risk-neutral lender cannot observe the realisable 
value (Y) of an indivisible investment project whose output 
is a random variable (Y) bounded between { O , Y < ~ } . . Both the 
lender and the borrower agree about the distribution and 
boundries of Y. In consequence, the lender has to monitor 
the borrower by spending C>O (physical cost of monitoring) 
to make Y observable. If individual lenders monitor every 
borrower (m>1), the total cost (m*Cm) will be significantly 
large and increasing with respect to m. Moreover, monitoring 
cost is even larger than expected deadweight non-pecunary 
penalty of E [ ~ ( Y ) ] ] introduced in the entrepreneur's contract 
with no monitoring. At the same time, even if the 
information from monitoring can be obtained at a low cost, 
there will be free-riding problem as a result of the from 
the public nature of information. 
Diamond (1984) has shown that an intermediary can 
monitor on behalf of lenders if C+D < m i n [ E ~ ( Y ) , ( m * C ) ] ] where 
D is the expected cost of providing incentive to the 
monitor. In other words, if the sum of the physical cost of 
monitoring plus the cost of incentive is less than the cost 
of monitoring with no delegation. There still remains an 
incentive problem as the payment recieved by the 
intermediary is not observed by the depositor. It is shown 
that there is a minimum cost contract which provides 
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incentives to the intermediary for a minimum payment equal 
to the rate of interest r or a total payment (m*r). This 
6 
will force the intermediary to effectively monitor Y. 
Given the high deadweight cost ~ ( Z n ) ) plus the total 
monitoring cost (C+D), it is not viable for the intermediary 
to contract with a single entrepreneur. Diamond proved that 
if the entrepreneurs' projects have both bounded returns and 
are distributed independently then as the number of 
entrepreneurs tend to infinity n -) 00 then D -) O. Thus, 
portfolio diversification by firms and markets makes 
delegation cost very small. 
In consequence, the models by Leland and Pyle (1977), 
and Diamond (1984) have demostrated that an efficient way to 
reduce the cost of monitoring borrowers is to form a 
coalition of lenders (i.e. financial intermediary). In this 
context, it is implicitly assumed that a bank should have 
information advantages over other forms of financial 
intermediaries given its long-term financial relationship 
with the clients. However, it is argued that the banks' 
definite advantage lies on the fact that they are able to 
obtain additional information due to their role as their 
customers' bookeeper. Once the loan has been made the 
transaction account becomes a continuing source of credit 
information. This link between transaction services and 
lending has been suggested by stiglitz and Wiess (1990). 
The banks' role as efficient monitors and social accountants 
is vital for their existence. 
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It should be mentioned that banks' effective control 
over loans is also enhanced by the possibility of refusing 
to renew the loan at a future date. stiglitz and Wei65 
(1983) have formally proven that a contingent contract which 
involves the threat of termination encourages a borrower to 
maximise the bank's expected return while avoiding the 
negative effects arising from changes in the term of the 
contract. Specifically, in a two-period model with identical 
risk-neutral borrowers (i.e. no ex ante asymmetrical 
information) the bank faces a probability of loan default 
and therefore a financial loss as the collateral is below 
the amount loaned. The bank cannot observe the project 
chosen and the amount of effort put into it ex post 
asymmetrical information) but is aware of how the term of 
the contract may affect the borrower's behaviour. The most 
important conclusion from this model is that a risk-neutral 
bank makes the availability of credit to the second period 
contingent on the outcome from the first period project 
performance. 
Therefore, the existence of a financial intermediary 
(bank) emerges as an endogeneous response 
imperfections (i.e asymmetrical information) by 
information services. 
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to the 
providing 
(4.3.2) Banks as Liquidity Insurers. 
The demand for liquidity insurance arises in this less 
than ideal economy as a result of uncertainty. In this case, 
a financial intermediary (bank) will provide liquidity 
insurance to risk-averse depositors who are uncertain about 
their future consumption. 
Edgeworth (1888) provided the first attempt to show 
formally how banks can supply liquidity to the system. He 
assumed that depositors' withdrawls are both stochastic and 
independent events so that there is an optimal amount of 
cash reserves to respond to the expected demand for cash 
balances from bank depositors. Specifically, maintaining 
reserves equal to some multiple of the standard deviation of 
deposit withdrawals over a selected time period would enable 
a bank to respond to the demand for liquidity from banks' 
depositors as well as to invest the remaining on assets. 
Thus, under the law of large numbers and the principle of 
pooling risks, a bank issuing demand deposits is actually 
pooling independent risks and providing liquidity insurance 
to depositors. 
The bank's liquidity insurance function became central 
to the literature of financial intermediation. In the 
seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
Haubrich and King (1984), Smith (1984), and 
followed by 
Waldo (1985) 
banking institutions play an insurance role in the face of 
liquidity uncertainty. 
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Diamond and Dybvig's model demonstrated that simple 
competitive markets can not provide 
against the contingency of being 
liquidity insurance 
in liquidity need, 
information which is private to the agent in need. Moreover, 
they demonstrated that a bank is able to transform illiquid 
assets by offering liquid liabilities with a different 
smoother pattern of returns over time than a liquid asset. 
This transformation would enable a bank to provide liquidity 
insurance and hence to provide better risk-sharing among 
agents who need to consume at different random times and 
improve upon the unintermediated outcome. 
This model considers two type of consumer-investor 
inserted in a three period framework T=O,1,2. Type 1 agent 
after investing one unit of input (initial endowment) in T=O 
is forced to consume after one period in T=l. The investment 
return from one unit input at t=l is equal 1 (initial 
investment). This costly interruption of investment may 
occur from random shocks to his consumption plans. In 
contrast, type 2 agent consumes at T=2 when his investment 
has fully matured and provides a return R>l. At period T=O 
all investors-consumers are identical, although each of them 
carries a risk of facing a consumption shock and thus 
interrupting his investment before it matures. In other 
words, a risk of being type 1 investor-consumer and with a 
probability of t. 
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Given that investment decisions have to be made in T=O 
and there is a risk of being type 1 investor-consumer, he 
has to decide whether to be self-sufficient and carry the 
risk on himself or get into optimal risk-sharing 
arrangements. Thus, if we let Cij being consumption of type 
i agent in period j, then the agents choose C11=1, 
C12=C2l=O, and C22=R>1. Diamond and Dybvig show that if 
types were publicly observable at T=l it is possible to 
implement an optimal insurance that gives ex ante optimal 
7 
share of output between both types of agents. 
Diamond and Dybvig argue that the lack of observability 
of agents' type rules out the possibility of this mutual 
insurance contract that indemnifies the holder in case of 
being type 1 (interrupt investment). Given that claims will 
depend on nonverifiable private information (asymmetrical 
information), this type of contract will entail moral 
hazard. Indeed, by announcing himself of being type 1 agent 
he can claim indemnity from other individuals and protect 
his own resources from claims. 
Diamond and Dybvig maintained that a bank will supply an 
optimal risk-sharing insurance contract by offering demand 
deposit contract (liquid liabilities) and then invest them 
in earning assets with a promise of a positive return to 
those depositors type 1 (withdraw deposits at period 1). The 
promised return per unit deposited at T=O and withdrawn 
randomly at T=1 is R1=C11)1 by liquidating bank assets. 
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Thus, the payoff per unit deposit withdrawn at T=l which 
depends on the random arrival to the bank and independent of 
each depositor is given by Vl(Fj,Rl)=Rl if Fj(l/Rl and 0 If 
Fj>l/Rl where Fj is the number of deposit withdrawals before 
agent j as a proportion of total deposits denoted as F. 
Similarly, V2(F,Rl)=max[R(1-R1F)/(1-F),O] is the deposit 
payoff at T=2 which depends on total withdrawls at T=l. 
In consequence, a demand deposit contract supplied by a 
bank permits the attainment of a full information optimal 
risk sharing which enables a type 1 investor-consumer to 
consume Cl and a type 2 agent to consume C2 where 1<C1<C2<R. 
In this equilibrium type 1 agent withdraw at T=l and type 2 
agent postpones consumption until investment has fully 
matured at T=2. This is what constitute a "good" 
equilibrium, although as we will see shortly it is not 
unique equilibrium. 
The Diamond and Dybvig's model succeeds in explaining 
the emergence of a deposit-taking institution (bank) in the 
event of random shocks in consumption and the need of 
liquidity insurance combined with the illiquidity of agents' 
assets. Banks are able to provide transformation services by 
offering liquid liabilities (demand deposits), a contract 
which has at least two equilibria: one the one hand a good 
equilibrium associated with optimal risk sharing, and on the 
other hand a bad equilibrium associated with bank runs. 
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(4.4) Theories of Bank Failures and Banking Instability. 
(4.4.1) Banking Panics and Bank Failures. 
One of the earliest views about bank failure and 
instability was that a fractional reserve banking system is 
inherently unstable. As we have seen in the previous 
section, the existence of random and independent deposit and 
withdrawals enabled banks to issue liabilities payable on 
demand while holding earning assets and an estimated cash 
reserve sufficient to respond to stochastic demand for 
deposits. In this fractional reserve banking system, the 
bank's asset transformation and the provision of liquidity 
insurance by means of a deposit demand contract offer an 
optimal risk sharing (good equilibrium). However, it was 
also pointed out that a demand contract also has a bad 
equilibrium consistent with a bank run. This result was also 
shown formally by Diamond and Dybvig's model where those 
investor-consumers who were forced to withdraw their funds 
due to consumption shocks in T=l are followed by others 
which otherwise would have waited until their investment had 
matured in T=2. According to Lewis (1996), bank failures and 
banking instability can be seen as an unfortunate and 
undesirable by-product of banks' intermediation activities, 
particularly the provision of liquidity insurance. 
In Diamond and Dybvig's two type investors-consumers 
and three period modelling with consumption risk there is 
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another equilibrium where type 1 and type 2 agents panic and 
try to withdraw their deposits at T=l. This occurs because 
type 2 agent5 anticipate both that others will demand the 
redemption of their deposits and that the bank will face a 
value of its deposits which will be larger than the value of 
the bank's assets. In this sense, assets will be liquidated 
at a significant loss so that the bank's potential liability 
in T=1 will exceed the assets' value when liquidated in this 
8 
period. In this model, agents' expectations about bank runs 
become universal and self-fulfilling regardless of the true 
financial condition of the intermediary. Therefore, the 
dividing line between a good equilibrium and bank run 
equilibrium in a fractional reserve banking system is very 
thin. This makes the optimal risk sharing equilibrium very 
fragile and dependant on depositors' confidence. 
In this model a bank run equilibrium and the optimal 
risk sharing equilibrium depends on the depositors' commonly 
observed random variable in the economy. Among them the 
model includes bad earning reports, commonly observed runs 
at other banks, or sunspot. It is clear that under this 
exogeneous-imposed uncertainty the loss of confidence and a 
bank run equilibrium is a very likely event in this model. 
Waldo (1985) in his three-period four-agent model 
arrived to a similar run equilibrium where bank run is a 
random event. Like Diamond and Dybvig, Waldo considers a 
bank run when each depositor believes other depositors will 
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withdraw their deposits, losses which can be avoided by an 
early withdrawal. Again the cause of a run is extraneous and 
unrelated to any fundamental. 
Given that in this model savers have an initial 
endowment W at T=O and can split it into storage and bank 
deposit and for each saver there is a long term investor 
and a short term investor financed by short term and long 
term bonds, then the bank will act as intermediary by the 
issue of deposits and the holding of both short term and 
9 
long term securities (asset transformation). Thus, a bank 
by exploiting economies of scale provides small savers with 
access to the market of primary securities with the issue of 
deposits which exceed short term yields as well as the 
benefit from the storage of the savers' initial endowment 
which in this model serves as liquid currency but sterile 
store of wealth. In the event of a run, banks can meet 
withdrawls out of their revenues from first period short 
terms securities and from the sale of their long term assets 
to a short term investor in the secondary market. 
Thus, Waldo's model re-affirms Diamond and Dybvig's bank 
instability in the form of bad equilibrium and the cause of 
a run being extraneous and unrelated to any fundamental, 
although it differs from the role of banks as well as on 
10 
some empirical observations concerning bank runs. 
These models which treat bank failures and banking 
instability as a result of a lack of confidence in 
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fractional reserve financial institutions providing 
liquidity insurance have important shortcomings. Firstly, it 
could be argued that a good equilibrium can be supported by 
equity contracts. Indeed, it is demonstrated that an equity 
contract provides the same optimal sharing contract than 
Diamond and Dybvig's bank contract, but without the run 
11 
equilibrium. Moreover, the existence of an intermediary is 
not necessary for optimal risk-sharing as anyone could issue 
and offer shares to interested buyers, unless we drop the 
model's restrictive assumption which suggest that all 
projects and hence shares are the same. 
Secondly, a bank run occurs partly due to an 
exogenously-imposed sequential service constraint, where as 
stated by Lewis (1996), the "fixed-price-first come-first 
served" payout rule on deposits demand operates. 
Thirdly, the models do not introduce any role for 
collateral and/or capital adequacy in order to assure that 
depositors' claims can be met. For instance, if we allow for 
bank' shareholders to commit sufficient assets as collateral 
to assure depositors' confidence then a bank run may not 
occur. Similarly, banks may have access to interbanking 
funds (liquidity) by offering shareholders' assets as 
collateral. However, the Diamond and Dybvig's type of model 
has made no distinction between depositors and shareholders. 
Moreover, even if they allowed for it, the role of any 
collateral may have certain limits on enhancing depositors' 
12 
confidence. 
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Fourthly, these models of banking instability fail to 
distinguish panics and information-based bank runs. Jacklin 
and Bhattacharya (1988) identify private information about 
bank loan/asset payoffs on the part of depositors as the 
source of banking instability (run) as opposed to Diamond 
and Dybvig's model which view a run as a sunspot phenomena. 
By introducing uncertainty on the return to production and 
the irreversibility of long term assets, they show that 
deposit contracts tend to be better suited for financing 
low-risk assets as compared with equity contracts which are 
more suitable for higher-risk assets. Moreover, they 
obtained a unique equilibrium and discuss those factors 
which could trigger a run, particularly bad interim 
information. Thus, under uncertain return to production, a 
run can be a systematic event conditional on the news about 
an asset quality at T=1 
Finally, the evidence from different episodes of banking 
instability suggest that runs were systematic events. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), and particularly Bernanke 
(1983) and Gorton (1988) have shown that bank failures tend 
to be associated with high currency-deposit ratio, output 
contraction, and explosive demand for banks' liabilities. 
For instance, Gorton (1988) found that panics are 
systematic and predictable events linked to the business 
cycle. Indeed, panics resulted from changes in risks 
predicted on the basis of prior information. Liabilities of 
failed non-financial firms as proxy of recession was the 
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best prior information in forming conditional expectations. 
If banks hold claims on firms and if they begin to fail as a 
result of a rece55ion depositors will re-assess the risk. 
Moreover, it was shown that the larger the movement of the 
predictor and hence in the percieved risk, the larger the 
movement in the currency-deposit ratio. Thus, these models 
in which a bank run is a sunspot equilibrium do not provide 
a theory of bank failure. This remark becomes even more 
important today as bank failures have not provoked runs and 
systematic collapse of financial institutions. 
(4.4.2) External and Internal Factors in Bank Failures. 
As we have seen in the previous section, banks as 
liquidity insurers in a fractional reserve system can be 
inherently unstable in the sense that they are vulnerable to 
runs and panics in the absence of a safety net of deposit 
insurance and a lender to the last resort policy. This 
sunspot equilibrium was influenced by extraneous and 
unrelated factors to the true financial condition of a bank. 
That is, to the market value of its liabilities and assets 
structure, as well as its capital and reserves. Moreover, a 
bank failure could occur at any point in the business cycle 
rather than in the turning point of the cycle. 
A run equilibrium is likely to emerge as result of 
sunspot, bad report, the failure of a large financial 
institution, or any other relevant factor in depositors' 
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self-fulfilling expectations on the bank's inability to 
respond to depositors' demand for currency. In this 
argument, there is no theory of failure nor an explanation 
behind the failure of a large financial institution. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) have provided a useful 
insight into the more than 9.000 bank failures (from 40.000 
to 14.000) and the three day suspension of bank trading 
during March of 1933 at the time of the Great Depression. In 
their view, this wave of bank failures was determined by a 
contagious panic which started with the collapse of the Bank 
13 
of the United states in December 11, 1930. Both the rise in 
the banks currency-deposit ratio, and reserve-deposit ratio 
led to a fall in the money supply and a shortage of bank 
liquidity. The monetary contraction and the widespread 
rumours which followed produced additional bank failures 
independently of the banks' initial financial soundness 
(asset quality). Sound banks were forced into insolvency by 
a fall in the value of their assets caused by the scramble 
for liquidity. 
This monetarist interpretation of the 1930's banking 
debacle suggests that the monetary authorities should follow 
a stable and predictable path for money supply as well as 
the readiness to supply the economy with liquiditity to 
avoid widespread runs and panics. Futhermore, a deposit 
insurance provision should complement the lender to the last 
resort so as to keep the public's confidence in the safety 
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and stability of the banking system snd to protect small 
depositors. 
The view that the wave of bank failures can be explained 
from a contagion fear originated from the failure of large 
financial and/or non-financial institution is ad hoc, and 
an exception to the general rule when we look at several 
bank failure episodes. Indeed, according to Beston and 
Kaufman (1986) there is little evidence of a currency run in 
recent years despite the fact of well publicised large bank 
failures such as Continental Illinois in 1984, and the two 
largest Savings and Loans Associations (thrifts) in the US. 
Moreover, they found that in only one single year between 
1865 and 1914 more than 200 banks failed and in only nine 
years in which more than 100 banks failed. The failure rate 
during this period, which before the safety net was 
established, was 
Feldstein (1991), 
only 0.8%. Lewis and Davis (1987), 
and Davis (1992) have also identified 
several financial episodes during the mid-1970's and mid-
1980 which did not ended in a wave of bank failures. 
Moreover, it appears that the number of bank failures 
per se has become more frequent now than in past despite the 
fact that the economy appears to be stable. In the case of 
the US banking system, from 1934 to 1943 the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) closed 490 banks averaging 54 
banks per year. This average was much smaller between 1943 
and 1981 with 6 banks per year (total of 232). However, 
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these figures increased drastically between 1982 and 1988 as 
the FDIC closed 811 banks which is equivalent to 115 banks 
per year. 
The relevant question which should concern us is the 
identification of the underlying factors behind the rise in 
bank failures and whether these factors were under the 
banks' control (internal) or outside their influence 
(external). Specifically, the causes of bank failures are 
either internal or external to the institution, or some 
combination of the two. Internal causes are identified as 
those factors which the managers and directors of a bank 
have direct control. For instance, a bank can exert control 
on its loan and investment policy, particularly asset and 
loan concentration, as well as the growth rate of asset 
expansion. Moreover, self-serving loans, embezzlement, and 
fraud are also within the responsibility of the bank 
management. Managerial inefficiency, dishonesty, or 
insufficient internal provision will lead to excessive risk-
taking and bank failures. It could be argued that this 
classification correspond to a firm-specific factor. 
External causes of bank failures are those over which 
the manager and directors of a bank have no control such as 
structural changes in banking (industry-specific) and the 
economic environment (macroeconomy). In the former we 
include increasing competition from financial 
liberalisation, regulatory and supervisory changes, and 
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technological innovation. In the latter, we refer to adverse 
changes in output and key macroeconomic prices such as the 
rate of interest, real exchange rate, or commodity prices. 
Although, in theory we can draw a definite line between 
internal and external factors on bank failures, in practice 
this distinction becomes somewhat blurred. Bank managers can 
in fact respond to changes in external factors depending on 
their capacity and objectives. For instance, financial 
liberalisation entails more opportunities for profit 
maximisation but at the expense of additional risk-taking. 
The managers' response depends on their attitude toward 
risk-taking, the existence of remaining distortions like 
fixed rate deposit insurance and related portfolio structure 
(bank holding companies), and the 
prudential regulation and supervision 
operations. 
effectiveness of 
to monitor banks' 
Before we progress towards the examination of those 
factors responsible for bank failures it is desirable to 
technically define a bank failure and to present a bank's 
balance sheet in order to identify the sources of risk. As 
we have seen in chapter 2, a bank fails in economic terms 
when the market value of their assets is below the market 
value of their liabilities. Therefore, all depositors and 
creditors cannot be expected to be paid in full and on time. 
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With reference to a bank balance sheet, we 
consider a simplified balance sheet as follows: 
can 
ASSETS 
Cash 
Securities 
Loans and Advances 
LIABILITIES 
Deposits 
Non-Deposit Liabilities 
Capital 
On the asset side, the bank's balance sheet is dominated 
by loans and advances. Financial securities have a smaller 
share in the asset portfolio, and the cash item is even less 
important. On the liability side, deposits represent the 
largest share in the liability structure. Similarly, banks 
are highly geared as their liability-capital ratio is very 
14 
high. 
By looking at the structure and composition of a bank 
balance sheet, it could be argued in broad terms that 
banking instability can arise on the asset side, on the 
liability side, or on both. For instance, as we have 
already seen changes in the percieve risk on bank deposits 
can originate a shock on bank liabilities as depositors rush 
to claim back their funds. This liquidity risk could impair 
a bank's ability to respond unless there is access to a 
discount window and/or assets can be sold at short notice at 
a large undervalued price. 
Similarly, on the asset side of the balance sheet there 
several factors affecting both the bank's loan portfolio and 
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the security investment. For instance, adverse changes in 
the bank's external economic environment such as output and 
price deflation, significant price misalignment due to gross 
macroeconomic policy inconsistency and/or exogenous shocks 
to the economy affect the quality and riskiness of the 
bank's loan portfolio. The effect can be magnified in the 
event of excessive loan concentration on a limited number of 
borrowers or related group, industry, countries, or regions. 
Equally important is the role played by a mismatching 
between the bank's assets and liabilities, particularly in 
the event of interest rate risk. There are banks which, 
given the nature of their activities (thrifts), present 
assets and liabilities that are unbalanced with respect to 
their maturity. Thrift institutions hold long term fixed 
interest mortgages (assets) funded by short term saving 
deposits (liabilities) which an increase in the level and 
volatility of interest rates can cause the market value to 
fall and be worth less than the value of its deposits. 
It should be pointed out that a bank's balance sheet may 
not only reflect external shocks from the macroeconomy but 
also can be affected from increasing competition and 
innovation in the banking industry as a result of financial 
liberalisation which is also considered external to the 
bank. However, banks are not passive victims of changes in 
the underlying economic environment where they operate. 
Moreover, bankers' attitudes towards risk-taking in terms of 
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a more aggressive management can also increase the 
vulnerability of banks. A less conservative attitude by the 
bank's management is reflected in an inadequate capital and 
provision for bad loans, poor asset and liability quality 
from the lack of diversification, rapid growth in assets and 
liabilities, and a low profitability. 
(4.4.2.1) External Factors in Bank Failures. 
It is argued that bank failures (financial instability) 
are related to the business cycle, as a downturn weakens 
banks' balance sheet. This link is indirect via the 
financial fragility of non-financial institutions following 
15 
their overindebtness and unexpected deflationary shocks. 
Fisher (1933), and later Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky 
(1977) focused on a link between bank failures and 
deflation. The development of a fragile financial structure 
leads to a wave of bank failures at the turning point of the 
business cycle and not at any point of the cycle as argued 
by the monetarist. Moreover, they disassociated with the 
view that a wave of bank failures is the result of some 
exogeneous factor, accident, or a policy mistake by the 
Central Bank. 
The whole economic cycle is described by a process in 
which a buoyant output growth caused by an exogeneous event 
(new inventions, the opening up of new markets as a result 
of economic liberalisation) which improves profit 
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opportunities leading to an investment boom in both physical 
and financial investments financed by bank loans. Rising 
prices reduce the percieved value of outstanding debts, and 
increasing demand for financial investment increases the 
value of debtors' collateral. Both factors plus widespread 
optimistic expectations lead to a significant 
overindebtness. According to Fisher (1933), a significant 
overindebtness and a deflation will bring a downturn in the 
business cycle. It could be argued that a deflation in 
commoditity prices, falling output, and even rising real 
interest rates should increase both the value of outstanding 
debt and difficulties to service the debt. Debtors unable to 
pay their debt and refinance its position may force 
creditors to liquidate assets adding additional pressure to 
falling prices and hence increasing the magnitude of the 
deflationary pressures. Thus, falling prices, rising real 
interest rates, and falling output will reduce firms' net 
worth and profits and hence lead to loans default which in 
turn will certainly raise the likelihood of bank failures. 
Kindleberger (1978) identifies three stages of the same 
process leading to the transformation of the economy from a 
buoyant and euphoric stage (boom) to a fragile and 
collapsing stage (bust). This include overindebtedness, 
significant relaxation of safety and risk provision by 
banks, and subsequently bankruptcies and bank failures. The 
first stage is a mania where investors shift money to real 
and financial assets during the expansion of the business 
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cycle. The second stage is a panic as they start moving back 
to money at the turning point of the cycle. The final stage 
ends with a crash as commodity and stock prices 
output falls and the number of bankruptcies 
suspensions increase. 
collapse, 
and bank 
Minsky (1977) also provide a theory for the build-up of 
financial fragility over the upturn of the business cycle 
and the subsequent downturn of the cycle and the rising 
number of bankruptcies. He identifies three factors which 
may produce 
speculative 
portfolio. 
The hedge, 
systemic fragility; first, the mix of 
, and ponzi finance. Second, liquidity 
Third, the ratio of external-internal 
hedge, 
of the 
finance. 
speculative, and ponzi finance units are 
vulnerable to several events which will affect cash flows 
from assets. For instance, a decrease in operating income as 
a result of unrealistic expectations about the market and 
growth prospect may transform an hedge financing unit into a 
speculative unit. That is, from a unit in which his assets' 
cash-flows exceed cash payments over a long period into a 
financing unit where cash payments exceed the short run cash 
receipts. Changes in the money market (interest rates) 
should affect an speculative unit by trying to refinance its 
position and make himself vulnerable to the disruption of 
financial flows. A margin of safety may exist if the present 
value (PV) of assets is greater than the liabilities' 
present value. This margin exists for the hedge and 
speculative financing unit but not for ponzi finance as the 
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PV is clearly negative. Thus, for Ponzi units a rise in 
interest rates can entail negative net worth and bankruptcy. 
Once this form of financing becomes a significant portion of 
the financial structure of the economy there will be either 
a debt-deflation and depression or there will be rise in 
expected cash flows from capital assets as a result of 
inflation. 
The model's mechanism suggests that in the upswing of 
the cycle larger demand for investment (physical and 
financial) financed by external resources (bank debt) leads 
to rising interest rates and a shift from hedge to 
speculative, and even Ponzi finance. Shifts from long term 
to short term financing and reductions in margins of safety 
for banks increase their vulnerability to further rises in 
interest rates. Ponzi finance units unable to refinance 
their position (roll-over of their debts) will result in 
liquidation of assets leading to further deflation and 
bankruptcies of both non-financial and financial firms. 
In these models of financial fragility instability in 
the macroeconomy arising from both exogenous factors like 
innovation, wars, or swings in investment, and policy 
induced changes from liberalisation reforms can be seen as 
prime shock to the financial system. These disturbances are 
amplified by over optimistic expectations by both non-
financial and financial firms which lead to overindebtedness 
and subsequent reversal when a deflationary shock affects 
fragile firms. The likelihood of bank failures and the 
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subsequent contagious effect on other financial institutions 
becomes a real threat to the stability of the financial 
system. 
Although these models of financial fragility offers an 
alternative on the causes of bank failures and a re-
interpretation of the Great Depression, it lacks a solid 
foundations based on rationality and endogeneous 
expectations. 
To begin with, the model introduces a debt-type of 
contract and rules out alternative form of financing without 
formally introducing assumptions concerning agency cost, and 
other imperfections which explain the importance of debt 
finance over equity finance. 
With respect to rational behaviour, models of financial 
fragility have departed from the assumption of rational 
economic behaviour. Investors are assumed to be 
overoptimistic about the expected returns and traders' 
purchases are responding to rising prices rather falling 
prices (low prices). Moreover, the model does not explain 
expectation formation and the sources of wrong 
risk perceptions. 
Guttentag and Herring (1984) introduce a model where 
rational individuals (banks) during a period of boom will 
relax both credit policy (rationing) and their capital 
position, and the existence of uncertainty will lead to 
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underpriced risk. Once a shock occurs this leads to a vio-L ,-,e 
in a subjective probability of disaster combined with low 
capital level producing credit rationing and a crisis. This 
1s known as a "disaster myopia". 
Disaster myopia explain why in a booming economy with a 
long period of stability lenders (banks) expand loans 
rapidly and accept a decline in their capital position. In 
this case there is a increased vulnerability which is not 
percieved at such until a shock to confidence occurs. This 
leads to a revision of subjective probability and 
subsequently to a higher risk premium and credit rationing. 
Credits will be unavailable for some class of borrowers, 
investment will be cut-back from previous buoyant levels, 
and production stopped with a subsequent fall in the 
16 
economy's output (crisis). 
The rational expectation school and the model of 
speculative bubbles also provide a framework to model 
Kindleberger's irrational euphoria and bank instability 
(run). According to the model provided by Flood and Garber 
(1982) and Blanchard and Watson (1982) a mania can be 
associated with a speculative bubble. Under rational 
expectations where agents' anticipations are conditional to 
the information set of the underlying structural model so 
that prediction error will not be systematic, an asset price 
depends on its current value but also on the expected rate 
of change. Asset prices depart from the fundamentals as 
rational agents anticipate changes in asset prices (price 
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bubble). The bubble will last so long as the average return 
is sufficient to compensate for the risk of crash. The price 
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of the asset will need to be increased exponentially. 
Bernanke (1983) also embraced the view that an 
unanticipated deflation due to a collapse of stock prices 
can cause borrowers to default and banks to fail as a result 
of the reduction of borrowers' net worth and the rise in 
the real stock outstanding debt. At the same time, growing 
fears of total financial collapse lead to a marked 
preference for liquid assets and hence the shrinking of 
loanable funds available for lending. Bernanke's model also 
introduces a link between financial disruption as 
consequence of Fisher's deflationary shock, and output 
decline which came to complement the monetary forces behind 
the depression of the early 1930's. 
There are also factors within the industry which are 
outside the control of the bank. Institutional, and 
structural changes in the form of technological 
improvements, and innovation playa significant part in 
increasing the fragility of the banking system. 
For instance, government policies can affect the banks' 
ability to cope with risk. It is argued that in the US 
banking system prohibition of interstate and intrastate 
branching, obstacles to takeovers, and restrictions on banks 
activities had made banks more vulnerable as a result of the 
lack of diversification. There is considerable evidence 
187 
which demostrates that restrictions on branching limits the 
banks' ability to withstand economic shocks (external). As 
local economic conditions deteriorate an increasing 
proportion of their loan portfolio becomes non-performing 
and their deposits are increasingly withdrawn. Lack of 
diversification will disable banks' ability to offset their 
losses forcing these banks to fail. White (1984) holds the 
view that pervasive restriction on branching in the US 
created a large number of small and specialised banks with a 
limited portfolio diversification. He argues that one 
important factor in the bank failures during the Great 
Depression of the 1930's was the banks' inability to 
withstand any real and/or monetary shock. A system of 
nation wide branching could have reduced or eliminated bank 
failures by establishing intermediaries with loan 
portfolios that were sufficiently diversified to manage 
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regional risk. Further evidence is provided by Amos (1992) 
for the regional distribution of bank closing between 1982 
and 1988. The data indicate a significant concentration of 
bank closings in states with oil and gas extraction and to a 
lesser extent, farming. Moreover, it confirms that those 
states with unit banking regulation account for nearly 57% 
of total bank failures. 
other regulation like the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
which prohibited commercial banks from engaging in 
securities-related activities (separation of commercial and 
investment bank) have also contributed to reduce banks' 
188 
diversification possibilities. According to the evidence 
from White (1986), it appears that banks with security 
operations before 1933 had a lower probability of failure 
than other banks. 
Similarly, the introduction of interest rate ceilings 
can also affect the banks' capacity to adjust in the face of 
economic shocks like inflationary instability and the 
subsequent desintermediation via off-shore markets. In the 
case of regulation Q in the US which prohibited interest 
payments on demand deposits and introduced ceilings on 
savings and time deposits it made more difficult for banks 
to compete for funds relative to unregulated financial 
institutions. 
(4.4.2.2) Internal Factors in Bank Failures. 
One of the most important criticisms of the hypothesis 
that banks' failures can be affected by factors outside the 
banks' control is that they are treated as passive adjusters 
and henceforth victims of an adverse economic environment, 
and the changes and annomalies of the financial market per 
se (industry). On the contrary, financial institutions are 
actively responding to changes in both the macroeconomy and 
in particular to conditions within its own market (industry) 
as a result of deregulation, liberalisation reforms, and 
technological change and innovation. 
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It could be argued that financial liberalisation in the 
form of interest rate deregulation, geographical and 
funrtional deregulatIon (products) have contributed to the 
increment in competitive pressures and followed by an 
appropiate response from banks. Indeed, there is a 
substantial literature which suggest that deregulation and 
greater competition has shifted banks' strategy from safety 
towards a greater risk-taking. Moreover, it is argued 
argued that excessive risk-taking in a deregulated banking 
system (liberalised) reflects the effect of a subsidy from 
the government safety net and the failure of prudential 
supervision. 
The evidence has given considerable support to the 
importance of internal factors on bank failures. For 
instance, Peterson and Scott (1985) found that most bank 
failures in the US between 1982 and the first quarter of 
1984 were the result of internal causes, particularly fraud 
and manipulation, poorly managed rapid growth, and sustained 
low performance. 
According to Beston and Kaufman (1986) fraud can take 
many forms. Banks can make loans to business associates, 
subsidiaries, and relatives violating the legal restrictions 
and limits established by the authorities. The loans' 
proceeds which are allocated to very risky ventures involve 
risky concentrations relative to the bank's capital on 
entities and persons controlled by or associated with 
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controlling stockholders and bank managers. The evidence 
from the failure of the United states National Bank of San 
Diego in 1973, the failure of the Hamilton Bank of 
Chattanooga in 1976, and as we will see in chapter 8 the 
overwhelming loan concentration with affiliates in the 
Chilean banking system during the liberalisation episodes 
are examples of fraud, excessive risk-taking and its effect 
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on bank failures. Further evidence from different period 
of the US banking history confirms the importance of fraud 
in bank failures. While Peterson and Scott's research 
confirms the importance of fraud where 66% of the 80 
failures between 1982 and 1984 were the result due wholly 
or partly to some form of fraud. Sinkey (1979) also confirm 
this finding for the pre-insurance (1865-1920) and the post-
insurance periods (1960-1974). 
Similarly, a rapid growth in a bank's loan portfolio 
would increase the likelihood of bank failure as it becomes 
extremely dificult for management to support such strategy. 
Management should ensure that growth in loans is fueled with 
good credit risk, proper documentation, a reward in quality 
being favoured instead of growth per se, and loan growth 
and risk which are sufficiently diversified. Limited 
management resources like training, as well as the existence 
of asymmetrical information do not help the maintance of 
management quality. Moreover, rapid growth of loans 
portfolios in a scenario with high interest rates will 
exacerbate the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
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Therefore, under a rapid growth scenario excessive loan 
concentration, poor quality loans, and fraud may be very 
serious affecting the likelihood of bank failures. Short, 
O'Driscoll, and Berger (1985) provide evidence on the effect 
of poorly managed rapid growth as a determinant of bank 
failure. Further discussion of this model is presented in 
chapter 5 and 8. 
Although the evidence tends to support the importance of 
internal factors on bank failures, there are still important 
difficulties in the analysis. There is a fine dividing 
between bad luck, fraud, and incompetent management so 
it may in practice be difficult to prove any mis-conduct 
bankers. Moreover, the presence of fraud does not mean 
fraud caused bank failure. 
(4.4.3) The Role of Moral Hazard in Bank Failures. 
line 
that 
by 
that 
One of the most important shortcomings in the incidence 
of internal factors is the fact that these internal factors 
are not exogeneous in the sense that bank defaults take 
place in a vacuum. Indeed, bankers respond to certain 
incentives and distortions (i.e policy-induced or 
instrinsic) which are present in the banking system 
(industry). For instance, while fraud and rapid growth 
syndrome could be the result of the strategy "hit and run", 
it could also reflect moral hazard from deposit insurance 
and weak prudential regulation (government safety net and 
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regulation). Moreover, the increases in bank 
as a result of unsound loan concentration 
vulnerability 
reflects the 
increasing interdependency between affiliates of bank 
holding company structure. 
It could be argued that the presence of 
distortions (e.g. financial liberalisation 
policy-induced 
as external 
factor) will encourage excessive risk-taking (moral hazard) 
by banks, raising the likelihood of bank failures. 
Specifically, the existence of a bank holding company 
structure combined with a fixed rate underpriced deposit 
insurance, rapid deregulation of interest rates, and a weak 
and inefficient prudential regulation 
provide banks with greater incentives to 
and supervision 
increase risk-
bearing. The increases in banks' vulnerability should be 
reflected in a deterioration of assets quality, higher 
leverage, lower capital and reserve requirements. Financial 
and accounting ratios constructed fom banks' balance-sheet 
should reflect the banks' incentives to take greater risks 
raising the ex ante probability of bank failures. 
- Bank Holding Company Structure and Market Concentration. 
To begin with, a bank holding company can be defined as 
a multi-company firm which operates under a common 
management and financial control. Its scope of ownership and 
economic influence can be made extensive into both financial 
and non-financial firms operating in different markets and 
segments. 
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While this specific form of company organisation carries 
legal recognition and is subject to regulation in the US, 
and economies like Japan, and Germany, its identification 
has been more implicit in LDC's, particularly before the 
episodes 
during 
of financial liberalisation and banking crisis 
the late 1970's and early 1980's. Some of the 
literature on development economics recognises this form of 
industrial organisation as "economic conglomerates" or 
"group". It is identified as an informally established 
multi-company firm which like the bank holding company also 
operates under common management and financial control. 
Generally, the centre point of an economic "group" is 
constituted by a "parent company" or holding company which 
is valued in the stock exchange or owned by an extensive web 
of family inter-relationships. This nucleus company directly 
or indirectly controls several subsidiaries as well as 
financial institutions. The ownership of banks and other 
financial institutions enable a "group" to exercise direct 
influence on banks' decisions, particularly credit 
concentration and credit terms. It is also possible for this 
"parent" company to exert indirect control over financial 
institutions through their own subsidiaries which in turn 
own one or several intermediaries. This web of 
relationship can be extend even further 
interlocking 
by allowing 
financial institutions themselves to directly control 
financial and non-financial firms. 
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The common form of this network of financial and 
managerial inter-relationships is despicted in diagram 2. 
Figure 4.1. Bank Holding Company structure. 
> 
> 
Bank A < IHolding Coy. 
Bank B < Holding Coy. 
Bank C < Holding Coy. 
v 
Non-Bank Financial 
Institution A < 
Non-Bank Financial < < 
Institution B 
Non-Bank Financial 
Institution C < 
A 
B 
C 
>1 Firms A 
> 1 Firms B 
>1 Firms C 
For instance, holding company C owns and directly 
control a number of firms in C, and financial institutions 
in C both bank and non-bank entities. In addition, holding 
company C also holds and influences indirectly non-bank 
financial institutions in C through bank C. 
According to Leff (1978), this form of industrial 
organisation has flourished as a mean to expand the size of 
the economic conglomerate. Indeed, the ownership of 
financial institutions has permitted them to attract 
resources from other segments outside the "group's" market 
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influence. It will be relatively easy for a "parent" company 
having a controlling interest in a financial institution to 
U 5 ~ ~ the banklB reBOUlces to purchase a controlling interest 
in other non-financial firm. Moreover, if the legislation 
permits it, they could even acquire other financial 
institutions to further their expansion. 
Apart from the feature of economic conglomerates, the 
financial market can also be highly concentrated among a few 
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financial institutions. More often than not, are-current 
characteristic of LDC's banking structure is the presence of 
three or four large banks controlling more than half of the 
system's assets and liabilities while the remaining share is 
held by several small financial institutions. Therefore, we 
may say that there is skewed distribution of assets, 
liabilities, and capital in this banking system. 
Galbis (1986) maintained that a bank holding company 
structure and a significant bank concentration should lead 
to an oligopolistic market-structure behaviour by financial 
institutions. This pattern of conduct should be reflected 
upon the growth of bank asset portfolios and concentration, 
risk diversification, and the level and spread of domestic 
interest rates. 
From oligopoly theory we can establish two possible 
outcomes; one inefficient which entails collusion, and the 
21 
other an unstable one with a price warfare. 
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Depending on the relative strength of the bank holding 
company group and the stability of their collusive 
agreements, we should expect a mixture of a significant loan 
concentration among its affiliates and a low average spread 
between deposit and loan interest rates. 
the affiliates' need for funds the 
concentration 
portfolio. 
and hence the riskier 
The more intense 
larger the loan 
the bank's loan 
Although collusion is in the interest of the oligopoly, 
there are instances where a predatory price warfare 
dominates over a collusive agreement. Increases in 
competition for fund among "groups" to finance their 
relative expansion will increase the probability of a price 
war. At the same time, free entry into the financial system 
by both domestic and foreign institutions will make 
competition for funds stiffer. As a result, a financial 
market dominated by "economic conglomerates" and facing 
unrestrained competition for funds will be conducive to high 
real deposit and lending interest rates and lower spread and 
bank profits. It is clear from the evidence of chapter 8 
that the restoration of bank holding company structure (i.e. 
economic groups) in Chile as a result of the privatisation 
of the financial system, together with the unbounded 
pressures from domestic and foreign banks were responsible 
for increasing competition for funds to finance the 
"groups'" economic expansion. Excessive concentration of 
bank's loans with its own affiliates which clearly 
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represented related risks (joint) contributed to an increase 
in the likelihood of bank failure in Chile. 
- ImplicIt and Explicit Deposit Insurance. 
It could be argued that the existence of a safety net 
(deposit insurance and lender to the last resort) can make 
the bank default more likely. Indeed, this government policy 
combined with the uncertainties of deregulation can 
encourage banks to take excessive risk (moral hazard) 
affecting the likelihood of bank failure. 
As we have seen in the previous sections, Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) demostrated that one of the equilibrium from a 
bank contract supplying liquidity insurance was consistent 
with a run sunspot equilibrium. However, this model 
demonstrated that there is a feasible contract 
(unconstrained optimum) which allows banks to provide the 
asset transformation service without the event of a run 
equilibrium. Specifically, the model shows that demand 
deposit contracts with government deposit insurance achieve 
the unconstrained optimum as a unique Nash equilibrium if 
the government imposes an optimal tax to finance a deposit 
insurance. 
The government can tax type 1 agents who withdraw in T=l 
(early withdrawl). The amount of tax raised depends on the 
number of type 1 agents who decide to go for an early 
withdrawal and the amount promised in return (assuming no 
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panic). The government infers the realised value of t 
(probability of withdraw) after all type 1 have come 
forward. If the realised value of t is greater than 
expected value of t then it charges a tax on the type 
the 
1 
individual and a subsidy in the opposite case. The tax-
subsidy policy ensures that type 1 receives its optimal 
consumption bundle contingent on the realisation of t. 
Similarly, given that the tax-subsidy is costless to operate 
type 2 also receives its optimal bundle of consumption and 
hence no incentive to withdraw in T=I. 
However, Diamond and Dybvig have warned us about the 
danger of moral hazard if the risk of bank portfolios 
selected by bank managers are unobservable by outsiders. 
Since the expected value of the bail-out to any bank 
increases with the probability of default which in turn 
rises with promised return to withdrawals in T=I, then bank 
optimisation of the bail-out subsidy will provide an 
incentive to bankers to compete more agressively for 
deposits by offering higher interest rates (return) to those 
withdrawn in T=l. It follows that the rate of interest for 
T=l rises to a point where the anticipated return on T=2 
falls so low that no one want to keep deposits beyond T=I. 
Type 2 depositors demand their deposits at T=l (run) and a 
bail-out of deposits will be necessary. 
According to Mckinnon (1988), the bank is a beneficiary 
of an unfair bet against the government. The bank can 
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provide risky loans at extremely high interest rates without 
having to compensate insured depositors for additional risk-
taking. The bank will have accrued extraordinarily high 
profits without having to pay the full cost of large losses 
from bad loans. 
White (1989) considers an implicit deposit insurance as 
a specific form of insurance which is analogous to medical 
or legal malpractice insurance contracts or to a third party 
car liability insurance. The purchase of an insurance policy 
forces the insurer to pay a compensation to the beneficiary 
( i . e . depositor, medical patient,legal client, or 
motorist/pedestrian) in the event in which the action of the 
insured (i.e. bank/thrift, doctor, lawyer, or driver) has 
caused some loss to the third party. This comparison between 
deposit insurance and a typical insurance contract allow us 
to identify the drawbacks and possible corrections which are 
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available in a typical insurance contract. 
Based on the state-preference model, Karaken and Wallace 
(1978) and Furlong and Keeley (1989) have formally shown 
that a value maximising bank will maintain the highest 
degree of leverage and an increasing asset portfolio unless 
there are limits set by regulation. Similarly, Merton (1977) 
arrived to the same conclusions by modelling deposit 
insurance as a put option. In his model a deposit insurance 
is introduced "as if" bank shareholders purchase the right 
to "put" the asset portfolio onto the insurer at a price 
equal to the value of the outstanding deposit liabilities. 
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The price of put option depends on the riskiness of the bank 
asset portfolio, the degree of leverage, and the proportion 
of insured deposits. It follows that unless the insurance 
price is variable, insured banks will need to be subject to 
prudential regulation to limit excessive risk-taking. 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) in a two-period model with two 
possible future states with Pl and P2 payouts, and two risky 
assets, X(xl,x2) and Y(yl,y2) where xl<yl and x2>y2 or more 
generally xl<yl<ly2<yl (i.e. X is riskier than Y), the 
current value of a maximising bank Vo that can meet its 
obligations in both states is given by the expression Vo= 
[(Co+Do)/P][sxl+(I-s)yl]Pl + [(Co+Do)/P][sx2+(1-s)y21P2 - Do 
where Co and Do are the initial amount of capital and 
deposits (claims), and s is the percentage of bank assets 
allocated into a riskier asset X. We take that the sum of 
the current pay-offs on assets in each state minus the 
current value of depositors' claims are equal to its initial 
capital (i.e Vo=Co). 
If we assume that there is a free deposit insurance and 
a given Co and a bank asset quality (risk) such that 
bankruptcy occurs at state 1, then the current value of the 
insurance policy 10 will be given by 10 = (Do/P)Pl-
[(Co+Do)P][sxl+(1-s)yl1Pl > O. The expression for 10 is 
positive since the current values of depositors' claims fell 
short of the assets' pay-offs. Therefore, an optimising bank 
will maximise its equity value Vo=Co+lo by maximising the 
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value of 10. The maximisation of the insurance policy 
involves maintaining both a high bank leverage, and a high 
asset risk. 
specifically, the effect of a change in leverage on the 
value of 10 is given by dI o /dDo=[P1/P][1-(sx1+(1-s)y1)1)O 
since x1<yl<1. Similarly, the effect of risk-taking on 10 is 
given by the partial derivative dIo/ds=-Ao[P/P11(x1-y1»0 
since xl<yl. In theory a value-maximising bank with free 
deposit insurance will choose s=1 and a large leverage. 
In consequence, it is demonstrated that fixed price 
deposit insurance should encourage maximising banks to 
excessive risk-taking (moral hazard) as their liability is 
limited to the value of their net worth. Once its net worth 
is exhausted, the outstanding claims of insured depositors 
will be covered by the deposit insurance. Full coverage 
combined with a flat rate insurance premium will make both 
bankers and depositors tolerant and indifferent about risk-
taking. In other words, a distortion to the market 
discipline which according to Eisenbeis and Gilbert (1985) 
will prevent depositors to ask for a higher risk 
compensation to hold riskier bank's liabilities, and 
encourage bankers to restructure their portfolio to reduce 
risk. An undistorted market mechanism may also discipline 
bankers by a reduction in the availability of funds or 
withdrawal of bank deposits from risky financial 
institutions. 
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The same conclusion follows in the case when there is 
the expectation of a de facto insurance. In effect, the 
public will hold the expectation that the monetary 
authorities will bail-out uninsured depositors from large 
banks in order to avert any loss of public confidence in 
the financial system. It could be argued that the belief in 
a de facto insurance guarantee feeds itself from the 
authorities' lack of reputation and credibility exhibited in 
the past with respect to the intentions and objectives of 
their banking policy. 
Karaken and Wallace (1978) have shown that deposit 
insurance and the need for regulation will not be necessary 
even in an unregulated fractional reserve banking system. 
Indeed, unregulated banking system will be inherently stable 
under their assumptions. If depositor are fully informed 
about banks' asset risk then bank managers will voluntary 
choose a maximising strategy which lower the risk of 
bankruptcy. 
Clearly the susceptibility of an unregulated fractional 
reserve banking system had given a major justification for 
government intervention in the form of deposit insurance 
complemented by regulation either to prevent bank panics and 
to oversee bank failures from inefficient units. 
As we have seen earlier on from the evidence from the US 
the number of failures have increased significantly during 
the 1980's and also have involved large financial 
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institutions and thrifts. Most of the studies concluded with 
a different emphasis the important role played by a fixed 
price deposit insurance on excessive risk-taking and bank 
failures. At the same time, they proposed urgent reforms to 
the existing deposit insurance scheme to remove some of the 
incentives to take additional risks beyond the social 
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optimum. 
- Prudential Regulation and Supervision. 
As we have seen from the previous analysis the central 
problem with a government improperly priced mandatory 
deposit insurance is that it encouraged insured maximising 
banks to exacerbate risk-taking (moral hazard) and hence to 
increase the probability of bank failure. Indeed, as 
demonstrated by Merton (1977), and Furlong and Keeley 
(1989), the value of deposit insurance for a bank was 
increasing in asset risk, and decreasing on capital. Thus, 
it was optimal for banks to hold high risk assets and 
maintain as little capital as possible raising the 
likelihood of bank failure unless portfolio constraints and 
minimum capital requirements were introduced. 
Indeed, Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981) show 
diagrammatically that a bank with free insured deposits and 
no regulation (treated as tax) his optimal maximising value 
for a given level of leverage (deposit) is greater than in 
the case when there is a positive cost of bankruptcy. This 
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difference in value measures the benefit of free insurance 
so that an optimal premium on insurance to reduce the 
increment in the bank's value can be arranged. However, 
there is no incentive to accept this "fair-value" rule which 
goes with the added regulatory mandate. Instead, they show 
that in the case of an explicit flat rate premium on 
deposits, a risk-rated structure of implicit premia in the 
form of regulatory interference can achieve a comparable 
effect relative to the risk-related premia option. Thus, 
regulation and supervision in this model is to find the 
appropriate mix between regulatory interference, and flat-
rate premia to contain excessive risk-taking. 
As it was established in an earlier section of this 
chapter, the lenders' need for continous and extremely 
expensive monitoring of informationally indistinguishable 
borrowers was overcome by means of delegating this 
monitoring task to a financial intermediary (bank). However, 
a depositor face another incentive-informational problem as 
the bank may fail to fulfill its monitoring obligations so 
that a depositor must bear both a fall in deposit rates and 
a rise in the probability of failure (i.e. the return from 
the bank portfolio below the depositors' claims). 
Again, the cost of continously monitoring their bank for 
an early detection of problem and insolvency will be large, 
and even if possible, any information from its monitoring is 
basically a public good. Therefore, there will be no 
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incentive to monitor. The problem of delegating a monitoring 
task to a third party is monumental since it has to provide 
the right incentives, to be discrete, and deal with 
contagious panics. 
One of the solutions is to appoint a government agency 
as a guarantor of bank deposits (i.e. Diamond and Dybvig's 
deposit insurance) and to monitor the banks. In this 
context, the government as a guarantor solves the monitoring 
problem since it is legally liable for any depositors' 
losses. 
Benston (1983) indicated that from the records of the US 
banking history it appears that the deposit guarantee system 
which also empowered officials to monitor banks' operations 
and control excessive risk-taking proved to be successful in 
comparison to a banking system arrangement which did not 
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include supervision. Dooley and Mathieson (1986) also hold 
similar views with respect to LDC's experience. In an 
economy where the government is no longer directing and 
distorting credit allocation (i.e. financial repression) and 
is unable to reduce its insurance committment, there is a 
need for both regulation and supervision of financial 
intermediaries in order to restrain excessive risk-taking, 
and hence reducing the probability of failure. They also 
argued that the problem of joint ownership of financial and 
non-financial firms which encourage loan concentration will 
also demand regulation to limit the emergence of joint 
risks. 
206 
Within the context of a newly liberalised financial 
system, prudential regulation and supervision should play an 
important role which in a sense is against the logic of 
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liberalisation. Financial liberalisation represents a shift 
of decision-making away from the government and towards the 
private sector. However, the existence of asymmetrical 
information and some remaining distortions will make the 
risk evaluation and assets return highly inadequate and 
distorted. As Dooley and Mathieson (1986) have put it, there 
is a principal-agent problem in the sense that a liberalised 
and competitive market does not work well unless bankers 
(agent) are induced to act in the interest of the depositors 
(principal). 
A complex institutional framework has evolved in 
developed countries to ensure that financial intermediaries 
act in the interest of depositors. As has been discussed 
extensively in the literature on financial regulation in 
industrial countries, particularly in the case of the US, 
the authorities have the responsibility of ensuring safety 
and the prevention of bank failures together with the 
guarantee of bank deposits. 
According to Golembe and Mingo (1986), prudential 
regulation and supervision involves a direct and close 
observation of individual institutions as well as indirectly 
influencing management decisions which affect risk. 
Normally, regulation entails specific rules while 
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supervision oversee for direction. For instance, regulation 
introduces portfolio restrictions in terms of limits on loan 
expOBureB and types of assets allowed to hold. At the same 
time, regulation may restrict entry, branching, and the type 
of product being offered and its price, although today these 
are less important than minimum capital requirements. In 
contrast, supervision is concern with overseeing and 
evaluating portfolio restrictions and capital requirements 
amongst other things. 
The central question is whether regulation and 
supervision can indeed be efficient in restraining bank 
risk. According to Blair and Heggestad (1978), the 
introduction of portfolio restrictions by excluding high-
risk, high return assets may increase the probability of 
bank failure instead of reducing it. In their mean-variance 
model, the banking firm will not be able to diversify 
therefore it cannot choose a market portfolio which is in 
the unregulated efficiency frontier and entails a lower 
probability of bank failure. These results stem from a 
failure to appreciate the existence 
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covariance between assets. 
of significant 
Similarly, Koehn and Santomero (1980) also applying a 
mean-variance model to utility maximising banks demonstrated 
that higher capital ratios could lead to a higher 
probability of bank failure by means of higher asset risk. 
They showed that for a bank with a smaller value for the 
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coefficient of relative risk-aversion the banks' reaction to 
an increase in capital is a larger shift towards riskier 
assets which more than offsets the effect of rising 
capital. Therefore, the likelihood of bank failure will 
to be 
that 
increase accordingly. In consequence, it appears 
significant theoretical ground to sustain the view 
regulation on bank portfolios and bank capital is not 
effective by itself in lowering the probability of bank 
failure. 
However, Kahane (1977) with a mean-variance model, and 
Furlong and Keely (1989) with state-preference model have 
shown formally that capital requirements combined with 
portfolio restrictions can actually affect the risk of bank 
default. Moreover, there are many empirical studies, as we 
will see in chapter 5 , which suggest that capital ratios, 
and proxies for asset quality are significant variables in 
the ex ante probability of bank failure. 
Supervision also contributes to ensure that portfolio 
regulation and minimum capital standard are observed by the 
financial institution under surveillance. Sinkey (1977,1978) 
shows that the authorities have two main weapons to 
supervise financial institutions namely, on-site 
examination, and early warning statistical models. 
bank 
With reference to on-site examination, although the 
identification and inclusion of a bank in the list of 
"problem banks" is a multi-dimensional problem ( e . g • 
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compliance with law and regulation, management quality, 
liability structure, accounting practices), the authorities 
tBnd to concentrate their efforts on the quality of loans 
portfolios, and capital adequacy. These two items are likely 
to reflect some of these multi-dimensional factors, 
particularly management quality. The examiners look at the 
documentation and collateral of both large loans and a 
random selection of small loans in order to classify them 
accordingly. In the US, loans are listed as "loss" if they 
are uncollectable, "doubtful" if they have a high 
probability but with a chance of partial collection, and 
"substandard" if the loan has an inadequate collateral and 
an uncertain capacity of debtor's payment. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the US has reduced 
this process to single ratio, namely the net capital ratio 
(NCR) which combined both asset quality and capital 
adequacy. Briefly, the NCR is defined as NCR=K+R-C/A where 
K,R,A are capital, reserves, and total assets. Also C is 
defined as the sum of loss,doubtful, and substandar loans. 
The evidence from the US suggest that examiners have been 
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successful in detecting problem banks. 
Supervision can also be aided by the introduction of 
early warning models. They are not designed to substitute 
on-site examination but to complement it. The early warning 
from these models will help the authorities in determining 
the order, scope, intensity, and frequency of banks' 
examinations. This should enable the authorities an 
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efficient allocation of the agency's resources, particularly 
in a large financial system. In these models bank problems 
and failures can be predicted in advance through the use of 
balance-sheet information. The ability of these models are 
undermined in the case of fraud, embezzlement, and 
misapplication of funds. In this case, the information is 
deliberately masked, and manipulated so that it cannot be 
uncovered by the supervisors and hence the bank failure is 
an explosive and sudden phenomena. However, Meyer and 
Pifer (1970) concluded in his pioneer study that even in the 
case of those failures which result from fraud, and 
embezzlement are picked-up by bank failure prediction model. 
Chapter 5 provides a thorough account of the concepts and 
techniques of these models. 
Acharya and Udell (1991) argue that under the assumption 
of symmetric information between banks and the 
regulator/supervisor, the government agency can observe a 
bank's capital and asset risk through the examination 
process and early warning models. Indeed, malfeasance, 
fraud, and misconduct will be spotted immediately. If the 
market value of assets fall short of the market value of 
liabilities 
be forced 
during the examination the individual bank 
into liquidation or into merger with 
can 
a 
financially viable bank. Moreover, a deposit insurance to 
prevent any panic run will be supplied with a premium which 
increases with the bank's asset risk and decreases with any 
increment in capital. Under theses optimal rules, banks may 
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be induced to both voluntary monitor their asset risk and 
capital and follow more conservative banking management. In 
this scenario regulators/supervisors duties are simplified 
and carried out effectively and efficiently by sharing these 
duties with banks themselves. 
Under the assumption of asymmetrical information, 
regulation/supervision becomes a complicated problem between 
a principal (regulator) and the banks (agent). As we have 
seen previously, supervisors will be unable to clearly see 
the banks' asset quality. Moreover, banks could even have 
the incentive of altering their portfolio risk and capital 
between examinations. This severely undermines the role of 
monitoring by the regulator/supervisor, and forces them to 
charge a fixed-rate insurance premium which promote moral 
hazard unless it is limited by regulation. It is clear that 
under aymmetrical information the regulator no longer can 
establish minimum capital requirements nor observe banks' 
asset quality with certainty. At the same time, it can 
introduce risk-weighted related premium for deposit 
insurance. Thus, as the regulator (principal) faces moral 
hazard since he cannot observe the activities controlled by 
his agent (bank), the role of supervision will be undermined 
severely. Moreover, even if a failure can be identified by 
the regulator/supervisor there are still principal-agent 
conflicts between regulators, politicians, and taxpayers. 
Specifically, regulators will try to avoid visibly large 
failures by delaying bank liquidations. This can be 
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explained by their own fear about the public's perception of 
their work, the existence of funding constraints, and 
political calculations. 
As we have seen earlier the collapse of Saving and Loan 
Associations in the US clearly represents a failure of the 
regulatory agency to effectively regulate and supervise 
these financial institutions. And as we will see in chapter 
8, the failure of the Chilean banking authorities in their 
supervisory duties, particularly in the presence of bank 
holding company structure, explicit free deposit insurance 
and rapid financial deregulation contributed to excessive 
risk-taking and the large number of bank failures. 
- Deregulation of Interest Rates. 
Finally, the timing of interest rate deregulation has an 
important incidence in the problem of moral hazard and the 
likelihood of bank failures. There is considerable 
theoretical and empirical grounds to sustain this view. 
Although the role of a bank has important advantages in 
the selection and control functions as producer of 
information reducing the ex ante and ex post information 
asymmetries of capital markets, important incentive and 
selection problems still remain. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
have shown that the rate of interest (1) charged by a bank 
may in itself affect the riskiness of a loan by affecting 
both the mix of applicants (i.e. adverse selection) and the 
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action of chosen applicants (i.e. incentive/moral hazard). 
The model assumes that there are two groups of 
observationally indistinguishable borrowers (good and bad 
risks). Although a risk-neutral bank is able to distinguish 
the mean return of a project, he cannot ascertain the 
riskiness of the project measured as mean preserving spread 
(i.e. given two projects A and B with equal mean, if every 
risk-averse prefers A to B then B is riskier than A). 
Therefore, given that the bank cannot ascertain both type 
of borrower and his actions it designs a loan contract which 
includes the cost of lending (1), collateral (CI), and 
equity (E). The value of i, Cl, and E serve as signalling 
mechanism as well as inducing borrowers to take actions 
which are in the interest of the bank. 
In their model two important results are derived: 
Firstly, the quality of the mix of applicants changes 
adversely lowering the bank's expected return from loans as 
the interest rate charged to borrowers increases (adverse 
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selection). 
Secondly, a rise in interest rates introduce an 
incentive effect where successful applicants undertake 
riskier projects with a lower probability of success but a 
higher pay-off. As before, a higher 1 reduces the bank's 
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expected return from loans (incentive/moral hazard) 
Although the increment in collateral and/or equity 
requirements may have a positive effect by increasing the 
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borrowers' wealth at stake in the case of default and hence 
reducing the risk of loan losses, there are limitations. 
stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that if borrowers have 
different wealth holdings and similar utility functions with 
decreasing absolute risk-aversion then any increase in 
collateral would discourage the most risk-averse borrowers 
and hence reduce the bank's expected return from loans. 
It is clear from the model that the Walrasian 
equilibrium interest rate at which demand and supply for 
credit are equal can be considered as an inferior 
equilibrium. Indeed, there should be a lower interest rate 
at which the bank's expected profits are maximised. This 
equilibrium is consistent with excess demand and credit 
rationing. It is not profitable nor optimal to a rise 
interest rates and collateral beyond the optimal point even 
if borrowers are willing to pay higher rates. Mankiw (1986) 
has shown that a small increase in the rate of interest 
would cause the loan market to dissappear for some borrowers 
even if their projects are socially productive at higher 
interest rates. 
This provide sufficient theoretical support to the view 
that a rapid deregulation of interest rates can produce 
moral hazard and adverse selection problems raising the 
likelihood of bank failure. In addition, the availability of 
deposit insurance combined with both bank holding company 
structure and a weak prudential regulation will encourage 
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banks to undertake a rapid expansion of risky lending even 
at high lending interest rates. Furthermore, Villanueva and 
Mirakhor (1990) and Leite and Sundararajan (1990) suggest 
that the flow of credIt demand becomes fairly interest 
inelastic as the stock of non-performing loans rises rapidly 
as the macroeconomy deteriorates. Thus, as business 
profitability deteriorates and banks extend fresh credits 
which will turn-up to be irrecuperable, they will be 
increasing the likelihood of its own failure. 
Looking at the deregulation of deposit interest rates, 
there is also evidence which pin points a link between 
deposit interest rates deregulation and moral hazard. Keeton 
(1984) provides two reasons why banks' risk-taking will 
increase with the removal of deposit rate ceilings. Firstly, 
the removal of ceilings on insured deposits would increase 
the distortion which already exists under a fixed price 
deposit insurance. Assuming that a deposit insurance covers 
both the principal and the interest of a bank deposit up to 
a specific limit, then a rise in the deposit rate paid on 
insured deposits below the set limit will increase the 
insurer's potential liability. Therefore, banks will have an 
undue incentive to take additional risks by choosing a mix 
of riskier assets. 
Secondly, it introduces additional distortions on risk-
taking as banks whose risk is under-priced succeed in 
attracting deposits from sound banks whose insurance premium 
is over-priced. Despite this risk difference, they all face 
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a similar premium per dollar worth of deposit. This will 
result in a cross-subsidisation of relatively risky banks by 
relatively safer banks. Thus, while interest rate ceilings 
make more difficult for risky banks to outbid safe banks, 
deregulation removes this constraint and distorts risk-
taking. 
Another issue which arises from a sharp deregulation of 
interest rates involves the increase in interest rate risk 
as a result of the imbalance resulting from the maturity 
transformation by financial institutions. On this point, 
Leite and Sundararajan (1990) maintained that those 
financial institutions which are involved in long-term 
short-term lending at fixed rate but whose funds are mostly 
can face serious difficulties during the deregulation 
per se which period. However, it is not the mismatching 
could drive a financial institution into insolvency, but its 
reaction to changes in its own market. Given that loans 
pacted at regulated interest rates would not pay sufficient 
to cover the interest rate cost, then new loans arranged at 
higher interest rates may exceed the cost of funds. Thus, as 
old loans mature and are replaced by new ones, the imbalance 
between assets and liabilities can be eased and the entity 
could become profitable. Thus banks will be seeking rapid 
growth in their assets as well as looking into higher yield 
assets. This excessive risk-taking in the pursue of higher 
growth and asset yields can be aided by both a fixed 
deposit insurance and the relaxation of prudential 
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regulation, particularly with respect to capital adequacy 
and allowing investment into risky assets. This clearly 
represent a gamble In the sense that if it succeed the 
improvement in profitability will be accrued by the bank, 
and the losses from bank failures if the bet does not pay-
off is absorbed by the insurance agency. This description 
clearly reflect and explain the failures of Saving and Loan 
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Associations in the US during the 1980's. 
The arguments for a rapid deregulation of interest rates 
have been disputed not only at the theoretical level but 
also on empirical grounds. Villanueva and Mirakhor (1990) 
have established that those countries which followed a 
gradual approach towards deregulating interest rates 
succeeded in liberalising their financial system. For 
instance, Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea engaged in a gradual 
and flexible management of interest rates with frequent 
adjustments which resulted in low and sustainable rates, low 
non-performing loans, and the absence of mismatching and any 
financial difficulties which could have endangered the 
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stability of the financial system. 
In contrast, countries like Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey, 
Philippines, and particularly Chile liberalised interest 
rates within a short period of time. This approach resulted 
in sharp increases in real interest rates which in turn 
contributed to exacerbate the moral hazard problems. Indeed, 
Mckinnon (1988) one of the founders of the 
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"liberalisationist" school of thought on financial markets 
conceded that the failure of financial liberalisation in 
Latin America can be partly explained by the failure of 
interest rate deregulation. He supported the view on policy-
stance that governments should have imposed a ceiling on 
interest rates to avoid banks' moral hazard. 
In general, one could argue that factors such as 
holding companay structure and bank concentration, 
availability of a fixed price deposit insurance scheme 
bank 
the 
or 
the expectation of a free deposit guarantee by the state, a 
weak prudential regulation and supervision, and a rapid 
deregulation of interest rates will encourage excessive 
risk-taking (moral hazard) by both bankers and depositors. 
Moral hazard will in turn raise the likelihood of bank 
failures. These four factors are policy-induced and hence 
external to the banks, but the banks' reaction to these 
incentives in the form of excessive-risk taking are internal 
to the management. 
As we will see in chapter 8, the evidence from developed 
and developing countries has given more ground to the role 
played by moral hazard in different episodes of bank 
failures, and undoubtedly it will explain the collapse of 
banking institutions in Chile during 1982-83. 
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(4.5) The Importance of Bank Failures. 
As we have seen in early sections of t'llQ ch-pt- I k 1 ~ ~ ct er, )an.s 
have been subject to several mechanisms to regulate and 
supervise financial institutions. Most of this regulation 
has been designed in order to prevent bank failures. There 
is a widespread consensus that bank failures produces a 
significant social cost and hence the necessity to protect 
the public. Specifically, the social costs of bank failures 
are borne by third parties rather than banks' owners and 
creditors. In the event of bank failures, people unconnected 
with the banks will be facing credit rationing, termination 
of productive investment, loss of employment, and the 
overall effect of a reduction in economic activity and 
increasing uncertainty. 
Most of the theoretical framework developed for the 
study of financial crisis (bank failures) postulates links 
between banking system instability and output fluctuations. 
That is, they recognise a direction of causation running 
from bank failures to real economic activity. Their efforts 
have been concentrated in identifying the transmission 
mechanism between banking failures and panics to economic 
activity. 
According to the monetarist model and its interpretation 
of the Great Depression of the early 1930's the wave of bank 
failures was responsible for the collapse of economic 
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activity. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) maintained that bank 
failures led to deflation via a reduction in the money 
stock, as the currency/deposit and currency/reserve ratios 
rose unexpectedly. In this model, the transmission mechanism 
was viewed through the narrow channel of changes in the 
money supply and the effect on output under the implicit 
assumption of sticky prices (i.e. the IS/LM paradigm and the 
shift inwards of the LM). 
It was argued that the impact of bank failures on output 
via money supply reductions seems quantitatively 
insufficient to explain a large fall in 
the monetary model has to rely on ad 
output. Moreover, 
hoc sticky price 
assumption to produce real output effect unless we introduce 
the Lucas' supply curve and/or Barro's unanticipated 
monetary change. 
Bernanke (1983) demostrates that the impact of money on 
output does not come only through the conventional channel 
of shortage in liquidity and high ex ante real interest 
rates but also and more importantly through the effect of 
the disruption of the real services provided by financial 
intermediaries (banks). The model departs from the Neo-
classical assumption of perfect competitive capital market 
by assuming the existence of asymmetrical information 
between lenders and borrowers. Thus, a bank performs a 
service of differentiating good from bad risk borrowers by 
incurring administrative, screening, and monitoring costs. 
The minimisation of these intermediation costs are achieved 
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as a result of the benefits from continous trading between 
the bank and the lenders. Among them we include the 
accumulation of information on qualities and characteristic 
of borrowers from a long term financial relationship, 
accumulated expertise at evaluating potential borrowers, and 
the use of collateral and net worth requirements. 
The essence of Bernanke's model is that bank failures 
and bankruptcies disrupt the allocation property of the 
banking system by destroying and distorting the value of 
past information and henceforth raising the intermediation 
cost. Although there would be borrowers willing to pay high 
intermediation costs in order to secure funds, a profit 
maximising bank will prefer to ration the limited 
availability of loanable funds. Thus, even though some class 
of borrowers were able to borrow funds under a more sound 
economic environment, under an adverse economic climate they 
will be rationed. Thus, the reduction in the availability of 
credit via credit rationing, and recalling loans will affect 
production and the economy's output as much as it will be 
affected by the money supply_ 
In consequence, this modern approach which introduces 
asymmetrical information has provided a theoretical and 
empirical framework to understand how the disruption of 
financial markets can cause a downturn in output without 
resorting only to the money supply narrow transmission 
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mechanism. 
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Apart from the social costs from bank failures, there 
are also private costs from failure which are those borne by 
bank shareholders and by individuals and firms with 
contractual financial interests. When there is a failure of 
a financial institution there are legal procedures, 
including 
bank which 
bankruptcy 
the appointment of a receiver to 
involves costly legal expenses. 
cost is bear by the bank's 
liquidate the 
This direct 
creditors and 
shareholders since they receive what is left of undervalued 
assets after the receiver's and lawyer's fees have been 
paid. 
There are also indirect bankruptcy costs, as depositors 
will need to incur search costs to find another deposit 
taking institution. Moreover, insured and particularly 
uninsured depositors will need to bear a long delay before 
the bank is liquidated and they can get their money back. It 
should be said that direct and especially indirect costs are 
extremely difficult to quantify empirically. 
(4.6) Two Testable Hypotheses for the Chilean Bank Failures 
From the examination of the proximate factors of bank 
failures in the earlier sections of this chapter, there are 
two general hypotheses which can be empirically tested. 
Firstly, the effect of an adverse change in the general 
economic environment due to international disturbances 
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and/or policy inconsistencies which produce severe 
misalignment in some key macroeconomic prices (e.g. real 
exchange rate, real interest rate, and real stock prices), 
and a bust in output on the likelihood of bank failure. 
These factors are considered to be external to the banks' 
management. 
Secondly, the likelihood of bank failure can be affected 
by the banks' willingness to undertake excessive risk-taking 
as a response to structural changes, increase in competition 
and remaining incentives from financial liberalisation. The 
existence of free deposit insurance, powerful bank holding 
company structure, weak prudential regulation and 
supervision, and a rapid deregulation of interest rate will 
induce banks' moral hazard, excessive-risk taking, and thus 
a higher probability of bank failure. Although those changes 
coming from liberalisation reforms are external to the banks 
(industry), the managers' attitude is an internal factor to 
the bank (firm-specific) 
In my view it seems that the banks' vulnerability to the 
type of financial crisis which affected the banking systems 
during the 1930's as a result of panics and illiquidity is 
an unlikely event today. According to the evidence from 
different financial episodes, the banking system remains 
vulnerable to the type of crisis which will result from the 
internal response by banks to undertake more risks. The 
effect from changes in the external environment is merely a 
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detonator of a banking system already weakened by less 
conservative banking practices. 
The study of the banking crisis in Chile during the 
early 1980's emerges as an interesting and unique episode 
not only due to its magnitude but also from the concurrence 
of two factors namely adverse macroeconomy, and banks' 
excessive risk-taking from liberalisation reforms. 
There are several issues relating to the Chilean bank 
failures which remain to be answered from an empirical point 
of view. Firstly, how important was the deterioration of the 
banks' external environment, particularly the misalignment 
of key macroeconomic prices, and the collapse of aggregate 
output on bank failures? This issue will be addressed in 
chapter 7. 
Secondly, is there any significant evidence to suggest 
that banks' increasing vulnerability and subsequent debacle 
can be attributed to moral hazard (excessive-risk taking)? 
Chapter 8 will provide the answer to this question. 
Finally, given the fact that the process of financial 
liberalisation started several years before the collapse of 
banks, is there any early warning signs which may suggest 
that the banks' increasing vulnerability started before the 
deterioration of the banks' external environment? Chapter 6 
and 9 discusses the result of an early warning model for 
Chile, and evaluates the two competing hypotheses 
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Endnotes. 
(1) Chant (1992) have also maintained that models should 
also be able to explain the characteristics of financial 
intermediaries, particularly the types of claims they issue 
and hold. In the case of banks, they issue liquid 
liabilities with a fixed value and payable on demand and 
hold mainly non-marketable securities (loans and advances). 
(2) In this economy households know their intertemporal 
income and consumption as much as firms know the technology, 
the supply of both capital and labour, and the future 
demand. Different rate of time preference among households 
will enable firms to borrow from surplus units and use this 
divisible productive capital in an amount different to what 
their own initial physical capital would permitted. This 
contractual agreement can be monitor and enforced at no cost 
if necessary. Or we can assume that every transactor is 
honest about this intertemporal exchange. 
(3) Specifically, Myers and Majluf (1984) introduced a model 
where a firm has an asset in place and a valuable real 
investment (I) whose expected value depends on a random 
variable. The project realisable values are denoted as a and 
b respectively. The investor only knows the distribution of 
the random variable in contrast with the manager who knows a 
and b. The model also assumes that the management act in the 
interest of existing and passive shareholders by maximising 
Vo(a,b,E). They demostrate that under these assumptions a 
rational expectation equilibrium indicate that a firm may 
passed-up a positive present value project if it has to 
issue new shares to finance it. The firm has insufficient 
internal resources or financial slack (i.e S=cash+marketable 
securities so that S<I then E=I-S), and the price of equity 
after the issue P' is less than the price P if no equity 
has been issued. That is, the market value of the firm if no 
issue is Vo=[P/P](S+a) > Vo=[P'/P'+E](E+S+a+b) when it has 
issued. This can be interpreted as the share of existing 
assets and financial slack going to new shareholders is 
greater than the share is more than the share of the 
increment in the firms' value obtained by the old 
stockholders. It is proven that P'< P since the decision to 
issue equities is interpreted by a rational individual as 
bad news on the project prospect and hence the firm's value. 
However, once the assumption of passive shareholder is 
dropped and they are compelled to buy and hold new issues 
this loss is avoided. 
(4) Apart from perquisites, managers have the incentive to 
divert resources towards the acquisition of skills and 
technical knowledge in order to improve its market value and 
makes himself indispensable to the firm. This type of 
activity is known in the literature as managerial 
entrenchment. 
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(5) stiglitz (1985) maintained that in a modern capitalist 
firm (i.e. many small number of shareholders and a manager 
controlling a large amount of resources) a manager does not 
act in the interest of the stockholders and the market 
mechanism fail to provide the necessary incentives. 
Shareholders' meeting and voting are mechanism which attempt 
to control managers and replace them in the case of bad 
performance. However, small shareholders hold the belief 
that their vote has a neglible effect on the outcome. 
Moreover, the cost of information in evaluating a manager 
and alternative teams is forbbiden for individual 
shareholders and the information obtained is by nature a 
public good. These two factor will preclude shareholders to 
vote intelligently if any. The market discipline is also 
undermined by the failure of take-overs to provide limits on 
managers. As we know if a manager fail to maximise the 
firm's profits and market value then there is a risk of 
take-over from outsiders and the likelihood of management 
restructuring. Insiders have more information that outsiders 
so that when an existing shareholder is willing to sell 
signal that the take-over firm is actually paying in excess. 
Thus, under the existence of asymmetrical information, a 
take-over bid will be successful when the bidding firm is 
paying an over-valued market price for shares. This may put 
off any attempt of buying-off a firm. Moreover, information 
is costly and a public good so that any firm spending on 
information search to identified under-valued firms will 
make negative profits as new bidders which are free riding 
from information will rise the cost of bidding. At the same 
time, if the take-over bid succeed then the firm's market 
value increases such that small shareholders will prefer to 
free ride and internalised additional gains unless the 
market value is reduced. 
(6) Given that g(Y)<Y (entrepreneur's payment to the 
intermediary depends on Y) then the total payment from 
monitoring n entrepreneurs is Gn=Eg(Y). But Gn is a random 
variable bounded as { O , G n < ~ } . . Moreover, the intermediary 
must pay to the lender (depositor) at least r or a total 
payment Zn=(n*r). It follows that Zn<Gn. Therefore, a 
deadweight non-pecuniary penalty must be impose so that the 
intermediary pays at least (n*r). The optimal contract is 
given by ~ ( Z n ) = m a x [ H n - Z n , O J J where Hn is the smallest 
solution to P(Gn<Hn)E[GnIGn<HnJ+[(l-P)(Gn<Hn)JHn)n*r. The 
expected return to the intermediary is E[Gn]-Hn so that he 
has an incentive to monitor and to max E(Gn). 
(7) The optimal insurance contract (consumption) satisfies 
C12=C21=O which states that type 1 and type 2 agent derives 
no utility from consumption in T=2 and T=l respectively. 
Moreover, u'(Cl1)=pRu'(C22) and tC11+[(1-t)C22/RJ=1 where p 
is the rate of time preference means that the marginal 
utility is equal to the marginal productivity, and the 
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resource constraint is satisfied. Given that pR>l and the 
relative risk-aversion always exceed unity then the optimal 
consumption from the insurance contract satisfy e11>1 and 
C22<R and C11<C22. 
(8) The model demostrate that this equilibrium destroyed the 
optimal risk sharing between agents affecting detrimentally 
production efficiency as production is stop at T=l. 
Moreover, they demostrate that a bank run equilibrium is 
inferior than the competitive claims market. 
(9) It is assumed in the model that investors both short and 
long run have no initial endownment so that avery investment 
opportunity has to be financed by bonds. Specifically, a 
long term investor faces an investment opportunity I at T=O 
with a yield F(I) at T=2. At the same time, a short term 
investor has two consecutive short term investment 
opportunity Xl and X2 at T=O and T=l with a yield of f(Xl) 
and f(X2) at T=l and T=2. These investments are financed 
with long term bonds B and short term bonds Y at a given 
interest rate. 
(10) As we have seen in the Diamond and Dybvig's model, a 
bank insures savers against the risk of a consumption shock 
and hence a liquidity needs by offering a deposit. In 
contrast, the role of bank is Waldo's model is to provide 
indirect access to market for primary securities. At the 
same time, it is shown that savers shifts from deposits to 
storage in the anticipation of a run, and hence explaining 
the decline in the deposit-currency ratio. Moreover, it 
explains the rise on interest rates as the bank sell long 
term securities before maturity and purchasers have to be 
compensated for the forgone return of existing investment 
opportunities. These two observations were present during 
the financial crisis of the 1930's. 
(11) Dowd (1992) provide a summary of Jacklin's model. It is 
shown that agents can invest in a mutual fund which in turn 
invest in production and issue equities at T=O with a 
promised and fixed dividend announced at T=O and paid at 
T=l. At T=l equity holders receive a dividend D and as they 
learned their type, type 1 agent sells its equity to type 2 
with a return which is greater than its market price, that 
is R(1-D)=R(1-tR1»R1(I-t). Type 1 sells its equity as 
future dividend at T=2 does not matter to him after the 
consumption shock at T=l. The return to type 1 is equal to 
the dividend D at T=l which is equal to tRl plus what he 
gets from selling its equity stake at T=l, (l-t)Rl. It is 
demostrated that an equity contract satified the same 
condition as the Diamond and Dybvig's contract. 
(12) Lewis (1992) argues that a collateral is mortgage, and 
its disposal will be slow as it requires legal consent. With 
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reference to the role of collateral and interbank loans, it 
is argued that this market is rationed and subject to 
asymmetrical information. In addition, there is evidence 
that interbank lending encouraged excessive risk-taking as 
reflected by the collapse in the US of the Franklin National 
and Continental Illinois in 1975 and 1984 respectively. On 
the value of the collateral, I should add that if the assets 
are subject to a bubble and hence valued above its 
fundamentals then it follows that when the bubble burst then 
the collateral's value should fall and hence offering no 
sufficient guarantee to depositors. 
(13) Although the number of bank suspensions during most of 
1930 remained similar to the average number of failures in 
the previous nine years it picked up in November and 
December of that year. According to them, although farm-belt 
banks failures were unusual during these two months and led 
to bank runs from currency and postal savings without 
geographical limits, the role played by the Bank of the 
United states was paramount in affecting depositors' 
confidence. Although Wicker (1980) supports the panic nature 
of bank failures and the importance of the failure of the 
Bank of the United states, he lent more importance to the 
collapse of the Caldwell and Coy. in November 1930. This 
company based in Tenneesse was the largest investment house 
in the south of the us. It controlled the largest chain of 
banks, insurance coys.,industrial enterprises, and even 
newspaper businesses totalling more than U$ 1.5 billions 
worth of assets. He found evidence that the bankrupcy of 
Caldwell was attributable to financial weakness from 
inadequate capital, its rapid expansion, lack of liquidity, 
poor quality of loans and investment as a result of 
excessive portfolio concentration by bank affiliates with 
the "parent" company. This reckless and risky managerial 
performance of Caldwell led to the suspension of more than 
120 banks in four states which were directly or indirectly 
affiliated to Caldwell Coy. 
(14) Lewis (1994) compares the balance sheet composition of 
the us and the UK. In both cases, loans and advances 
represent around 65% of total assets followed by 33% of 
securities, and between 1% and 2% in cash. Similarly, 
deposits exhibited the largest share of total liabilities 
with approximately 80% followed by 14% in other liabilities, 
and the difference being equity capital. These figures are 
not different for a bank in a less developed economy. 
(15) Eichengreen and Portes (1986), Kindleberger (1986), and 
Keran (1986) provide a thorough account of the effect of 
macroeconomic instability on bank failures of the 1930's and 
the 1980's. 
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(16) Basically, the model shows an investment with an 
stochastic return R with a cummulative distribution F(R w) 
where w is the diversification of project-specific risk. The 
probability of loss is given by Pr[R<L(l+i)-K]=F[L(l+i)-K w] 
where Land i is the loans and the rate of i n t e r ~ s t t
re5pectively. Higher indebtness, lower capital, and riskier 
project-specific the higher Pro However, there are uncertain 
events where nature draws investment returns from a 
disastrous distribution with R=O. The subjective probability 
of loss when nature draw from this distribution (rr)O) is 
Pr[R<L(1+i)-K]=(1-rr)F[L(1+i)-K,w]+rr. That is, a weighted sum 
of the objective probability of an adverse outcome from the 
project-specific distribution and the subjective probability 
of nature draws investment return from a disastrous 
distribution rr. While frequent shocks affecting the 
specific-project distribution are priced as risk-premium 
loan or forcing quantity rationing, the distribution of 
disastrous returns are unknown even from past history. This 
imply that subjective and objective probabilities may differ 
leading to a disaster myopia. Subjective probabilities are 
considered as determined by psychological mechanisms. For 
instance, the probability of an event depend on the time 
elapsed since the last occurrence and its intensity 
(availability heuristic). After some point of the occurrence 
of the event, the probability is considered as zero 
(threshold heuristic). When new information contradict 
previous information and suggest that there is a probability 
of disaster, such information is ignored or rejected 
(cognitive dissonance). This expectation formation which 
leads to mistakes are reinforced by the lack of supervision, 
and the principal-agent problem between managers and 
shareholders due to asymmetrical information and agency 
costs. 
(17) Meltzer (1982) argues that there are events which are 
not susceptible to be measured by means of an objective and 
stationary probability distribution. These events then need 
to be excluded altogether from rational expectation models. 
The existence of uncertainty as opposed to risk is another 
facto which could be relevant in financial disorders and 
instability However, there is no theory of how decisions 
are made under uncertainty. In general, people tend to watch 
others and do not deviate from the pattern already set by 
the rest. Although there is no way of knowing ex ante if 
people are right or wrong this in it self may contribute to 
a possibility of banking instability. For i n s t a n ~ e , ,
innovation increases uncertainty via destructive creatlon 
process which may trigger a shift in confidence and provoke 
a bank run. 
(18) White compares the dissimilar configurations of the 
banking system in Canada and in the US and the different 
responses to the problem of the 1920's. The US operated with 
30.291 banks during 1920 whereas Canada had 8 chartered 
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banks w ~ t h h 4.676 branches. Between 1920-29 there were 6,008 
suspensIons ~ n d d voluntary liquidations and 3,963 absorptions 
and mergers In the us. In contrast, in Canada only one bank 
failed and nearly 14% of branches were closed. Between 1929-
33 there were no failures in Canada and a fall in branches 
by 10%. Nationwide branching in Canada permitted a quick 
mobilisation of funds to meet localised runs. A similar 
argument is made by Wheelock (1995) for bank failures in the 
Great Depression. 
(19) Sinkey (1979) provide a thorough account of the failure 
of the US National of San Diego and the Hamilton National 
Bank. The US National was the second largest failure in the 
US after the Franklin National. Loss classification of loans 
exceeded the bank's capital, involving principally 
extensions to persons and entities related to the bank. 
Similarly, The Hamilton National become the third largest 
failure in the US. It involved illegal loans to speculative 
real estate operations by the affiliate Hamilton Mortgage 
Corp. After the recession of 1974 heavy losses emerged from 
the bank's loan portfolio which forced him into insolvency. 
(20) Undoubtedly, the existence of economies of scale in 
banking can explain partly bank concentration. However, it 
should be also pointed out that there are potential benefits 
available from market concentration. For instance, given the 
nature of banks as they are highly gear (i.e. high 
liabilities/capital ratio) they should benefit from 
horizontal integration. 
(21) A basic oligopolistic model with no bank holding 
company structure predicts that whenever collusion is 
plausible financial intermediaries would widen the spread 
between asset and liability interest rates. However, the 
oligopolistic profits which arise from a positive spread is 
passed onto the affiliates caompanies in the form of a 
subsidised credit. According to Galbis (1986), the bank's 
choice of the size of the interest rate spread respond to 
the tolerance and effectiveness of the supervisory 
authorities with respect to abnormally high profits. The 
possibility of examining bank's balance-sheet in looking for 
implicit subsidies will encourage a low spread by 
oligopolistic banks related to bank holding companies. 
(22) Like credit markets, the insurance market is also 
subject to adverse selection and moral hazard problems which 
arise from information asymmetries between the insurer and 
the insured. Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) identified two 
market equilibrium: pooling equilibria where bad and good 
risk individuals buy the same insurance contract, and a 
separated equilibria in which a different contract is 
offered to each particular risk. It is shown that an average 
actuarial premium of Ka will be offered to both type of risk 
affecting adversely the mix of applicants if Ka is greater 
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that marginal benefit of low risk individuals and viceversa 
(adverse selection). With respect to moral hazard, Arrow 
(1963) and Pauly (1968) identify two problems faced by 
insurers, particularly in relation to medical insurance. 
Firstly, the insurer is unable to assess the extent of the 
insured's losses in the case of an adverse state of nature 
unless he incurrs into costly monitoring. Secondly, the 
probability of an adverse state of nature is under the 
control of the insured. The introduction of deductibles 
coinsurance, limited coverage, flexible risk premiums and 
information gathering to encourage the insured to s i g n ~ l l i n g g
their risk-characteristic as well as its actions to reduce 
risk are important steps to reduce the moral hazard and 
adverse selection problem. 
(23) Benston (1983), Eisenbeis and Gilbert (1985), White 
(1989), Calomiris (1990), and Karaken (1983) among others 
not only have shown the perversive incentive created by 
deposit insurance, but also provide alternative ways to 
reform the system. White (1989) believe that the command-
control regulation approach (i.e. regulation of banks asset 
portfolios, entry controls, bank ownership etc.) have been 
inefficacious. Instead he proposes the introduction of 
tools applied by insurance companies to protect themselves 
against risk. Among them favour the implementation of 
deductibles (minimum net worth at market value), 
coinsurance, reinsurance, limits on insurance coverage, the 
preference for market value accounting information, and 
risk-based premiums. On the opposite extreme, Calomiris 
(1990) advocate a greater role for incentive-compatible 
self-regulation. Self-imposed regulation and mutual 
monitoring will keep members from privately established 
coalitions away from taken undue risks and from free riding. 
Kareken (1983) prefer a middle road solution where the 
government can provide information about banks' asset 
quality in a digestible and comprehensible form. Given that 
there is no secondary market for loans, a practical rule for 
valuation will be required to provide information as part of 
the public domain. 
(24) Calomiris (1990) have shown that deposit guarantees 
were established in New York (1828), Vermont (1831), Indiana 
(1834), Ohio (1845), and Iowa (1858). Except for the first 
two which were state run, the others operated successfully 
largely because they empowered the agencies to monitor bank 
risk-taking. In contrast, a second wave of deposit guarantee 
plans , particularly the compulsory plans of Oklahoma 
(1908), Nebraska (1909), and South Dakota (1916), as well as 
the voluntary arrangements of Kansas (1909), Texas (1910), 
and Washington (1917) resulted in failures as these plans 
did not include supervision. 
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(25) This does not mean that the regulatory framework which 
was in operation during the state of financial repression is 
useful in a more liberal order. On the contrary, it could be 
argued that the old regulatory institutional structure is 
obsolete, ineffective, and expensive. While a regulator in 
a financially repressed market was concern with following 
government directives, to day they are enhancing the role of 
the market and competition along the lines which ensures 
efficiency and stability. 
(26) The unregulated efficiency frontier contain portfolios 
with minimum standard deviation for a given expected return. 
A risk-averse bank maximised its utility by choosing a 
portfolio at the point of tangency between the efficiency 
frontier and the upward sloping indifference curve. That is, 
at a point where the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) 
between expected return and risk is equal to the marginal 
rate of transformation (MRT) along the derived efficent 
frontier. This portfolio equilibrium is consistent with 
portfolio's insolvency risk shown by a ray along which the 
probability of failure is constant. The introduction of 
portfolio restriction shifts the efficient frontier 
downwards so that the new equilibrium will entail a lower 
indifference curve (i.e. lower expected utility) and a 
higher probability of failure as the ray pivot downwards. In 
this model, any point on the unregulated efficient frontier 
should cointain portfolios with a higher expected utility 
(i.e. higher indifference curve) and a lower probability of 
failure (i.e. a ray pivoting upwards). This model can also 
capture changes in capital requirements by means of a shift 
downwards in the ray if capital is increased. Or the 
introduction of a global efficency frontier which is an 
envelop of efficient frontiers with all values of capital. 
The same conclusions as before follows from the analysis. 
(27) The evidence from Sinkey and Walker (1975) lend support 
to importance of banks' asset condition for the 
classification of problem banks. They found that that from 
the FDIC's list of 318 problem banks in 1973, 210 (64.8%) 
presented poor asset condition measured by the adversely 
classified loans relative to capital and reserves. 
Similarly, Sinkey (1978) found that NCR was the most 
significant variable separating problem banks from non-
problem banks. The list of problem banks analysed 
corresponded to 143 commercial bank from the FDIC sample of 
1973 and compared with a random sample of 163 non-problem 
banks draw from a total sample of 9065. By applying 
discriminant technique which test for groups mean and the 
dispersion-matrix difference indicates any significance mean 
difference between groups and any overlapping between 
groups. Out of 21 examination variables, NCR was the most 
important discriminator between the two groups with a type-I 
error of only 4.9% (7 banks). 
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(28) For all projects e such that e>ec where ec is the 
critical value which satisfy the condition that the 
borrower's expected profits ~ [ l , e c ] = o o for a given 1 the 
borrower undertakes the project. Any increase in t r i s ~ s s ec 
so that below this critical value individuals do not apply 
for loans. These two results indicates that if there is a 
discrete number of potential borrowers each of them with a 
different e (risk) then the bank's average expected return 
~ ( t ) ) will not be monotonically increasing with 1 as good 
risk (i.e. e<ec) leave the market. There will be then a 
discrete fall in ~ . .
(29) If two projects A and B with returns Ra>Rb and 
probabilities Pa<Pb then at a given t the firm would be 
indifferent between the two projects (i.e. [Ra-
(l+t)B]Pa=[Rb-(l+t)B]Pb). It is demostrated that in the 
event of an increase in 1 will lower the expected return of 
a project with highest probability of success by more than 
it lowers the return from the riskier project. It follows 
from this result that the bank's average expected return ~ ~
is lowered by a rise in t if the firm at a given t is 
indifferent between projects A and B. Again, i this case ~ ~
is not monotonically increasing with respect to t. 
(30) According to Feldstein (1991) the root of the problem 
of thrift banks was the rapid inflation of the 70's and the 
authorities respond to solve the problem. Congress permited 
managers to grow fast into mortgages for real investment and 
to take sUbstantial risk in higher yield assets like "junk 
bonds". At the same time, it was agreed to increase the 
banks' liability insurance to U$ 100.000 per account, and 
relax the minimum capital standard for thrifts enable them 
to increase their size without adding to their equity 
capital. The differential between high interest rate paid on 
junk bonds and the low cost of insured deposits made this a 
very profitable solution. At the same time, Saving and Loans 
had little of their own resources invested and at risk. The 
process of excessive risk-taking came to an end when 
mortgage borrowers for many commercial real estate 
investment were unable to service their debt. The magnitude 
of the problem was so large that the insurer's agency had 
insufficient assets to deal with all of the insolvent 
thrifts. Therefore, the government guarantee those losses. 
(31) For instance, Cho and Khatkhate (1989) have described 
the Korean interest rate deregulation as flexible by noting 
that lending interest rates were adjusted downwards in the 
event of a reduce profitability by the corporate sector as a 
result of shocks. Moreover, prudential regulation and 
supervision was enhanced to restraint banks' risk-taking. 
After macroeconomic stability was ensure and an effective 
prudential regulation introduced, the authorities fully 
liberalised interest rates. 
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(32) Bernanke (1983) in his Lucas-Barro model formulation 
found that monetary variables were statistically significant 
on the output equation. The dynamic simulation of the path 
of output captured less than half of the total output 
decline during the Great Depression. The introduction of 
non-monetary variables improved the fit of output for the 
period between the mid-1929 and March 1933 by showing 
smaller mean square simulation error. Hamilton (1987) have 
also confirmed these results for the 1930's Great 
Depression. Similarly, Calomiris and Hubbard (1989) arrived 
to similar results for the pre-World War I gold standard era 
and support the importance of the credit hypothesis over the 
role of money. 
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Cbaptex ~ ~ Banking Failures: Some Empirical Studies and 
the Econometric Methodology 
(5wl) Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the 
econometric methodology applied to the study of the banking 
crisis in Chile. This includes an analysis of some previous 
empirical studies carried out mainly in the US and the 
application of logit estimation technique. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections. The first one is a self-
contained review of some of the early studies in explaining 
the failure/problem of financial institutions. Most of the 
studies employ specific econometric methods, in particular 
binary choice models. Much of the literature available is 
related to the US financial institutions and their failures 
and/or problems during the 1930's as well as the early 
1970's and 1980's. 
The second section presents a discussion of a univariate 
logit model with which I estimate the probability of bank 
failure given the set of the chosen explanatory variables 
using maximum-likelihood estimation for logit models. 
Moreover, there is a discussion of the criterion for 
hypothesis testing and model selection applicable for logit 
models. 
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(5.2) Previous Empirical Studies on Banks' Failures. 
The economic environment and some policy reforms have 
introduced significant changes in the banking environment 
during the 1970's and early 1980's in both developed and 
developing countries. The pace of globalisation and 
integration of financial markets has generated a rapid 
increase in competition and marked shift in banks' attitude 
towards a greater exposure to risk. According to Short, 
O'Driscoll,and Berger (1985), the rate of annual bank 
failures in the US from 1975-81 has doubled compared with 
the average of the post war period and continued at this 
higher trend from 1982 onwards in spite of economic 
recovery. The same pattern is true with regard to the Saving 
and Loans financial institutions. Barth, Brumbaugh, 
Sauerhaft, and Wang (1985) calculated that since the 
establishment of Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) there have been 627 thrift-institution 
failures where at least 500 of them took place in the early 
1980's. This financial instability and some of the 
difficulties in economies have also been 
by 
developed 
the banking system in some experienced 
countries. 
developing 
which took In many cases these were economies 
steps towards market liberalisation 
of their banking system brought to an 
decisive 
collapse 
and 
end 
the 
the 
deregulation of their financial system. This is true for 
Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, and especially Chile 
during the early 1980's. 
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As a result, there has been a proliferation of research 
directed towards the study of financial liberalisation and 
the causes of bank failures. In the US much of the effort 
has been concentrated on comparing the characteristics of 
failed/problem banks and non-failed/non-problem 
institutions. The aim has been to develop sophisticated 
methods to identify a bank's risk exposure and construct an 
early warning system to evaluate ex ante the weakness of 
financial institutions. Such bank failure prediction models 
not only can help test those factors (i.e asset quality, and 
capital adequacy) which contribute to bank failures/problems 
but also to an earlier detection of any financial weakness. 
This may also be critical for the improvement of the 
allocation of the scarce resources available for supervision 
and to minimise any costs from financial instability. 
The bulk of the research on the US has been conducted by 
US Federal Banking Agencies such as Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York. In addition, the National Bank Surveillance System 
(Comptroller of the Currency) and the Board of Governors 
(FED System) had also carried out important research into 
the development early warning system and bank failure 
1 
prediction models. 
Traditionally, the banking authorities have carried out 
site their supervisory duties by relying on the on-
examination of a bank asset portfolio and capital adequacy. 
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For instance, the bank-examination process in the US has 
been the primary supervisory technique for identifying banks 
with financial difficulties although it has been 
complemented with statistical model using banks' balance-
sheet data. Sinkey (1975) and Martin (1977) pointed out that 
financial and accounting information from a bank balance 
sheet and income statement have proven to be very efficient 
in showing specific bank characteristics as well as good 
discriminators between 
financial institutions. 
failed/problem banks 
The accounting and 
information is used as a ratio analysis. 
Those ratios have been included into 
and sound 
financial 
different 
categories such as liquidity, asset quality and risk, 
capital adequacy, profitability, efficiency, and liability 
quality and risk. It was expected by researchers that the 
average problem bank will be less efficient, and less 
liquid, with riskier assets and liability structure, and 
with inadequate capital. This difference between problem and 
non-problem banks will tend to increase as we approach the 
failure status defined as negative net worth or by the 
liquidation, merging, and/or any other support from those 
responsible to ensure confidence and stability in the 
financial system. 
The modern use of financial and accounting information 
in studying and developing models to assess the 
characteristics and to predict the problems and/or failures 
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of financial and non-financial institutions was first 
applied by Secrist (1938). He used a simple tabular and 
graphics comparison of one or two balance sheet ratios at a 
time for failing banks and non-failing ones for the period 
of 1921-33. Although this study concluded that the 
univariate analysis did not discriminate well, Secrist 
maintained that a more elaborate approach using multivariate 
techniques should produce more satisfactory results. 
The application of financial information from balance 
sheet to predict bankruptcies was first introduced by Beaver 
(1966). He developed a model to predict financial failure in 
a broader sense. In the firms' failure group he included 
bankruptcies, bond default, overdrawn bank accounts, and 
firms that omitted preferred dividends. Of the 30 ratios 
estimated by Beaver, only three of them best predict 
failures and with at least 2 of them with 5 years before 
2 
failure. 
The other early path-breaking work was by Altman (1968) 
who studied the problem of failure prediction of firms in 
the manufacturing sector. Apart from using accounting 
information, he was the first to apply multivariate 
discriminant statistical technique to failure prediction 
models. He concluded that his model was an accurate 
predictor of firm bankruptcy up to two years prior to 
failure. From his initial 22 financial variables just 5 were 
3 
included with good predictive ability. 
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The subsequent literature has expanded in several 
directions. This was translated in the introduction of 
different new approaches, estimation techniques, and the 
study of different institutions under distint episodes, in 
particular banks and non-banks financial institutions. 
One of the most common approaches in the literature of 
financial failure has been the ex post empirical approach. 
This approach included a wide range of estimation techniques 
4 
and different criterias to identify a failure. The essence 
of this approach consists in taking the actual 
classification made by the regulators in terms of failure 
and non failure groups as a discrete dependent variable. The 
second step is to identify and explain the classification as 
a function of a set of explanatory variables, mostly from 
information estimated from a balance sheet and income 
statement. An alternative and equally applied treatment for 
the discrete dependent variable is to categorise banks in 
terms of problem and non-problem institutions using 
examiners' reports. However, the bank failure prediction 
model has important advantages over a problem prediction 
model. Firstly, it eliminates the supervisory judgment 
regarding the problem status. Thus, failed and non-failed 
groups should be more discrete and identifiable than problem 
and non-problem banks. 
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secondly, it should eliminates somewhat the problem of 
overlapping among groups. This advantage is important for 
claBslflcation purposes. 
The advantage of bank problem prediction model lies in 
the fact that most failed banks are normally classified as 
problem with a sUbstantial lead before failure. However, it 
should be pointed out that the converse is not true in the 
sense that not all problem banks actually failed. 
The result is a model relating the probability of 
failure in period t to the set of independent variables as 
of period t-i. The evaluation of the estimated model depends 
on the significance of the variables, the goodness of fit 
and prediction ability as well as the stability of the 
coefficients over time. The methods employed to test the 
estimated model depends basically on the specific estimation 
technique being used. As we will see in the next section 
discriminant, logit, probit, and linear probability are the 
most common techniques applied in the study of 
5 
failure/problem. 
bank 
Table 1 gives a chronological account of the most 
important studies using the ex post empirical approach. It 
shows that a number of studies have succesfully tested those 
financial variables which discriminate well between 
failed/problem and nonfailed/non-problem banks and can be 
used as early warning of banks' financial difficulties. The 
independent variables are organised in six categories which 
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include capital adequacy, profitability, credit risk, 
liability risk, liquidity risk, and others. In each category 
the variables are not the same for each study. A more 
detailed description of the use of these accounting and 
financal ratios is provided in table 2. 
The sampling methods and the definitions of the discrete 
dependent variable have involved pairing samples of 
failed/problem banks with nonfailed/non-problems banks. They 
have used 
location, 
a 
and 
controlled sample by size, geographical 
number of branches or alternatively with a 
random sample of sound institutions. As examples of the 
former procedure one may include Sinkey and Walker (1975), 
and Sinkey (1975) whereas with respect to the latter we have 
Sinkey (1978), Bovenzi, Marino, and Mcfadden (1983), and 
Nelson White (1984). In addition, those studies have used 
diverse and more sophisticated statistical techniques since 
the pioneer work of Secrist, Beaver, and Altman. For 
instance, Meyer and Pifer (1970) have applied a linear 
probability model to estimate the likelihood of bank 
failures. Following Altman's work in 1968 and the use of 
Multi-Discriminant Analysis (MDA) on the bankruptcy of non-
financial firms and later in 1974 applying the same 
technique to the failure of the Saving and Loan 
Associations, Stuhr and Van Wicklen (1974) and Sinkey 
(1975,1978) extended its application to commercial banks. 
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Table 5.1 Analysis of selected Empirical Studies on Banks. 
Author 
Year 
Number Time Est. Dep.Vr. Independent Var. 
Type Period Tech. Class. KA PR CrR LbR Lq ot 
Meyer& 
Pifer 
(1970) 
39FB 1948-65 Linear 
Prob. 
l=FB + + + 
O=NFB 
Sinkey& 210PB 1972-73 
Walker 210NPB 
ANOVA Two-Way 
Class. + + + 
(1975) control 
Sinkey 
(1975) 
110PB 1969-72 Discrim. Two-Way + + + 
110NPB Analysis Class. 
control 
Martin 58FB 1970-76 Logit 
(1977) 5642NFB 
l=FB 
l=NFB 
+ + + 
Sinkey 163PB 1973-74 
(1978) 163NPB 
Discrim. Two-Way + 
Analysis Class. 
+ + 
control 
Bovenzi, 70FB 1980-83 Probit 
Marino,& 150NFB 
McFadden Random 
(1983) 
Avery& 100FB 1978-83 Logit 
Hanweck 588NFB 
(1984) 
Nelson 
White 
(1984) 
152FB 1927-30 Logit 
253NFB 
random 
Short, 81FB 1962-83 Probit 
O'Driscoll 13820NFB 
&Berger 
(1985) 
West 
(1985) 
Rodriguez 
Fernandez 
(1990) 
PB 
NPB 
Logit 
31FB 1978-83 Logit 
49NFB 
l=FB + 
O=NFB 
+ 
l=FB + + + 
O=NFB 
l=FB + 
O=NFB 
l=FB + 
O=NFB 
+ 
+ 
l=PB + + + 
O=NPB 
l=FB + + + 
O=NFB 
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
t 
+ + + 
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
------------------------------------------------------------
FB=Failed Bank 
PB=Problem Bank 
KA= Capital Adequacy 
CrR=Credit Risk 
Lq=Liquidity 
NFB=NonFailed Bank 
NPB=NonProblem Bank 
PR=Profitability 
LbR=Liability Risk 
ot= Others 
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The probit and logit analysis have also been applied 
very widely in different case studies of bank failures. 
Following the first logit application to bank failure by 
Martin (1977) several studies have appeared in the 
literature ever since. For example, Avery and Hanweck (1984) 
and Nelson White (1984) applied the logit technique whereas 
Bovenzi, Marino, and Mcfadden (1983), Short, O'Driscoll and 
Berger (1985), West (1985), and Rodriguez Fernandez (1990) 
had applied probit analysis for bank failures. 
With respect to the independent variables used in the 
literature, most of the financial ratios computed from 
balance sheet and income statement and tested in 
studies have been grouped in 6 categories, namely 
adequacy, profitability, credit risk, liability 
banking 
capital 
risk, 
liquidity, and others. A number of key financial ratios were 
associated with an increasing incidence on bank 
failures/problems, in particular during the last full year 
of operation before failure. In Martin's model the best 
regressors included net income/total asset ratio (NI/TA) as 
a indicator of profitability, gross charge-off/net income 
ratio (CGO/NI) and commercial loans/total asset ratio 
(CL/TA) as indicator of asset quality, and an indicator of 
capital adequacy measured by capital/risky asset ratio 
(K/RA). As we see from table 2, similar variables are used 
by Short, O'Driscoll, Berger (1985), Avery and Hanweck 
(1984), but with different success. 
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More recent studies have attempted to include also bank 
stock prices. Among these studies we include Pettway and 
Sinkey (1980) and Shick and Sherman (1980). Given the 
efficient market hypothesis, stock prices represent the 
bank's market value at all time since news and additional 
information on a bank performance will be instantaneously 
reflected in the stock price. Thus market information should 
complement the accounting information in bank failures 
predicting models if available and so long as stock prices 
does not respond to accounting data. In addition, it 
represents a quicker warning on a bank financial health if 
stock market have complete information. 
The ex post empirical approach has thrown up 
considerable evidence on the usefulness of using accounting 
data to discriminate between financial firms that go 
bankrupt and those which remain solvent and to predict 
financial failures or problems. 
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Table 5.2 Synthesis of Selected Empirical Studies on 
Banks. 
Author 
Meyer& 
Pifer 
(1970) 
Sinkey 
(1975) 
Martin 
(1977) 
Sinkey 
(1978) 
Objectives 
To discriminate 
between FB & NFB 
using financial 
data as proxies for 
managerial ability 
and employee honesty. 
To discriminate between 
PB and NPB by using 
financial ratios and 
MDA technique. He aimed 
at testing group mean 
differences and group 
overlapping. 
To analyse FB & NFB 
using logit and a 
wider definition of 
failure. To compare 
the results of logit 
and MDA. 
Although is similar 
to Sinkey (1975) it 
includes net capital 
ratio estimated by 
using examination 
Estimates 
The 9 variables regression 
model where 8 are trend and 
lag variables which correctly 
discriminate and classified 
80% of the banks sample. 
Beyond two years lead time 
type-I error increases and 
financial ratios are unable 
to discriminate effectively. 
Using a 10 variable model 
the null hypothesis of equal 
covariance and mean was 
rejected. Loan volume and 
quality were important as 
was efficiency in 1969-71. 
The mis-classification rate 
improved from 36% in 1969 
to 24.8% in 1972. Type-I 
error fell from 46% in 1969 
to 28% in 1972. 
The regressors were selected 
from 25 financial ratios.The 
best model was choosen by the 
Akaike's criterion. The best 
model of bank failures in 
1975-76 estimated with data 
of 1974 had 4 variables, 
NI/TA,CGO/NI,CL/TL and K/RA. 
The model perdicted 20 
failures out of 23 although 
the predicted accuracy 
declined with time. 
data on loans class. 
NCR is used to assess 
PB and to spot failures 
for large banks 
Bank capital and examiners' 
substandard loans proved to 
be important. On average,the 
latter accounted for 80% of 
PB loans' classification. FB 
showed a large vol. of bad 
loans 16 to 20 months before 
failure. However, most 
with low NCR did not fail. 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Bovenzi, 
Marino,& 
McFadden 
(1983) 
Avery& 
Hanweck 
(1984) 
Nelson 
White 
(1984) 
To develop an early 
warning model using 
financial data and 
to compare with early 
models in terms of 
relative performance. 
To use CAMEL to test 
and predict failures. 
To examine factors 
associated with FB. 
It focus on local 
market condition and 
the dynamic leading 
to failures unlike 
earlier studies. 
To study bank failures 
in the 1920's and the 
banking crisis of 1930 
By analysing financial 
ratios he ascertained 
the empirical meaning 
of managerial factors 
on FB. Also, to test 
between real and money 
factors of the crisis. 
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They estimate 3 models: Call 
A included OOE/TA,GSp/K,TL/K 
CGO/TL ratios. Exam A i5 an 
extension of Call A as 
includes credit risk based 
on loan examination data. 
Exam B included also TOL/TA. 
All coefficients were 
significant and with correct 
expected sign. Examination 
data improves classification 
accuracy although efficiency 
falls relative to call data 
as the interval between data 
& failure increases. The 
result from using CAMEL 
classification is consistent 
although does not do better 
than the ratios. 
The model contain 9 ratios 
where 5 were significant 
among them NI/TA,NL/TA,K/TA, 
CIL/TA and log TA-LLR.Lagged 
financial ratios did not add 
much to the model after 6 
months and a year. 
For failures occurring in 
1930 capital adequacy was 
insignificant unlike loan 
losses.Liquidity measured 
as CR/TD did affect the 
probability of bank failure. 
The Temin & Friedman/Schwartz 
hypotheses were found both 
significant. The evidence 
from the model shows the 
characteristics of FB in the 
1930's were similar to those 
who had failed some years 
earlier where there was no 
liquidity problems. 
Table 5.2 (continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Short, 
O'Driscoll 
& Berger 
(1985) 
Similar to White's 
paper. To assess the 
determinants of bank 
failures by comparing 
asset and liability 
portfolios of FB&NFB. 
To establish whether 
the explanatory power 
of risk variables 
have changed over 
time. 
West 
(1985) 
It introduces a new 
approach to early 
warning system by 
means of factor 
analysis. 
Rodriguez 
Fernandez 
(1990) 
To provide an ex post 
empirical analysis of 
the Spanish banking 
system. To identify 
a set of financial 
ratios to explain 
bank failures. 
They estimated 5 ratios as 
proxies for the conduct of 
management.It includes K/TA 
TL/TA,CoD/TL and PuF/TL.The 
loan-asset ratio was 
significant during 3 years 
unlike PuF/TL. The probit 
estimates for FB indicates 
that the quality of banks' 
assets and the risk of 
outflows were important 
determinants of bank 
failure. 
The model includes 19 ratios 
most of them successfully 
used in earlier studies. By 
factor analysis 4 ratios are 
included in the model which 
is similar to the CAMEL 
components. They are 
successful in the estimation 
of the probe of failure. 
Ratios NI/TA, K/TL, and 
FA/TA were significant. In 
terms of the accuracy, the 
model perform well only 1 
and two year before the 
failures. 
NI= Net Income RA= Risk Assets LLR=Loan Loss Res. 
TA= Total Assets OOE= Other Opere EXp. CR= Cash and Res. 
CGO= Gross Chargeoff GSp= Gross Spread TD= Total Deposits 
CL= Commercial Loans TOL= Overdue Loans CoD=Core Deposit 
TL= Total Loans CIL= Commercial&Ind.Loans PuF=Purchased 
K= Capital NL= Net Loans Funds 
FA=Fixed Assets 
As evidenced by the selected number of studies reviewed 
in table 1 and 2, the empirical models have been developed 
and applied for different periods of time. They have evolved 
from a basic classification problem to the construction of 
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failure prediction models and early-warning systems. The 
building up of the ex post empirical model has involved a 
sampling process for sound and unsound banks (failed and 
problem banks) . By making comparisons on the bank 
characteristics over time ,it was possible to find out 
systematic differences between the two groups and from there 
on to proceed in the calculation of the probability of 
failure and make predictions. 
Most of the studies analysed have used data derived from 
balance-sheet and income statements to construct financial 
ratios and apply multivariate estimation techniques ranging 
from MDA to logit analysis. The results from these models 
have been very encouraging particularly with reference to 
the ability to assess the banks' characteristics, to test 
statistically the importance of explanatory factors (e.g 
asset quality), and to provide early signals about 
approaching bank failure/problem one and more years in 
advance. 
However, the empirical approach have been questioned on 
several grounds. Rodriguez Fernandez (1990) maintains that 
although the explanatory power of model development for 
bank failures exhibits a good record, the predictive 
accuracy is less conclusive from those models. Furthermore, 
Scott (1981) also introduces some criticisms to this 
approach. He stresses the lack of theoretical underpinnings 
as most of the findings and conclusions have been derived by 
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a statistical search through a number of plausible financial 
indicators. Table 3 gives an assessment of the most 
important contribution and shortcomings from the selected 
cases of study. 
Table 5.3 
Author 
Meyer& 
Pifer 
(1970) 
Sinkey 
(1975) 
Martin 
(1977) 
Sinkey 
(1978) 
Bovenzi, 
Marino,& 
McFadden 
(1983) 
Avery& 
Hanweck 
(1984) 
Overview of the Contributions and Shortcoming 
from the Selected Banks' Studies. 
Contributions 
It represent one of the 
first attempt to use 
financial information 
on bank failures in the 
form of ratios,trends& 
lags. 
It is the first study 
using MDA technique on 
commercial banks. 
It is the first attempt 
to use LOGIT on banking 
studies. It compares the 
the results between MDA 
and LOGIT. 
One important contribution 
is the use of NCR and its 
ability to discriminate 
between PB and NPB. 
Shortcomings 
A narrow definition of 
failure, the lack of 
predicting ability 
beyond 2 years, and the 
use of linear prob.model 
The use of examiners' 
determined groups& the 
use of MDA itself. 
Small sample size and 
exclude nonmember bank 
failures. 
The estimation of NCR 
is based on information 
of loans'classification 
implemented by banks' 
examiners. 
Compares the results of Small sample size for 
models using call data, some subperiod leading 
examiners'data, and with to lack of efficiency 
early models (Martin 1977) in the estimators. 
Also, it test the usefulness 
of CAMEL ratings on failures. 
(a) 
By using pooled cross-section 
data rather than average for 
independent variables the model 
has the advantage of providing 
dynamic prediction of the probe 
of failure. 
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The sample was 
including small 
size institutions 
and the data was 
elaborated from 
examiners' report. 
Table 5.3 (continued) 
- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Nelson 
White 
(1984) 
The application of LOGIT to 
US bank failures during the 
1920's and 1930. It tested 
the Temin&Friedman/Schwartz 
competing hypothesis. 
It included data on 
National Banks only. 
The highset failure 
rate was concentrated 
on state-Chartered 
banks. 
Short, 
O'Driscoll, 
& Berger 
(1985) 
It represent a fresh attempt 
to test the portfolio risks 
decision of commercial banks 
using PROBIT. 
It assumes that 
macro-factors 
(general economic 
conditions) remain 
constant.It treats 
West 
(1985) 
Rodriguez 
Fernandez 
(1990) 
Its contribution lies on 
the use of factorial 
analysis. 
The application of LOGIT 
the case of the Spanish 
Banking System. 
financial ratios as 
proximate determinants 
rather than casual 
factors. 
The groups in which the 
logit analysis was based 
was determined by the 
opinion of supervisers. 
The use of financial 
ratios as proximate 
determinants. 
(a) The CAMEL rating system based on capital adequacy, asset 
quality, management, earnings and liquidity. Each indicator 
is rated from 1 to 5 with 1 being the highest score. 
The shortcomings stated in table 3 and the lack of a 
totally objective and exact criterion for identifying bank 
failures have prompted the researchers to introduce other 
methodologies in the study of bank failures. 
A second approach defines bank failure as the event 
whereby the net worth of a bank is negative. This a priori 
methodology attempts to estimate and test the a priori 
probability of a negative net worth by incorporating the 
observed probability distribution of factors such as 
earnings, loan losses, and other factors affecting the 
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value of a bank's net worth. For instance, Santomero and 
Vinso (1977) and Nelson (1979) had followed this approach. 
Santomero and Vinso estimate the probability of a negative 
net worth by considering period to period changes in the 
bank's capital as random variable. The parameters of this 
stationary distribution for each bank were estimated using 
weekly time series data reported by banks and transated into 
a probability of failure. Factors such as profitability, 
loan losses, liquidity , and other relevant financial 
information were implictly treated in the determination of 
6 
the distribution. 
In contrast, Nelson estimated a very similar model of 
the role of capital in relation to the likelihood of failure 
that disaggregates the effect of loans losses and other 
elements affecting the variability of a bank's net worth. 
Santomero and Vinso's model performed poorly as their 
estimated probability of failure based in the sample 1965-74 
was very low. This result was highly inconsistent as the US 
banking system witnessed the collapse of the Franklin 
National Bank and the Security National Bank in 1974-75. 
A third approach may be identified from the banking 
literature. The a priori undefined approach introduces the 
concept of bank vulnerability as a more general concept. For 
instance, Korobow and Stuhr (1975) and Korobow, Stuhr, and 
Martin (1976) distinguish vulnerable banks from resistant 
ones. They constructed a ranking of banks by weighting a 
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set of financial variables as proxies of financial weakness 
or strength. Those banks which were above the arbitrary cut-
off point were considered as resistant to failure and 
7 
viceversa. 
One important criticism is that the a priori undefined 
models and the concept of vulnerability bears no relation to 
the issue of banks failure. In a later articule Korobow, 
stuhr, and Martin used the score as an independent variable 
to estimate the probability of bank problems using an 
8 
arctangent regression equation. According to Martin (1977), 
this new version is merely a variant of the ex post 
empirical approach but with a poorer fit as they used a 
single explanatory variable based on the rank scores. 
One important criticism to the banking studies carried 
out in particular for the case of the us banking system is 
related to the use of financial ratios and in some cases 
market data as independent explanatory variables. Clearly, 
financial ratios point to symptoms rather than causes. In 
other words, it identifies proximate determinants of bank 
failures but not more fundamental causal factors. For 
instance, increasing in asset and liability risk, reduction 
in profitability, and low capital adequacy may be affected 
by general factors such as a downturn in economic activity 
and/or more specific issues relating to bank management and 
risk taking. Thus, one could visualise two interesting 
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competing hypothesis, 
9 
firm-specific factors. 
namely macroeconomic and 
The approach to be followed in the present study will 
consist in the modelling and estimating of the probability 
of bank failure/problem in Chile. We will test those two 
competing hypotheses using the logit model. At the same 
time, we will use the ex post empirical approach based on 
accounting and financial information to classify banks into 
the two groups as it will be seen in the next chapter. 
Before that we will discuss the econometric methodology 
involve in the binary-choice model with specific reference 
to the logit model. 
(5.3) Binary-Choice and the Logit Model. 
Usually we are dealing in economics with models in which 
the dependent variable is continuous. However, bank 
failures/problems can be in general considered as an event. 
Since we are estimating the probability of occurrence of an 
event the dependent variable takes a discrete value. Thus, 
the econometrician is faced with the modelling of a pattern 
of behaviour which involves a decision on a finite set of 
alternatives. Models which are used for such purposes are 
called qualitative response models (QR). QR models have 
been extensively used in biometrics applications for much 
longer than they have been applied in social science and in 
particular in economics. These dicrete or QR models however 
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have had numerous applications in social science in more 
recent times. Their topics range over a great variety of 
discrete economic decisions such as labour force 
participation, education and schooling, legislation and 
voting, choice of occupation, and jobs and firm location 
10 
among others. As we have seen in the review of previous 
studies these models have also been used successfully in 
banking and finance. 
(5.3.1) The Logit Hodel. 
Suppose we want to consider the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an event,in our study we define this event as 
a failure/problem bank (PB) and non-failure/non-problem bank 
(NPB). We define a dichotomous random dependent variable Yi 
which takes the value of Yi=l if PB and Yi=O if NPB. We 
assume that Pi is the probability that Yi takes the value of 
1 and hence (I-Pi) is the probability that Yi=O. Therefore 
the probability function for Yi can be expressed as (1). 
Yi I-Yi 
(1) fCYi)= Pi (I-Pi) 
It is argued that the outcome of the random variable Yi 
is determined by factors which can be grouped in terms of 
microeconomic variables including banks' characteristics and 
management as well as general economic conditions. Then we 
have 
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(2) Yi= ( Zi - Zi )'<5 + Wi'( ei 
1 
el ) 
o 1 0 
where 
* 
+ e 
i 
Zi' are vectors of microeconomic 
variables and/or bank characteristic 
of the ith bank. 
Wi' is a vector of general economic 
conditions and/or macroeconomic 
variables. 
Therefore, we may express the linear model in terms of (2b) 
* (2b) Yi = Xi'B + e for 
i 
where 
i = 1,2, ... ,n. 
Xi = K-vector of known 
explanatory variables 
B = K-vector of unknown 
parameters 
* 
e = random error term 
i 
One of the earliest functional form used was the linear 
probability model (LP). The LP model can be interpreted as 
the probability that the event will occur given the value of 
Xi. The estimated probability can lie outside the admissible 
range 0,1. In other words, the distribution of F is not 
limited to be between 0 and 1. In addition, because of the 
heteroscedasticity problem, the OLS estimates of B will not 
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be efficient. Its wide usage can be explained as a result of 
computational simplicity and its usefulness today remains 
in determining quick estimates at a preliminary stage only. 
Given the shortcomings associated with the LP model we 
need an alternative specification concerning the 
distribution assumptions so that all predictions lie within 
the interval [0,1]. Since our main concern is to interpret 
the dependent variable Yi as the likelihood of an event then 
the notion of probability can be regarded as a suitable 
basis for a transformation. There are two important 
requirements which need to be met: Firstly, for all real X 
the probability must fall between 0 and 1. Secondly, such 
transformation has to be monotonic, that is increases in X 
are associated with increases (decreases) in Yi for all X. 
Probability distribution theory shows that the 
cummulative distribution function (c.d.f.) for a continuous 
random variable X is given by 
(3) F(x) f (t) dt -(X) < X < (X) 
-0) 
where f(t)=probability density function 
Notice that F(-oo)=O and F(00)=1 and if a<b it follows 
tha t F (a) < F (b) . 
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Therefore, given the p.d.f. the LP model in (2a) 
becomes 
(4) P(Yi=l) = F(X'B) for i= 1,2, ... ,n. 
where F= c.d.f. 
The two most common choices of distribution are the 
standard normal and the logistic distributions. The c.d.f. 
for the former is defined as 
( 5 ) F(t) -* (2rr.) exp{-X2/2} dX (Probit) 
-co 
and for the latter we have 
(5a) F(t)= 1 / 1 + exp (-t) (logit) 
where exp=e= 2.718 
The probit model (PM) may be justified by reference to a 
central limit theorem and so it is the case for the logit 
model given that the logistic distribution is similar to the 
normal distribution. In fact, both distributions are bounded 
between 0 and 1 as well as being monotonic. Also, they are 
symmetric around zero means and have a variance equal to 1 
and rr./3 respectively. The standardised logistic has slightly 
heavier tails than the standard normal distribution. Because 
of the close similarity between two distributions, it is 
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difficult to distinguish statistically between them unless 
we have a large sample. Thus in a univariate dichotomous 
model it does not matter whether we use problt or logit 
model. In consequence, both transformations are suitable in 
modelling bank failure/problem models, choice which is made 
on the basis of convenience and the availability of computer 
software. 
From now on we will concentrate on the formulation, 
estimation, testing, and selection of a logit model. Thus, 
by recalling expression (4), the model can be expressed as 
XiB 
( 6 ) F(XiB) = J f(Z) dZ 
-0) 
where f(Z) = 1 / 1 + exp(-X) 
standard logistic density 
function. 
Then the problem bank or bankruptcy is determined by a 
logit probability model as shown in (6). The interpretation 
of the estimated coefficient in the logit model reflects the 
effect of a change in an independent variable on the odds 
ratio given by the expression Ln[ Pi / (1- Pi) ]. 
The next question we need to look at is relating to the 
parameter estimation of the logit model. 
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(5.3.2) Estimation of a Logit Kodel. 
The object of estimation of this model is the vector of 
unknown parameter B. How the estimation is carried out 
depends on the type of data being used. In some cases, we 
may have repeated observations on a particular decision 
maker (case). In this context we may apply the min X2 method 
for QR models also known as the "Berkson-Theil approach". It 
is only useful when there are repeated draws on the 
dependent variable Yi having the same value of the vector of 
the independent variable X. Then F(X'B) for the specific 
value of X can be estimated by the relative frequency of Y 
being equal 1. (Amemiya 1981,1985) 
This restriction is satisfied in the case of the 
physical science where the data in an 
experimental setting. 
trials holding the 
They normally 
are generated 
consist of repeated 
discrete independent variable as 
constant. In contrast, most social science data are often 
continous where observations differ both in the dependent 
and the independent variable. Moreover, it would be very 
difficult having natural repeated trials with the X's held 
constant. 
If sufficient repeated observations are not available we 
must resort to the use of the maximum likelihood estimator 
for B. The likelihood function of the logit model is given 
by 
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n Yi (l-Yi) 
(7) ML= E F(XIB) [l-F(XIB)] 
i=l 
By taking natural log we get 
n n 
(7a) InML= E Yi In F(XiB) + E (l-Yi) In [l-F(XIB)] 
i=l i=l 
The ML estimator for B, say B ~ ~ is obtained by maximising 
(7a) with respect to B. 
n n 
(7b) dlnML/dB= {E Yi-F(XiB) / E F(XiB)[l-F(XiB)]} f(XiB)Xi 
i=l i=l 
By setting the first order condition given by (7b) equal 
to zero we obtain an estimate for B. The InML is globally 
concave as the Hessian matrix of second partial derivatives 
is negative definite. This implies that the solution 
corresponds to a single local maximum and hence a solution 
to (7a) which is unique if it is bounded. 
Notice that the expression (7b) is a non-linear first 
order condition in terms of B so that the ML estimator must 
be obtained by mean of an iterative method. In order to 
define the iterative method and to obtain the asymptotic 
variance-covariance matrix we calculate the second order 
condition from InML in (7b). 
262 
n 
(8) d2 lnML/dBdB'= -E{[Yi/F2(X1B)] 
i=l 
+1-Yi/[l-F(1-XiB)]}f 2 (XiB)XiXi 
n 
+ E{Yi-F(XiB)/F(XiB)[l-F(XiB)]}f'(XiB)XiXi 
i=l 
where f'is the derivative of f. 
Taking expected values we are left with 
n 
(8a) Ed2 lnML/dBdB'= -E{f2 (XIB)/F(XIB)[1-F(X1B)]}XiXi 
i=l 
Amemiya (1985) has shown that under very general 
conditions the ML estimator is consistent and asymptotically 
normal with the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix as 
-1 
(9) -(Ed2 lnML/dBdB') = V a r ( B ~ ) )
n -1 
= E{{f 2 (XIB)/F(XIB)[1-F(XIB)]}XiXi} 
i=l 
By substituting F by the logistic distribution defined 
in expression (Sa) we obtain the formulas for the logit 
model. 
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The non-linear equation can be solved by a variety of 
11 
iterative techniques. One the most common method to 
calculate the ML estimator is the Newton-Rapshon. This is an 
iterative procedure where the (t+l)st round estimate of B ~ ~
is 
(10) B ~ ~ = 13 ..... - ( 
t+1 t 
-1 
d 2 lnML/dBdB'1 ] 
B ~ ~
t 
dlnML/dBI ] 
13 ..... 
t 
t+1 
where (d2 lnML/dBdB'1 is a (K*K) 
matrix of second partial derivatives of lnML function 
evaluated at the th round estimate B ~ . .
t 
This procedure is to be repeated until the iteration 
converges to a global maximum bound on any set of starting 
values B ~ . .
(5.3.3) Hypothesis Testing. 
There is a full menu of procedures available for 
hypothesis testing. The simplest testing for a single 
restriction is based on the normal and/or t-student test. 
Suppose we are interested to test a general linear 
hypothesis of the form given by expression (11). 
(11) RB = r 
where R=(JxK) known hypothesis design 
matrix with rank J ~ K K
r= (Jxl) known vector 
=:64 
Thus the null hypothesis Ho is defined as 
(lla) Ho: RB = r 
If we test specifically R B=[l 0 0 O ... O]B= r where 
1 1 
any scalar including the value of 0 then a test of (11) 
r is 
1 
can 
be performed on the basis of the following asymptotic 
results. 
(llb) R B"'-
I 
-1 
r / r r " ' ~ R ( X ' X ) ) R' z 
III 
N(O,l) 
-1 
where r r " ' ~ R ( X ' X ) ) R' is an scalar and a 
I 1 
variance estimate of R B-- r 
I I 
Therefore, the null hypothesis Ho is rejected when the 
absolute value of (lIb) is bigger than the theoretical value 
given by the normal distribution ( Z value) corresponding to 
a particular level of significance. This test is suitable 
for large samples and a known variance. 
Alternatively, for small samples (lIb) possess a t-
student distribution. For instance, if we test the null 
hypothesis that the coefficient is 0 and the sample size is 
small then (llb) is reduced to 
!65 
-1 
(llc) B ~ ~ / ~ r r 2 ~ ( X ' X ) ) z t 
(n-k, ~ / 2 ) )
where (n-k) degrees of freedom 
~ / 2 2 level of significance two-tail 
As before the null hypothesis is rejected as long as the 
absolute value exceed a defined critical region of the t-
distribution at n-k degrees of freedom and ~ / 2 2 level of 
significance. Notice that (lIb) and (1Ic) are both correct 
and equivalent since a t-distribution is asymptotically 
A 
equal to a normal distribution, that is t z N(O,I). 
( n - k , ~ / 2 ) )
We may also wish to test the significance of all or a 
subset of the coefficient of the logit model when the ML 
estimator is used for B. A test using the chi-squared 
distribution replaces the usual F-test applied to ordinary 
regression. The null hypothesis is defined as Ho:B=B= .. =B=O. 
I 2 K 
The likelihood ratio test (LRT) reflects the 
comparability between a sample of data and the null 
hypothesis through a comparison of the constrained and 
unconstrained likelihood functions. Thus, the LRT is defined 
as 
A 
(12) LRT = 2 [ l n M L ( B - ) - l n M L ( B ~ ) ] ] z X2 (chi-square dist.) 
c q 
where lnML(B-) = unconstrained likelihood function 
l n M L ( B ~ ) ) = constrained likelihood function 
c 
q= degrees of freedom 
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is obtained by maximising the ML function 
c 
given by expression (7b) with respect to B subject to the 
linear constraint RB=r where as we already know R is (JxK) 
known design hypothesis matrix and r is (Jxl) vector of 
given values. 
The null hypothesis Ho as defined by (1Ia) is rejected 
if the value of the statistics exceed a given critical value 
12 
of chi-square distribution with q degrees of freedom. 
(5.3.4) Hodel Selection. 
Finally, we need to develop a simple criterion for model 
selection to choose alternative specifications in terms of 
explanatory variables and/or general distribution functions. 
There are a number of criteria for selecting among 
alternative OR models. The use of a single scalar may be 
treated with caution since it may be suitable only for some 
instances. This means that it is extremely difficult to make 
a definite evaluation concerning the relative merits of 
various criteria independently. As a result, one should 
select at least two or more scalar criteria for selection 
purposes and compare the results. Another important remark 
is that whatever criteria one decides to apply it is 
necessary to make adjustment for degrees of freedom. 
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For the purpose of this study we have chosen two scalar 
criteria from the menu, namely the prediction accuracy and 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) which follows the 
13 
discussion. 
- Prediction Accuracy. 
Suppose we have 
n 
(13) E ( Y i - Y i ~ ) ) where Y · ~ ~1 = 1 if F i ~ ~ > 
* i=1 
and Y · ~ ~1 = 0 if F i ~ ~ < 
* 
Expression (13) gives the number of wrong predictions 
as ( Y i - Y i ~ ) = l l if and only if Yi and Y i ~ ~ are not equal. This 
criterion is appropiate when one has an all or nothing loss 
function. Thus, if an individual who estimated its 
probability to be 0.40 and another individual who estimated 
its probability equal to 0 then both are equally penalised. 
However, under this criteria most models will do relatively 
well even if the probabilities differ greatly within the 
interval 0 ~ ~ Y i ~ < < *. 
- The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
According to Judge, Carter, Griffith, and others (1988) 
the information criterion seeks to incorporate in model 
selection the divergent consideration of accuracy of 
estimation and the best approximation to reality. Thus use 
~ 6 8 8
of this criter1'on l'ntroduces t t' t' a s a 1S 1C that gives a 
measure of the precision of the estimate and a measure of 
the parameterisation of the model. Then the AlC is defined 
as 
(14) AlC = -lnML + K 
where lnML= likelihood function 
K= number of parameters 
Clearly, from (13) we see a trade -off between 
precision and parameterisation where increases in K involves 
a penalty in the value of the AlC. According to this 
criteria one chooses the model with smallest AlC. 
So far the discussion has centered on the specification 
and estimation of a univariate logit model using cross-
section data. There are other alternative specifications for 
a logit model such as a univariate multinomial model which 
specifies the discrete dependent variable with more than two 
alternatives. For instance, in a model of transport modal 
choice we might specify the model with three alternatives, 
say car, bus, and train. We may extend this model by making 
such choice sequentially. That is, any particular choice or 
state is determined by a previous choice or state. Suppose 
that Yi=2 and Yi=3 where the first choice correspond to 
problem bank and the second one to a non-problem bank. Then 
if Yi=3 then Yi=1 which is defined as failed bank. 
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A second large group correspond to the multivariate 
models. This type of QR model specifies the joint 
probability distribution of two or more discrete dependent 
variable. (For a thorough review of these models see Maddala 
1983 and Amemiya 1985) 
Finally, we have to consider the question of a 
specification and estimation of a logit model using panel 
data. The panel data consist of observations made on 
individuals over time. In other words, it is a combination 
of cross-section and time series data. This approach is very 
useful in case of limited number of individual observations 
in the cross-section data. 
If the observations are independent between individuals 
and overtime, then a logit model using panel data does not 
introduce additional complications. In fact, it becomes only 
a larger model with more observations. However, if there is 
heterogeneity across units, the estimated parameters from 
the logit model will be inconsistent. 
The logit estimation with panel data and some of the 
potential problems and shortcomings will be discuss in 
chapters 7 and 8. 
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Endnotes. 
(1) At the same time but in less quantities academics from 
universities and institutes have also contributed to the 
development of this topic. For an exhaustive review and 
assessment of early warning system developed by these 
agencies and others for the US see Altman E., Avery 
Einsenbeis R., and J.Sinkey Jr. (1981) Chapter VIII. R., 
(2) Of the 30 ratios reported by Beaver cash flows/total 
assets,net income/total debt, and cash flows/total debt best 
predicted financial failures. 
(3) The 5 variables are the following: working capital/total 
assets, retained earnings/total assets, earnings before 
interest and taxes/total assets, market value of equity/book 
value of total debt, and sales/total assets. For a 
thorough account on the pioneer work of Beaver (1966), 
Altman (1968) and the more recent development of failure-
prediction models for non-financial firms see Altman, Avery, 
Eisenbeis, and Sinkey Jr. (1981). 
(4) As argued by Martin (1977), it is commonly agreed that a 
financial firm fails as any other enterprise when its net 
worth becomes negative or incurr losses that would result in 
a negative net worth. However, actual insolvency and 
receivership are infrequent relative to some form of 
intervention by the monetary and banking authorities. Among 
them we find mergers with a healthy institution, the 
purchases of bad loans and risky assets. In spite of this, 
he argues that no serious problems will be present in 
empirical research. 
(5) For an excellent and thorough review of the econometrics 
for binary choice models see Amemiya (1981) and Judge, 
Carter, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, and Chao-Lee (1988). For a 
more advance treatment see Maddala (1983) and Amemiya (1985) 
(6) Santomero and Vinso studied 224 large US banks between 
1965 to 1974. Those banks who have not reported continuously 
over this relevant period were excluded. United state 
National Bank, Franklin National Bank, and Security National 
Bank felt into this category. 
(7) They employed a linear combination of 12 financial 
ratios to measure vulnerability. Each variable is weighted 
by either 1 or minus 1 depending whether this financial 
ratio is a priori favorable or unfavorable. After dividing 
it by the standard deviation, the weighted sum represent the 
rank score. Positive score implies resistance and negative 
score vulnerability. 
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(8) The arctangent procedure differ only slightly from the 
logit analysis. The regression estimate the relationship 
between the bank scores and the observed probability of 
receiving low rating over the estimation period subsequent 
to the base year. This realtionship was assumed to be 
continuous, approaching zero for large positive scores 
and approaching one for negative score, and monotonic. The 
arctangent distribution has indeed these properties. 
(9) This point have been raised by Nelson White (1984) and 
Short, Q'Driscoll, and Berger (1985). Nelson White test two 
competing hypothesis for the banking crisis of 1930, the 
effect of real and monetary factors and the ability of the 
banking system to withstand those shocks. 
(10) For an 
applications 
(1984) 
exhaustive review of QR models 
see Amemiya (1981) and Pindyck and 
and its 
Rubinfelt 
(11) Normal equations for non-linear models are in general 
non-linear with respect to the parameters so we require some 
specific algorithms to solve them. We should mention the 
Newton-Raphson, method of scoring, the Berndt, Hall, Hall, 
and Hausman algorithm, and Davison, Fletcher, and 
Powell algorithm among the most common. 
(12) For more involved restrictions we may 
model by means of the Wald test. As the LRT, 
chi-square distribution and both are 
equivalent. (See Judge, Carter, Griffith, and 
also test the 
this test has a 
asymptotically 
others 1988). 
(13) Amemiya (1981) gives a more thorough review of the 
list of scalar criterias for QR models. In addition, Judge, 
Carter, Griffiths, and others (1988) discuss problems of 
specification in econometrics models. 
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Chapter 6. The Discrete Dependent Variable: Predictions 
from an Early Warning Hodel. 
(6.1) Introduction. 
This chapter seek to develop an appropriate 
banks'classification method using financial information from 
balance-sheets and income statements. In the absence of ex 
post information on the state of health of the chilean 
financial institutions prior to the failure date of 1983, we 
have constructed an early warning system to predict the ex 
ante probability of bank problem/failure based on the 
statistically significant determinants of the likelihood of 
those events. The empirical results were obtained by the use 
of univariate and multivariate statistical techniques. At 
the same time, the model provides evidence as to whether the 
bank failures could have been anticipated by the 
authorities. 
This chapter has been structured into three main 
sections. Section 2 contains a description of the model in 
terms of the definition of bank failure/problem and the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
definitions used in the literature. Section 3 discusses the 
set of independent variables and its classification in seven 
broad categories. Finally, the last section reports and 
assesses the empirical results from univariate and 
multivariate statitical models. The evidence is complemented 
with a set of appendices to compare the results. 
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(6.2) Development of a Failure/Problem Prediction Hodel. 
(6.2.1) Failure/Problem Hodel: The Dependent Variable. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are 
several approaches to the construction of a problem and/or 
failure prediction models in the empirical literature of 
banking. The lack of an objective criterion for identifying 
bank failures in the real world has led to researchers to 
deal with this ambiguity by taking the ex post 
classification of bank failures or alternatively, they 
have also adopted a more abstract and subjective definition 
based on the judgment from the banking authorities about 
what constitutes a sound and healthy financial institution. 
This acceptable variant of the ex post empirical approach 
rests on the existence of a bank "problem" list elaborated 
by the banking authorities. This classification is 
elaborated with information from on-site bank examinations, 
and in particular, from the evaluation of asset portfolios 
1 
and the quality and riskiness of bank loans. 
However, given that a failure is a more objective 
indication of a bank's ability to continue its operation, 
then this approach results in a more convenient and less 
subjective approach than the definition of a problem bank. 
On the other hand, if bank problems precede actual failures, 
then a problem prediction model may provide a longer lead 
time for identifying and classifying financial institutions 
than would a failure prediction model. Also, the authorities 
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may encourage corrective actions which can prevents bank 
failure. Thus, as the failure path tends to be a decaying 
one rather than an explosive one, then identifying tho5e 
banks with financial difficulties would be the first step 
towards achieving the failure prevention goal. 
The evidence from other empirical studies and from the 
banking crisis in Chile show that all failed banks were 
identified as problem banks although it did not follow that 
all problem banks failed. Bearing in mind the pros and cons 
discussed above, this study accepts as a more convenient 
approach to study the banking crisis in Chile a definition 
of the discrete and dichotomous dependent variable as 
failed/problem and nonfailed/nonproblem banks. At the same 
time, this definition maximises the number of observations 
unlike the case where the dependent variable is failure and 
non-failure banks. The data limitation for this empirical 
study became a powerful reason to choose failure/problem 
prediction model instead of a failure-prediction model. 
The development of this model aims at replicating the ex 
post list of problem banks of 1983. At the same time and 
equally important, the model is used to construct a 
classification list for financial institutions prior to 
1983. Given that such ex post information is not available 
we then predict quarterly estimates 
probability of problem as a proxy in 
of the 
order to 
ex ante 
classify 
financial institutions into the two groups. The estimating 
coefficients of the logit models will generate a set of 
probability estimates so that those institutions classified 
as problem are assigned a high ex ante probability of 
problem and a low probability to non-problem banks. 
Initially, two models were considered for comparison 
purposes conveniently labeled as models A1B1 and A1B2. Both 
correspond to problem-prediction models where in the first 
case Al includes all those financial institutions which have 
sold bad loans to the Central Bank and/or were liquidated, 
merged, and capitalised in 1983. From table 1 and appendix 1 
we see that for 1983 a total of 17 commercial and 
development banks were classified into the list of Al from a 
total of 27. The only two institutions which remained 
healthy and hence did not have to sell bad debts to the 
banking authorities were the state bank Banco del Estado and 
the private commercial bank Banco Industrial y de Comercio 
2 
Exterior. 
The chosen samples did not include those financial 
intermediaries which were subject to regulatory intervention 
during 1981, despite that the fact that this year marked the 
beginning of the severe banking crisis of 1983. This 
arbitrary selection was justified on the grounds that most 
financial failure were concentrated in non-bank financial 
institutions and it would have reduced the sample size for 
the empirical study. Moreover, the period of 1981 can be 
seen as one with a buoyant macroeconomic environment and 
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hence no comparison between two macroeconomic states would 
have been possible for those institutions. 
Table 6.1 List of Problem and Failed Banks in Chile 
During 1983. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Bank Code Problem Failed 
------------------------------------------------------------
Chile 001 SBO Rk & Rp O'Higgins 008 SBd 
Internacional 009 SBO Rk & Rp Continental 011 SBO 
Sud Americano 014 SBD 
Credito 016 SBO 
Trabajo 022 SBO 
Pacifico 025 SBO 
Nacional(a) 026 SBO 
Concepcion 027 SBO Rk & Rp 
Edwards(b) 029 SBD 
Santiago 035 SBO Rk & Rp 
MorganFinansa(c)047 SBO 
Unido Fomento 502 Liquidated 
Hipotecario F. 504 SBO Rk & Rp 
Hipotecario Ch. 505 Liquidated 
Colocadora Nac. 506 SBO Merged 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) Former Banco de Curico 
(b) Former Banco Constitucion 
(c) Former Financiera Finansa 
Rk= Capitalised 
Rp= Privatise 
SBO= Bad Debt Sold to 
Central Bank. 
An important observation is the fact that foreign banks 
did not fail and/or sold bad debts to the Central Bank, 
although there were two exceptions namely Banco Espanol and 
Banco Talca which in 1981 were bought by the Santander Bank 
and the Central Bank both from Spain. Later on, they became 
Banco de Santander and Centro Banco. 
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The group of non-problem banks was constructed using two 
classifications. For the case of B1, this sample includes 
the two healthy commercial banks, a group of foreign banks 
which opened after 1980 and the remaining development bank 
but excluded non-bank financial institutions. B2 differs 
from B1 only in terms of the replacement of foreign banks by 
non-bank financial institutions. 
The inclusion of foreign banks in the sample B1 is 
justified on the grounds that they outperformed domestic 
banks during and after the crisis. Marshall (1990) reported 
that foreign banks performed better than domestic banks 
3 
measured in terms of a performance index. The same 
conclusion was obtained by the author by looking at the rate 
of growth of total deposits, loans, financial investment 
measured in real terms. Therefore, their inclusion as sound 
banks was expected to give some light on the specific 
differences with respect to the unhealthy ones. The same 
objective was sought when we include non-bank financial 
institutions and exclude foreign banks in the sample B2. 
However, the sample size of B2 was smaller than B1. 
Therefore, AIB2 contained a total of only 25 observations as 
compared with A1B1 with 36 observations. 
There are two final points to be stressed about problem-
prediction models. Firstly, apart from the arguments for and 
against one or other model suggested earlier on, the number 
of observations included in the model also should be given a 
~ 7 8 8
considerable weight in our choice. Given that the of 
the Chilean financial system is rather small as compared 
with, say, the USA, where normally the sample size i5 in 
excess of 1000 observation for each period, it is necessary 
to maximise our sample size. 
Secondly, and also related to the data limitations we , 
attempted to work with a controlled sample model labeled as 
A1B3. The B3 contained a controlled sample by bank size to 
incorporate such differences in the model. However, the 
sample of non-problem banks was insufficient to construct a 
paired observations with problems banks having the same size 
category. Therefore, such model was dropped from the 
empirical analysis. 
(6.2.2) Variables Categories and Financial Ratios as 
Regressors. 
Once we have chosen and defined the problem-prediction 
models, the next step is to discuss the selection and use of 
variables as regressors. In this study, we have included a 
large number of financial ratios properly calculated from 
4 
bank balance sheets and income statements. Unfortunately, we 
were unable to include market data to be used as regressors 
in the estimated models. Although the "market-efficiency 
relevant hypothesis" suggest that markets contain all 
information on the future performance and hence provide the 
earliest warning signal, the lack of market data for Chilean 
banks left this option unavailable. 
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The list of selected explanatory variables is similar to 
those used successfully in other previous studies as 
discussed in chapter 5. 
In selecting variables for its inclusion we identified 
the potential risks and problems inherent in financial 
institutions. Thus, the list of variable in each category 
serving as reasonable proxies for banks' risks and financial 
problems were considered in terms of its theoretical 
plausibility. 
Appendix 3 contains a list of the 49 financial ratios 
classified into 7 broad groups: capital adequacy, liquidity, 
profitability, asset risk and quality, efficiency, liability 
risk and quality, and mismatchings. 
Each of these general characteristics could in theory 
and in 
affect 
practice as proved by 
the prospects of bank 
the empirical literature 
problem and failure. For 
instance, a bank may become a problem and be threatened with 
the possibility of failure as a result of large and 
unsustainable losses from its asset portfolios, in 
particular, bad loans. Capital adequacy, profitability, 
efficiency, and liquidity will measure the ability of banks 
to remain in business in the face of unexpected losses. 
As pointed out by Sinkey (1979) and Barth, Brumbaugh and 
others (1985), capital adequacy or net worth represents a 
cushion against future unanticipated losses. Moreover, it is 
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argued that stringent capital regulation reduces the 
incentive to increase asset risk and the likelihood of bank 
failure in the case of fixed price deposit insurance. 
On the other hand, profitability measures the ability of 
a bank to maintain its net worth and hence its current 
performance. On this aspect it was also considered a 
variable which measures efficiency which indirectly will 
affect the financial result concerning the bank gross 
utility. 
Asset risk and quality measures the potential erosion 
of a bank's net worth and the subsequent reduction in 
profitabilty from loan loss provisions and chargeoffs. 
The model also includes a category which measures the 
bank's liquidity. According to Sinkey (1979) banking firms 
need liquid assets as a buffer or cushion for meeting any 
excess in cash outflows. Thus, most liquidity ratios attempt 
to measure the size of this buffer. 
There are two additional measurements included in this 
study which are worthy of consideration. The first one 
concerns the risk associated with a mismatch of maturities 
between assets and liabilities, both in domestic and foreign 
currency. Here, fluctuations in interest rates and 
unexpected devaluations can introduce a significant risk for 
the financial position of a bank. Finally, I also included a 
category which accounted for the riskiness and quality of 
the liability structure of a bank. 
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Admittedly, financial ratios identify symptoms rather 
than causes. This means that these financial ratios employed 
as regressors are proximate determinants of bank 
problem/failure but not the more fundamental causal factors. 
For instance, the profitability and the asset quality can be 
equally affected by both bank management in terms of risk 
5 
taking, and the general condition of the economy. 
The model is estimated using financial data with 
different time lags between the ex post data of bank problem 
and the financial statement, that is with data between 1979 
and 1983. 
(6.3) The Empirical Results from the Failure/Problem 
Prediction Model for Chile. 
The main objective was to estimate the quarterly ex ante 
probability of failure/problem for the period between 1979 
and 1983. We started by taking an ex post definition from 
the classification available for 1983 to construct the 
dichotomous dependent variable. We modelled the ex post 
classification as a function of several independent 
variables using the data available from the balance-sheets 
and income statements. 
From several tentative specifications I chose the 
estimated equation with the lowest Akaike's value, and 
maximise the overall accuracy in terms of type-error I and 
II at a given cut-off point. 
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Then we proceded with the evaluation of the ex ante 
probability based on the prediction from the estimated 
equation using quarterly financial data prior 1983. This 
procedure will enable us to calculate the quarterly ex ante 
probability that a financial institution had problems before 
1983. 
The analysis consisted of two major steps. Firstly, we 
applied one way analysis of mean and variance techniques to 
examine the extensive list of financial ratios of problem 
and non- problem financial institutions. The importance of 
this first step rests on the need to reduce the list to 
more manageable proportions and selected numbers of 
independent variables. 
The second step consisted in the application of a 
multivariate technique using a logit model to identify those 
financial variables from the remaining list as significant 
determinants of the likelihood of bank problems and to be 
followed by the prediction of the likelihood of financial 
difficulties. 
(6.3.1) Univariate Results. 
The univariate results are shown in table 2 which 
contain the mean and the mean differences for each financial 
ratio as well as each group and year. In addltion appendix 4 
provides a review of the testing procedure for the 
difference between means. 
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We tested the mean difference for the specifications 
for the A1B1 and A1B2 at the critical time of 
failure/problems, that is 1983, and for each of the 4 years 
before the critical year. 
Table 6.2 Mean Differences between Nonfailed/Nonproblem 
and Failed/Problem Banks and the t-Statistics 
for 1983.(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
category Yare B1-Al t(b) Yare B2-A1 t(b) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Capital 
Adequacy 
( 1 ) 
Liquidity 
( 2 ) 
Profits 
( 3 ) 
Asset Risk 
( 4 ) 
Efficiency 
( 5) 
Liability 
Risk(6) 
Mismatching 
( 7 ) 
13 -8.73 
14 -0.83 
15 0.19 
23 0.19 
26 0.43 
21 0.15 
24 0.34 
31 0.72 
35 0.33 
41 -0.19 
42 0.15 
44 0.92 
43 10.19 
423 -0.10 
61 0.26 
62 -0.01 
67 0.10 
611 0.03 
74 0.33 
73 0.07 
75 0.89 
72 0.22 
-5.69 
-4.81 
3.55 
6.50 
5.48 
5.32 
4.88 
3.69 
2.74 
-6.18 
5.32 
5.13 
5.07 
2.98 
2.56 
-2.54 
2.39 
2.55 
4.88 
4.31 
2.91 
2.87 
15 
16 
14 
24 
21 
26 
23 
32 
31 
423 
41 
42 
416 
415 
63 
66 
67 
65 
71 
74 
0.12 
0.11 
-0.84 
0.21 
0.09 
0.22 
0.09 
0.06 
0.18 
-0.20 
-0.10 
0.09 
-0.04 
-0.05 
0.26 
-0.19 
-0.20 
-0.14 
-0.19 
0.15 
3.58 
3.55 
-3.42 
2.65 
2.60 
2.53 
2.40 
3.97 
2.81 
-5.30 
-2.60 
2.60 
-2.19 
-2.07 
3.76 
-3.61 
-3.55 
-3.46 
-5.22 
2.64 
(a) The table include the most significant variables and 
they are ranked in terms of the relative significance. The 
definition of each variable is found in appendix 3 
(b) Evaluated at 5% significance level. 
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One important finding from the data is that the sign in 
the mean difference values are consistent with the a priori 
expectations and statistically significant at 5% level in 
most cases. Moreover, the average values for capital 
adequacy are significantly greater for non-problem banks 
than problem banks. For instance, in the model A1B1 the 
mean difference for the variable total loans/capital 
(variable category 1-13) is -8.73 which is consistent with 
the a priori expected sign and statistically significant. 
This means that failed/problem banks exhibited a lower 
capital ratios than sound banks. 
At the same time, liquidity ratios for the former 
are, as expected a priori, higher than the latter 
This is evident by examining financial investment 
cash/total asset1 ratio (variable 2-23). 
group 
group. 
plus 
Another interesting result from table 2 is that the 
measurement of asset risk also shows a significant 
difference between the two groups of banks. For instance, 
variable 43 defined as provision for bad loans/operating 
expenses shows a statistically significant difference of 
10.19 between A1-B1. This means that non-problem/non-failed 
banks have chosen a less risky portfolio than problem/failed 
banks. It is not surprising then to find that B1 group is 
relatively more profitable than A1 group judging from the 
profitability ratio operating earnings/operating expenses 
( variable 3-31 ). With reference to the risks involved 
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from banks' liability structure the evidence from the ratio 
analysis suggests that failed/problem banks did not show 
lower and inferior quality in its liability structure than 
nonfailed/nonproblem banks. Indeed, the mean difference of 
the deposit(less than a year)/total liabilitiesl ratio 
(variable 6-61) between nonfailed/nonproblem and 
failed/problem banks is positive and significant. 
Finally, we expect a priori that group Bl should exhibit 
a lower risk of mismatching than group AI. In effect, the 
evidence from mismatching ratios supports this view. 
In general, the evidence from the ratio analysis for the 
critical year of 1983 indicates that nonproblem banks 
exhibit significant differences in terms of each selected 
category. On average and as expected, they carried 
relatively less risk in terms of the asset structure. At the 
same time, the data on capital adequacy and profitability 
suggest that they have a greater ability to respond in a 
case of unexpected losses and/or risks. 
A second important finding from the data is the fact 
that the variable assessing any difference in efficiency 
between the two groups was not significant for both models 
AI-B1 and AI-B2 at least for 1983. 
Thirdly, it appears that the differences in the mean 
values are larger for Al-Bl than AI-B2. In the former we had 
included foreign banks and excluded non-bank financial 
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institutions. This evidence may indicate that for comparison 
purposes it is more convenient to consider a larger sample 
which includes foreign banks. 
Finally, the difference in mean values tends to change 
as the time before failure lengthens. These changes over 
time occur in both the significance of the ratio and its 
relative ranking within its category. These comparison can 
be seen in table 3 and 4 respectively. 
From table 3 we see that over-time mean differences 
diminish for the variables in the category of capital 
adequacy and asset risk in contrast with profitability which 
tends to increase as we go back from the critical time. 
Also, we observe that over-time significance of the variable 
changes from year to year with the exception of total 
loans/capital (13), and net capital/assetl (15) both 
measuring capital adequacy and the financial ratio total 
loans/assetl (41) which assess the rikiness of the 
portfolios. 
These findings tend to suggest that variables relating 
to capital adequacy and asset risk consistently spotted 
significant differences between the two groups. These early 
data may lead to the assertion that managerial differences 
could be important in the likelihood of financial 
6 
difficulties. However, it must be pointed out that capital 
adequacy, unlike the quality of banks' portfolios, is not 
completely within the control of bank managers. This 
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variable is set by the bank legislation which inforce 
certain minimum limits. Nevertheless, some discretion is 
still left to banks in this respect. 
Table 6.3 Over-time Mean Differences and its t-Statistics 
for A1B1. 
------------------------------------------------------------
category Var. 82 t 81 t 80 t 79 t 
------------------------------------------------------ -----.-
Capital 
Adequacy 
( 1 ) 
13 -7.08 -7.22 -7.57 -5.93 -5.44 -4.10 -4.98 -3.38 
14 -0.09 -2.39 
15 0.15 2.70 0.25 3.26 0.15 2.93 0.24 2.69 
Liquidity 23 
(2) 26 
21 
24 
0.10 
0.19 
0.07 
0.13 
4.16 0.09 
3.23 
3.32 0.06 
2.60 
Profits 
( 3 ) 
31 1.14 2.21 
35 
2.40 0.09 
0.27 
1.99 
2.87 0.11 
2.11 
1.41 1.97 
2.58 
-0.09 -3.43 -0.07 -3.36 
AssetRisk 
( 4 ) 
41 
42 
-0.12 -4.48 -0.09 -2.77 -0.09 -2.82 -0.10 -2.41 
0.07 3.32 0.06 1.99 
44 0.18 2.78 
43 
423-0.08 
Efficiency --
( 5 ) 
-1.94 
Liability 61 0.11 2.39 0.15 2.64 
Risk(6) 611 0.10 2.03 0.06 2.10 
62 -0.01 -2.20 
67 
Mismatch 74 
(7) 73 
75 
72 
0.17 
0.05 
0.46 
0.15 
3.43 
3.60 
3.71 
2.83 
0.07 2.05 
0.14 2.09 
0.20 
0.06 
0.09 
2.02 
2.70 
2.38 
0.11 2.79 
(a) The table include the most significant variables and 
they are ranked in terms of the relative significance. 
From table 4 we observe that the relative rankings of 
the financial ratios within each categories changes 
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overtime, although some of them still remain among the most 
significant. 
Table 6.4 Overtime Rankings for Financial Ratios in Model 
A1B1. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Categories Rankings(a) 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 
------------------------------------------------------------
Capital 
Adequacy 
( 1 ) 
Liquidity 
( 2 ) 
Profits 
( 3 ) 
Asset 
Risk 
( 4 ) 
Efficiency 
( 5 ) 
Liability 
Risk 
( 6 ) 
Mismatching 
( 7 ) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
13 
14 
15 
16 
23 
26 
21 
25 
31 
35 
41 
42 
44 
43 
423 
412 
61 
611 
62 
67 
63 
74 
73 
75 
13 
12 
11 
16 
21 
25 
23 
26 
31 
41 
412 
411 
42 
44 
415 
51 
64 
62 
611 
75 
73 
74 
13 
12 
11 
15 
23 
21 
32 
411 
41 
45 
46 
421 
42 
51 
611 
72 
73 
12 
13 
15 
11 
23 
25 
35 
33 
34 
41 
45 
46 
412 
411 
51 
61 
63 
72 
73 
13 
12 
11 
15 
22 
23 
25 
35 
413 
41 
411 
52 
61 
63 
66 
73 
(a) Rankings are established according to the value of the 
t-statistics. 
Given these difficulties we have included the most 
significant financial variables during 1983 and those which 
consistently appeared in the group of significant variable 
overtime. 
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(6.3.2) Multivariate Results. 
to 
Based upon the univariate results, we use a logit 
identify those financial variables belonging 
model 
to a 
specific category which are significant determinants of the 
likelihood of failure/problem. Then we proceded to use the 
estimated equation to assess the predictions from the model 
during the critical time of 1983 and before the crisis. 
In tables 5-9 I present the logit results for 
alternative specifications at the time of 
and years before the critical date. Among 
specifications presented in table 5, 
preferred to the others on the basis 
failure/problem, 
the alternative 
equation E1 is 
of the Akaike's 
information criterion (AlC) and the likelihood ratio test as 
discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike E1, the 
alternative specifications E2 and E5 were statistically 
insignificant at 1% as the chi-square with 6 degrees of 
freedom is 16.81. Similarly, although E3 and E4 nearly 
rejects the null hypothesis their Akaike's value are quite 
large in comparision to E1. (x2 =9.2 with 2 d.f.) 
The specification E1 includes the constant and the 
and explanatory variables total loans/capital 
provision/operating expenses. A negative 
means that if the variable increases the 
problem/failure declines (increases). 
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(positive) sign 
probability of 
Table 6.5 Logit Analysis of Selected Financial Variables 
at the Time of Failure/Problem in 1983.(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Financial 
Variables 
Alternative Specifications 
El E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
Capital Adequacy 
13 
14 
Liquidity 
24 
Profits 
35 
Asset Risk 
41 
43 
412 
Liability Risk 
61 
62 
Mismatching 
72 
75 
-6.22 
(-1.14) 
1.15 
(1.64 ) 
-1.28 
(-1.79) 
127.81 
(1.00 ) 
-2.74 
(-0.70 ) 
-87.05 
(-1.09) 
-15.45 
(-0.88 ) 
-114.95 
(-0.92) 
-31.24 
(-1.36) 
-45.98 
(-1.10) 
7.05 
(1.42) 
1.25 
(0.34) 
-27.07 
(-1.28) 
-14.83 
(-0.93) 
-52.18 
(-1.42) 
18.47 
( 0 . 31) 
2.30 
( 0 . 18 ) 
7.17 
(1.43) 
1.10 
(0.27) 
-29.9 
(-0.82) 
-14.67 
(-0.91) 
-49.98 
(-1.26) 
19.65 
(0.30) 
0.92 
(0.13 ) 
23.45 
(1.58) 
-3.29 
(-0.76) 
-7.98 
(-0.31 ) 
-4.32 
(-0.35) 
-1.43 
(-1.42) 
-32.88 
(-1.52) 
-21.67 
( -0 . 82) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Ln(Lklhd) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
AIC(-) (c) 
-4.71 
48.14 
7.71 
-6.37 
12.61 
13.37 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
-5.77 
17.87 
12.76 
-5.77 
17.55 
12.77 
-5.46 
14.76 
12.46 
(b) The likelihood ratio is calculated as -2[lnLklhdr-
InLklhdu] and is has a chi-square distribution with k-l 
degrees of freedom 
(c) The Akaike's information criterion is -In(Lklhd)+k where 
k is a number of estimated parameters. 
Thus, the signs of the coefficients with respect to 
total loans/capital and provision/operating expenses are 
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consistent with hypothesised role of capital adequacy and 
asset risk. The first of the regressors suggest that an 
increase in total loans relative to capital increases the 
probability of problem/failure. In constrast, the increase 
of provision relative to operating expenses reduces the 
likelihood of financial difficulties. 
With respect to the significance of the estimated 
coefficients, we found that provision/operating expenses is 
significant at 10% of significance. However, as we increase 
the degree of statistical significance, say 5%, the 
estimated coefficients are insignificant. We suspect the 
existence of multicollinearity among the explanatory 
variables. On this issue, Judge, Griffiths and others (1980) 
and Johnston (1988) show that the near multicollinearity 
produces three effects, namely very large sampling 
variances, large covariances, and unstable coefficients. In 
this case the correlation coefficient of the two explanatory 
variables is nearly 64%. Furthermore, by dropping one of the 
regressors in the equation the t-statistic of the remaining 
7 
variable left improves considerable and becomes significant. 
In spite that both of the regressors together are 
insignificant, the overall equation is still statistically 
significant in terms of the likelihood ratio test and as we 
will see the overall prediction accuracy of the model is 
exceptionally good and comparable with other studies in this 
area. This indicator should be the overwhelming criterion to 
choose the best specification together with the Ale. 
~ 9 2 2
Table 6.6 Logit Analysis of Selected Financial Variables 
One Year Before the Critical Time.(1982) 
------------------------------------------------------ ------
Financial 
Variables Alternative Specifications El E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant -3.22 -32.09 21.36 25.95 
(1.68) (1.57) 
13.30 
(2.03) (-0.79) (-1.16) Capital Adequacy 
13 0.67 
14 
Liquidity 
24 
Profits 
35 
Asset Risk 
41 
43 
412 
Liability Risk 
61 
62 
Mismatching 
72 
75 
(2.04 ) 
-0.30 -3.68 -4.32 1.99 
(-0.16) (-1.26) (-1.29) (0.65) 
-6.07 -44.85 -31.13 -31.47 
(-0.28) (-1.56) (-0.89) (-1.53) 
9.45 -1.77 -0.36 21.33 
(1.18) (-0.17) (-0.03) (1.82) 
41.71 
(1.41) 
-2.92 -6.02 
(-1.65) (-1.83) 
-205.1 -243.1 
(-1.48) (-1.43) 
-6.76 -10.51 
(-1.02) (-1.31) 
-2.90 
(-0.70) 
-12.43 -21.37 
(-0.50) (-0.72) 
-2.70 
(-2.11) 
-8.34 
(-0.65) 
1.16 
(0.11) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Ln(Lklhd) 
Lklhd Ratio 
Ale 
-8.90 
27.62 
11.90 
-12.13 
6.34 
19.13 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
-12.13 
19.85 
19.13 
The results for one and more years 
-6.16 
19.80 
13.16 
before 
-6.4 
20.95 
13.43 
the 
problem/failure date are presented in tables 6-10. The 
evidence shows that specification El is preferable to the 
others for every year prior to 1983 with the exception of 
1980 based on the Akaike's information criterion. 
293 
There are several interesting findings from this 
estimation. Firstly, the variable of capital adequacy is 
significant at 10% for every single year prior to 1983. 
Table 6.7 Logit Analysis of Selected Financial Variables 
Two Years Before the Critical Time.(1981) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Financial 
Variables 
Alternative Specifications 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
Capital Adequacy 
13 
14 
Liquidity 
24 
Profits 
35 
Asset Risk 
41 
43 
412 
Liability Risk 
61 
62 
Mismatching 
72 
75 
Ln(Lklhd) 
Lklhd Ratio 
Ale 
-4.30 -9.55 -0.13 0.33 5.16 
( 1.86 ) (-3.06) (-1.42) (-1.42) (0.29) 
0.39 
( 3 . 30) 
6.14 5.40 4.09 8.83 
(1.48) (1.46) (1.08) (1.57) 
-0.008 2.33 2.76 -5.95 
(-0.02) (1.20) (1.23) (-0.61) 
8.54 5.92 6.98 4.31 
(1.24) (0.88) (1.02) (0.61) 
12.64 
(1.65) 
-0.008 -3.47 
(-0.17) (-2.04) 
-16.22 
11.73 
19.22 
-7.18 -8.01 
(-1.21) (-1.18) 
-4.57 -6.95 
(-1.29) (-1.71) 
-0.59 0.85 
(-0.08) (0.12) 
-2.34 -2.38 
(-0.89) (-0.96) 
-19.21 
2.41 
26.21 
-21.49 
1.51 
28.49 
-2.21 
(-1.49) 
-20.57 
1.84 
27.57 
1.74 
(0.42) 
-14.6 
4.72 
21.64 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
294 
Secondly, the overall significance of the equation the 
likelihood ratio is significant for every single year, 
although its value felt as we approached 1979 and 1980. 
Table 6.8 Logit Analysis of Selected Financial Variables 
Three Years Before the Critical Time.(1980) 
---------------------------------------_._-------------------
Financial 
Variables 
Alternative Specifications 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
Capital Adequacy 
13 
14 
Liquidity 
24 
Profits 
35 
Asset Risk 
41 
43 
412 
Liability Risk 
61 
62 
Mismatching 
72 
75 
Ln(Lklhd) 
Lklhd Ratio 
AlC 
-2.89 161.55 -2.29 -1.48 6.01 
(-2.13) (1.92) (-0.89) (-0.56) (1.50) 
0.31 
(2.61 ) 
0.04 -0.95 0.14 -0.14 
(0.03) (-0.26) (0.02) (-0.06) 
-140.50 -41.53 -49.41 -11.20 
(-1.74) (-1.61) (-1.41) (-1.27) 
30.93 
( 2 . 15) 
-154.32 
(-1.88) 
52.09 
( 2 . 06 ) 
41.71 18.78 
(2.09) (1.85) 
-0.02 0.10 
(-0.10) (0.14) 
-17.14 
5.46 
20.14 
-22.54 -19.09 
(-1.57) (-1.41) 
-40.47 -9.38 
(-1.29) (-1.61) 
-47.65 
(-1.92) 
-9.31 
6.72 
16.31 
106.04 88.89 
(1.93) (1.86) 
12.67 
( 1 . 27 ) 
-10.01 
5.99 
17.01 
8.33 
(1.03) 
-10.27 
5.80 
17.27 
-7.64 
(-1.02) 
-13.28 
3.53 
20.28 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Thirdly, the negative value of the likelihood function 
gets larger for E1 over-time meaning that the predictive 
power of the model tend to fall as the time before 
failure/problem lengthens. 
Table 6.9 Logit Analysis of Selected Financial Variables 
Four Years Before the Critical Time.(1979) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Financial 
Variables 
Alternative Specifications 
El E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
Capital Adequacy 
13 
14 
Liquidity 
24 
Profits 
35 
Asset Risk 
41 
43 
412 
Liability Risk 
61 
62 
Mismatching 
72 
75 
Ln(Lklhd) 
Lklhd Ratio 
AIC(-) 
-4.35 
(-1.70) 
0.31 
(2.25) 
16.42 
(0.79 ) 
0.89 -1.29 3.59 
(0.36) (-0.52) (1.03) 
-0.02 -0.02 -2.02 -0.06 
(-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.83) (-0.05) 
-9.76 -12.74 -33.93 -2.84 
(-0.54) (-0.83) (-1.35) (-0.24) 
23.95 
( 1 . 55) 
-14.27 
(-0.62 ) 
24.54 
(1.61 ) 
32.32 19.65 
(1.63) (1.56) 
-0.008 -0.26 
(-0.06) (-0.32) 
-12.82 
3.71 
15.82 
-15.23 -24.98 
(-1.08) (-1.39) 
-4.86 -6.30 
(-0.82) (-0.88) 
124.85 238.64 
(0.98) (1.21) 
-17.81 -2.41 
(-1.08) (-0.22) 
-10.56 
1.94 
17.56 
-9.72 
2.11 
16.72 
7.22 
(1.05) 
-9.11 
2.47 
16.11 
-2.97 
(-0.15) 
-10.63 
1.87 
17.63 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Now we turn to the classification accuracy of E1 where 
we aimed at minimising misclassification errors. One could 
make type-I error which occurs when one classifies a 
problem bank as non-problem and vice versa for type-II 
error. 
Table 6.10 Prediction Accuracy of the El Logit Model for 
1983. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Problem Accuracy 
Type-II Error 
Non-problem Accuracy 
6 . 6 ( 1 ) 
93.4 
4 . 7 ( 1 ) 
95.3 
6 . 6 ( 1 ) 
93.4 
9.5(2) 
90.5 
13.3 ( 2 ) 
86.7 
9.5(2) 
90.5 
20.0(3) 
80.0 
14.2(3) 
85.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy 94.4 91.6 88.8 83.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Number Probe 14 
Actual Number Probe 15 
Predicted Number NonProb.20 
Actual Number NonProb. 21 
14 
15 
19 
21 
13 
15 
19 
21 
12 
15 
18 
21 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - -
Table 6.11 Prediction Accuracy of the E1 Logit Model for 
1982. 
Cut-Off Point 
Type-I Error 
Problem Accuracy 
Type-II Error 
Non-problem Accuracy 
Overall Accuracy 
0.5 
5 . 8 ( 1 ) 
94.2 
13.6(3) 
86.4 
89.7 
Predicted Number Prob. 16 
Actual Number Probe 17 
Predicted Number NonProb.19 
Actual Number Non-Prob. 22 
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0.6 
11.7(2) 
88.3 
13.6(3) 
86.4 
87.1 
15 
17 
19 
22 
0.7 
1 7 • 6 ( 3 ) 
82.4 
22.7(5) 
77.3 
79.4 
14 
17 
17 
22 
0.8 
23.5(4) 
76.5 
22.7 (5) 
77.3 
76.9 
13 
17 
17 
22 
Table 6.12 Prediction Accuracy of the El Logit Model for 
1981. 
------------------------------------------------------------
cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
Type-I Error 
Problem Accuracy 
Type-II Error 
Non-problem Accuracy 
23.5(4) 
76.5 
16.6(4) 
83.4 
29.4 (5) 
70.6 
20.8(5) 
79.2 
35.2(6) 
64.8 
20.8(5) 
79.2 
58.8(10) 
41.2 
29.1 (7) 
70.9 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - -
Overall Accuracy 80.4 75.6 73.1 58.5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Number Probe 13 
Actual Number Probe 17 
Predicted Number NonProb.20 
Actual Number 24 
12 
17 
19 
24 
11 
17 
19 
24 
7 
17 
17 
24 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Table 6.13 Prediction Accuracy of the El Logit Model for 
1980. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 
Type-I Error 
Problem Accuracy 
Type-II Error 
Non-problem Accuracy 
Overall Accuracy 
0.5 
25.0(4) 
75.0 
16.6(3) 
83.4 
79.4 
Predicted Number Probe 12 
Actual Number Probe 16 
Predicted Number NonProb.15 
Actual Number 18 
0.6 
31.2(5) 
68.8 
22.2 (4) 
77.8 
73.5 
11 
16 
14 
18 
0.7 
4 3 . 7 ( 7 ) 
56.3 
38.8(7) 
61.2 
58.8 
9 
16 
11 
18 
0.8 
75.0(12) 
25.0 
50.0(9) 
50.0 
38.2 
4 
16 
9 
18 
Table 6.14 Prediction Accuracy of the El Logit Model for 
1979. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point O. 5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Problem Accuracy 
Type-II Error 
Non-problem Accuracy 
21.4(3) 
78.6 
27.2(3) 
72.8 
28.5(4) 
71.5 
36.3(4) 
63.7 
35.7(5) 
64.3 
45. 4 ( 5 ) 
54.6 
50.0(7) 
50.0 
63.6(7) 
36.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy 76.0 68.0 60.0 44.0 
------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Number Probe 11 
Actual Number Probe 14 
Predicted Number NonProb. 8 
Actual Number 11 
10 
14 
7 
11 
9 
14 
6 
11 
7 
14 
4 
11 
------------------------------------------------------------
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These results are based on specification E1 and are 
reported in tables 10-14. Most previous studies assign a 
aut-off point of 0.5 for the likelihood of failure/problem. 
Nevertheless, in the present study, we have estimated the 
classification accuracy for different cut-off points. There 
are several interesting findings which is worth to be 
mentioned. 
Firstly, the overall accuracy of E1 is superior to the 
other specifications at different cut-off points. For 
instance, at the 0.5 (50%) cut-off point conventionally 
used in most studies, the type-I error for the E1 logit 
estimation for 1983 is 6.6% which is equivalent to a 
failure/ problem accuracy of 93.4%. Moreover, type-II error 
is 4.7% so that the nonfailure/nonproblem accuracy is 95.3%. 
Thus, the overall accuracy of this model is 94.4% which it 
is quite acceptable. 
Secondly, we observed that the overall accuracy 
decreases as we increase the cut-off point from 0.5 to 
higher restrictions. For instance, the overall accuracy for 
El for 1983 at 0.6,0.7, and 0.8 cut-off value 
88.8%, and 83,8% respectively. 
is 91.6%, 
Thirdly, we observe that the overall accuracy of the 
model decreases as we attempted to predict problems with 
data before the critical time. The overall accuracy at 0.5 
fall to 89.7% in 1982, 80.4% in 1981, 79.4% in 1980, and 76% 
in 1979. Indeed, type-1 errors have risen from 6.6% in 1983 
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to 21.4% in 1979. Similar deterioration is observed with 
respect to type-II errors as they went from 4.7% in 1983 to 
27.2% in 1979. 
In view of the overall prediction accuracy of 
specification El over the years under examination and in 
comparison with other empirical studies on the subject, 
8 
these results should be considered as highly satisfactory. 
These econometrics results confirm the view that the 
failure of some financial institutions in Chile would have 
been anticipated before its critical time in 1983 with an 
acceptable degree of confidence. Indeed, it was seen that 
the model was predicting these failures with a lead time of 
four years. 
We can estimate the E1 equation using quarterly data for 
each year and from there to obtain the ex ante quarterly 
probability estimates to construct a quarterly 
classification of financial institutions. These estimates 
will be used as the dependent variable of the macromodel and 
the moral hazard model in chapters 7 and 8 respectively. 
Once the financial institutions have been classified 
either into a failed/problem and nonfailed/nonproblem group 
in each quarter for the five year period we can proceed to 
test two competing hypothesis which may explain the 
financial difficulties experienced by Chilean banks. In 
chapter 7 and 8 we will estimate a logit model with 
quarterly macroeconomic and microeconomic data. 
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Endnotes. 
(1) After the banking crisis of 1983, the chilean banking 
authorities improved the mechanism of loan classification 
in terms of risk and the classification and related risk 
for different financial institution was agreed in 1987 to be 
in the public domain. 
(2) Appendix 1 provide an exhaustive list of the chilean 
financial institutions and its classification. 
(3) This index was calculated by the magazine estrategia. 
It is a general index composed by four financial ratios: 
profitability, capital adequacy, liquidity, and asset 
quality. The index was 70, 68, 60, and 59 for foreign banks 
during 1980, 81, 82, and 83 respectively. Whereas domestic 
banks showed an index values of 69, 66, 58, and 40.3 for the 
same period of time. 
(4) The data have been taken from the monthly reports of the 
Superintendencia de Bancos de Chile. This reports include 
bank balance sheets and income statements as well as 
information of the health of the financial system. The data 
quality and reports improves considerable from 1982 onwards. 
(5) The testing of macroeconomic and 
determinants of problem/failure will be 
reported in chapter 7 and 8. 
microeconomic as 
carried out and 
(6) However, capital adequacy is not completely within the 
control of bank managers. This variable is determined by 
the bank legislation which tend to inforce certain minimum 
limits. Nevertheless, still some discretion is left to banks 
in this respect. 
(7) The result of separate regressions for variables 13 and 
43 are reported in appendix 5. 
(8) Similar results in terms of overall prediction are 
obtained from other empirical studies. For example, Barth, 
Brumbaugh, and others (1985) reported an overall prediction 
accuracy of 87% at cut-off point of 0.5 for Thrift 
Institution failures. Also, Martin (1977) reported 
accuracies around 90% for failure and non-failure bank. 
Although his result assumes a cut-off point of 0.0041, the 
sample proportion failure. That is the cut-off point assumes 
a priori probability of group membership equal to the sample 
frequencies and equal misclassification cost. 
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Chapter 2 ~ ~ Bank Failures in Chile: The Role Qf 
Macroeconomic Factors. 
(7.1) Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to re-assess and to 
examine the issues related to the bank failures/problems of 
1982-83 and to evaluate the importance of the economic 
recession and the role played by some key macroeconomic 
prices which exhibited severe misalignment and could have 
affected the performance of the banking system. It is shown 
the inconsistency of macroeconomic policy and external 
shocks produced a boom-bust economic cycle and coincided 
with the rise and fall of the Chilean banking system. In 
effect, bank failures/ problems were preceded by a sharp 
fall in output. Although the evidence on the link between 
the general economic climate and the collapse of the 
banking system is irrefutable as a first approximation, its 
empirical validity need to be assess. 
This chapter will provide a discussion of the boom-bust 
cycle hypothesis and its evaluation for the case of Chile 
during the period 1977-81 and 1982-83 as part of sections I 
and II. In addition, it will be shown that performance of 
the banking sector was correlated with the macroeconomic 
environment. Finally, section III provides a thorough 
discussion of the model specification and estimation. At the 
same time, I report the econometric results and its 
interpretation. 
302 
(7.2) Macroeconomic Instability and Banking Crisis. 
The central tenet of the hypothesis to be tested in this 
chapter relates the banking crisis with changes in the 
general economic conditions and the misalignment of some key 
macroeconomic prices. In general, it could be argued that 
macroeconomic shocks, including external exogenous 
disturbances (deterioration of the terms of trade, and 
rising world interest rates) and policy inconsistencies a 
fixed exchange rate regime with backward-looking wage 
indexation scheme, and/or significant fiscal deficit, trade 
and financial liberalisation with no supportive 
macroeconomic policies) can generate significant 
misalignment of key macroeconomic prices 
the real exchange rate, high real 
overvaluation of 
interest rates, 
overvaluation of stock prices, rising real wages) which may 
increase the proportion of non-performing loans and lead to 
bank failures. Similarly, serious output downturns can 
equally affect the values of bank assets and the likelihood 
of bank failure. 
There are several episodes described in the literature 
which fit this hypothesis. For instance, Kindleberger (1986) 
and Keran 
comparing 
(1986) subscribed to this hypothesis 
bank failures in the 1930's with the 1980's 
when 
for 
the US banking system. Indeed, the evidence 
indicates that 6.704 (9.2% of total banks) 
failed during the period between 1930-33. 
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from the US 
of the banks 
Although the 
number of failures fell in the years 1934-1978 to only 689, 
the evidence for the 1980's suggests a significant increase 
in the number of failed banks from 10 in 1981 to 120 in 
1985. Although most of these financial institutions were 
concentrated among small farm and energy banks, the 
failures of the Continental Illinois in 1984 (8th largest 
bank in the US), The First Pennsylvania in 1980 (23rd 
largest), and the Seafirst in 1983 (29th largest) were a 
matter of concern in the banking system as a result of their 
significant size. 
According to Kindleberger and Keran major shocks to 
relative prices produced a deflationary impact in both 
periods. They found that during the 1980's there was a major 
decline in the relative price of farm land as much as in the 
1920's and the 1930's. The collapse of land prices during 
the 1980's was accompanied by the effects of major oil 
shocks during the late 1970's. Similarly, they show that 
these two periods exhibited a substantial increase in real 
interest rates and noted that they stayed high longer in the 
1980's than in the 1930's. It was certainly a major reason 
behind rising non-performing loans and subsequent bank 
failures. 
Finally, a major dollar appreciation analogous to the 
one of the 1980's was present during the 1930's. A real 
appreciation was bound to generate distortions in both 
production and consumption as well as wealth effects by 
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turning domestic relative prices in favour of non-tradables 
and away from tradables. Those financial institutions with a 
high share of their capital in loans to those companies in 
the tradable sector will be at risk. However, even if the 
banks' portfolio is weighted towards profitable activities 
at the given relative prices, still there is the danger of a 
time bomb if the real appreciation is not sustainable in the 
long-run and the adjustment take place initially via output 
deflation. Thus, Kindleberger and Keran attached a great 
importance to relative price shocks on the banks solvency. 
Similarly, Sundararajan and BaliHo (1990) examines the 
recent experiences with banking crisis in seven countries 
(Argentina, Malaysia, Phillipines, Spain, Thailand, Uruguay, 
and Chile) with a focus on the linkages between 
macroeconomic conditions, financial liberalisation, and 
banking failures. In spite of the cross-country differences 
they found common causes to explain the episodes of banking 
crisis (failures). Their study demostrated that the episodes 
of banking crisis (defined as a generalised solvency 
problems among banks due to an increase in non-perfroming 
loans, and losses due to foreign exchange exposure, interest 
mismatch, contingent liabilities, and decrease in the value 
of investment) occurred following a shock to the 
macroeconomy, and reinforced the subsequent decline in 
output. In most countries in the sample, the banking 
failures took place after a sustained period of rapid 
expansion in output following major fluctuations in relative 
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prices and general business conditions. After major external 
shocks, and gross policy inconsistencies, sharp adjustments 
in real exchange rate, real interest rates, and stock price5 
affected the economy's performance, ouput growth, and the 
soundness of financial institutions. Although the effect of 
macroeconomic instability appears to be central in their 
argument, it was equally accepted that a more gradual 
financial liberalisation, vigilant bank supervision, and a 
well designed prudential regulation would limit the 
magnitude of bank failures (crisis) and help to reduce the 
vulnerability of the banking system to the shocks from the 
macroeconomy. 
With specific reference to the Chilean banking crisis, 
Moreno and Perez (1983) have also provided a testimony to 
the importance of macroeconomic instability on bank 
failures. On this account, they argued that the collapse of 
the banking system had little to do with financial 
liberalisation and inadequate bank legislation. Moreover, 
they maintained that no banking system would be able to 
withstand a fall in GDP and the level of interest rates a c o 
the one observed during 1982-83. External shocks combined 
with inadequate macroeconomic policies, in particular the 
exchange rate policy, tended to amplify the economic cycle 
in the open economy. In effect, sharp increases in lending 
interest rates after a long history of negative rates, the 
introduction and later on the abandonment of a fixed 
exchange regime, and the burst of the stock exchange bubble 
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all contributed to major variations in the overall economic 
environment and consequently the solvency of the banking 
system. In their own words, they blame the authorities for 
inadequate management of macroeconomic variables, 
particularly the exchange rate, and interest rates, 
misalignments which amplified the economic cycles and hence 
the financial condition of several financial institutions. 
As we will see in section 3, although this description 
fit extremely well to what happen in Chile during the period 
of 1977-83, this in itself represents no direct empirical 
test on the influence of these set of variables on 
likelihood of bank failure/problem. 
There are two interesting papers which attempted to 
evaluate the influence of macroeconomic variables on bank 
failures. Bovenzi and Nejezchleb (1985), for instance, 
studied the relationship between the rate of bank failures 
and macroeconomic conditions in the US using quarterly data 
from 1970 through the first quarter of 1984. They maintained 
that during an economic downturn, fixed loan commitments 
established previously under more auspicious economic 
circumstances become difficult to fulfil so that an 
increasing number of borrowers will be forced to default. 
Thus, after some specific time lag an increasing share of 
non-performing loans and falling bank profits would result 
in higher bank failures. 
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They studied bank failures by using alternative proxies 
for overall macroeconomic conditions among them real GNP 
growth, re.:tl intere5t rates, unernployment rate, and the 
corporate debt burden. The evidence indicates that although 
the relationship between real GDP and the bank failure rate 
was significant it explained only 10% of the variation of 
the failure rates. 
With reference to the unemployment rate, this proxy 
accounted for 56% of the total variation in bank failures. 
At the same time, given that unemployment rate tend to lag 
general economic conditions, it lead the failure rate by one 
to three quarters which is shorter than the GDP regressor. 
Similar results are found for the interest rate on the 
failure rate with 50% prediction accuracy after about a 
five-quarter lag. On this account, high business failure 
rates and loan losses seem to be correlated with real 
interest rate movements. 
The regressor measuring the corporate debt burden 
represented a more direct measure of the ability to repay 
debt measured by the ratio "after-tax nonfinancial corporate 
debt service to nonfinancial corporate cash flow. It 
exhibited a better fit with 62% of the variation of bank 
failure rates. Although these variables were statistically 
significant, macroeconomic conditions explained only a part 
of the increase in the rate of bank failures. The estimated 
equations did in fact overestimate bank failures during 
1981 but underestimated failures from that point on. I 
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Similarly, Amos (1992) found that for periods with high 
rates of bank closings were characterised by the economy 
growing below its historical trend. The evidence from his 
time series regression analysis using sample data for the 
US bank closing between 1934 and 1988 tend to support his 
assertion. The effect of current real GNP on the number of 
closing banks was statistically significant and with a 
positive sign as expected. The effect of lagged GNP on the 
dependent variable was insignificant. The regression also 
included the money supply as an additional explanatory 
variable. The money supply with one year lag was significant 
although with a positive sign. The overall goodness of fit 
of the regression was 0.95. 
Although this empirical approach is useful for a large 
sample with aggregate data, there are certain limitations 
for the study of the Chilean bank failures. Firstly, bank 
failures in Chile were mostly concentrated in a single year, 
that is 1983. Secondly, the purpose of this study is to 
estimate the ex ante probability of bank failure during the 
period of liberalisation. In other words, the likelihood 
previous to the critical year of 1983. 
With this purpose in mind, I have constructed and 
estimated a logit model for panel-data in order to directly 
test the explanatory power of macroeconomic variables on the 
likelihood of bank failure/problem. Partly, I expect that 
some of these systematic factors could explain the collapse 
of the banking system in Chile. 
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(7.3) The Boom-Bust Economic Cycle: ~ ~ Hacloeconomy in 
Chile. 
(7.3.1) The Chilean Economy and the Main Policy Reforms. 
Before we proceed to assess the performance of the 
economy it is necessary to give a brief account of the main 
reforms introduced prior to the deterioration of the 
macroeconomy and the crisis of financial institutions in 
1982-83 period. 
As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, previous to the 
reform period which started in September 1973 inmediately 
after the military coup which overthrew Allende's socialist 
government, the economy was pursuing an inward-looking 
strategy for development which relied exclusively on 
intensive and extensive government intervention in all the 
spheres of the economy. The trade bias was towards the 
import substitution sector by means of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers across sectors , export taxes, and an over-valued 
exchange rate. In addition, the financial system was subject 
to a wide range of instruments to direct credit towards the 
priviledged industries and to finance the fiscal deficit. 
The imposition of high reserve requirements, ceilings on 
interest rates, selective credit controls and rationing was 
conducive to the repression of the financial system. The 
economy was immersed in a large macroeconomic disequilibrium 
and a modest growth as compared with its historical standard 
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and with those economies pursuing outward looking 
strategies. This became even more acute during Allende's 
populist government in 1970-73. 
stabilisation and liberalisation policies were 
implemented from late 1973 onwards in order to correct the 
large macroeconomic disequilibrium and to enhance the rate 
of economic growth. The economic reforms contained three 
main prinCiples. Firstly, the transformation toward an 
outward-looking economy fully integrated with international 
capital and goods markets with a dominant role assigned to 
the private sector in a competitive market economy was 
regarded to be conducive to higher growth rates. 
Secondly, the credibility and success of trade and 
financial liberalisation required that they were preceded 
by macroeconomic stabilisation, particularly in view of the 
high inflation rate. 
Thirdly, the question of the dynamics of liberalisation 
suggested that the sequence and timing should follow a 
specific order. As I have shown in chapter 2, there was a 
consensus among the experts that trade and domestic 
financial liberalisation should come before the opening of 
the capital account of the balance of payments. 
According to these prinCiples, the reforms started with 
an orthodox stabilisation strategy which emphasised the 
control of the money supply and a consistent reduction in 
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1 
the fiscal deficit. The fiscal shock included large cuts in 
government expenditures, temporary increases in income 
taxation and the replacement of sales tax for a 20% VAT, 
full indexation of the tax system, integration of personal 
and business income tax, and the elimination of the 
remaining tax exemption and subsidies. The shock treatment 
also included a tight monetary policy although some 
monetarist like Harberger (1982) and a critic such as Foxley 
(1983) do not accept the view of a nominal monetary crunch. 
Specifically, the evidence indicates that the percentage 
increase in M2 was still high at 257%, 166%, and 130% in 
1975, 1976, and 1977 respectively. Whereas the percentage 
increase in the GOP deflator was 328%, 252%, and 103% for 
each three successive years. Similar results are obtained 
between the period of 1977 and 1980 but with the added query 
that the nominal growth of M2 was still above the inflation 
rate. Therefore, there was no genuine nominal monetary 
crunch during the second half of the 1970's but it certainly 
was one in real terms between 1975 and 1976. This apparent 
closed economy monetarism was pursued with some relative 
2 
success until early 1978. 
Given the greater openess of the economy, the modest 
progress made on inflation, the contractionary effect of the 
orthodox measures in particular during 1975, and the 
increasing role played by exchange rates in expectations 
formation of tradable prices the authorities advocated an 
exchange rate stabilisation approach as an anti-inflation 
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policy. The academic and practical acceptance of the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments made readily 
acceptable two important tenets of this approach. 
Firstly, the law of one price will hold so that domestic 
inflation will rapidly converge towards world inflation plus 
the expected rate of devaluation. And secondly, under a 
fixed or preannounced exchange rate monetary policy will be 
endogenous. That is changes in the quantity of money will 
only affect the composition of the base money as the 
increase in domestic credit will be offset by a fall in 
3 
international reserves. 
In theory the exchange rate stabilisation approach 
involves the public announcement of a fixed schedule of the 
future nominal exchange rate over a specified period which 
is credible by the rational agents. Moreover, this anti-
inflationary policy has been part of an overall 
stabilisation and growth strategy comprising both trade and 
financial liberalisation. According to Blejer and Mathieson 
(1981) the potential stabilising effects of preannouncing 
the exchange rate will have two fundamental effects on the 
rate of inflation: a direct impact on expectations, and an 
indirect effect via product and financial markets. 
With reference to the former, a credible announcement of 
the future path of the nominal exchange rate in an open 
economy consistent with lower inflation should help to 
reduce the public's expectations concerning future 
313 
inflation. In this scenario nominal claims between firms and 
managers should be in line with lower expected inflation. 
Moreover, if nominal yields on financial assets are market 
determined and reflect the expected rate of inflation, then 
lower inflationary expectations should raise the demand for 
money (currency holdings), and hence lower price increases 
for a given monetary expansion and income growth. 
With respect to the indirect effect, the elimination of 
trade restrictions (tariffs) will produce both a price 
differential, and a potential profits which will not be 
arbitraged away unless they persist over time to recover the 
high initial cost of entry. Thus, a predictable future path 
of the exchange rate will help to curb inflation by 
enhancing price arbitrage. 
A formal "tablita" was introduced in February 1978 
consisting in a preannounced future rate of devaluation set 
below the domestic inflation rate and at a decreasing rate. 
In June of 1979, this active crawling peg exchange rate was 
transformed into a fixed exchange rate regime as the US 
dollar was fixed at $39 Chilean pesos. However, it was 
abandoned three years later with the forced devaluation of 
June 1982 because of increasing overvaluation of the 
exchange rate. 
On the liberalisation front, the first step was the 
deregulation of nearly 3000 prices and the privatisation of 
state-owned firms, including financial institutions. The 
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liberalisation also included trade reforms with the removal 
of quotas and the reduction of the average and range of 
nominal tariffs. From early 1976 onwards, a new set proposal 
for tariff reduction was proposed and by late 1977 a 
gradual attainment of a uniform tariff of 10% was agreed. 
This schedule was completed in June of 1979. 
With respect to financial liberalisation, interest rate 
controls were removed for non-bank financial institutions 
and banks in May and October 1974 respectively. In addition, 
entry barriers to new financial institutions including those 
applicable to foreign banks were lifted. 
On the external side of the financial market, in 
September 1977 commercial banks were allowed to borrow from 
international markets under article 14 of the exchange law 
although with a monthly flow limit of 5% of capital and 
reserves. A stock limit of 25% under articule 14 was 
introduced in January 1978 and raised two months later to 
160% of capital and reserves. The relaxation of controls on 
capital inflows went further and by 1980 all monthly limits 
were lifted. In May 1982 banks were allowed to obtain 
external credit with maturities below 2 years and a reserve 
requirement of 20%. 
In general and as also argued by Mckinnon (1982), the 
stabilisation and liberalisation strategy followed what was 
accepted at that time as the optimal sequence and timing of 
reforms. However, the economic collapse of 1982 meant that 
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the liberalisation reforms were reversed by the in 
trade tariffs from 10% to 18% and the intervention of 
financial institutions as part of the rescue package of the 
financial system in Chile. At the same time, the crisis of 
1982 and the emergency measures taken by the authorities 
4 
meant increases in the fiscal deficit and inflation rate. 
(7.3.2) The Boom-Bust Economic Cycle of the Chilean 
Economy: The Appraisal. 
The central idea is that the introduction of exchange 
rate management, in particular the active preannounced 
crawling peg and which ultimately ended in a fixed exchange 
rate regime as an anti-inflationary tool during trade and 
financial liberalisation was likely to generate a boom-bust 
cycle as some key relative prices became misaligned and then 
5 
return to their long run equilibrium. It could be argued 
that the path from the economic and banking boom in 1977-81 
to the economic and banking bust in 1982-83 had its sources 
in what happened to key relative prices specially the real 
exchange rate, the real interest rate, and the real wage 
rate. 
Let's first examine the data for the economic boom 
between 1977-81 from table 1. The evidence portrays some 
impressive results from the reforms undertaken, in 
particular in terms of export volumes at least up to 1980 
and capital inflows, the improvement of overall balance of 
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6 
payments and the surplus in the fiscal budget. At the same 
time, we observe important gains in the control of the rate 
of inflation although achieved gradually and at a very high 
cost in terms of unemployment. Indeed the evidence indicates 
that the percentage inflation rate (as measured by the CPI) 
went from nearly 500% in 1974 to less than 10% in 1982, 
consistent with the astonishing figure of 22% unemployment 
rate during 1982 and 1983. 
Table 7.1 Indicators of the Economic Boom, 1977-81. 
------------------------------------------------------------
77 78 79 80 81 
------------------------------------------------------------
GDP Growth(a) 
GDP Tradables(b) 
Non-Tradables(c) 
Absorption(d) 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP 
Unemployment Rate(Nac. ) 
Overall Balance Payments(US$) 
Trade Balance 
Exports(FOB) 
Imports 
Capital Inflows(e) 
Number of Bankruptcies 
9.8 
7.8 
9.4 
14.2 
1.8 
13.2 
118 
4 
2186 
2151 
607 
224 
8 . 2 
4.5 
9.6 
9.7 
0.8 
14.0 
712 
-426 
2460 
2886 
1959 
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8.3 
7.0 
9.9 
10.9 
-1.7 
13.6 
1047 
-355 
3845 
4191 
2255 
344 
7.8 
5.2 
9.7 
9.3 
-3.1 
11.8 
1244 
-764 
4705 
5469 
3242 
415 
5.5 
2.9 
5.4 
10.9 
-1.7 
11.1 
67 
-2677 
3837 
6513 
4768 
431 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:Banco Central Chile,Monthly Bulletin,Various Issues 
Banco Central Chile, National Accounts 1974-85. 
ECLA, Statistical Yearbook, Various Issues. 
(a) All GDP data at 1977 prices. 
(b) Includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and 
manufacturing. 
(c) Includes construction and services. 
(d) Absorption includes private and public consumption plus 
total investment. 
(e) Long and short term flows. 
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With respect to GDP growth, the data shows that the 
average annual rate of GDP growth was nearly 8% between 1977 
and 1981. Although this figure exceeded Chile's historical 
standard it is below the growth rate of 1928 which was 
7 
24.3%. Surprisingly, the sectoral GDP growth shows that non-
tradables grew at a much faster rate than the tradable 
sector contrary to the intention of trade reforms. In fact, 
for the period of exchange rate stabilisation strategy, non-
tradables grew at an annual average of 8.8% as compared to 
5.4% for the case of tradables. It is remarkable that growth 
of GDP took place under a significant overvaluation of the 
peso. This performance and the relative boom between the two 
sectors can be explained by the pattern of some key prices 
in the Chilean economy, in particular the appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, the increases in real wages, the 
transitory reduction in real interest rates, and the 
unsustainable rate of capital inflows which made possible 
both rising expenditures to sustain the economy's growth 
rate given the relative prices, and to masked the sustained 
deterioration of the trade balance particularly in 1981. 
The data from table 2 shows the movements in three 
macroeconomic prices during the period of preannounced 
exchange rate. 
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Table 7.2 Key Prices in Chile between 1977-1983. 
------------------------------------------------------------
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 
------------------------------------------------------------
Nominal InterestR(a) 98.1 
Real Interest RT(b) 90.0 
Real Interest R(c) 43.9 
63.3 
52.7 
34.1 
49.2 
39.4 
16.2 
39.0 
10.7 
11.0 
42.5 
18.3 
31.7 
49.6 35.7 
54.5 46.1 
31.2 14.3 
Real Wages(d) 72.5 82.9 92.0 100.0 108.9 108.6 97.1 
Real Exchange Rate(e)83.6 100.0 
Real Value Stock(f) 46.9 
93.8 80.1 
54.2 100.0 
70.2 
80.4 
76.7 82.3 
61.2 39.2 
Sources:Banco Central Chile,Monthly Bulletin,Various Issues 
Edwards (1986) for effective real exchange rate. 
(a) Nominal lending rate on 30-89 days loans. 
(b) Ex post real lending rate was estimated as 
{[(1+i)/(I+PTI)]-I}*100 where i and PTI are nominal lending 
rate and changes in tradable price index. 
(c) Ex post real lending rate estimated from nominal rate 
deflated by the cpr which includes non-tradables. 
(d) Nominal index of wages and salaries deflated by CPl. 
1980=100 
(e) This index was constructed as the ratio of a weighted 
average of WPI of Chile's 10 main partners in $ to Chile's 
CPI.1978=100 
(f) stock price index at constant price, IGPA. (1980=100) 
Although the appreciation of the real exchange rate is 
seen as a major factor in most of the interpretation of the 
crisis of 1982-83, there is no consensus on what caused the 
systematic appreciation of the real exchange rate of more 
than 30% between 1978 and 1981. The most obvious factor in 
the appreciation of the real exchange rate was the 
introduction between February 1978 to May 1979 of a 
preannounced declining rate of monthly devaluation set below 
the previous month's domestic inflation rate and the 
subsequent fixing of the nominal rate at $ 39 pesos per 
dollar until June 1982. 
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The data on domestic and international inflation plus 
devaluation from table 3 indicates two things: Firstly, the 
introduction of the "tablita" and fixed exchange regime 
coincided with a significant difference between domestic and 
US inflation rate. Under every definition of a real exchange 
rate this would have meant beyond any doubt an initial 
although transitory declining value for the real exchange 
8 
rate under the law of one price. 
Secondly, the data also show however that between 1978-81 
domestic inflation failed to converge rapidly enough and 
avoid a permanent overvaluation. 
Table 7.3 Indicators of Convergence (%) 
------------------------------------------------------------
77 78 79 80 81 82 
Real LIBOR(a) - 0.7 1.6 -10.6 1.7 8.7 26.2 
LIBOR(b) 6.1 8.8 12.1 14.2 16.8 13.2 
Spread lending-LIBOR(c) 50.6 40.4 25.9 28.5 30.4 -23.7 
Spread deposit-LIBOR(d) 13.9 23.3 12.7 20.1 20.8 -30.8 
Devaluation 60.5 21.4 14.9 0.0 0.0 88.3 
US Inflation (CPI) 9.1 13.3 12.4 8.9 3.9 
Chile Inflation(CPI) 91.1 40.4 33.0 35.0 19.6 9.9 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
(a) Nominal LIBOR deflacted by the variation of dollar price 
of Chilean tradables 
(b) Nominal LIBOR is the three months Eurodollar rate. 
(c) Calculated as {[(1+i)/(I+I)(I+e)]-1}*100 where i,I, and 
e are nominal domestic lending, nominal LIBOR and the 
expected devaluation rate respectively. 
(d) Calculated as {[(l+i)/(l+I)(l+e)]-l}*lOO where i nominal 
deposit rate. 
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Therefore the real exchange rate appreciation was not 
transitory and became even worse after the exchange rate was 
fixed. The existence of full wage indexation to compensate 
lagged changes in CPI introduced as part of the labour law 
in late 1979, and the fact that many non-tradables prices 
were fully indexed backward made the dynamic path of 
tradables and non-tradables prices inconsistent. In effect, 
as a first approximation and according to the real wage 
index in table 2, wages increased by 26% in real terms 
between 1978 and 1981 and coincided with the 30% real 
appreciation. Thus, the exchange rate regime became 
inconsistent with a wage indexation. 
However, as we have seen from tables 1 and 2, the real 
appreciation of the exchange rate also coincided with 
significant increases in private sector expenditures 
averaging 11% per annum, exports rising from U$ 2.186 
millions in 1977 to U$ 4.705 millions in 1980, falling 
unemployment rates, and substantial increases in the stock 
price index by 53% in real terms between 1978 and 1980. 
Although many proponents among them Corbo (1985, 1987), 
Edwards (1986,1989), Harberger (1985a,1985b, 1987), and 
Dornbusch (1985) accepted the inconsistency argument, they 
viewed the appreciation of the real exchange as a 
consequence of the increase in private sector expenditures 
on both tradable and non-tradables financed by large and 
unsustainable capital inflows as well as domestic borrowing 
9 
but for different reasons. 
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According to Corbo (1985,1987), the active crawling peg 
and fixed exchange rate mechanism combined with the gradual 
lifting of restriction on foreign indebtness encouraged a 
significant rise in the rate of capital inflows as a result 
of the increasing spread between domestic and foreign 
interest rates. This differential made it quite attractive 
for foreigners to bring capital into the economy and for 
nationals to borrow from abroad. These spreads were large 
even in the period where the exchange rate devaluation was 
pre-announced and fixed later on. The data from table 1 and 
3 shows that the spread between nominal peso lending rate 
and the nominal LIBOR in 1977 was 50.6 and remain high even 
in 1979 at 28.5, and capital inflow went from U$ 607 
millions in 1977 to U$ 2.255 millions in 1979. Similar 
observations can be drawn from the spread between nominal 
peso deposit rates and the LIBOR. 
Further relaxation of controls on capital inflows and 
the portfolio disequilibrium encouraged even more the inflow 
of capital and hence pushing the nominal domestic interest 
rate further down. According to the evidence the nominal 
lending rate fell from 63.3% in 1978 to 49% and 39% in 
1979 and 1980. But even more significant was the reduction 
in real interest rates which according to table 2 (lending 
rate deflated by changes in CPI) came down from 34% in 1978 
to 16% and 11% in 1979 and 1980 respectively_ Similar 
results were obtained when using the change in the tradable 
price index as a deflator. 
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It could be argued that the fall in real interest rates 
partly reflected increasing arbitrage between nominal 
domestic and foreign rates, although it remain fairly high 
as a result of Central Bank sterilisation and imperfect 
asset substitution. Similarly, the evidence also show that 
international influences were also important in the drop in 
real lending interest rates, in particular the dollar 
depreciation in world markets and the effect on the dollar 
price of chilean tradables. 
Table 7.4 
NEFF EXR 
REFF EXR(b) 
US Exchange Rates and 
Chi Ie. (a) 
77 
124.0 
117.6 
78 
111.2 
108.6 
79 
108.3 
108.9 
Tradable Prices for 
80 
108.0 
110.0 
81 
121.1 
125.2 
82 
135.2 
134.7 
Tradable Prices(c) 183.5 196.4 246.5 296.8 297.3 266.7 
Source:IMF,International Financial Statistics,Various Issues 
ECLA, Statistical Yearbook, Various Issues 
(a) Indices were constructed with 1970=100 
(b) Nominal effective exchange rate, NEFF EXR, is deflated 
by WPI 
(c) The average dollar price of tradab1es are calculated as 
follows 0.5 Px + 0.5 Pm where Px=unit value of exports and 
Pm=unit value of imports. 
According to the theory an appreciation of the US dollar 
with respect to other major currencies clearly will cause 
the dollar price of homogeneous traded goods to fall. It 
follows that for a small economy pegging to the dollar an 
appreciation of this currency will be subject to a 
deflationary pressures transmitted by changes in the dollar 
10 
price of its tradables. 
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If we compare the movements of the indices between the 
real and nominal exchange rate with the dollar price of 
tradables in table 4, we see that there was a dollar 
inflation between 1977 to 1979 as the accumulated 
appreciation in these 3 years was 7.4% in real terms. This 
coincided with sharp rise in tradables prices by 34.3% and 
thus the reduction in real interest rates over the 
same period. 
Therefore, Corbo's portfolio disequilibrium triggered by 
the exchange rate regime and the subsequent massive inflows 
of capital responding to the lending-libor spread explained 
the fall in nominal and in particular real interest rates 
and hence increasing permanent income and expenditures. 
According to Dornbusch (1985), in an intertemporal model 
consumption and investment could also be determined by the 
appreciation of the exchange rate. He asserted that the 
temporary overvaluation induced an intertemporal 
substitution accelerating the purchasing of durable goods 
11 
and generating a growing current account deficit. Rising 
expectations that the overvaluation and the exchange regime 
will not last clearly provoked the import surge 
particularly in 1981 as shown in table 1. 
The data from table 1 shows that the rate of absorption 
exceded the GDP growth and the current account deficit was 
getting larger. This demostrates the growing excess demand 
for non-tradables and tradables. For instance, in 1980 and 
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1981 private absorption increased at 9.3% and nearly 11% 
whereas GOP was growing much slower at 7.8% and 5.5% only. 
Thus, a market clearing appreciation was required to clear 
the excess demand for non-tradables (via nontradable prices) 
whereas the excess demand for tradables was reflected in a 
mounting external deficit. The real exchange rate reached 
its lowest value during 1981 with a nearly 30% overvaluation 
with respect to 1978 and the current account deficit was 
becoming too large with U$ 2.677 millions. 
In 1981 the nominal peso lending rate was beginning to 
rise in spite of the massive inflows of capital during the 
last three years from 39% in 1980 to 42.5% as shown by 
table 2. At the same time, table 3 shows the lending-LIBOR 
spread was getting larger as it moved from it lowest value 
12 
of 22.2 in 1979 to 25.5 in 1981. However, the rise in real 
interest rates was even larger as it went from its lowest 
value of 11% in 1980 to 31.7% and 31.2% in 1981 and 1982 
respectively. In those two years, the real lending rate for 
tradables also rose from 10.7% in 1980 to 18.3% and 54.5%. 
In spite of the significant increases in real interest 
rates and the deterioration of the world economy in the form 
of a reduction in the terms of trade and increasing nominal 
LIBOR during 1981, private sector absorption continued 
growing well beyond GOP growth. This can be explained by the 
lasting effects of the stock market bubble which generated 
wealth effects and increasing consumption expenditures. 
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Moreover, the stock market bubble overpriced private sector 
gurantees and collaterals, enabled firms to borrow 
additional resources from banks, thus making banks more 
13 
vulnerable to any change in market conditions. At the same 
time, the expectations of the unsustainability of the 
exchange rate regime could have accelerated the purchase of 
durable goods and enlarged the current account deficit. 
By 1982 the rate of capital inflows started to 
deccelerate so that the amount of external financing came 
down to U$ 2.327 millions in 1982 and only U$ 520 million in 
1983 as shown in table 5. Morover, nominal and real lending 
rate was reaching in 1982 almost 50% and 32% respectively. 
Given that monetary policy was endogenous then the decline 
in capital inflows produced a decline in the monetary base 
via changes in international reserves and a rise in nominal 
14 
interest rates to clear the money market. 
Equally the evidence from table 2 also indicates that 
the stock market price felt by more than 38% between 1980 
and 1982. The decline in expenditures reduced the demand for 
both tradables and non-tradables. According to table 5, 
absorption felt by 23.4% in 1982, and the trade balance went 
from minus U$ 2.677 millions in 1981 to U$ 62 millions in 
1982. 
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Table 7.5 Indicators of the Economic Bust of 1982-83. 
------------------------------------------------------------
1982 1983 
------------------------------------------------------------
Real GOP Growth 
GDP Tradables 
GDP Non-tradables 
Absorption 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP 
Inflation Rate 
Unemployment Rate 
Overall Balance Payments(US$) 
Trade Balance 
Exports 
Imports 
Capital Inflows 
Number of Bankruptcies 
-14.1 
-12.4 
-15.1 
-23.5 
2.3 
10.0 
22.1 
-1165 
62 
3706 
3643 
2327 
810 
-0.7 
1.6 
-7.2 
3.8 
27.1 
22.1 
-541 
986 
3831 
2845 
520 
375 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Banco Central Chile,Monthly Bulletin,Various Issues 
ECLA, Statistical Yearbook, Various Issues. 
Clearly, the decline in expenditures reduced the demand 
for traded goods improving the trade balance. At the same 
time, the reduction in expenditures and thus the demand for 
non-traded goods created now an excess supply. Unlike the 
opposite case of 1978-81, now the market for non-tradables 
needed a rise in the real exchange rate to restore the 
equilibrium with a lower level of expenditures and external 
financing. As a result of the Chilean labour law which 
introduced full backward wage indexation non-tradable prices 
were inflexible downwards. As we have seen already from 
table 2, real wage were in 1981 nearly 9% above the wage 
rate of 1980 and remain so in 1982. At the same time, the 
continous dollar deflation of tradable prices as a result of 
the dollar appreciation and the fixed exchange rate regime 
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imposed a severe adjustment in the nominal price of non-
traded goods to restore the real exchange rate to 
equilibrium consistent with the new level of expenditures, 
As Sjaastad (1982) correctly put it these two features were 
like imposing two inconsistent numeraires in the economy so 
relative prices did not adjust and the adjustment was in 
quantities. In consequence, the adjustment to lower 
expenditures was in terms of a severe output decline and 
increases in unemployment. 
As Corbo (1985,1987) and other commentators of the 
Chilean economy, in particular Edwards (1986) and Harberger 
(1985,1987), agreed on the elimination of wage inflexibility 
and a devaluation in late 1981 should have been the 
appropriate response to the fall in capital inflows and 
expenditures rather than relying on the governments' belief 
15 
in the economy automatic adjustment. 
According to table 5 output felt in two successive 
years. In 1982 and 1983, the GDP growth rate was 
16 
with -14.1% and -0.7% respectively. Unemployment 
negative 
rate and 
the number of bankruptcies also shows a marked increase 
reflecting the magnitude of the economic crisis. The rate 
of unemployment went from 11.1% in 1981 to 22.1% in 1982 and 
the number of bankruptcies almost doubled between 1981 to 
1982. Moreover, as we have seen in chapter 3, the collapse 
of the economy was accompanied this time by the bust of the 
banking system. 
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All in all, the evidence presented tends to support the 
view that the introduction of the exchange rate regime as an 
anti-inflationary policy in the context of trade and 
financial liberalisation was not a mistake per se if the 
rate of crawl would have been much higher so as to avoid the 
initial appreciation of the real exchange rate, and wages 
were not indexed fully to past inflation. In effect, 
Mckinnon (1981) and Blejer and Mathieson (1981) have shown 
in their models that real domestic interest rates would have 
been lower and the spread between domestic and world 
interest rates consequently lower. Accordingly, the real 
peso lending rate in Chile in 1979 and 1980 would have been 
much lower and the spread smaller, capital inflows and 
banks' asset expansion lower, absorption and hence the 
demand pressure on traded and non-traded goods much lower. 
At the same time, the equilibrating appreciation of the real 
exchange rate in the face of excess demand for non-traded 
goods would have been smaller so the loss of competitiveness 
and profitability of Chilean tradables and the current 
account deficit. Probably the path of output would have been 
dominated by the expansion of tradables financed by a 
greater reliance on domestic than foreign borrowing. 
Although these general observations are part of an 
acceptable description of the issues, the factors which 
explain the appreciation of the real exchange rate are not 
clear and remain a contentious issue. If we accept the 
Edwards and Harberger contention that the appreciation of 
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the real exchange rate was due to an exogenous increases in 
capital inflows then it follows that the hypothesis which 
suggest a wrong exchange rate policy is not sustainable and 
the external financial liberalisation was far too 
aggressive within the gradual approach followed between 1978 
to 1981. 
Regardless of the debate in the determinants of the 
large appreciation of the real exchange rate, the stock 
exchange bubble and the fluctuating interest rates, the 
facts tend to corroborate the notion that the expansion in 
output was not going to last given the long and large 
misalignment of some key relative prices. Given the 
inconsistencies and rigidities of the numeraire, the 
adjustment was going to take place via output, employment, 
and increasing numbers of bankruptcies both in industrial 
firms and banks. 
(7.3.3) The Boom-Bust Economic Cycle and the Increase 
Vulnerability of the Chilean Banking System. 
There is an apparent connection between the performance 
of the macroeconomy and the financial system. The 1977-81 
economic boom was accompanied by a significant expansion of 
the financial system just as the 1982-83 economic bust 
coincided with the collapse of the banking system. 
330 
As we have seen in chapter 3, the growth rate between 
1977-81 of both the sectoral GOP (GOPfin) and bank assets 
was 20.3% and 34.5% per annum respectively. At the same 
time, the data showed that bank liabilities exhibited an 
annual average growth rate of more than 36% over the same 
period. These spectacular growth rates not only coincided 
with an equally impressive growth in the economy's GOP but 
also they remained above the overall growth of the economy 
throughout the period in question. However, this financial 
boom ended in 1982 and 1983 as the sectoral GOP felt by 4.4% 
and 40.5%. This turning point was preceded by the downturn 
of the economy's GOP which fell by 14.1% and 0.7% in 1982 
and 1983. Although the growth rate of bank assets slowed 
down slightly, it continued climbing at a faster rate than 
GOP reflecting perhaps 
banks' willingness to 
some distress borrowing and 
take a fair-bet against 
the 
the 
government. At the same time, we do not observe a run from 
the banks since the growth of bank liabilities still 
exhibited positive growth rates. These observations can be 
seen from figure 1 which was constructed with data from 
chapter 3 and from the previous section. 
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Banks' profitability measured by the gross 
profits/capital ratio (Profit/K) also shows the influence 
from the changes in the economic cycle. The average rate of 
return for the boom period was 17% with a peak of 23.5% in 
1980. In contrast, by 1982 and 1983 the rate of return did 
fall to 4.1% and -24% respectively. At the same time, the 
data on risky and nonperforming loans also show a marked 
increment. For instance, the nonperforming loans/capital 
ratio (NPloans/K) was almost 42% and 50% during 1982 and 
1983. Moreover, the amount of risky and nonperforming loans 
purchased by the Central Bank was 60% larger than the total 
capital and reserves of the financial sector. Graph 2 
pictures the cycle of these ratios with the economy's GDP. 
Another interesting observation from the available data 
is the expansion of bank assets not only reflected the 
tendencies of the economy's output growth but also the 
changes in the composition of output. Table 6 contain 
information about the composition of output and the share of 
bank loans. We observe a large increase in the share of 
nontradables by nearly 9% between 1977 and 1981. The 
largest share in this group corresponds to commerce and 
financial services with an average share between 1978-81 of 
18.2% and 8.9% respectively. In contrast, the share of 
tradable output was reduced by more than 3% during the same 
period. 
The composition of bank loans also reflected the change 
in output composition as the tradables share of loans 
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dropped from 73% in 1977 to almost 35% in 1981. In contrast, 
the share of loans received by the nontradable sector went 
from 9.4% to 44.7% in 1977 and 1983 respectively. In effect, 
between 1980 and 1982 the construction sector received on 
average nearly 11% of loans. 
Table 7.6 Composition of GOP and Bank Loans. (%)(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 
------------------------------------------------------------
GOP Traded 40.3 39.2 38.5 37.5 37.2 37.7 38.7 
GOP Nontraded(b) 34.1 36.8 38.9 41.5 42.7 41.3 38.7 
Loans Traded 73.1 62.8 56.4 44.3 34.9 37.6 36.4 
Loans Nontraded 16.5 24.6 28.0 36.6 40.8 41.1 44.7 
Source: Banco Central Chile,Boletin Mensual, Various Issues. 
SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
(a) The data is express at constant 1977 pesos. 
(b) Includes the three most important items: retail and 
wholesale trade, financial services, and construction. The 
difference between traded and non traded GOP correspond to 
final nontraded GOP which remained around 20%. 
It could be argued that the larger share of loans to the 
nontradable sector could be explained by a superior 
performance. Galvez and Tybout (1985) and Tybout (1986) 
found that the appreciation of the real exchange rate 
affected in a detrimental way the performance of the 
tradable sector, in particular exportable firms, by reducing 
18 
significantly the price-cost margin. For instance, the 
exportables' relatively lower and falling operating earnings 
coincided with large reduction in gross margins and stable 
asset turnover but significantly small overhead costs. In 
contrast, while exportables' gross margins and operating 
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earnings were rapidly and continuously falling, nontradables 
margins were rising and remained high from 1978 onwards. One 
interesting performance which is worthty of comment is that 
of importables (low protection). This sector's performance 
was as good as nontradable sector in terms of gross margins 
and operating earnings although the latter exhibited high 
overheads cost. This explains the relatively superior 
performance of importables in spite of the currency 
19 
appreciation and the reduction in nominal tariffs. While 
exporters' financial costs remained relatively low and 
offset a poor operating earnings, they managed to survive. 
The opposite was true for nontradables and importables which 
20 
had larger financial costs at least at the beginning. 
However, rising real interest during 1981 and 1982 was 
making credit far more expensive reducing the excess of 
earning rates over financial costs. Firms in both 
nontradable and importable sector acquired debt with a real 
interest rate which exceeded their operating earnings. This 
was even more acute for those in the exportable sector. 
Thus the evidence from Galvez and Tybout's paper and 
graph 3 support the intuition that the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate (IREXR) and the subsequent rapid 
increases in absorption coincided with both increasing 
nontradable GDP as well as rising nontradables' output share 
(ISGOPNT), and smaller GOP growth and output share in the 
21 
case of tradables (ISGOPT). Similarly, the share of bank 
loans was clearly concentrated in the nontradable sector. 
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As we can see from graph 4, this process was more 
pronnounced between 1978 to 1981 when the peso was rapidly 
appreciating (REXR), real interest rates were falling (RLR), 
real wages (RWR) and real stock prices rising (IGPA), and 
capital inflows were at an all-time high. However, the 
relative price at 1981 was not sustainable as the current 
deficit was too large, nearly 16% of GDP, capital inflows 
started to decline very rapidly, real interest rates were 
rising again, and the stock exchange bubble were 
to burst. Given the backward wage indexation the 
beginning 
adjustment 
was in terms of output, employment, and bankruptcies 
including the banking system. 
After 5 years of sustained GDP growth, an increasing 
share of GDP output and bank loans, the nontradable sector 
experienced the collapse of output. By 1982 and 1983 GDP of 
nontradables fell by 15.1% and 7.2% respectively. The 
collapse in output growth coincided with both sharp 
increases in nonperforming loans/capital ratio and a 
substantial fall in the profit/capital ratio as shown by 
graphic Sa. 
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A similar conclusion is derived from graphic 5b when we 
plot the GDP for tradables with the two ratios a5 p r O X i ~ B B
for profitability and vulnerability. However, the turning 
point of the cycle for tradables does not exactly match the 
path of the two ratios. In effect, the increases in 
nonperforming loans coincided with the slowdown of tradable 
GOP growth in 1979-80 while output growth of nontradables 
were at its peak. Also, we observed that while output growth 
of tradables was growing at 1.6%, GDP for nontradables were 
still falling at 7.2%. This means that given the larger 
share of loans in nontradable firms and the two consecutive 
years of falling output the ratios were more affected at 
least between 1982-83 by the performance of the nontradable 
sector. 
It is clear that the change in the composition of bank 
assets between 
composition of 
vulnerability in 
1977-82 which reflected changes in the 
output may have produced a greater 
the banking system in the sense that 
increasingly 
sector were 
large allocation of loans in the nontradable 
producing an increasing vulnerability in 
particular in the case of falling output, wages, and asset 
prices, and rising real interest rates and real exchange 
rates. These observations are displayed by graphs 6a and 6b. 
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In addition, as I have reported in chapter 3, bank 
liabilities exhibited a significant rise in foreign 
currency. In effect, we estimated that the ratio of 
liabilities in foreign currency relative to domestic 
22 
currency went from nearly 24% in 1980 to almost 40% in 1982. 
This means that the shift in resources to the nontradable 
sector was financed by an increasing ratio of liabilities in 
foreign currency relative to domestic currency and this in 
turn meant an increasing vulnerability of firms and the 
banking sector to exchange rate collapse (devaluation). 
Graph 7 shows the tendency of loans' share and the 
liability ratio. 
The evidence from the graphics had permitted us to 
interrelate banking performance with the overall economic 
environment, at least as a first approximation, and 
explictly formulate conjectures about bank problem/failures 
and the role played by factors external to the bank in the 
likelihood of bank problem/failure. These conjectures can be 
listed as follows: Firstly, the abrupt change in the 
performance of the banking system was consistent with the 
turning point of the expansionary economic cycle which 
started just before 1977. If this is true then the 
spectacular growth and profitability and the subsequent 
downfall of the banking system has its explanation on the 
boom-bust economic cycle which took place between 1977 to 
1983. Therefore, we ought to be looking empirical links 
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between the rate of GDP growth and the probablllty of bank 
failure/problem. 
Secondly, if the boom-bust economic cycle can be 
explained by the misalignment of some key macroeconomic 
prices then it follows that the drastic changes in 
profitability and vulnerability could be explained by the 
disequilibrium of the key relative prices. Therefore, we 
should be looking for econometric evidence to sustain the 
relationship between real exchange rate, real interest rate, 
the stock prices, and the probability of bank 
failure/problem. 
Thirdly, if conjecture 1 and 2 are empirically valid 
then it is possible to estimate ex ante probability and to 
test the prediction accuracy as we did in chapter 6. 
(7.4) Econometric Analysis of Bank Failures: The Macro 
Aspect. 
In order to answer these conjectures I had developed a 
logit model for quarterly panel data following the 
methodology and estimation procedures described in chapters 
5 and 6. However, there are two main modifications with 
respect to the binary choice model introduced and estimated 
earlier. 
Firstly, the present model is estimated using quarterly 
panel data. As will be shown, it should not pose, under 
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certain assumptions, any additional difficulties except for 
the handling of a larger number of observations. 
Secondly, we regress the dichotomous dependent variable 
against macroeconomic factors. Given that macroconomic 
variables will be identical for each bank in a given quarter 
of a given year, the estimation of the logit model will 
introduce some difficulties. 
The attempt to relate banks' failure/problem 
systematic factors such us real exchange rates, 
with 
real 
interest rates, and stock prices and above all growth of GDP 
reflect indirectly the ability of businesses and individuals 
to meet their debt obligations under changing economic 
environment. This empirical model is the counterpart of 
Galvez and Tybout's model as we study the problem from the 
banks' perspective rather than the firm. 
(7.4.1) The Econometric Model. 
(7.4.1.1) Description of the Data. 
The model was estimated using quarterly panel data for 
the period between 1979 to 1983. Thus, the sample contain 20 
quarterly observations and 27 banks. Just as for the model 
of chapter 6, the bank sample was divided into two groups, 
Al and BI. 
The former correspond to the problem/failure group which 
includes all those institutions which were liquidated, 
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merged, capitalised, and/or sold nonperforming and risky 
loans to the central Bank during 1982-83. The latter group 
corresponds to the non-problem/no-failed banks which include 
Banco del Estado the only existing state bank, and Banco 
Industrial y de Comercio Exterior (BlCE). As we have seen in 
chapter 3 both institutions were the only two domestic banks 
which remained financially healthy. Also B1 group includes 
foreign banks on the grounds that they also remained 
financially sound and as we saw in chapter 2 were subject to 
similar legislation as domestic banks. 
Group Al and B1 contain 16 and 11 banks respectively as 
listed in table 2. 
Table 7.7 Bank List of Al and B1 . 
Al B1 
Banks Code Banks Code 
Chile* 001 Osorno 010 
O'Higgins** 008 Estado*** 012 
Internacional* 009 Do Brasil 017 
Continental** 011 BrCE 028 
Sudamericano** 014 Republic Nat. N.Y. 031 
Credito** 016 America 032 
Trabajo** 022 CityBank 033 
Pacifico** 025 Real 034 
Nacional** 026 Sao Paulo 036 
Concepcion* 027 Santander 037 
Edwards** 029 Exterior 038 
Santiago* 035 
Unido Fomento* 502 
Hipotecario Fomento* 504 
Hipotecario Chile* 505 
Colocadora Nacional* 506 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
* Failed Banks (liquidated, intervined, or merged) 
** Problem Banks (sold nonperforming and risky loans) 
*** State Bank. 
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The sample did exclude two groups of financial 
institutions. The first one corresponds to banks which 
failed during 1981 such us Espanol(002), Talca(006), 
Austral(024), and Linares(030). The second one, the non-bank 
financial institutions (financieras) including those which 
failed in 1981 among them Cash(705), General 
Financiera(715), De Capitales(725), and Del Sur (713). The 
exclusion of these two groups was justified as argued in 
chapter 3 by their small size in relation to the rest of the 
banks. In addition, as a general principle, we accepted all 
those banks which had 16 or more consecutive quarterly 
observations in order to compare their performance in the 
boom period of 1979-81 with the economic debacle of 1982-83. 
In consequence, the panel data of 20 quarters and 21 
banks gives a total number of 521 observations which 
represent a sufficiently large statistical sample to draw 
23 
logistic inferences. As argued in chapter 6, it would have 
been desirable to have had a controlled sample in particular 
by size, number of branches, or any other characteristic. 
However, data limitations and the small size of the Chilean 
banking system ruled out this possibility. 
With respect to the dichotomous dependent variable, we 
used the quarterly ex ante probability of problem/failure 
estimated by the problem/failure prediction model in chapter 
6. As we saw the overall prediction accuracy was extremely 
good at a 0.5 cut-off value. I stress the point that 
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quarterly evaluation of banks was not available from SIBF 
nor annual classification prior 1983. Therefore, we were 
forced to rely on the ex ante quarterly estimation of the 
problem/failure prediction model. 
The explanatory variables in the model are divided into 
three set of regressors. The first set contains some key 
macroeconomic prices such as indices for the real exchange 
rate (TCR) and the stock prices in real terms (IPA). These 
variables are also expressed in terms of percentage change, 
that is VTCR and VIPA. I also considered in this data set 
both real lending and deposit interest rates. The annualised 
ex post lending rate (TIAA) and ex post deposit rate (TIPA) 
were estimated by using 30-90 days nominal rates deflated by 
the consumer price index. In addition I computed the gross 
spread between lending and deposit interest rates express as 
OIFAP. 
The second set contains data on gross domestic product 
data is 
and in 
GOP per 
tradable 
expressed at constant prices of 1977. The GDP 
displayed in millions of Chilean pesos (PGB) 
percentage change (VPGB). Unfortunately, data on 
sector on a quarterly basis, in particular for the 
and nontradable sector, was unavailable for the 
question. 
period in 
Finally, the third set incorporates monetary variables 
to assess 
likelihood 
the implications of monetary aggregates on the 
of banks' failure/problems. Among the most 
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important aggregates the model included the narrow Ml define 
as notes and coins plus sight deposits and a broader measure 
such as M2, which includes Ml plus time deposits. 
I have also allowed some dynamic implications by 
introducing two lags among the sets explanatory variables 
which is equivalent to two quarters of year. 
(7.4.1.2) Hodel Specification and Estimation. 
The binary choice model was specified for panel data 
which consisted of observations made on individual banks 
over time. In addition, the model was restricted by assuming 
that observations are independent for both individuals and 
over time. These simplifying restrictions were desirable 
since the approach to estimate the model was straightforward 
and similar to the cross-section model estimated in chapter 
6 but with more observations. 
As we have seen in chapter 3 the determination of the 
failure of a bank or its classification as a problem bank is 
made in practice by monetary and banking authorities 
following different criteria. However, technically speaking 
we can determine a bank as insolvent or treated as problem 
so long as the market value of liabilities exceeds the 
market value of assets. Indeed, this condition arises as a 
result of an extreme unexpected deposit withdrawls and hence 
a fall in assets' market value from force liquidation, 
and/or large banks' loan losses and reduction in current 
income that must be charged to capital and reserves. 
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I assume that a bank has a given amount of capital (K) 
at the beginning of the period, and accumulates earnings (R) 
and losses (L) over the period, and spend (E) on screening 
and monitoring bank loans. The stream of bank's cash flows 
(Y) (net bank income) is given by (Rl-L1-E1),(R2-L2-
E2), ... ,(Ri-Li-Ei)1. Moreover, the bank may also pay 
dividends (8) and issue new capital (N) at the end of the 
period. For simplicity, I assume that banks' investment in 
securities is zero. 
The bank has issued a mix of deposits on which it 
promises to make a stream of payments (D1,D2, ... ,Di] that 
has a total value of D. It should be pointed out that 
although all assets and liabilities should be marked to 
market values to be more accurate, in practice we apply 
historical cost accounting as an approximation of the true 
bank's worth. 
Formally stated, in expression (1) the bank's net cash 
flows from its loan structure is insufficient to pay the 
depositors' claims (negative net worth). 
( 1 ) x = Y + D < 0 
In order to prevent a failure the bank may use 
from its initial capital and reserves. Therefore, in 
context failure occurs if condition (2a) holds. 
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funds 
this 
( 2a) X = Y + D + K < 0 
Expression (2a) suggest that a bank failure occurs if 
negative cash flow is greater than bank's capital. Or more 
generally as shown by (2b), if deposit outflows (D) exceed 
banks' capital and reserves (K) plus net income from banks' 
assets (Y) plus new issues (N) minus dividends (S). 
(2b) D > K + Y + N - S 
In consequence, the probability of bank failure (F) will 
depend on the likelihood that D + Y < -K . Specifically, 
(3) F = Probe D + Y < -K ) 
However, the model assumes that Y and D are unknown so 
that the condition for bank failure Y + D < -K should be 
related to the bank's financial condition (FC). If the 
bank's financial condition is weak then the failure 
condition will hold. 
(4) Y - D + K = FC + e where i= 1,2, ... ,n 
it it t= 1,2, ... ,T 
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Thus, the failure condition in (4) is related to Fe for 
the ith bank in time t plus a random term e. Fe can be taken 
as a composite measure of the bank's financial condition 
given the values of selected macroeconomic variables. In 
other words, the model assumes that a deterioration of the 
macroeconomic environment worsens the financial condition 
(Fe) of a bank and viceversa. This is shown in expression 
( 5) • 
(5) Fe = x B 
it 
where x= K-vector of known 
macro variables 
B= K-vector of unknown 
parameters. 
With this deterministic process giving rise to bank 
failure as shown by expression (5) we are able to convert it 
to a model of the probability of failure. 
To begin with, the model assumes that there is a 
theoretical (unknown) index e which is determined by 
macroeconomic variables. This index measures a bank's 
propensity to fail and is unobservable from the data. Given 
that e is a function of a well defined set of random and 
independent explanatory variables, the logit model should 
provide suitable estimates of this function and hence for 
the value of e. 
55 
If the dependent variable Y is equal to 1 when a bank 
fails and to zero otherwise, and each bank has a critical 
value for e (cutoff point) which translate the index e into 
a classification process then we have the following: if e < 
e the bank is classified as a failure and vice versa. 
Given that the logit model assumes that e is a random 
variable with a logistic distribution then it follows that 
the probability that e < e can be computed from the 
cumulative logistic probability distribution. 
The logit model was specified for panel data which 
consisted of observations made on individual banks over a 
specified interval of time. In addition the model 
specification was restricted by assuming that observations 
were independent for both individual banks and over time. 
These simplifying restrictions were considered desirable on 
the ground that the approach followed here was more 
straightforward and similar to the one applied in chapter 6 
with cross-section data but with more observations. 
Thus the restricted univariate binary choice model for 
panel data is defined by: 
( 6 ) P(Y = 1) 
it 
= F ( x' f\ ) 
it 
= F (e ) 
it 
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i = 1,2, ... n 
t = 1,2, ... T 
Expression (6) defines Y as a sequence of independent 
binary random variable taking the value of 1 if the ith bank 
failed/problem at time t, and 0 otherwise. Also x is a K-
vector of known macroeconomic variables, and a is a K-vector 
of unknown parameters. F is defined as a cumulative 
probability distribution. 
The cumulative probability distribution function enables 
us to translate the values of the independent and stochastic 
explanatory variables which range in value over the entire 
real line to a probability which ranges from 0 to 1. 
(7) P(Y = 1) = F(9) 
it 
= F ( x· 6 ) = 
it 
-9 
= 1/1 + e 
x'8 
J f(9)de 
-00 
= 1/1 + e 
In expression (7), F(x'B) is equal to the cumulative 
standard logistic function so that it assigns to a number e 
the probability that any arbitrary 9 will be less than 9. 
It follows that since the probability is measured by the 
area under the standard logistic curve from -00 to 9, the 
event will be more likely to occur the larger the value of 
the index 9. 
As it was shown in chapter 5, to estimate the vector of 
unknown parameter of 6 I resorted to the use of the 
maximum likelihood estimator for B. The maximum likelihood 
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estimation was appealing since a unique maximum always 
exists for the logit model. At the same time, it is 
appropiate for non-linear estimation and yields consistent 
parameters estimates. Thus, the likelihood function of the 
logit model is given by 
n TnT 
(8) lnML = E EY In F(x 6) + E E( l-Y ) In [ 1 - F(x 6) 
it it it it 
The ML estimator for 6, say 6 ~ , , is obtained by 
maximising (8) with respect to 6 and setting the first order 
condition (FOC) equal to zero. As was shown in chapter 4 the 
solution is a local maximum and hence unique. Also we saw 
that the FOC was non-linear and hence solved by the Newton-
Rapshon iterative procedure. 
However, a panel data specification such as ( 6 ) 
specifies only the marginal probability and leaves the joint 
probability P(Y ,Y , ... ,Y ) unspecified. One way to get 
il i2 iT 
around this problem is to introduce some restrictions. We 
assume independence so that the joint probability will be 
given by 
( 9 ) P(Y ,Y , ... ,Y) = 
il i2 iT 
E P(Y ) 
iT 
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The independence assumption implies that P(Y = 11 Y = 1) 
it i,t-l 
so that previous year status does not affect the one this 
year. This means two things: Firstly, there is no true state 
dependency in the sense that the present status is not 
affected by the past status. In other words, the 
probability of bank failure/problem is not affected by 
yesterday's probability. 
Secondly, there is no heterogeneity problem in the 
sense that there are no serious complications with 
unobservable variables which could affect banks differently 
with respect to their likelihood of failure/problem. 
Before we concentrate on the analysis of the results 
from the model estimation there is one complication in the 
setting of the matrix with the exogenous variables. Given 
that the macroeconomic data were identical for each 
individual bank in each specific quarter, the matrix was 
near singular. So in order to eliminate this problem we 
modified the matrix structure of the model. Let's take a 
close look to the matrix specification of the model and its 
meaning. 
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A TCRA ..... IPAA 0 0 . . . . . 179.1 179.1 179.1 
A TCRA ..... IPAA 0 0 
179.2 179.2 179.2 
· 
· · · 
A TCRA IPAA 0 0 
y= n83.4 x= n83.4 n83.4 
it B it 0 0 TCRB IPAB 
179.1 179.1 179.1 
B 0 0 TCRB IPAB 
179.2 179.2 179.2 
· 
. 
· · 
. 
· 
B 0 0 TCRB IPAB 
n83.4 n83.4 n83.4 
where i= 1,2, ... ,n. 
t= 1,2, ... ,T. 
The column vector Y contains the endogeneous 
it 
dichotomous variables for each bank i in a given quarter t 
for the ordered group A and B respectively. 
The matrix x was contructed by separating the data 
it 
for the group of banks A and B respectively. This enabled us 
to compare the performance of these two groups in relation 
to changes in the macroeconomy. At the same time, we 
eliminated the near singular problem in the estimation of 
the model. 
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(7.4.2) The Econometric Results and Its Interpretation. 
In this section I report the main econometric results 
from the restricted logit model using macroeconomic 
variables. The model was estimated for the period between 
1979 and 1983 which involves twenty quarters. This selected 
period, selection made in terms of the availability of 
information, includes a boom period between 1979 and 1981 
and the bust period between 1982 and 1983. The problem of 
multicollinearity among the sets of explanatory variables 
forced us to estimate and test the regressors separately. 
Before we proceded with those two issues concerning the 
importance of the economic cyle and the misalignment of some 
macroeconomic prices, we wanted to run the model to test 
the significance of monetary variables on the likelihood of 
bank failure/problem. 
- Logit Model with Monetary Variables. 
As showed in chapter 4, banking crisis are often 
associated with changes in the monetary conditions, in 
particular large shifts in the demand for money. As argued 
by monetarists, increasing uncertainty about the 
health of financial institutions would 
financial 
produce a 
substantial increase in currency deposit ratio and thus a 
fall in the money supply and widespread liquidity problem in 
the banking system. Table 8 report the results of the logit 
model with reference to the monetary aggregate M2 between 
1982.1 to 1983.4. 
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Table 7.8 Logit Analysis of Selected Macroeconomic 
Variables for the Period 1982.1 to 1983.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic Alternative Specifications 
Variables E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------Constant 1.09 1.21 1.10 1.46 0.56 (0.23) (0.26 ) (0.24) (0.30 ) ( 0 . 10 ) M2A 3.18E-06 1.85E-06 2.97E-06 2.47E-06 5.66E-06 (0.26) (0.14) (0.24 ) (0.19) (0.41 ) 
VIPAA 
-0.05 
(0.68) 
VTCR1A 0.01 
(0.45 ) 
VPGBA 0.05 
(0.69 ) 
TIAA2A 
-0.01 
(0.48) 
M2B -7.09E-05 -6.57E-06 -7.17E-06 
-8.15E-06 -7.17E-06 (0.57) ( 0.53) ( 0 . 58 ) ( 0.63) ( 0 . 52 ) 
VIPAB 0.04 
(0.63) 
VTCR1B 0.003 
(0.11) 
VPGBB 
-0.01 
(0.25) 
TIAA2B 0.01 
(0.75) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lk1hd(-) 76.55 76.09 76.44 76.27 76.09 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Given the high degree of collinearity in particular 
between M2 and the change in stock prices (VIPA) and real 
lending interest rate (TIAA) as shown in the covariance-
correlation matrix in appendix 6, we tested alternative 
specifications. The overall conclusion from the logit model 
is that the explanatory power of the M2 in the likelihood of 
bank failure/problem was insignificant in every alternative 
specification at both 1% and 5% level of significance. 
Therefore, we can reject the monetary hypothesis for the 
25,26 
Chilean banking crisis. 
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-Conjecture 1: The Likelihood of Bank Failure/Problem and 
the Economic Cycle. 
The first conjecture we observed from the data presented 
in the previous section and which had a significant 
intuitive appeal was the relationship between output growth 
and the performance of the banking system. In effect, a 
booming GOP between 1977 and 1981 coincided with a buoyant 
banking system. Similarly, the collapse of GOP in 1982-83 
led to the debacle of the banking system. 
Table 9 provides econometric evidence on the 
significance of GOP growth on the likelihood of bank 
failure/problem. Alternative specifications are also 
reported for this period to enquire the performance of GOP 
in a more general model. According to the correlation 
coefficient presented in appendix 6 there is no significant 
correlation among the explanatory variables tested in this 
model. 
Specification E1 correspond to a general model which 
included all the selected macroeconomic variables as 
explanatory variables. These included variation of GOP 
(VPGB), variation in stock prices (VIPA), real lending 
interest rate (TIIA), and variation in the real exchange 
rate (VTCR). The parameters' estimates are reported for each 
group of banks, namely group A for failed/problem banks and 
group B for nonfailed/nonproblem banks. 
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Table 7.9 L o g ~ t t Analysis for Selected Macroeconomic 
VarIables for the Period 1979.1 and 1983.4.(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic 
Variables E1 
Alternative Specifications 
E2 E3 E4 E5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
VPGBA 
VIPAA 
TIAA2A 
VTCR1A 
VPGBb 
VIPAB 
TIAA2B 
VTCR1B 
-0.38 
(1.24) 
0.13 
(3.02) 
-0.01 
(1.27) 
0.09 
(5.61) 
-0.09 
( 0 . 37 ) 
-0.14 
(2.71) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.06 
(3.78 ) 
0.04 
(1.44 ) 
0.18 
( 2 . 02) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.01 
(1.66) 
-0.06 
(2.05) 
0.007 
(0.75 ) 
-0.41 
(1.52) 
0.12 
( 3.09) 
0.09 
(6.27 ) 
-0.14 
( 2 . 91) 
-0.05 
(3.89 ) 
-0.31 
(1.06) 
0.11 
(2.85) 
0.08 
(5.64) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.15 
(3.02) 
-0.06 
(4.04 ) 
0.04 
(1.63) 
0.18 
(2.06) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(1.84) 
-0.05 
(1.92 ) 
-0.0008 
(0.04) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Ln Lklhd(-) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
LklhdR Index(c) 
A.I.C.(-)(d) 
227.00 
264.36 
36.80 
236.00 
355.59 
7.18 
1.00 
360.59 
229.08 
260.20 
36.22 
234.08 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
227.80 
262.76 
36.57 
234.80 
355.50 
7.36 
1.02 
340.50 
(b) The ratio is calculated as -2[LnLklhdr-lnLklhdu] and it 
has a chi-square distribution with j degree of freedom. 
(c) This index is a pseudo-R square defined as 
l-[lnlklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's information criterion (AIC) is defined as 
-Ln(Lklhd)+ K where K is the number of estimated parameters. 
Specification E1 exhibits the largest likelihood ratio 
(LR) and the highest goodness of fit measured by the 
likelihood ratio index. Indeed, it rejects the null 
hypothesis that all coefficient are zero as the value of the 
test statistic LR is larger than the critical value of a 
chi-square distribution at 0.5% of significance and eight 
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degrees 
obtained 
of freedom (i.e. 21.95). Similar conclusions are 
from specifications E3 and E4 which exhibit a 
similar performance. In contrast, E2 and E5 are found 
insignificant according to the LR test. 
From the results based on the those specification which 
were found statistically significant we can draw some useful 
observations with respect to the empirical incidence of VPGB 
on bank failure/problem. 
To begin with, the growth rate of real GOP (VPGB) was 
significant for the group of failed/problem banks (A) at 1% 
significance. Similar results are found for the group of 
nonfailed/nonproblem banks (B). At the same time, the 
negative sign of the coefficient for group B is consistent 
with the a priori expectation. That is, a fall in GDP growth 
rate increased the probability of failure/problem. 
However, we can observe that the effect of GOP changes 
on the group of banks in difficulties (A) was opposite to 
group B and inconsistent with the a priori 
This result is rather puzzling since it 
expectations. 
suggests that 
falling output is consistent with falling probability of 
failure/problem. 
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- Conjecture 2: The Likelihood of Bank Failure/problem and 
the Misaligment of Key Macroeconomic Prices. 
We also observed from the graphics that the performanre 
of the banking system was somehow related to the changes in 
some key macroeconomic prices. Severe fluctuations in 
relative prices coincided with the changes in banks' 
fortunes. Table 10 report the econometric results of the 
logit model estimated in order to test the significance of 
price misalignment. 
Again, we specified a general model el which included 
three macroeconomic prices, namely the changes in the real 
exchange rate (VTCR), real lending rate (TIIA), and real 
stock price (VIPA). Although the overall equation is 
statistically significant at 1% measured by the likelihood 
ratio (LR), and the goodness of fit is one of the highest 
among the alternative specifications with 45.5%, the 
estimated coefficients are insignificant as their t-
statistics fell outside the critical region at both 1% and 
5%. The only exception to this result corresponds to the 
real lending rate lagged by two quarters for both groups. 
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Table 7.10 Logit Analysis for Selected Macroeconomic 
Variables for the period 1979.1 and 1983.4.(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Macroeconomic 
Variables 
Alternative Specifications 
e1 e2 e3 e4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant -0.20 
-0.21 
-0.24 0.16 (0.97) ( 1.01) (1.20) (1.91) 
VTCR1A -0.0008 
-0.001 0.02 (0.036) (0.04 ) (1.51) 
VIPAA 
-7.217E-05 0.0002 
-0.009 (0.007) (0.02 ) (1.14) 
TIAA2A 0.08 0.08 0.08 
(6.46 ) (6.48 ) (6.80) 
VTCR1B 0.03 0.04 0.0006 (1.28 ) ( 1 . 74) (0.03) 
VIPAB -0.01 
-0.02 0.001 
( 1 . 08) (1.53) (0.11 ) 
TIAA2B -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
( 4 . 90 ) (4.78 ) (4.85) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Ln Lklhd(-) 240.21 240.86 241.03 356.73 
Lk1hd Ratio(b) 237.94 236.64 236.30 4.90 
LklhdR Index(c) 33.12 32.94 32.89 0.60 
A.I.C.(-)(d) 247.21 245.86 246.03 361.73 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(b) The ratio is calculated as -2[LnLklhdr-lnLklhdu] and it 
has a chi-square distribution with j degree of freedom. 
(c) This index is a pseudo-R square defined as 
l-[lnlklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's information criterion (AIC) is defined as 
-Ln(Lklhd)+ K where K is the number of estimated parameters. 
Alternative specifications were tried by dropping some 
of the regressors in order to confirm this result. Model e2 
and e3 performed as good as e1 in terms of their likelihood 
ratio and likelihood index. In contrast, e4 was found 
insignificant and hence meaningless. 
Specifically, I found that for group A (failed/problem 
banks) real lending rate was the only significant factor 
which carried explanatory power in every alternative 
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specification. The positive sign of the coefficient 
indicated that rising interest rates were consistent with a 
rise the 
quarter 
likelihood 
lag. This 
expectation. 
of bank failure/problem 
coefficient confirm the 
after two 
a priori 
With respect to group B, real lending interest rates 
with two quarter lag (TIAA2B) is statistically significant. 
The negative sign suggest that increase in lending rates was 
reducing the likelihood of bank failure/problem. 
There are some firm conclusions to be obtained from the 
model. The sustained appreciation of the real exchange rate 
by more than 30% between 1978 to 1982 and the subsequent 
real depreciation as the authorities abandonned the fixed 
exchange regime did not explain the likelihood of 
failure/problem for group A. Also a similar conclusion was 
obtained for group B during the period between 1979-83. 
High and rising real lending interest rates were found 
important in the probability of failure/problem in group A 
indicated by the significant and positive sign of the lagged 
TIAA2A. If we recall the data on real interest rates suggest 
that during the period of study the lending rate never fell 
below 11%. Indeed, we see that during the period of 
interest rates came down from over 34% in 1978 to 
1979-80 
16% and 
11% during 1979 and 1980 respectively. Thereafter, real 
lending rate rose from 11% in 1980 to over 30% in 1982-83. 
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The estimated coefficient for real lending rates was 
also statistically significant for group B although its 
interpretation is more complicated since the coefficient of 
lagged interest rate is with a negative sign. 
Finally, the evidence does not support the view that 
the abrupt fluctuations in stock prices during this period 
of study did affect adversely the likelihood of bank 
failure/problem for group A and group B. The data from table 
2 showed a substantial increase in the stock price index by 
53% between 1978-80 and a more severe drop between 1980 and 
1983.(i.e. insignificant coefficient) 
-Conjecture 3: Predicted Probabilities from the Logit Model 
with Macroeconomic Variables. 
We have found so far some econometric evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the deterioration of the 
macroeconomic environment had some role to play in the 
failure/problem of banks. The most significant variables in 
explaining the likelihood of bank failure/problem were the 
change in GDP and the real lending interest rate. 
The next step is to select the best equation for 
prediction purposes. This will enable us to assess and 
compare the prediction accuracy of the model which include 
macroeconomic variables instead of accounting ratios already 
evaluated in chapter 6. However, given that the 
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macroeconomic variables were the same for each individual 
bank in each specific quarter, the model cannot predict the 
quarterly likelihood for each bank. In effect, the quarterly 
probability for a given year will be exactly the same for 
every single institution included in a given group. The best 
we can aim for is merely a comparison between the 
prediction for group A and B. Therefore, this approach does 
not have any practical application as an early warning 
model. 
In selecting the best equation we will look at some of 
the scalar estimated for each specification. To start 
the likelihood ratio test found insignificant 
with, 
at 1% 
confidence level specifications E2,E5, and e4. The remaining 
specifications did explained the likelihood of bank 
failure/problem. In other words, reject the null hypothesis. 
Among the remaining alternative equations, specification 
E3 from table 9 was preferred to the others on the basis of 
Akaike's information criterion (AIC). In addition, this 
equation display one of the highest likelihood ratio index 
and contain the two most significant macroeconomic 
variables. (i.e. GOP and lending interest rate) 
Tables 11a, 11b and 11c displayed the estimated 
probabilities for each group between 1979.1 to 1983.4. 
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Table 7.11a Prediction Accuracy of the E3 Logit Model for 
Group A and B During 1983 and 1982. 
-----------------------------
-------------------------------
1983 1982 
------------------------------------------------------------
I II III IV I II III IV 
------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP A 0.72 0.93 0.82 0.75 0.82 0.95 0.93 0.95 
GROUP B 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.19 0.17 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7.11b 
I 
Quarterly Prediction of the E3 Logit Model for 
Group A and B During 1981 and 1980. 
1980 1981 
II III IV I II III IV 
GROUP A 0.54 0.86 0.80 0.83 0.51 0.64 0.91 0.86 
GROUP B 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.38 0.21 0.10 0.17 
------------------------------------------------------------
Table 7.11c Quarterly Prediction of the E3 Logit Model for 
Group A and B for 1979. 
------------------------------------------------------------
I II III IV 
------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP A 0.72 0.64 0.83 0.87 
GROUP B 0.14 0.29 0.17 0.09 
------------------------------------------------------------
Although the model did not enable us to compare 
individual predictions it was useful in predicting the 
likelihood of failure between groups. At 0.50 cut-off point, 
the E3 equation showed a good prediction accuracy as it 
obtained very high ex ante probability of failure for group 
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A during 1983 and 1982. As we move further back to 1981 and 
1979, the predicted likelihood Is smaller. If we increase 
the cut-off point, say 0.8, the accuracy of the model 
started to decline and the number of type-I error start to 
emerge. Similar conclusion were reached for the case of 
group B. 
All in all, although the logit model estimated with 
macroeconomic variables did not prove to be useful for 
individual prediction purposes, it did provide some 
interesting results with respect to the hypothesis testing 
on the role of macroeconomic variables on the likelihood of 
bank failure/model. The next step is to test empirically the 
role of management decision making in the probability of 
bank failure/problem. In Chapter 8, I will argue that 
bankers responding to changes in risk incentives as a result 
of financial liberalisation did affect above all the health 
of the banking system. 
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Endnotes 
(1) Although the reduction in the inflation rate was one of 
the central objective a gradual anti-inflationary approach 
was followed at least until April 1975. It involved a 
gradual slow down in the monetary growth and a reduction in 
the fiscal deficit by means of the elimination of subsidies, 
employees, and the sale of publicly owned enterprises. 
(2) The shock treatment soon delivered some positive results 
as the fiscal deficit was reduced from 10% of GDP in 1975 to 
0.8% in 1978. A surplus was attained in the three subsequent 
years. Although the progress on inflation was also important 
as it felt from 343% in 1975 to just above 37% in 1978, it 
was still high relative to international standards and 
involved an extremely high cost. The fiscal shock was felt 
inmediately as the economy plunged into a recession with a 
fall in GOP by nearly 13% and unemployment rate almost at 
20% towards the end of 1975. 
(3) There are no complete con census among the experts on 
whether the experience of the Southern Cone Countries is 
relevant in order to evaluate the predictions of the 
monetary approach as an operational instrument. As Blejer 
(1983) pointed out these episodes involved exchange rate 
policy for stabilisation in conjunction with liberalisation 
reforms for structural changes. 
(4) A more thorough account and evaluation of stabilisation 
policies and liberalisation reforms is provided in chapter 
2. 
(5) For instance, Edwards (1988) showed if capital controls 
are gradually removed to allow an increase in capital 
inflows, then the increase in current expenditures in 
particular in non traded goods will increase its price and by 
definition lead to an equilibrium real appreciation. 
However, if the rate of capital inflows cannot be sustain in 
the long run, the real exchange rate should return to its 
long-run equilibrium. Therefore, temporary changes in 
fundamental can result in significant divergences between 
actual and equilibrium real exchange rate or what is 
normally known as exchange rate misalignment. The same 
dynamic is true when we look at the determination of stock 
price bubbles. See note 13. 
(6) This performance was also determined by the favorable 
economic environment of the world economy. 
(7) Cortes Douglas (1989) found that the highest growth 
rate during the period of 1926-82 corresponded to 1928 with 
24.3%. The long run trend between 1940-82 was 3%. 
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(8) If P=aPnt+(1-a)Pt then if the law of one price hold for 
tradables P t = e + P t f + ~ ~ then P = ( P t f + e + ~ ) + a ( P n t - P t ) . . Thus if 
Pt=Pnt then P = ( P t f + e + ~ ) ) where pt=tradable prices, 
Fnt=nontradable prIces Pt£=world tradable prices, e=expected 
devaluation, and ~ = t a r i f f . . This condition is valid as long 
as the government budget is in surplus, and the labour 
markets works efficiently. The government was confident that 
the law of one price could hold as they achieved fiscal 
surplus unlike Argentina. (See Corbo, De Melo, and Tybout 
1986) 
(9) Although there is an overwhelming concensus on the 
importance of capital inflows on the determination of the 
real exchange rate, Harberger(1985a,b) and Edwards(1986) 
maintained that capital inflows were exogeneous responding 
to the investor perception in the domestic profitability of 
investment. This produced an increasing demand of Chile's 
capital stock. In addition, they found that capital flows 
were insensitive to interest rates. This finding was 
corroborated by Sjaastad(1982).In contrast, Corbo (1987) 
found empirical evidence to support the view that capital 
flows were endogenous, that is explained by a portfolio 
adjustment model, although the coefficient for interest rate 
was insignificant. In my view, although capital inflows were 
paramount, the increases in absorption was responding to the 
significant growth in domestic loans financed by the 
substantial expansion in peso deposits as shown in chapter 
2. At the same time, wealth effects from the stock market 
should have also been important on expenditures. 
(10) Sjaastad (1985,1989) and Cortes Douglas (1985) argued 
that the fluctuation in real interest rates between 1979 and 
1982 can be explained by the fluctuation in the value of the 
dollar. They maintained that in a small open economy with 
fully integrated capital and goods markets to international 
markets, domestic nominal interest rates will be fairly well 
arbitraged with external rates, but real interest rates 
would be affected by fluctuations in the exchange rate of 
major currency countries, where such fluctuations will be 
transmitted by the external price of traded goods. 
(11) The increases in real wage also contributed to the rise 
in expenditures. 
(12) Although the spread exhibited a significant reduction, 
particularly between 1978 and 1979 which reflected among 
other things a growing financial integration due to the 
gradual removal of external restrictions, less uncertainty 
from .the exchange rate regime, and a SUbstantial increase in 
peso deposits, it remained stable around 2\ a month between 
1979 and 1981. In chapter 2, we offered a more detailed 
evaluation about interest rates and the hypothesis to 
explained their performance. 
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(13) Barandiaran (1983) and Meller and Solimano (1984) 
argued that substantial rise in stock prices will affect the 
behavior of economic agents as they feel richer and enable 
them to expand their demand for credit. Meller and Solimano 
found that the movement of stock prices which went from a 
situation of boom to crash followed a trajectory of an 
speculative bubble. That is stock prices exceeded the value 
determined by the "fundamentals". 
(14) As we have seen in chapter 2, the rise in nominal and 
real interest rates can be explained by the incidence from 
country-specific risk and exchange rate risk, increasing 
world interest rates, dollar deflation. 
(15) Instead the authorities subscribed themselves to the 
automatic adjustment predicted by the monetary approach via 
increases in interest rates. However, the banking system was 
behaving in a very non-conservative way rolling over bad 
debts, capitalising the interest, financing distress 
borrowing. Therefore, the demand for credit became interest 
inelastic and the banking system was exhibiting a type of 
conduct consistent with moral hazard. The same observation 
was true for international banks which lent resources with 
no apparent control and with a belief that the government 
was willing to bail-out the banking system if difficulties 
arises. 
(16) According to Cortes Douglas (1989) the 1982-83 output 
performance was the second worse in Chile's economic history 
after the 1931-32 economic depression when output declined 
by 17.1% and 26.8% respectively. 
(17) Edwards (1986) investigated the empirical relationship 
between the real exchange rate (REXR) and capital inflows. 
In addition he included the terms of trade and real output 
as determinants of their equilibrium. His results support 
the view that capital inflows were significant in explaining 
the REXR and the slow adjustment towards its new 
equilibrium. Morande (1988) not only confirmed these 
findings and but also found in his VAR model that capital 
inflows were close to being Granger-Causality prior to the 
real exchange rate as well as capital flows being exogenous. 
(18) Galvez and Tybout (1985) explored empirically the 
issues relating the performance and failure of nonfinancial 
firms during the period of 1977-82. Longitudinal data base 
of industrial financial statements was used to document real 
side and financial changes in firms'performance. The Galvez-
Tybout empirical work is in a sense the counterpart of the 
present study as we are looking at the performance and 
failure of financial institutions. 
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(19) Galvez and Tybout (1985) found that between 1977 and 
1981 the ratio of exportables to nontradable prices fell by 
25% as did the ratio of exportable to nontradable gross 
margins. The most significant change in gross margin 
occurred in 1979 when the adverse terms of trade compounded 
the efect of the sustained real appreciation. Importables 
improved its margin between 1977 and 1979 and by 1981 were 
higher than both exportables and nontradables. By 1981 
importable gross margin continued rising while exportable 
and nontradable margins were falling from the overvaluation 
and increasing overhead costs. 
(20) Galvez and Tybout reported that by 1978 exporters 
(grupo firms) showed a lower financial cost than nontradable 
and importable (independent firms). The former was paying 
14% while the latter 22%. However, this difference started 
to come down as result of the liberalisation of capital 
flows. As long as operating earnings were above financial 
costs, nontradable and importable sector were able to 
operate. When the interest rate rose from 1981 onwards the 
financial situation worsen for those firms. 
(21) According to Brock (1989), trade liberalisation 
produced an anticipated upward shift in the productivity of 
tradable production so that the large increase in the share 
of non-traded goods was a part of the transition period 
during which nontraded production was needed to restructure 
the economy. Lower copper prices and thus a substantial 
deterioration in the terms of trade in 1981 brought down the 
value of capital and land and thus relative price of non-
tradables. In his representative agent model, there is no 
money and prices are flexible. Although the model introduces 
important features of the Chilean economy, it is 
unrepresentative by excluding the monetary sector and 
assuming that non-tradable prices were flexible. In fact, 
the collapse in output and the misalignment of relative 
prices can be explained by monetary factors and the downward 
inflexibility of nontraded goods prices. 
(22) Although the ratio of liabilities in foreign currency 
relative to domestic currency rose during this period, it 
was found statistically insignificant as a discriminator 
between failed/problem banks and sound banks. See chapter 6. 
(23) In group AI, Pacifico, Unido Fomento, Hipotecario 
Chile, and Colocadora Nacional de Valores have missing 
observations in 1979(3Q),1983(4Q), and 1979(1Q) 
respectively. In group B1, BICE, Republic, Santander, 
Exterior have missing observations in 79(3Q), 79(2Q), 
79(1Q), and 79(lQ) respectively. 
(24) Amemiya (1985) and Green (1991) discuss unrestricted 
models with heterogeneity and/or state dependency. 
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(25) This contradict the evidence available for Chile. For 
instance, Sundararajan and Balino (1990) found significant 
evidence for a shift into currency and a rise in the 
interest elasticity of the demand for currency during the 
banking crisis. Also, they found that the demand for M2 
showed an upward shift and their interest rate elasticity 
increased reflecting a portfolio shift from non-bank 
financial institutions to bank deposits. 
(26) It should pointed out that this approach does not 
represent a formal empirical test for the Diamond-Dybvig 
effect. An alternative formulation would be to test the 
model for the correlation between the residuals, that is 
between e & e, or between e & e. 
it jt it it-l 
A priori I expect that the liquidity effect from any run for 
safety was neglible as a result of the public belief of the 
existence of an implicit deposit insurance. 
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Chapter 8. The Bank Failures in Chile: The Role of 
Moral Hazard. 
(8.1) Introduction. 
It could be argued that bank failures may arise from 
macroeconomic instability produced from external shocks 
and/or gross policy inconsistencies during a process of 
liberalisation. Chapter 7 had provided empirical evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the episodes of bank failures in 
Chile reflected the incidence of macroeconomic variables on 
the likelihood of bank failures. 
This chapter examines a competing hypothesis that the 
rise in bank failures reflected the bank's greater 
incentives to take undue risks. Indeed, as we have seen 
from chapter 3, moral hazard can be motivated and even 
aggravated by the specific steps taken by the authorities to 
deregulate the financial market. An ill-implemented 
privatisation which enhanced the formation of powerful 
"economic groups" and economic concentration, the abrupt 
deregulation of interest rates which resulted in stubbornly 
high rates of interest, the expectation of explicit 
government insurance on bank liabilities, and an ineffective 
prudential regulation and supervision all exacerbated moral 
hazard among financial institutions (bank management) and 
bank users (depositors). As we will see from the evidence 
these features were present during the liberlisation episode 
in Chile. 
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It is shown that the balance-sheet of chil 1 k 
- ean )an.5 
reflected greater risk-taking as a result of moral hazard. 
At the same time, logit model estimates support the moral 
hazard hypothesis as an explanation of the bank failures in 
Chile. 
(8.2) Financial Liberalisation and Koral Hazard. 
Recalling the discussion in chapter 4, moral hazard was 
seen as the propensity to take excessive risk in the context 
of a bet against the government. It will be shown in the 
next section that the existence of certain specific features 
in the financial market as a result of ill-designed and 
implemented financial liberalisation could excerbate the 
moral hazard problems. On this point, Diaz-Alejandro (1984) 
maintained that the intrinsic imperfections in financial 
markets and the policy dilemmas they posed explain the 
collapse of financial institutions in the Southern Cone, 
particularly in Chile. Specifically, the development of bank 
holding company structure and a significant concentration of 
financial activities among few financial institutions, the 
existence of implicit or improperly priced explicit deposit 
insurance with respect to the bank's asset risks, a sharp 
deregulation of interest rates, and a weak prudential 
regulation either by design or enforcement would introduce 
Incentives towards excessive risk-taking by banks and its 
customers and hence increase the probability of bank 
failures. 
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Diagram 1 describes the basic elements of the hypothesis 
of moral hazard on bank failures. The existence of policy-
induced factors (financial liberalisation) exacerbates moral 
hazard and adverse selection type of behaviour which arise 
under information asymmetries. Specifically, the existence 
of a bankholding company structure combined with a fixed 
rate underpriced deposit insurance, rapid deregulation of 
domestic interest rates, and a weak and inefficient 
prudential regulation and supervision provided banks with a 
greater incentive to increase risk-taking (asset risk, 
higher leverage, lower capital and reserves requirements) 
hence increasing the likelihood of bank failures. Financial 
and accounting ratios constructed from banks' balance-sheet 
data should reflect the banks' incentive to take greater 
risks. 
Diagram 8.1 
Bank Holding 
Company 
Structure 
Factors Affecting Moral Hazard and Bank 
Failures 
Free Deposit Ineffective Sharp 
Insurance Prudential Interest 
Regulation Rate Freed 
I 
Moral Hazard/Excessive Risk-Taking Proxies for 
Risk-Taking 
Bank Failure/Problems 
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(8.3) ~ ~ Evidence from Chile. 
The evidence from Chile's experience with financial 
liberalisation and the subsequent banking debacle 1n 1982-83 
confirm the presence of those factors outlined in the 
previous sub-section and their likely effect on increasing 
risk-taking and the collapse of some banking firms. Although 
the role of an adverse macroeconomic environment (external 
factors to the banks) was tested and confirmed in chapter 7, 
the good predictive performance of the early warning model 
of chapter 6 suggest that the financial debacle would have 
been forseen a few years earlier. Indeed, the incidence of 
an ill-designed financial liberalisation was already 
inducing excessive risk-taking well before the 
deterioration of the macroeconomy. Therefore, the role of 
moral hazard in the debacle of the Chilean banking system 
should be considered as central in any explanation of bank 
failures. 
Looking at the banking structure in Chile which arose 
during the liberalisation period indicates three distinct 
features: Firstly, three commercial banks controlled nearly 
50% of the overall asset portfolio of the banking system. 
Secondly, financial institutions were owned by few and 
powerful economic conglomerates. 
And thirdly, the evidence shows that a large proportion 
of the banks' loan portfolio was allocated among their 
affiliates. 
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Table 8.1 Banks Ranking According to 
Portfolio.(%) 
Total Loan 
------------------------------------------------------------
Banks 1981 1983 Banks 1981 1983 
------------------------------------------------------------
Chile 20.5 22.0 O'Higgins 3.1 3.1 
Estado 16.7 16.8 Osorno 3.0 2.1 
Santiago 8.7 10.7 Unido de Fo. 2.5 
Credito 6.7 5.5 Edwards 2.4 3.2 
Sud Americano 5.5 5.5 Nacional 2.2 2.0 
Concepcion 4.9 4.6 Colocadora Nac. 2.1 1.9 
Hipotecario Fo. 3.8 3.6 Internacional 1.5 1.2 
Hipotecario Ch. 3.4 Continental 1.3 1.1 
Trabajo 3.4 3.3 BICE 1.2 1.4 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
The data from table 1 indicate that three commercial 
banks (Chile, Estado, and Santiago) controlled 49.5% of 
total loans of the banking system during 1983. For instance, 
Bank of Chile alone had a 22% control of the total loans of 
the system and this figure greatly exceeded the average 
participation of domestic commercial banks of 5.5% ( 2.7% 
excluding the three largest banks). Also, further evidence 
from SIBF suggests that the participation of foreign banks 
is even less important. For instance, the Citibank exhibits 
the highest share of total loans of the system with only 
1.7%. while the rest of the foreign institutions were 
falling below 0.7%. 
The banking system in Chile was owned and controlled by 
powerful economic groups organised in a tighly knit web of 
onwership links which included financial firms (banks, non-
bank financial institutions, and insurance) and non-
financial firms. 
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Table 2, which was taken from Dahse\s research, shows 
the degree of concentration of economic groups. Dahse (1979) 
found that only five economic conglomerates controlled 36\ 
of the 250 biggest firms and 53% of the total capital. For 
instance, "group" Cruzat-Larrain was the largest 
conglomerate with U$ 936 millions which was equivalent to 
nearly 25% of the total worth of the 250 firms valued at U$ 
3.788 millions. 
Table 8.2a The degree of Concentration of Chile's Economic 
Groups. 
Conglomerate (a) Firms % Ownership U$ % 
Cruzat-Larrain (CL) 37 14.8 936.88 24.7 
Vial J. (V) 25 10.0 477.30 12.6 
Matte E. (M) 12 4.8 325.31 8.6 
Angelini A. (A) 8 3.2 141.80 3.7 
Luksic A. (L) 8 3.2 139.06 3.6 
Galmez (G) 2 0.8 98.23 2.6 
Edwards A. (E) 9 3.6 95.95 2.5 
Yarur Banna (Y) 4 1.6 92.02 2.4 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Dahse (1979) 
(a) Data for 1978. 
There was no economic conglomerate which did not totally 
control (owned) or at least share joint ownership of one or 
more financial institutions. Indeed, Dahse (1979) maintained 
that private banking was owned by no more than fifty 
individuals. 
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Table 8.2b Banks' Ownership by Economic Groups in 1978. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Banks CL v M A L G E y Otro(o) 
---------------------------------
---------------------------
Chile 31 
Santiago 100 
Credito 
SudAmericano 
Concepcion 
Hipotecario Fo. 55 
Hipotecario Ch. 
Trabajo 
Unido Fomento 
Colocadora Nac. 100 
BrCE 
10 
7.5 3 
91 
3 
100 
21 
15 
20 
1 
77 
1 
22 (a) 
6 (b) 
24 (c) 
47 (d) 
45 (e) 
59 (f) 
20 (g) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Dahse (1979) 
(a) It is composed by families Hirmas (9.5), Soza(4), 
Menendez(3), Andina(3), and Garcia Vela(2.5) 
(b) The six percent is owned by Group Scheiss. 
(c) It includes Molineros Ass. (18), and Scheiss (6) 
(d) Ascui 9.8, Saenz Bros. 9.5, Martinez & Cueto 9.2, Giner 
7.5, Ruiz 8.0, and Acosta & Cosmeli 3.0. 
(e) 45% was owned by group Soza. 
(f) 20% was under the control of the Said family and 39% 
corresponded to capital from Venezuela. 
(g) Group Avalos & Gonzales hold 20% of the bank. 
The evidence from table 2a and 2b clearly indicates that 
Cruzat-Larrain, the largest economic group, owned totally 
Colocadora Nacional and Banco de Santiago, and had a 
majority holding in Banco Hipotecario de Fomento. Moreover, 
they had a 10% ownership of Banco de Chile. Similarly, J. 
Vial, the second largest group, also controlled several 
financial institutions among them, Banco Hipotecario de 
Chile with 91%, Banco de Chile with 31%, and two 
"financieras" (Finasa, and Atlas) which controlled nearly 
20% of the total credit of that segment. 
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What is clear from the evidence presented is that the 
the two two largest economic conglomerates controlled 
largest banks of the system (Chile and santiago). Moreover, 
those banks associated with the economic conglomerates were 
liquidated or intervened in order to be merged or sold 
later. For instance, we saw in chapter 3 that Hipotecario de 
Chile and Unido de Fomento were liquidated, whilst Chile, 
Santiago, Colocadora Nacional, Concepcion, and Internacional 
were intervened in 1983. The list of problem banks was also 
larger as it included those financial entities which were 
forced to sell a mounting stock of non-performing loans. 
The increasing concentration of credit among three large 
banks and the ownership and control of these institutions by 
large economic conglomerates meant a substantial 
concentration of loan portfolios among their own affiliates 
and a significant rise in the stock of nonperforming and 
risky loans. Table 2c shows the magnitude of the loan 
concentration and the problem of "related portfolios" in 
Chile. 
Before we examine the evidence, it should be stressed 
that the identification and measurement of related 
portfolios is far from being a simple problem. In theory, a 
related portfolio problem may arise from an ownership or 
managerial interrelationship. In the former, a debtor can be 
a bank's stockholder and/or a partner/shareholder of a 
commercial firm which in turn ownes the bank's shares. In 
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other words, the relationship can be direct or through third 
parties, whereas in the latter, the link relates directors, 
managers, and adviser with the bank itself. 
In practice however, several possible links can be 
established by individuals, commercial firms, and other 
entities which will make a precise definition a difficult 
task. The Superintendency of Banks had introduced a more 
practical definition which considers the existence of a 
"pressumed" link between the bank and the debtor. They 
defined a pressumed link whenever there appears to be a 
bank's preferential treatment toward certain borrowers. 
Once we have a working definition of those individuals 
and/or entities which are related to a specific 
firm, we are able to measure the magnitude of the 
portfolio concentration. 
banking 
related 
There are three important observations from the data of 
table 2c. Firstly, the two largest banks in Chile exhibit 
the largest credit concentration among their affiliates. For 
instance, Banco de Santiago and Banco Chile had 42.3% and 
18.6% of their total loans as related portfolios during 
December 1982 respectively. These figures are even higher 
and more meaningful with respect to capital and reserves, 
reaching four and three times the banks' capital. The stock 
of related portfolio worsened in 1983 as the authorities 
uncovered more information about the quality and structure 
of the banks' loan portfolios. 
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Table 8.2c Credit Concentration With Banks' Affilates. 
------------------------------------------
------------------
Related Portfolios(RP)/Loans RP/Capital 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Banks December 82 February 83 April 83 Dec 82 
------------------------------------------
------------------
Intervened Banks 
------------------------------------------------------------
Santiago(CL) 
Colocadora Nac(CL) 
Chile(CL,V) 
Hipotecario Fo(CL) 
Internacional 
Average 
42.3 
23.8 
18.6 
18.5 
22.8 
25.2 
45.8 
24.4 
19.7 
18.9 
25.9 
27.0 
47.8 
24.2 
17.8 
19.8 
20.5 
26.0 
413.5 
321.2 
300.3 
335.0 
164.6 
306.9 
-----------------------------------
-------------------------
Non-Intervened Banks 
------------------------------------------------------------
Nacional 
Sud Americano(V,L) 
Edwards 
Credito(Y) 
Concepcion(o) 
O'Higgins 
Osorno 
BICE(M) 
Trabajo(E) 
Average 
25.7 
14.8 
14.9 
11.9 
12.2 
9.1 
5.6 
4.0 
1.6 
11.0 
30.1 
16.2 
15.4 
12.0 
12.0 
8.9 
5.9 
5.5 
1.9 
12.0 
27.5 
18.1 
14.4 
12.1 
12.0 
12.1 
9 • 4 
4.2 
3.3 
12.6 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
252.6 
226.3 
232.8 
166.5 
146.7 
94.6 
56.3 
49.2 
22.3 
138.6 
Secondly, banks with the largest credit concentrations 
were owned by single economic conglomerates. For example, 
Banco de Santiago and Colocadora Nacional de Valores were 
totally controlled by Cruzat-Larrain. Similarly, Banco de 
Chile was jointly controlled by Cruzat-Larrain and J. Vial 
with 31% and 10% each. 
Thirdly, financial institutions rescued by the 
authorities were mainly owned by Cruzat-Larrain and 
exhlbited a significantly larger credit concentration with 
respect to their total stock of loans and capital and 
reserves. For instance, the group of non-intervened banks 
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presented an average credit concentration of 11% of total 
loans (138% of their capital and reserves) in December 1982. 
In contrast, for the group of intervened banks these numbers 
were more than doubled with 25% of total credit. (306% of 
capital and reserves). 
Overall, the problem of related portfolios involved 
nearly 20% of the system's total stock of credit and nearly 
2.5 times the capital and reserves. Undoubtedly, banks acted 
in a non-conservative way following their indifference about 
the concentration of their risk portfolio and the 
maximisation of the expected returns. 
Apart from the influence of the banking structure in 
Chile, the belief that there was an implicit deposit 
insurance exacerbated the problem of moral hazard. Financial 
liberalisation reforms and the authorities sent the wrong 
signal to both the public and the bankers. 
Right from the beginning of financial liberalisation the 
authorities stressed the point that financial institutions 
would be totally responsible, just like any other private 
commercial enterprise, for their financial losses and 
obligations with their liabilities' holders. This attempt to 
introduce a market mechanism into the banking system 
supposed that any losses incurred by financial institutions 
would be shared by banks and their customers. However, in 
spite of these continuous announcements, the authorities 
bailed out some banking institutions in two separate 
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instances before the debacle of 1982-83. In January 1977, 
the Superintendency of Banks intervened in Banco Osorno and 
a day later introduced a free public deposit insurance to 
protect small savers up to a limit of U$ 2.789. 
Simultaneously, the Central Bank made explictly clear its 
willingness to provide financial support to Banco Osorno. 
A second and even more powerful signal which reinforced 
this belief was the intervention and subsequent liquidation 
of four banks and four non-bank financial institutions 
(financieras) in December 1981. As presented in chapter 3, 
Banks Talca, Linares, Espanol, and Fomento de Valparaiso, 
followed by Financieras Cash, Capitales, Compania General 
Financiera, and Finansur which accounted for no more than 
10% of the total deposits and loans in the system received 
Central Bank's financial support. 
The financial liberalisation reforms failed to introduce 
an efficient and credible explicit deposit insurance. 
Instead the banking system was left with the worst possible 
scenario, a deregulated system with an implicit deposit 
insurance. After the bank failures of 1981, the authorities 
made an attempt to establish an explicit voluntary deposit 
insurance which was expected to complement the existing 
deposit guarantee for small savers enacted after the 
collapse of Bank Osorno. This insurance was designed to be 
offered by banks to its customers for deposits equal to or 
less than U$ 5,100. The thrust of this initative was short-
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lived since it lacked the bankers' and depositors' support 
and the authorities failed to implemented it fully. 
It is clear that the banking and monetary authorities 
sent conflicting signals to the market's participants and 
confirmed the belief in the existence of a de facto deposit 
insurance. Moreover, the liberalisation reforms did not 
include an explicit scheme to insure deposits. The public 
belief in the existence of a free public 
contributed 
standards. 
towards a further relaxation 
guarantee 
of credit 
It could be argued that the widespread relaxation of 
bank practices and risk-taking would have been restrained if 
financial liberalisation had included an adequate and 
efficient supervision aided by an early prevention system. 
At the same time, the authorities were left with only two 
alternatives to regularise a bank subject to solvency 
problem: a specific time limit (two years) to comply with 
additions to capital, or liquidation. 
For instance, bank legislation in Chile during the 
liberalisation period did state limits on credit 
concentration either among affiliates or non-affiliates. As 
we have seen already in more detail in chapter 2, banks were 
allowed to lend to a single borrower an equivalent of 5% of 
its own capital and reserves and 25% if the loan was secured 
by good quality collateral. The evidence from above clearly 
demostrates that these limits were surpassed several times. 
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The establishment of "paper firms" once the limits on 
individual firms were reached, the common practice of cross-
credit allocation between "economic groups", and credlt 
allocation via "off-shore" financial institutions owned by 
the conglomerates enabled them to exceed these limits 
unnoticed. 
Similarly, 
capitalisation 
the rolling-over of bad debts 
of the interest was also a clear 
and the 
indication 
that regulation was ineffective. After 1976, the 
authorities set a 90 days' limit to recognise a bad debt and 
instructed the inmediate 100% individual provision. At the 
same time, there was an overall provision of 2% of total 
loans. However, the rapid growth of bank loans during 1979-
80 encouraged a relaxation in the global provision to only 
0.75% and 24 months' limit for the creation of an 
individual provision once a bad debt was recognised. The 
evidence presented in chapter 3 shows a significant 
increment in the ratio of non-performing and risky loans 
sold to the Central Bank relative to capital once the 
banking collapse unfolded and there was an explict 
recognition of the quality of loan portfolios. In fact, 
this ratio went from 78% in 1982 to 186% in 1984. These data 
coincided with an explosive growth in loans of nearly 35% 
average per annum between 1977 and 1981, and high real 
lending rate of more than 42% between 1975 and 1982. 
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By any 
inadequate 
standards, regulation and supervision 
and ineffective in encouraging 
was 
loan 
diversification, adequate provision for bad loans, and a 
more sustainable and conservative growth in bank assets. At 
the same time, the supervisors failed to provide the public 
with timely and reliable information about the financial 
condition (quality of loan portfolios, and profitability) of 
each bank. The authorities' fresh attempt to introduce a 
method of loan classification according to risk in 1980 was 
too modest and too late. At the same time, the fact that the 
information was not at the public disposal suggested the 
magnitude of the problem in hand. The increment of the 
minimum capital requirement for commercial banks from U$ 4 
millions in 1978 to U$ 10.4 millions in 1980 was 
insufficient to cover to mounting expected losses in the 
system. 
The new bank legislation which emerged after the banking 
debacle aimed at correcting the omissions and shortcomings 
of the existing regulation. The Banking Act of 1986 entitled 
the authorities with the responsability for ensuring the 
safety and stability of the financial system by providing 
elements for a continuous assessment of banks's financial 
conditions, providing information to the public, introducing 
an explicit deposit insurance, and a mechanism to deal with 
problem banks effectively. 
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It is clear that the prudential regulation and 
supervision framework which prevailed during the years of 
financial deregulation and growing competition failed to 
promote sound banking and prevent with a significant time 
lead the collapse of the banking system and the expensive 
rescue operation. 
Finally, another related factor to financial 
liberalisation which enhanced the moral hazard problem and 
increased the probability of bank failure was the rapid 
deregulation of interest rates. As stated in the description 
of the Chilean financial reforms and discussed in chapter 2, 
the monetary authorities followed a sharp deregulation of 
domestic interest rates. It began in May 1974 with the 
elimination of interest rate controls impossed on non-bank 
financial institutions and was followed shortly by the 
freeing of interest rates for commercial banks in October of 
the same year. As we have seen from the evidence, the abrupt 
financial deregulation brought about an initial overshooting 
in nominal and real interest rates. The data from chapter 2 
indicated that in 1975 nominal and real lending rates 
reached 498% and 114% respectively. Despite the gradual 
opening to capital inflows, these rates failed to converge 
to international levels and remained stubbornly high and 
volatile. Indeed, the lowest lending rate occurred in 1980 
with nearly 47% in nominal terms and 11.3% in real terms. 
The evidence confirmed the coincidence of high interest 
rates with an explosive growth in banks' assets (loans) and 
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subsequently with a significant deterioration in the quality 
of bank loan portfolios measured by the ratio of non-
performing loans sold to the Central Bank (NPLSCB) relative 
to capital and reserves (K). The average asset growth rate 
per annum between 1977 and 1983 was 29.5% with a peak of 
50.4% while the average real lending rate over the same 
period was 26.8% This explosive asset growth at an 
extremely high real cost of borrowing coincided with a 
spectacular rise in non-performing loans during 1982 and 
1983 with 78.8% and 158.1% of capital and reserves 
respectively. In consequence, deregulation of interest rates 
and hence high domestic rates worsened the banks' moral 
hazard as they extended significant credits at high costs 
and with a low probability of repayment to their own 
affilates and non-affiliates. 
In sum, the evidence from Chile confirms the existence 
of the dominance of a few banks which as a matter of fact 
were controlled by powerful "economic conglomerates". 
Moreover, the public believed in a de facto deposit 
guarantee which, combined with a weak prudential regulation 
and supervision, motivated a rapid expansion in bank loans 
and liabilities, and a significant loan concentration among 
their affiliates. This excessive risk-taking by market 
participants (bankers and depositors) should partly explain 
the bank failures of 1982-83. 
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(8.4) Bank Failures and the Role of Moral Hazard: 
A Testable Model For Chile. 
Although there have been several studies supporting the 
hypothesis that the specific features which prevailed 
during the liberalisation of the financial market led to a 
moral hazard type of conduct by financial institutions and 
the subsequent collapse of the banking system, no empirical 
verification for the development of a bank failure 
predicting model has been conducted in the case of Chile. 
The moral hazard hypothesis implies simply that banks 
would be willing to take greater risks (beyond the social 
optimum) which in turn should be reflected in terms of the 
banks' quality of loan portfolios, the banks' capability to 
absorb their losses via reserve and capital requirements, 
the liability structure, and the growth rates of banks' 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, any model testing the 
role of moral hazard (excessive risk-taking) on the 
likelihood of bank failure should include proxies which 
measure the quality of the banks' assets and liabilities. As 
we will see in the next sub-section, some of the empirical 
research in this area have followed this approach, although 
the list is very limited. 
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(8.4.1) General Framework. 
There have been few attempts to model and test moral 
hazard in the literature of bank failures. In effect, most 
of the empirical work has been oriented towards testing the 
influence of deposit insurance on banks' risk-taking: 
particularly relevant are Clair (1984), Grossman (1992) and 
Wheelock (1992). For instance, Claire (1984) was one of the 
earliest attempts to test moral hazard in the context of the 
deposit insurance literature for the US. The hypothesis that 
the provision of federal deposit insurance resulted in 
greater risk-taking was tested using financial ratios of 
credit union institutions as dependent variables in the 
regressions. In his model financial ratios tend towards an 
optimal value so that any deviation from this optimum was 
1 
an indication of moral hazard. Any change in the secular 
trend resulting from the provision of deposit insurance was 
modelled by using a binary variable (dummy) which interacted 
with a time variable. If the coefficient of the dummy which 
separates the data in to two sub-periods (preinsurance and 
insurance periods) was significant, this indicated that the 
trend of the optimal ratio of the dependent variable had 
changed between the two periods. The regressions for the 
capital ratio (capital and reserves/total loans) and 
delinquency rate (loans with payment delinquent for two 
months or more/total loans) suggested an increment in risk 
following the provision of deposit insurance. 
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Similarly, Grossman (1992) also tested the 
consequences of deposit insurance on the 
moral hazard 
US thrift 
institutions during the 1930's using balance-sheet data from 
insured and uninsured entities. The foreclosures-asset ratio 
(non-performing loans) was taken as an appropiate proxy for 
thrifts' risk-taking and regressed against institution-
specific characteristics, particularly the insurance status, 
and annual dummies measuring changes in economic conditions. 
Among the regressors, the insurance status was modelled 
also with a dummy variable and found positive and 
significant among the thrifts which were state-chartered and 
insured. 
In the present study, I have relied also on banks' 
balance-sheet to test the significance of moral hazard on 
the likelihood of failure. Indeed, in order to assess the 
moral hazard consequences of these factors, an appropiate 
measure of bank risk-taking is needed which is sensitive, 
among other things, to changes in incentives facing bank 
managers. For instance, managers can choose the quality of 
their loan portfolios as well as having some discretion over 
capital adequacy and provisions. 
The expected mean and variance of loan returns obtained 
from an efficient examination and classification of loan 
portfolios is an ideal measurement of risk-taking, if 
available. It follows that a risk-averse bank would make 
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comparatively low-risk low-return loans with high quality 
collateral than a less risk-averse entity. 
In the absence of such detailed information, as was the 
case of Chile during the period of study, I relied on some 
selected proxies estimated from banks' balance sheet 
information to assess the propensity for risk-taking. Unlike 
Clair and Grossman's papers, selected financial ratios in 
this study were included as the model's regressors in order 
to estimate a binary choice model. The dichotomous dependent 
variable was set equal to 1 for failed/problem banks and 0 
otherwise. 
Short, O'Driscoll, and Berger (1985) and Wheelock (1992) 
also tested a binary model with banks' balance-sheet data to 
ascertain the impact of risk-taking on the probability of 
failure. For instance, Short, O'Driscoll, and Berger's study 
focused on the microeconomic determinants of bank failures, 
particularly managerial decisions concerning risk-taking. 
They tested for the effect of changes in some selected 
financial ratios, including, capital-assets, loans-assets, 
US Treasury securities-assets, deposits-liabilities, and 
purchased funds-liabilities ratios, on the probability of 
bank failure. They hold the view that given that banks' 
managers can exert control over these ratios, their choices 
should reflect changes in the incentives towards risk-
taking. The probit estimates indicated that the quality of 
banks' assets and the vulnerability to deposit outflows were 
398 
important determinants of bank failures in the us, 
particularly for the period 1982-83. 
Wheelock (1992) has also found empirical evidence for 
the 1920's using the same framework but also included a 
2 
dummy for the insurance status. In general, these models 
were successful in testing increasing risk-taking and its 
impact on the probability of bank failures. 
However, I depart somewhat from this framework in two 
ways: Firstly, the model is estimated by assuming a logistic 
distribution of the random term as explained thoroughly in 
chapter 6. 
Secondly, although the model included financial ratios 
estimated from the banks' balance-sheets, the moral hazard 
effect was captured by the ratio's deviation from its own 
trend. I assume that that the optimal value for the 
financial ratio is given by the time trend. Specifically, 
* 
r = a+bt where t=1,2, ... ,n and t is the time trend. Thus, 
t 
in the absence of moral hazard the management behaves as if 
it seeks to adjust for any difference between the actual and 
optimal ratio. However, the actual financial ratio r is 
t 
affected by moral hazard so that any significant deviation 
* 
of the ratio r over the optimal r indicates a bank's 
t t 
attitude to take greater risks beyond the optimal, ceteris 
paribus. 
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(8.4.2) The Model and the Econometric Specification. 
(8.4.2.1) Model Specification and Estimation. 
The descriptive and explanatory model of bank failure 
depicted below allow us to assess the influence of the 
features which emerged during financial liberalisation on 
risk-taking and the subsequent increase in the probability 
3 
of bank failure. Indeed, the interaction of bank management, 
government regulators, and depositors is seen to have a 
direct and indirect effect on the likelihood of failure. 
The model implictly assumes that the economy is 
populated by rational optimising agents. In a two-period 
setting a risk-neutral bank attempts to maximise its book 
4 
net worth by choosing its loan portfolio, loan policy 
including the collateral (C), interest rate (t), and the 
amount spent on screening and monitoring (E), minus the 
expected value of the bankruptcy penalty (c). That is, max 
BNW cF(y+d<-k) where F( ) is the likelihood of bank 
failure as we shall see shortly. 
The model assumes that the bank has a given amount of 
capital (K) at the beginning of the period, and accumulates 
earnings (R) and losses (L) over the period, and spends (E) 
on screening and monitoring bank loans. The stream of bank's 
cash flow Y (net bank income) is given by [(RI-LI-El),(R2-
L2-E2), ... ,(Ri-Li-Ei»). Moreover, the bank may also pay 
dividends (S), and issues new capital (N) at the end of the 
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period. For simplicity I assume that bank's investment in 
securities is zero. 
The bank has issued a mix of deposits on which it 
promises to make a stream of payments [01,D2, ... ,Dil that 
has a total value of D. Although all assets and liabilities 
should be marked to market values to be more accurate, in 
practice we apply historical cost accounting 
approximation of the true bank's worth. 
( 1 ) x = Y + D < 0 
as an 
In expression (1) the asset's net cash flows from its 
loan structure is insufficient to pay the depositors' claims 
(negative net worth). In order to prevent a failure the bank 
may uses funds from its initial capital and reserves. 
Therefore, in this context failure occurs if condition (2a) 
holds. 
(2a) X = Y + 0 + K < 0 
Thus, expression (2a) suggests that a bank failure 
occurs if negative cash flow is greater than bank's capital, 
or more generally, as shown by expression (2b), if deposit 
outflows (D) exceed bank's capital and reserves (K) plus net 
income from bank's assets (Y) plus new issues (N) minus 
dividends (3). 
(2b) 0 > K + Y + N - 3 
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Given that 0 > K+Y+N-S implies that S > K+Y-D+N > Y-D 
then S=O. Dividends must be zero since they cannot exceed 
the bank's net cash flows (X). Also, it is assumed that the 
bank issues capital only when the bank's net cash flow X is 
positive. Thus, if s=o and N=O , and dividing expression 
(2a) by bank's total assets (A) we obtain 
(3a) x = d + Y + k < 0 
(3b) x = d + y < -k 
where d= DIA 
y= Y/A 
k= KIA 
Thus, the probability of bank failure (F) will depend on 
the probability that d+y<-k. Specifically, 
(4) F = Prob(d+y<-k) 
or more generally 
(4a) F = ~ ( d , y , k ) )
In this model, the quality (riskiness) of bank assets 
(loans) is captured by the parameter a and under the direct 
control of bank's management. For instance, if the bank 
manager chooses a riskier loan portfolio which entails a 
high loan concentration with its affiliates, or designs a 
loan contract with a high interest rate t and a low 
collateral requirement C, then the value of Y becomes 
riskier (variable). In consequence, a higher value of a, 
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other things being equal, implies a higher F. Since a 
describes the riskiness of Y we can substitute «for Y in 
expression (4a). Similarly, F is also positively related to 
k, although the bank exercises less discretion over its 
value than «. 
The model may also include an indirect effect on F via 
the value of d. If we assume that there is no prudential 
regulation and supervision, and deposits remain uninsured, 
then any change in the value of « and/or k will affect F and 
hence d. Specifically, as F rises the risk-return ratio 
facing uninsured depositors also increases producing in turn 
a rise in deposit withdrawals. Expression (4a) can be 
express as follows: 
(4b) F = ~ [ d ( F ) , « , k ] ] where 6d/6F)0 6F/6«)0 
6F/c5k)0 
By applying Taylor's expansion we separate the direct and 
indirect effects on F as shown by expression (4c). 
(4c) F = f(<<,k) + d(F) 
The next step is to 
where f=direct effect of bank 
management on F 
model 
d= indirect effect from 
depositors on F 
the impact of deposit 
insurance and prudential regulation on bank management ( f ) 
and depositors (d) , and the value of F. I assume that 
depositors are fully insured with no cost (or de facto 
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deposit insurance). The value of deposit insurance (I) is 
equal to the value of deposits (d). The term I can also be 
considered as the access to the discount window (lender of 
last resort) when d+y<-k. It follows that the bank failure 
condition in expression (3b) becomes d+y+1<-k and then we 
have: 
(5a) F = f [ ~ ( 1 ) , k ( I ) , 1 ( F ) ) ] + d(F) 
By Taylor's expansion we separate the overall effects on F 
so we obtain (5b) 
(5b) F = f [ ~ ( I ) , k ( I ) ] ] + [d(F) - I(F)] 
Expression (5b) shows that the existence of full deposit 
insurance (I) affects both ~ ~ and k. Indeed, bank managers 
will be willing to take more risk (moral hazard) by choosing 
higher ~ ~ and k and hence rising F. Also, the effect of 
deposit insurance will make depositors less sensitive to 
changes in F via the effect I(F) on the overall value of F. 
Notice that the value of I depends on F, that is I(F). This 
follows from the assumption that banks are entitled to 
deposit insurance and emergency loans, and the larger is the 
probability of failure F the more likely a bank will have to 
recourse on the deposit insurance and/or emergency loans. 
Finally, the model introduces the effect of prudential 
regulation and supervision (G) on the likelihood of bank 
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failure (F). I assume that there is direct impact on bank 
management. Specifically, banks with high ~ ~ and k and hence 
f are likely to face supervision. Therefore, it should 
constrain the banks' choice over parameters ~ ~ and k, hence 
reducing f. Moreover, the likelihood of supervision would 
depend on the value of F. 
The effect of supervision and regulation can be seen by 
modifying expression (5b) so we obtain 
(6a) F = f [ ~ ( I ) , k ( I ) , G ( F ) J J + d(F) - I(F) 
By Taylor's expansion we get an expression with separate 
components defined in (6b) 
(6b) F = f [ ~ ( I ) , k ( I ) ] ] + [d(F) - I(F)] - G(F) 
Expression (6b) is a general specification where the 
negative sign of G(F) indicates that regulatory intervention 
is likely to reduce the likelihood of bank failure (F). 
Moreover, it will offset the insurance effect on F as it 
constrain the value of parameter ~ ~ and k. With respect to 
depositors confidence, the effect of G on the value of d is 
indirect via changes in F. 
In general, expression (6b) describes the interactions 
among banks, depositors, and regulators in determining the 
probability of bank failure (F). 
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The next step is to estimate the model by assuming that 
the failure condition y+d<-k and the value of F given by 
(6b). However, y and d are unknown with certainty so that 
the model should related y+d<-k with the bank's financial 
condition (Fe). If the bank's financial condition is weak 
then the failure condition will hold. 
(7a) y-d+k = Fe + e 
it it 
where i= 1,2, ... ,n 
t= 1,2, ... ,T 
Thus, the failure condition in (7a) is related to Fe for 
ith bank in time t plus a random term e. Fe can be taken as 
a composite measure of the bank's financial condition of 
selected proxies as shown in (7b). 
(7b) Fe 
it 
taking. 
= xl3 
it 
where x=K-vector of selected 
proxies measuring 
risk-taking 
6= K-vector of unknown 
parameters 
With this deterministic process described by expression 
(7b) we are able to convert it to a model of the 
probability of failure. This model is conditioned on well 
defined and selected proxies from banks' balance-sheet data 
which measure excessive risk-taking (moral hazard). 
To begin with, the model assumes that there is a 
theoretical (unknown) index e which is determined by some 
selected proxies for risk-taking. This index measures a 
bank's propensity to fail and is unobservable from the 
data. Given that e is a function of well-defined random and 
independent explanatory variables (proxies) the logit model 
should provide suitable estimates of this function and 
hence for the value of e. 
If the dependent variable Y is equal to 1 when a bank 
fails and Y equal 0 otherwise, and each bank has a critical 
cutoff point e which reflects the index e classification 
process, then we have: if e > e the bank fails and 
vice versa. 
Given that the logit model assumes that e is a random 
variable with a logistic distribution then it follows that 
the probability that e > e can be computed from the 
cumulative logistic probability distribution. 
The logit model was specified for panel data which 
consisted of observations made on individual banks over an 
specified interval of time. In addition the model was 
restricted by assuming that observations are independent for 
both individuals and over time. These simplifying 
restrictions were considered desirable since the approach to 
estimate the model was straightforward and similar to the 
cross-section model estimated in chapter V but with more 
observations. 
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Thus, the restricted univariate binary choice model for 
panel data is defined as follows: 
( 8 ) P(Y = 1) = F( x ~ ~ a) = 
it it 
F( 9 ) 
it 
i = 1,2, ... ,n 
t = 1,2, ... ,T 
Expression (8) defines Y as a sequence of independent 
binary random variable taking the value of 1 if the ith bank 
failed/problem at time t, and 0 otherwise. Also x is K-
vector of known proxies measuring risk-taking, and a is a K-
vector of unknown parameters. F is defined as cumulative 
probability distribution. 
The cumulative probability function enables us to 
translate the values of the independent and stochastic 
explanatory variables which range in value over the entire 
real line to a probability which ranges from 0 to 1. 
(9) P(Y = 1) = F(9) 
it 
= F (x' a) = 
it 
= 1/1 + e 
x ~ a a
f f(9)d9 
-00 
-9 
= 1/1 + e 
-(x'6) 
In expression (9), F(x'6) is equal to the cumulative 
standard logistic function so that it assigns to a number 9 
A 
the probability that any arbitrary 9 will be less than 9. It 
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follows that since the probability is measured by the area 
under the standard logistic curve from -00 to e, the event 
will be more likely to occur the larger the value of the 
index 9. 
As was shown in chapter 5, in order to estimate the 
vector of unknown parameters of 6,I resorted to the use of 
the maximum lileklihood estimator for B. The maximum 
likelihood estimation was appealing since a unique maximum 
always exists for the logit model. At the same time, it is 
appropiate for non-linear estimation and yields consistent 
parameters estimates. Thus, the likelihood function of the 
model is given by expression (10). 
n TnT 
(10) LnML= E EY Ln F(x' 6) + E E ( l-Y ) Ln [ 1 - F(x' 6)] 
it it it it 
The ML estimator for B, say B, is obtained by maximising 
(10) with respect to B and setting the first order condition 
(FOC) equal to zero. As was shown in chapter 5, the solution 
is a unique local maximum. Also, the FOC was non-linear and 
hence solved by the Newton-Raphson interative procedure. 
It should be pointed out that the specification given by 
(8) specifies only the marginal probability and leaves the 
joint probability P(Y ,Y , ... ,Y ) unspecified. One 
il i2 iT 
simple step to deal with this problem is to introduce some 
restrictions. We assume independence so that the joint 
probability will be given by 
(11) P(Y ,Y , ... ,Y ) = 
i1 i2 iT 
E P( Y ) 
iT 
The independence restriction implies that P(Y = IIY = 1) 
it i,t-1 
so that previous year status does not affects the status 
this year. This means two things: Firstly, there is no true 
state dependency in the sense that the present status is not 
affected by the past status. In other words, the probability 
of bank failure/problem today remains unaffected by 
yesterday's probability. 
Secondly, there is no heterogeneity problem. This means 
that no serious complications with unobservable variables 
which could affect banks differently with respect to their 
likelihood of failure/problem would araise. 
Given the difficulties in estimating the unrestricted 
version of the model for panel data with T=20 and n=21 we 
proceeded to estimate the restricted version of the logit 
model. The matrix specification of the model which is 
similar to the one in chapter 7 looks as follows 
o 
A RAT33A ..... RAT63A 0 0 · . . . . . 179.1 179.1 179.1 
A RAT33A ..... RAT63A 0 0 · . . . . . 179.2 179.2 179.2 
· · · 
· . . . . . 
· 
· . . . . . 
· · · 
· ..... 
· 
· . . . . . 
A RAT33A ..... RAT63A 0 0 · . . . . . 
n83.4 n83.4 n83.4 
y= B x= 0 · . . . . . 0 RAT33B .... RAT63B 
it 179.1 it 179.1 179.1 
B 0 · . . . . . 0 RAT63B .... RAT63B 
179.2 179.2 179.2 
B 0 0 RAT33B .... RAT63B 
n83.4 n83.4 n83.4 
where i = 1,2, ... ,n 
t = 1,2,3,4, .... T 
The column vector Y contains the endogeneous 
it 
dichotomous variables for each bank i in a given quarter t 
for the ordered group A (failed/problem banks) and group B 
(nonfailed/nonproblem banks). The matrix x was constructed 
it 
by separating the data for each group of banks A and B 
respectively. This procedure has enables us to assess and 
compare the hypothesis of excessive risk-taking for each 
individual group. This is in itself an important 
modification from the traditional literature bank failure 
modelling. 
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(8.4.2.2) Description of the Data and the Variables. 
The model was estimated using quarterly panel data for 
the period between 1979 to 1983. Thus, the sample contained 
20 quarterly observations for 27 banks. Like the model 
specification of chapter 6 and 7, the banks sample was 
divided into two groups, A1 and B1. A1 group corresponds to 
the problem/failure group which includes all those 
institutions which were liquidated, merged, capitalised, 
and/or allowed to sell non-performing and risky loans to the 
Central Bank during 1982-83. Group B1 includes non-
problem/non-failed banks, among them Banco de Estado and 
Banco Industrial y de Comercio (BICE). As we have seen in 
chapter 3 both institutions were the only two domestic 
banks which remained financially healthy. In order to 
enlarge the B1 group, foreign banks were also included as 
they remained sound and as we saw in chapter 2 were subject 
to a similar legislation as domestic banks. Thus, Al and 
contain 16 and 11 banks respectively as they are listed 
table 3. 
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B1 
in 
Table 8.3 Bank List of A1 and B1. 
----------------------------------------
--------------------
Al B1 
------------------------------------------------------------
Banks Code Banks Code 
------------------------- -----------------------------------
Chile* 
O'Higgins** 
Internacional* 
Continenta1** 
Sudamericano** 
Credito** 
Trabajo** 
Pacifico** 
Nacional** 
Concepcion* 
Edwards** 
Santiago* 
Unido Fomento* 
Hipotecario Fomento* 
Hipotecario Chile* 
Co10cadora Nacional* 
001 
008 
009 
011 
014 
016 
022 
025 
026 
027 
029 
035 
502 
504 
505 
506 
Osorno 
Estado*** 
Do Brasil 
BICE 
Republic Nat. 
Of America 
Citybank 
Real 
Sao Paulo 
Santander 
Exterior 
N.Y. 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
* 
** 
*** 
Failed Banks (liquidated,intervined,or merged) 
Problem Banks (allowed to sell nonperforming and 
loans) 
state Bank 
010 
012 
017 
028 
031 
032 
033 
034 
036 
037 
038 
risky 
This sample excluded two sets of financial institutions 
which may appear relevant for this study. The first one 
corresponds to banks which failed during 1981 among them 
Espanol (002), Talca (006), Austral (024), and Linares 
(030). The second group correspond to non-bank financial 
institutions (financieras) which were left out all together, 
including those which failed during 1981 among them Cash 
(705), General Financiera (715), De Capitales (725), and Del 
Sur (713). Their exclusion was justified, as demostrated in 
chapter 3, as a result of their relatively small size. In 
addition, as a general principle, I have included all those 
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financial institutions which had 16 or more consecutive 
quarterly observations. This was necessary for comparison 
purposes between the periods of 1979-81 (booming 
macroeconomy) and 1982-83 (economic debacle). 
It should be 
Pacifico, Unido 
pointed out that in group AI, banks 
de Fomento, Hipotecario Chile, and 
Colocadora Nacional de Valores have missing observations in 
1979(03), 1979(03), 1983(04), and 1979(01) respectively. In 
group B1, banks BICE, Republic, Santander, and Exterior also 
presented missing observations in 79(03), 79(02), 79(01), 
and 79(01) respectively. In consequence, the panel data of 
20 quarters and 27 banks gives an adjusted total number of 
521 observations which represent a sufficiently 
statistical sample to draw logistic inferences. 
large 
As argued in chapter 6, it would have been desirable to 
have had a controlled sample, particularly by size, number 
of branches, and age. However, data limitations and the 
small size of the Chilean banking system ruled out this 
possibility. 
With reference to the dependent variable (regressand) of 
the model, I have specified the dependent variable as 
dichotomous where it takes the value of 1 if the bank has 
been listed as failed/problem and 0 otherwise. It is assumed 
that in each year a financial institution either 
failed/problem or did not failed/problem. However, a list of 
quarterly classification of banks's soundness was not 
A 1 A 
available from the Superintendency of Banks (SIBF) nor an 
annual classification prior 1983. Instead, I was forced to 
rely on the predicted values estimated from quarterly bank 
failure predicting model presented in chapter 5. As we saw 
from there, the overall prediction accuracy evaluated at 0.5 
cut-off point was judged as extremely good at different lead 
time. 
With respect to the explanatory variables (regressors), 
I have selected a set of financial ratios estimated from 
banks' balance-sheet as proxies for changes in risk-taking 
by banks' managers. Like Short, O'Driscoll, and Berger 
(1985), the model used as regressors those ratios controlled 
by managers among them loans/asset ratio which serves as 
5 
proxy for asset quality. Indeed, loans are the riskiest 
assets for banks to hold so that the higher the loans/asset 
ratio the greater the risk exposure. Also, the study 
included profits/total assets, nonperforming loans/capital, 
and nonperforming loans/total loans as additional indicators 
of asset quality. 
Also, there is a measure of capital adequacy which 
indicates the capacity of a bank to respond to asset losses. 
The capital/asset ratio and the provision/asset ratio are 
considered as two proxies for the banks' ability to absorb 
these losses. The expected sign of both ratios should be 
negative as increases in capital and provision relative to 
asset holding should lower the probability of failure. It 
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should be said that these proxies are not entirely under the 
managerial control, but there is direct involvement by the 
banking authorities as part of their regulatory framework. 
The risk associated with an unexpected outflow of 
deposit is captured by the deposit/liabilities ratio. The 
larger demand (sight) deposits and passbook savings relative 
to total liabilities, the higher banks' vulnerability to 
withdrawals. However, this ratio can also be interpreted as 
the cost of banks' indebtness. It is shown in the literature 
that the higher is the proportion of deposits (low cost) the 
lower is the probability of bank failure. Therefore, the 
interpretation of this ratio is ambiguous and hence treated 
with caution. 
Finally, the model includes a measure of the asset and 
liability growth as proxy for banks' risk-taking. Indeed, in 
a regime of unregulated and stubbornly high deposit and 
lending interest rates high growth rates of assets (loans) 
and liabilities (deposits) rises the likelihood of bank 
failure. 
It should be stressed that the ratios as proxies of 
banks' risk-taking (moral hazard) are expressed as the 
deviation from its own trend. They perform better in testing 
moral hazard than the financial ratios per see The trend was 
estimated by regressing each monthly selected proxy for the 
ith bank against time. Its fitted value was applied to 
obtain the deviation from the its trend. 
~ ~ - ~ ~ l I f " "
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(8.4.3) Econometric Results and its Interpretation. 
The first step in assessing the role of moral hazard in 
the Chilean banking system is to compare the arithmetic mean 
of selected financial ratios between the group of 
failed/problem banks (F) and nonfailed/nonproblem banks (NF) 
over the four-year period. The financial ratios are 
expressed as the deviation from its own trend for each 
financial institution and the group mean was estimated with 
monthly observations for each bank. 
If moral hazard characterised the banking system, then 
failed/problem banks would have exhibited a riskier 
management than nonfailed/problem banks. A riskier bank 
management should be reflected in the quality of bank 
assets, capital and reserves adequacy, and bank leverage. 
With respect to the quality of bank loans, we should 
expect a priori that the deviation from the trend for total 
loans/total assets ratio (TL/TA) and the nonperforming 
loans/capital (NPL/K) and nonperforming loans/total loans 
(NPL/TL) ratios of failed/problem banks should be larger 
than those of nonfailed/nonproblem banks. These results are 
reported in tables 4a and 4b. 
For instance, the mean of nonperforming loans/capital 
mean ratio indicates sharp differences between the two 
groups particularly in 1980, 1981 and to a lesser extent in 
1982. In 1981 and 1982 the difference between the mean 
ratio5 of the two groups (F-NF) Is 0.8368 and 0.7182 
respectively. 
Table 8.4a 
1979 
F 
Pr/TA .001 
TL/TA -.005 
NPL/K -1.001 
NPL/TL -.018 
Prv/TL .017 
Dep/TL -.017 
LACTOT .088 
LPASCIR .087 
Sample Mean for Failed/Problem and Nonfailed 
Nonproblem Banks for the Period 1979-1981. 
NF 
-.005 
.046 
-.094 
.007 
F 
.001 
.016 
1.202 
.014 
1980 
NF 
-.005 
.034 
.365 
-.015 
.014 -.020 -.117 
.022 -.002 -.008 
.369 .253 
.394 .239 
.246 
.255 
F 
.008 
.065 
1.154 
-.026 
1981 
NF 
.006 
.104 
.436 
-.013 
Average 79-80 
F 
.003 
.025 
.451 
-.010 
NF 
-.001 
.061 
.235 
-.007 
-.058 -.030 -.020 -.044 
.100 
.305 
.373 
.011 .027 
.020 .215 
.080 .233 
.008 
.211 
.243 
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Similarly, the evidence from the growth of bank assets 
and liabilities also confirms a propensity by failed/problem 
banks to undertake more risk than safe banks. For instance, 
the trend deviation of banks' assets for the former group 
not only widened during the period 1979-82 but also it was 
larger than the nonfailed/problem bank group. The average 
mean deviation for F-group and the NF-group for the whole 
period was 0.27 and 0.147 respectively. The same conclusions 
are drawn from the data on bank liabilities. 
The provision/total loans ratio was included as measure 
of banks' capacity to respond to losses from banks assets . 
.d1A 
The lower the ratio, the smaller the decline in asset values 
necessary to make a bank insolvent. The evidence does not 
indicate a marked difference between the means of these two 
groups. At the same time, the deviation from the trend is 
negative in almost every year which suggest a more risky 
stance by all financial institutions. However, this ratio is 
not solely the managers' choice but influenced by regulatory 
standards concerning capital and reserves requirements. In 
consequence, its meaning and interpretation should be 
treated with caution. 
Table 8.4b 
1982 
F 
Sample Mean for Failed/Problem and Nonfailed 
Nonproblem Banks for the Period 1982-83. 
1983 Average 82-83 
NF F NF F NF 
------------------------------------------------------------
Pr/TA .007 .011 -.008 -.001 -.0005 .005 
TL/TA .032 .0002 -.175 -.183 -.071 -.091 
NPL/K -1.027 .113 -3.461 -1.832 -2.244 -.859 
NPL/TL -0.011 -.015 -.001 .066 -.006 .025 
Prv/TL .097 -.150 .108 .532 .102 .191 
Oep/TL -.091 -.169 -.065 -.053 -.078 -.111 
LACTOT .438 -.044 -.429 -.230 .005 -.137 
LPASCIR .426 -.040 -.468 .309 -.021 .134 
----------------------------
--------------------------------
Source: SIBF, Informacion Financiera, Various Issues. 
Finally, the remaining ratio captures the banks' 
vulnerability to deposit withdrawals. One should expect the 
total deposits/total liabilities ratio to be lower for 
failed/problem banks. However, the data indicate the 
d1q 
opposite result, with the exception of 1979. This ambiguity 
can be explained by the fact that sight deposits represent a 
cheaper source of liabilities. Therefore , a lower ratio 
implies a lower probability of failure. 
Further evidence from selected individual banks of both 
groups are plotted in order to assess excessive risk-taking 
(moral hazard) for the period between 1979 and 1983. Among 
the group of failed/problem banks, Banco Chile, Banco 
Santiago, Banco Internacional, and Banco Concepcion were 
selected among 16 financial institutions classified in this 
category. With respect to the sample of nonproblem/nonfailed 
banks, Banco del Estado, Banco BICE, Banco Real, and Banco 
Sao Paulo were chosen from the list of 11 institutions for 
comparison purposes. As we have learned from chapter 3, 
Banco del Estado (the only remaining state bank after 
financial reforms) and Banco BICE were the only two domestic 
commercial banks which did not sell bad loans to the Central 
Bank. Also, Banco Real and Banco Sao Paulo were listed with 
the group of foreign banks operating in the Chilean banking 
system. 
With reference to the banks' asset quality, the charts 
which plot the deviation and the trend of the total 
loans/total assets ratio shows that failed/problem banks 
exhibited an upward trend over the whole period and a large 
deviation of the ratio over its own trend, particularly 
between 1981 and the middle of 1983. For instance, the 
A?O 
monthly ratio and its estimated trend plotted for 1979 to 
1983 for Banco Chile, Banco Internacional, Banco Concepcion 
and Banco Santiago shows an upward trend indicating a 
greater exposure to credit risks. As was argued earlier, the 
trend should capture the influence of the overall economy 
and both technological and regulatory changes. However, the 
total loans/total assets ratio's deviation was largely 
positive indicating an over-exposure to credit risks. This 
is particularly the case during 1982 and part of 1983 during 
which the economy's output collapsed. 
In contrast, nonfailed/nonproblem banks show a more 
steady upward trend especially Banco del Estado, and Banco 
Sao Paulo. Moreover, there are cases where the ratio trends 
downward as is the case of Banco Real. This evidence may 
suggest a more conservative banks' attitude to a buoyant 
macroeconomy. Although the ratio is above the trend and 
hence indicating some degree of over-exposure, the deviation 
began to fall rapidly during the beginning of 1982, period 
which witnessed the collapse of the economy's output. 
Similar conclusions about loans quality can be drawn 
from other proxies. Particularly interesting is the 
comparision of the persistent positive deviation of 
nonperforming loans/capital ratio of failed banks (Banco 
Chile, Banco Internacional, and Banco Concepcion) in 
comparison to Banco del Estado and BreE which exhibit a 
smooth deviation. As it was seen in chapter 3, these two 
institutions did not sell bad loans to the central Bank and 
thus suggesting a more conservative attitude towards the 
quality (riskiness) of their assets. Also noticeable is the 
significant fall in the ratio for the failed/problem banks 
towards the end of 1982 explained by the rescue package 
enacted by the monetary authorities. As it was explained at 
length in chapter 3, this included the possibility of 
selling nonperforming loans to the Central Bank and the 
capitalisation of these troubled institutions. 
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Figure 8.3a Banco del Estado: Total Loan/Total Asset Ratio 
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Figure S.3c Banco Real: Total Loan/Total Asset Ratio 1.0-,.----------______ _ 
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Figure 8.4a Banoo Chile: NP Loans/Capital Ratio 
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Figure 8.4c Banco Internacional: NP Loans/Capital Ratio 
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Figure 8.5a Banco del Estado: NP Loans/Capital Ratio 
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Figure S.5c Banco Real: NP Loans/Capital Ratio 
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Figure S.5d Banco de Sao Paulo: NP Loans/Capital Ratio 
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Figure a.6a Banco Chile: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 0.100-,.--------------____ _ 
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Figure a.ae Banco Internacional: Profits/Total Asset s Ratio 
O,fJJ-r----------------__ .... 
0.02 
0.00-
.... 
.. .. 
- .. 
-0.01-
..... 
.. .. 
-0.02-
-0.03-
-0.04 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
I-B009 ----- B009TI 
Figure a.ad Banco Concepcion: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 
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Figure 8.7a Banco del Est ado: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 
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Figure 8.Th Banco BlCE: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 
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Figure 8.'lc Ban.co Real: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 0.20-.-------------____ _ 
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Figure 8.'ld Ban.co de Sao Paulo: Profits/Total Asset Ratio 
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It is clear that a low quality of bank portfolios should 
be reflected in the profits/total assets ratio. Indeed, the 
examination of the trend for failed banks are clearly 
downwards as compared with healthy institutions. This again 
suggets that a secular deterioration in the banks' assets 
quality was underway during the overall period of 
examination. In addition, the former group exhibits a sharp 
fall in the value of the ratio relative to its trend towards 
the end of 1982 as compared with healthy banks. (see charts 
above) 
Another proxy to assess the excesses on risk-taking is 
the provision/total loans ratio. It measures the banks' 
ability to absorb loan losses. Its value per se is partially 
determined by the regulators, although any deviation from 
its trend will capture the banks' flexibility and propensity 
to incur additional risk. Firstly, we can observe that the 
trend for the selected banks of the two groups is upward 
which may reflect the underlying increment in the phase of 
rapid expansion of banks' assets. 
Secondly, the ratio fell below the trend between the 
1980 and the end of 1982. Thereafter, it began to rise 
rapidly responding to the authorities' intervention and 
awareness concerning the difficulties of some banks. A less 
extreme result is true for healthy banks, Banks BleE, Real, 
and Sao Paulo which show smoother downward deviation from 
the tendency. This prompts me to suggest that the former 
group chose a greater credit exposure than the latter group. 
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Figure 8.& Banco Internacional: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 
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Figure 8.8d Banco Concepcion: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 
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Figure a.9a Banco d.el Estad.o: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 0.40-·,..------------_____ _ 
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Figure 6.9b Banco DICE: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 
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Figure 8.9c Banco Real: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 
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Figure 8.9d Banco de Sao Paulo: Provision/Total Loan Ratio 
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As was argued in a previous section, when a depositary 
financial institution becomes riskier the cost of deposits 
may not rise in proportion to the risk undertaken. This is 
certainly the case when there is an implict or explicit 
deposit insurance. Banks are able to increase their net 
interest margins by using low cost resources to fund loans 
with higher payoffs but riskier returns. 
It is reasonable to expect that a positive deviation of 
the total deposit ratio/total liabilities ratio over its 
trend value should be relatively higher for failed banks. 
The evidence from the four selected failed banks and the 
group of nonfailed institutions clearly supports this 
assertion. For instance, Banco Chile and Banco Internacional 
show a sharp positive deviation over a downward trend. The 
downward trend is present in all the cases indicating how it 
was becoming more expensive to raise funds via banks' 
deposits. This is obvious if we examine the ex post short 
term real deposit rate which prevailed during the whole 
liberalisation reform. 
In contrast, Banco BICE, Banco Real, and particularly 
Banco del Estado exhibit values close to the underlying 
trend, and in some instances below it. This suggests a more 
conservative approach by bankers to issuing deposit 
liabilities than failed financial institutions. (see charts 
below) 
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Figure a.l0b Banco Santiago: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 
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Figure 8.10c Ban.co In.ternacional: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 1.25-·,--------------____ ---. 
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Figure 8.11a Banco del Estado: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 
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Figure 8.11b Banco BICE: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 
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Figure S.11c Banco Real: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 
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Figure S.Ud Banco de Sao Paulo: Deposit/Total Liabilities Ratio 
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Finally, one of the most noticeable aspects of financial 
liberalisation was the spectacular growth in bank assets. 
This took place in spite of stubbornly high real lending 
rates indicating a propensity to accept more risks. The 
evidence from the asset growth and its deviation from its 
trend confirms this point. 
The plot of the ratio measuring the growth of bank 
assets for selected failed banks shows a positive deviation 
from its trend by almost the whole period of study, 
especially between 1980 and 1982. This contrast sharply with 
the observations from the cases of Banco Real and Banco Sao 
Paulo. Also, it can be seen that the asset growth began to 
fall towards the end of 1981, especially in the case of 
Banco del Estado. 
The trend is upward in all cases indicating the response 
of the banking system to the rapid output growth experienced 
by the economy during most of the period. It is clear 
those banks which exhibited a growth rate above 
that 
their 
secular trend were willing to expand credit beyond an 
optimal point and hence to accept a greater risk-exposure. 
(see charts below) 
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Figure 8.12c Banco Internacional: Asset Growth 
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Figure 8.12d. Banco Concepcion: Asset Growttt 
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Figure 8.13a Banco del Estado: Asset Growth 8.7...-------------____ ___ 
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Figure 8.13c Banco Real: Asset Growth 
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Figure 8.13d Banco de Sao Paulo: Asset Growth 
6.50-....---------------------. 
8.25 
6.00-
5.75 
5.50-
5.25-
19'19 1980 1961 1982 1983 
I-B036 ----- B036TI 
44'3 
The evidence presented in tables 4a and 4b for a grouped 
data and the charta for individual aelected bankB Bupport, 
at first hand, the view that moral hazard was present in 
the Chilean banking system. In fact, it reveals a greater 
propensity to take risk among those financial institutions 
which failed or experienced financial difficulties.(problem 
banks) 
However, a more sophisticated model is necessary to 
support this hypothesis and its incidence on the failure of 
financial institutions in the Chilean banking system. There 
are three conjectures about bank failures/problems and the 
role of moral hazard on the likelihood of bank failure which 
I would like to explictly test. 
Firstly, the role of moral hazard was present throughout 
the period of study and it was significant in explaning the 
failure of financial institutions in Chile. Specifically, I 
should be looking for the empirical link and the statistical 
significance of the selected proxies for risk-taking over 
the period between 1979 and 1983. 
Secondly, if conjecture one is found to be true, we 
should also test the assertion that excessive risk-taking 
(moral hazard) was more acute for the years between 1982-83 
than 1979-81. Thus, the model will be estimated and tested 
for each year separately for comparison purposes. 
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Thirdly, once we accept that hypothesis which relates 
moral hazard with the likelihood of bank failure/problem, it 
is possible to use the "best" model to estimate the ex ante 
probability and assess the prediction accuracy as I did in 
chapter 6 and 7. 
In order to evaluate these conjectures I have estimated 
the restricted logistic model for quarterly panel data 
following the methodology and estimation procedures 
described thoroughly in chapter 6 and 7 and reviewed in 
earlier sections of this chapter. 
-Conjecture 1: The Likelihood of Bank Failures/Problems and 
Moral Hazard during the period 1979-1983. 
The first conjecture establishes the relationship 
between excessive risk-taking (moral hazard) and the failure 
of financial institutions, and the subsequent debacle of 
the banking system. It is argued that the incidence of 
risk-taking is present throughout the period of study. 
Table 5 provides econometric evidence on the 
significance of some selected proxies which measure banks' 
propensity to take risk and the probability of bank 
failure/problem. It should be stressed that the ratios as 
proxies for banks' attitude towards risk-taking are 
expressed in terms of the deviation from its trend. A 
positive sign on a coefficient indicates that the higher the 
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value of the ratio, the greater the propensity to take 
excessive risk and hence the larger the likelihood of 
failure. 
Apart from a general model specification which included 
all selected regressors, alternative specifications are 
reported as the explanatory variables exhibited 
multicollinearity. As can be seen from the estimates and the 
covariance-correlation matrix of the explanatory variables 
included in appendix 7, the ratio total loans/total assets 
(TL/TA) is highly collinear with assets growth (LACTOT) and 
liability growth (LPASCIR). Similarly, asset growth and 
liabilitity growth also present a high correlation 
coefficient. It can be seen that the correlation coefficient 
exceeds 80% in most cases. 
Specification M1 corresponds to a general model which 
included all the selected proxies for bank's risk-taking. We 
can observe that the overall equation is statistically 
significant at 0.5%. Specifically, the likelihood ratio 
statistic is 129.5 and the critical value of the chi-square 
distribution for the 0.005 level of significance is 35.71 so 
we reject the null hypothesis that B1=B2 .... Bk=0. Although 
M1 exhibits the largest likelihood ratio and the largest 
goodness of fit measured by the likelihood ratio index 
(Lklhd RIndex), most of the regressors are insignificant. 
Indeed, besides the nonperforming loans/capital ratio 
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(NPL/K) for group A (failed/problem banks) and group B 
(nonfailed/nonproblem banks), and the proxy for "related 
portfolios" (cartint), the remaining regressors are 
insignificant according to their t-statistics at 1% and 5% 
significance. The theoretical value for t-statistic for 0.01 
and 0.05 is 2.58 and 1.96 respectively and hence the 
estimated ratios fell outside the critical region. 
I suspect that multicollinearity is serious among some 
independent variables judging from the covariance-
correlation matrix included in appendix 7. As we are aware, 
the presence of collinearity among the regressors affects 
the standard errors and the stability of the coefficient. To 
obtain meaningful estimates and inferences, different 
specification were carried out by dropping those variable 
found to be highly collinear. 
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Table 8.5 L o g ~ t t AnalYSis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taklng for the Period 1979.1 to 1983.4 (a) 
-----------------------
-'-------------
-----------------------Proxies 
M1 
Alternative Specifications 
M2 M3 M4 
Constant 
------------------------------------------------------------
M5 
(Pr/TA)A 
(TL/TA)A 
(NPL/K)A 
(NPL/TL)A 
(Prv/TL)A 
(Dep/TLi)A 
(LACTOT)A 
(LPASCIR)A 
(Pr/TA)B 
(TL/TA)B 
(NPL/K)B 
(NPL/TL)B 
(Prv/TL)B 
(Dep/TLi)B 
(LACTOT)B 
(LPASCIR)B 
CARTINT 
-0.17 
(-1.65) 
-20.80 
(-1.12) 
-1.64 
(-0.51) 
0.24 
( 3 .25 ) 
-0.05 
(-0.06) 
-1.13 
(-0.32) 
-3.03 
(-1.27) 
-3.55 
(-1.25) 
3.67 
(1.27 ) 
-0.01 
(-0.007) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.46 
( 2 . 42) 
1.02 
( 3 . 29) 
0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.31 
(-0.30) 
-0.28 
(-0.37) 
-0.33 
(-0.44) 
3.32 
( 6 . 55) 
-0.16 
(-1.60) 
-14.82 
(-0.85) 
0.05 
(0.06 ) 
-4.78 
(-1.91) 
-4.38 
(-1.96) 
0.22 
(2.81 ) 
0.60 
(0.48) 
0.95 
(3.14 ) 
-0.16 
(-0.35) 
0.06 
(0.06 ) 
-0.45 
(-2.66) 
2.92 
(6.51) 
-0.18 
(-1.80) 
-13.55 
(-0.79) 
3.83 
(2.51 ) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-2.10 
(-0.89) 
-3.53 
(-1.64) 
0.49 
(0.38) 
-1.95 
(-1.17) 
0.83 
(2.75) 
-0.49 
(-0.88) 
-0.16 
(-0.16) 
-0.16 
(-1.61) 
-14.53 
(-0.84) 
0.05 
(0.06 ) 
-4.64 
(-1.86) 
-4.42 
(-1.97) 
0.22 
(2.83) 
0.15 
(0.12 ) 
0.96 
(3.17) 
-0.39 
(-0.82) 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.44 
(-2.67) 
2.92 
( 6 . 51 ) 
-0.17 
(-1.69) 
-25.25 
(-1.39) 
0.24 
(3.26) 
-2.64 
(-1.03) 
-2.97 
(-1.27 ) 
0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.11 
(-0.09) 
0.37 
(2.15) 
0.53 
(1.08) 
-0.44 
( -0 . 43) 
-0.30 
(-2.14) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 294.43 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 129.50 
Lklhd Rlndex(c) 18.00 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 312.43 
304.34 
109.60 
15.27 
316.34 
309.49 
99.38 
13.84 
321.49 
(a) t-statisties are in parentheses. 
304.28 
109.80 
15.29 
316.28 
306.20 
106.00 
14.76 
318.20 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2(lnLklhdr-lnLklhdu] and it has 
chi-square distribution with j degree of freedom. 
(e) The pseudo-R square is 1-[lnLk1hdr/lnLklhdu] 
Cd) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -In(Lk1hd)+K where 
K is the number of estimated parameters. 
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Model specification M2 did not include the ratio TL/TA 
and the LPASCIR for both groups of banks. Similarly, LACTOT 
was replaced for TL/TA and LPASCIR in models M3 and M4 
respectively. The results clearly show a marked improvement 
in the t-statistic and the sign of the coefficient so that 
we can draw some important observations from it. 
Firstly, the negative and the statistically significant 
coefficient of the provision/total loans ratio (Prv/TL) for 
failed/problem banks (group A) at 10% and 5% confirm its 
importance as a determinant of failure. This result 
indicates that banks which have chosen a lower provision for 
bad loans were more likely to fail. This ratio was found 
statistically insignificant for nonfailed/nonproblem banks 
(group B). It should be pointed out that although this 
variable was significant in different variations of 
specification M2, it did not perform well in the alternative 
specification examined in table 5. 
Secondly, the proxies for the quality of bank assets 
were an important determinant of the likelihood of bank 
failures. The NPL/TL ratio was found particularly important 
for nonfailed/nonproblem banks (group B) in all the 
alternative specifications. The estimated coefficient was 
both consistent with the a priori expected sign, and 
significant at 1%. This suggests that the higher the ratio 
the more likely a bank was to fail. As we have seen in the 
earlier data from table 4a-4b, nonfailed/nonproblem banks 
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did exhibit a lower mean value for the ratio's deviation 
over its trend and the conflrmatlofl (_If lOt " "t--~ 5 5 Blgnl lcanC6 
supports the hypothesis that this group 
excessive risk-taking 
financially healthy. 
(moral hazard) and 
did not incur 
hence remained 
This result was not confirmed for failed/problem banks 
(group A) except in the case where we estimate the model 
(M5) using nonperforming loans/ capital ratio (NPL/K). 
Alternative modifications of M5, not reported in the table, 
indicate that both ratios NPL/TL and NPL/K are significant 
for both groups of banks. Similarly, the TL/TA ratio, 
included in estimation M3, confirms the importance of the 
asset quality on the likelihood of failure for group A. This 
finding contrast sharply with the irrelevant statistical 
incidence of the profit/total asset ratio in every 
specification. 
Thirdly, the deposit/total liabilities ratio as a proxy 
for bank costs by failed/problem banks (group A) was found 
significant at 5%, especially in model M2 and M4. The 
negative sign for the estimated coefficient, consistent with 
a priori expectations, indicates that those financial 
institutions which borrowed most cheaply (sight deposits, 
and passbook savings) had a lower probability of failure. 
The coefficient for the second group was found inSignificant 
in all the alternative versions. 
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Fourthly, one of the most telling indication of the 
growing fragility of the banking system was the explosive 
growth of bank assets and liabilities. Although the economy 
was buoyant, there were significant risks in expanding 
assets and liabilities in a period of high real interest 
rates. The statistical estimates confirm these worries. For 
instance, the variable which measures the growth of bank 
assets (LACTOT) is significant at 1% in both groups for 
model M2. The positive sign for (LACTOT)A is consistent with 
a priori expectations implying that the deviation over its 
trend was an important determinant of bank failures. This 
regressor was also 
nonfailed/nonproblem 
significant for the group 
banks but with an opposite sign. 
of 
This 
finding is puzzling since it suggests that excessive asset 
growth reduces the likelihood of failure in this particular 
group. It could be argued that this result reflects specific 
advantages of this group of banks in extending credit 
efficiently. Additional evidence such as the banks' 
profitability, low nonperforming loans, and the absence of 
related portfolios help to support this reasoning. As we 
have seen from the previous evidence, Banco del Estado and 
BICE are particularly good examples. 
Similar 
growth of 
results and conclusions are obtain 
banks' liabilities from model M4. It 
from 
should 
said that the banks' ability to maintain 
asset quality enhance the capability of 
relatively 
sound banks 
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the 
be 
good 
to 
expand their liabilities beyond a certain point. This 
appears to be the case of nonfal1ed/nonproblem banks group. 
Finally, the model includes a dummy variable which took 
the value of 1 in those financial institutions which 
maintained a significantly large proportion of their loans 
portfolios with related firms, individual, and/or 
conglomerates and the value of 0 otherwise. In all the 
alternative estimations the variable was very significant 
and with a correct sign for the estimated coefficient. This 
result clearly indicates that an increasing concentration of 
the banks' loan portfolios among related parties (related 
risks) raises the probability of bank failure. 
All in all the logit estimates of failing and non-
failing banks indicate that the quality and the growth of 
bank assets, and the expansion of bank liabilities have 
proven to be important determinants on the likelihood of 
failure or sucess. The impact of bank provisions and 
leverage are less clear. Some preliminary results have also 
shown that nonfailed/nonproblem banks maintained better 
asset qualities, relatively larger provisions for bad loans, 
and relatively slower growth in bank assets and liabilities. 
With the exception of technical provisions, all these 
proxies for excessive risk-taking are subject to a 
considerable degree of managerial control. Therefore, one 
can conclude that bank managers failed/problem banks did 
incur larger risks and hence contributed to the likelihood 
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of bank failures. These results do not establish the 
relative strength of each proxy nor if moral hazard was 
more prominent during the early period or the later period 
of study. 
-Conjecture 2: The Incidence of Moral Hazard on 
Likelihood of Bank Failures in Each 
Year. 
the 
Single 
In the second conjecture, the model attempts to 
establish that moral hazard was more serious during the 
period 1982-83 than in early years. The collapse of the 
macroeconomy in 1982 and 1983 where real GOP fell by nearly 
15% and 0.5% respectively should had encouraged financial 
institutions to roll-over what constituted bad loans and to 
capitalised the interest. Indeed, Mckinnon (1989) argued 
that in the presence of macroeconomic instability which will 
create positive covariance in the default rates of the 
banks' borrowers, moral hazard on the part of the bank will 
be present. A loosely regulated bank with both inadequate 
loan-loss provision and implicit free deposit insurance has 
an strong incentive to extend credit at high interest rates 
knowing ex ante that a favorable macroeconomic outcome will 
generate him high profits. In the opposite case, the bank 
will be able to transfer the heavy losses ultimately to the 
taxpayers. 
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It is 
instability 
reasonable to expect that macroeconomic 
should exacerbate even further the problem of 
moral hazard in the banking system. One simple procedure to 
verify this conjecture would require us to estimate the 
logit model separately for each year and test the 
significance and the goodness of fit of the model by means 
of the likelihood ratio (Lklhd Ratio) and the likelihood 
index (Lklhd R-Index) respectively. These results for the 
alternative specifications of the logit model are presented 
in table 6. It should be mentioned that the missing results 
from the tables can be explained by the failure of the 
iterative process to converge after 20 successive 
iterations. 
At the outset, the empirical evidence gives support to 
the second conjecture. The examination of the likelihood 
ratio for each year and alternative specifications are 
statistically significant at 1%. This means that the 
statistic rejects the null hypothesis that all estimates are 
equal to zero. The chi-square statistic with 17 degree of 
freedom at 1% is 33.4. 
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Table 8.6 Logit Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taking for Single Periods. (a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
1983 Ml 
Alternative Specifications 
M2 M3 M4 M5 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 25.03 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 86.60 
LklhdRlndex(c) 63.36 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 43.03 
29.95 
76.76 
56.16 
41.95 
28.21 
80.24 
58.71 
40.21 
30.44 
75.78 
55.45 
42.44 
32.10 
72.46 
53.02 
44.10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1982 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 30.00 
Lk1hd Ratio(b) 83.38 
Lklhd RIndex(c) 58.15 
A.I.C.(d) 48.00 
38.32 
66.74 
34.37 
50.32 
32.87 
77.64 
54.14 
44.87 
38.35 
66.68 
46.50 
50.35 
38.82 
65.74 
45.85 
50.82 
------------------------------------------------------------
1981 
-------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lk1hd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd RIndex(c) 
A.I.C.(d) 
40.22 
68.68 
46.05 
58.22 
38.05 
73.02 
48.92 
50.05 
40.42 
68.28 
45.78 
52.42 
42.16 
64.80 
43.45 
54.16 
------------------------------------------------------------
1980 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lk1hd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd RIndex(c) 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 
1979 
In Lklhd(-) 
Lk1hd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd RIndex(c) 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 
39.93 
69.52 
46.53 
56.93 
51.45 
46.48 
31.11 
62.45 
58.44 
32.50 
21.75 
69.44 
39.48 
55.40 
41.23 
50.48 
50.94 
47.50 
31.79 
61.94 
47.41 
54.56 
36.52 
58.41 
39.62 
55.12 
41.02 
50.62 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) The models were estimated for each year with quarterly 
data. 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr - InLklhdu] and it 
has chi-square distribution with j-1 degree of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo-R square is defined as 1-[lnLk1hdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -In(Lklhd)+K where 
K is the number of estimated parameters. 
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However, a closer look at the likelihood value over time 
suggests that it rises as we go back from 1983. For 
instance, the value of the likelihood function for H1 in 
1983 is -25.03 in comparison to a value in 1980 of nearly 
40.00. 
Even more telling are the values from the goodness of 
fit of the model. For instance, the likelihood index ratio 
for HI in 1983 is more than 63% in comparison with only 46% 
in 1980. Similar conclusions are obtained from the evidence 
of the alternative specifications where we also observe a 
clear deterioration in the goodness of fit. 
This conjecture may also be tested in the form of a 
hypothesis that the coefficients on each variable were equal 
in all years against the alternative that they were 
significantly different. The likelihood ratio test is 
defined as -2[lnLklhd(Z)-ElnLklhd(Z)] where InLklhd(Z) is 
the log of the likelihood function estimated with the whole 
sample data and ElnLklhd(Z) is the sum of the log of the 
likelihood functions for each year estimated individually. 
For model Ml, the likelihood ratio test statistic was 
239.54. At 1% level of significance, the value of the chi-
square with 70 degrees of freedom is 100.42. It follows that 
model HI rejects the null hypothesis that all coefficient 
are equal. 
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The likelihood ratio was also estimated for all pairs of 
years and these results are reported in table 7. At the 5\ 
of significance the chi-square with 17 degrees of freedom 
has a value of 27.58. We observe that the pairwise 
comparison of 1983 with each individual year (except 1982) 
is significant and hence we reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficients are equal from year to year. 
Table 8.7 Likelihood Ratio Test for Equality of All 
Coefficients Across Years for Model MI. 
------------------------------------------------------------
1980 1981 1982 1983 
------------------------------------------------------------
1979 1.00 2.86 18.96 28.90 
1980 3.76 19.86 29.80 
1981 20.44 30.38 
1982 9.94 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Correspond to the M3 likelihood function given the 
missing the values for MI. 
In general, these tests have proven two things: Firstly, 
the coefficient on each variable for Ml model for the years 
1979,1980, and 1981, and 1982-1983 were equal. Secondly, 
this finding did not hold for the 1983 pairwise comparisons 
as they differ from year to year. 
In consequence, it appears reasonable to believe that 
although moral hazard was present throughout the period 
1979-83, it was more severe during the years of 
macroeconomic instability. 
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-Conjecture 3: The Prediction Accuracy of the Bank Failure 
Prediction Model. 
As we have seen from the evidence of the logit model, 
the role of moral hazard in the likelihood of bank 
failure/problem was found significant during the whole 
period of the study. It is not inconceivable to suggest that 
if the moral hazard hypothesis was overwhelmingly 
significant then it is plausible to construct a bank failure 
prediction model from the set of proxies for moral hazard. 
This model enables us to evaluate not only its prediction 
accuracy at the time of failure (critical time), but also 
its accuracy to signal early warnings with some leading time 
before the critical time. Indeed, it will be shown that this 
model performs better than the traditional early warning 
model estimated with annual accounting and financial ratios 
shown in chapter 6. 
Following a similar methodology of chapter 5, I have 
proceded to estimate a quarterly logit model with those 
proxies for risk-taking similar to the one used in testing 
the moral hazard hypothesis. The dependent variable alb183 
which includes a quarterly classification of failed/problem 
banks and nonfailed/nonproblem banks for 1983 was regressed 
against regressors measuring excessive risk-taking. As 
before, each ratio (proxy) for each bank was expressed in 
terms of the deviation from its own trend. 
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Table 8.8a Logit Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taking at the Time of Failure/Problem in 1983. 
-------------------------------------
Variables -----------------------
M1 
Alternative Specifications 
M2 M3 M4 M5 
------------------
-------------------
-----------------------constant 
Pr/TA 
TL/TA 
NPL/K 
NPL/TL 
Prv/TL 
Dep/TLi 
LACTOT 
LPASCIR 
2.61 
(4.19 ) 
8.27 
( 1 . 78) 
-1.31 
(-0.33) 
0.01 
(0.27 ) 
3.00 
( 0 .94 ) 
0.72 
( 0 • 32) 
10.83 
(2.69 ) 
-19.45 
(-3.42) 
19.67 
( 3 . 44) 
0.75 
(2.48) 
-0.53 
(-0.36) 
3.09 
( 1 . 52 ) 
-3.59 
(-2.73) 
-1.49 
(-0.80) 
0.08 
(0.30 ) 
0.79 
(2.52) 
-0.55 
(-0.38) 
1.60 
(0.58) 
2.96 
(1.49) 
-3.28 
(-2.40) 
-1.44 
(-0.78) 
0.82 
(2.60) 
-0.40 
(-0.28) 
3.04 
(1.50) 
-3.54 
(-2.70) 
-1.49 
(-0.79) 
0.21 
(0. 79 ) 
0.52 
(1.69 ) 
-1.00 
(-0.72) 
0.006 
(0.15 ) 
-2.35 
(-2.21) 
-2.89 
(-1.10) 
0.32 
(1.25 ) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd Rlndex(c) 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 
43.52 
48.48 
35.77 
52.52 
56.06 
23.40 
17.26 
62.06 
55.93 
23.66 
17.45 
61.93 
55.78 
23.96 
12.98 
61.78 
61.69 
12.14 
8.90 
67.69 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr-lsLklhdu] and it 
has chi-square distribution with j-1 degrees of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo R-square is defined as l-[lnLklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -lnLklhd+K where K 
is the number of estimated parameters. 
Table 8.8b Prediction Accuracy of Ml Logit Model for 1983 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Type-I Error 
Failure Accuracy(%) 
Type-II Error 
Non-Failure Accuracy(%) 
Overall Accuracy(%) 
Predicted Num. Fails 
Actual Num. Failures 
Predicted Num.NonFails 
Actual Num. NonFails 
4 
92.8 
11 
74.4 
84.8 
52 
56 
32 
43 
10 
82.1 
15 
65.1 
74.7 
46 
56 
28 
43 
17 
69.6 
18 
58.1 
64.6 
39 
56 
25 
43 
29 
48.2 
23 
46.5 
47.4 
27 
56 
20 
43 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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Tables 
alternative 
8a-12a present the logit 
specifications at the time of 
results for 
failure/problem 
(critical time) and for years before the critical time. 
Among the alternative specifications presented in table 8a, 
equation Ml is preferred to the alternatives on the basis of 
the Akaike's information criteria (A.I.C.) for model 
selection. As we have seen in chapter 7, according to this 
criterion for selection of non-nested models, the researcher 
chooses the lowest A.I.C. 
Specification MI includes the constant and the set of 
explanatory variables used in the previous estimations; that 
is proxies for asset quality (profits/capital (Pr/K), total 
loans/total assets (TL/TA), nonperforming loans/capital 
(NPL/K), nonperforming loans/total loans (NPL/TL), reserves 
adequacy (provisions/total loans (Prv/TL», liabilities 
qualities (total deposits/total liabilities (Dep/TLi», and 
the growth rates for banks' assets and liabilities (LACTOT 
and LPASCIR respectively). 
Although most of the regressors are statistically 
insignificant, the overall equation is still significant 
judging from the likelihood ratio statistic evaluated at 1% 
of significant. ( chi-square with 8 d.f is 20.09) 
Equation M5 is insignificant and M2,M3, and M4 are just 
above the significant level to reject the null hypothesis. 
Similarly, the likelihood R-Index (pseudo R ) confirms the 
superiority of MI with respect to the goodness of fit. 
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As we will see shortly, the overall prediction accuracy 
of specification M1 in comparison to the alternative 
specifications is exceptionally good. This indicator 
together with the Akaike's criterion should be the 
overwhelming criterion in choosing the best specification. 
Table 8.9a Logit Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taking One Year Before the Critical Time.(1982) 
(a) 
------------------------------------------------------------
Variables Alternative Specifications 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 1.02 0.84 0.67 0.85 0.54 (2.05) (2.29 ) (1.66) (2.29) (1.57) 
Pr/TA 45.79 68.28 71.85 69.06 46.42 ( 1 . 34) ( 2 . 74) (2.83 ) (2.76) ( 2 . 47) 
TL/TA 12.55 5.60 
(1.58) ( 1.06 ) 
NPL/K 
-0.81 
-0.86 
(-1.91) (-2.26) 
NPL/TL -5.98 -4.08 -4.42 -4.10 
(-1.62) (-1.99) (-2.22 ) (-2.01) 
Prv/TL 12.14 13.56 14.51 13.75 9.16 
( 2 . 60 ) (3.62 ) ( 3 . 78) (3.68) (3.21) 
Dep/TLi 14.55 14.37 14.19 14.46 11.72 
( 3 .03 ) ( 3 . 38 ) (3.38) (3.39) ( 3 . 02 ) 
LAC TOT 12.11 0.16 0.86 
( 2 . 38 ) ( 0 . 62) ( 2 . 18 ) 
LPASCIR -11.97 0.12 
(-2.30) (0.54 ) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 32.65 40.54 40.07 40.63 41.18 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 80.68 64.90 65.84 64.72 63.62 
Lklhd R-Index(c) 55.26 44.45 45.10 44.33 43.58 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 41.65 46.54 46.07 46.63 47.18 
------------------------------------------------------------
Ca) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr-lsLklhdu] and it has 
chi-square distribution with j-1 degrees of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo R-square is defined as l-[lnLklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
Cd) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -lnLklhd+K where K 
is the number of estimated parameters. 
Table 8.9b Prediction Accuracy of Ml Logit Model for 1982. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Failure Accuracy(%) 
Type-II Error 
Non-Failure Accuracy(%) 
8 
87.5 
6 
86.3 
9 
85.9 
7 
84.1 
12 
81.2 
11 
75.0 
15 
76.5 
17 
61.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy(%) 
Predicted Num. Fails 
Actual Num. Failures 
Predicted Num.NonFails 
Actual Num. NonFails 
87.0 
56 
64 
38 
44 
85.1 
55 
64 
37 
44 
In tables 9a-12b the evidence also 
78.7 
52 
64 
33 
44 
shows 
70.3 
49 
64 
27 
44 
that 
specification M1 is preferable to the alternatives for every 
year prior to 1983 based on the likelihood ratios, A.C.I., 
and overall prediction accuracy. 
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Table 8.10a L o g ~ t t Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taking Two Years Before the Critical Time. (1981)(a) 
~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
-----------------------------------------
Constant 
Pr/TA 
TL/TA 
NPL/K 
NPL/TL 
Prv/TL 
Dep/TLi 
LACTOT 
LPASCIR 
3.81 
( 4 .44 ) 
-11.81 
(-0.33) 
-8.20 
(-1.09) 
0.56 
( 2 . 43) 
-3.49 
(-3.34) 
6.91 
( 1 . 23) 
-1.76 
(-0.83) 
31.29 
( 3 . 90) 
-31.43 
(-3.90) 
1.39 
( 3 . 60 ) 
34.48 
(1.48) 
-1.50 
(-2.98) 
13.76 
( 3 .67 ) 
-0.63 
(-0.40) 
0.28 
(1.19 ) 
1.52 
(3.89) 
32.46 
(1.37) 
1.52 
(0.51) 
-1.51 
(-3.03) 
14.55 
(3.89 ) 
-0.52 
(-0.34 ) 
-------------------
1.43 
(3.64) 
34.24 
(1.46) 
-1.49 
(-3.02) 
14.00 
(3.74) 
-0.60 
(-0.38) 
0.21 
(0.97) 
0.62 
(1.93) 
-2.36 
(-0.13) 
0.53 
(2.82 ) 
6.94 
(3.21) 
-0.18 
(-0.12) 
-0.16 
(-0.71) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd R-Index(c) 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 
35.75 
74.48 
51.02 
44.75 
53.37 
39.24 
26.88 
59.37 
54.12 
37.74 
25.85 
60.12 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
53.70 
38.58 
26.42 
59.70 
59.30 
27.38 
18.75 
65.30 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr-lsLklhdu] and it has 
chi-square distribution with j-1 degrees of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo R-square is defined as l-[lnLklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -lnLklhd+K where K 
is the number of estimated parameters. 
Table 8.10b Prediction Accuracy of Ml Logit Model for 1981 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Failure Accuracy(%) 
Type-II Error 
Non-Failure Accuracy(%) 
5 
92.1 
9 
79.5 
7 
89.0 
14 
68.1 
10 
84.3 
15 
65.9 
21 
67.1 
17 
61.3 
------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy(%) 87.0 80.5 76.8 64.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Num. Fails 
Actual Num. Failures 
Predicted Num.NonFai1s 
Actual Num. NonFails 
59 
64 
35 
44 
57 
64 
30 
44 
54 
64 
29 
44 
43 
64 
27 
44 
------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 9.11a Logit Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taking Three Years Before the Critical Time. (1980) (a) 
; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - -
H1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
------------------------------------------------------------Constant 
Pr/TA 
TL/TA 
NPL/K 
NPL/TL 
Prv/TL 
Dep/TLi 
LACTOT 
LPASCIR 
1.19 
( 3.02 ) 
11.07 
( 0 . 20 ) 
21.81 
(2.32 ) 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
-2.09 
(-1.33) 
4.86 
(0.72) 
1.97 
(0.39 
50.26 
(4.18) 
-52.44 
(-4.21) 
1.10 
( 3 . 91) 
94.37 
( 2 • 40) 
-1.96 
(-1.81) 
12.40 
(2.33 ) 
5.65 
( 1.46 ) 
-0.54 
(-2.85) 
0.73 
(3.18) 
68.22 
(1.99) 
-9.85 
(-2.42) 
-1.56 
(-1.66) 
10.93 
(2.11) 
4.12 
(1.09) 
1.14 
(4.03) 
93.72 
(2.37) 
-1.95 
(-1.79) 
12.58 
(2.34) 
6.07 
(1.56) 
-0.61 
(-3.07) 
1.01 
(3.67) 
79.01 
(2.08) 
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
10.99 
(2.19) 
5.54 
(1.46) 
-0.54 
(-2.80) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
Lk1hd R-Index(c) 
A.I.C.(d)(-) 
34.11 
77.76 
53.26 
43.1 
58.05 
29.88 
20.46 
64.05 
59.31 
27.36 
18.74 
65.31 
57.08 
31.82 
21.79 
63.08 
60.58 
24.82 
17.00 
66.58 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLkIhdr-IsLklhdu] and it has 
chi-square distribution with j-1 degrees of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo R-square is defined as 1-[lnLkIhdr/InLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -lnLkIhd+K where K 
is the number of estimated parameters. 
Table 8.11b Prediction Accuracy of M1 Logit Model for 1980 
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Failure Accuracy(%) 
Type-II Error 
Non-Failure Accuracy(%) 
4 
93.7 
12 
72.7 
4 
93.7 
13 
70.4 
------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy(%) 85.1 84.2 
------------------------------------------
Predicted Num. Fails 
Actual Num. Failures 
Predicted Num.NonFails 
Actual Num. NonFails 
60 
64 
32 
44 
60 
64 
31 
44 
11 
82.8 
15 
65.9 
19 
70.3 
16 
63.6 
------------------
75.9 67.5 
------------------
53 
64 
29 
44 
45 
64 
28 
44 
------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 8.12a L o g ~ t t Analysis of Selected Proxies for Risk-
Taklng Four Years Before the Critical Time. (1979)(a) 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
----------------------------------------
--------------------Constant 
Pr/TA 
TL/TA 
NPL/K 
NPL/TL 
Prv/TL 
Dep/TLi 
LACTOT 
LPASCIR 
1.52 
( 4 . 10 ) 
-24.65 
(-2.19) 
-4.70 
(-0.91) 
0.14 
(0.76 ) 
-0.02 
(-0.03) 
-11.30 
(-3.18) 
-0.03 
(-0.006) 
0.10 
(0.07 ) 
-0.45 
(-0.32) 
1.43 
(4.14) 
-21.64 
(-2.25) 
-0.06 
(-0.09) 
-9.68 
(-3.52) 
-0.79 
(-0.14) 
-0.45 
(-1.54) 
1.42 
(4.17) 
-23.04 
(-2.48) 
-6.25 
(-1.58) 
-0.20 
(-0.35) 
-11.29 
(-3.77) 
-3.67 
( -0 .84 ) 
1.45 
(4.15) 
-23.26 
(-2.41) 
-0.05 
(-0.07) 
-10.10 
(-3.64) 
-0.59 
(-0.11) 
-0.45 
(-1.56) 
1.47 
(4.12) 
-22.04 
(-2.36) 
0.08 
(0.50) 
-9.71 
(-3.50) 
-0.12 
(-0.02) 
-0.50 
(-1.73) 
------------------------------------------------------------
In Lklhd(-) 
Lklhd Ratio(b) 
Lklhd R-Index(c) 
A.I.C.(d}(-) 
43.52 
58.94 
40.37 
52.52 
46.95 
52.08 
35.67 
52.95 
47.12 
51.74 
35.44 
53.12 
(a) t-statistics are in parentheses. 
46.94 
52.10 
35.68 
52.94 
46.83 
52.32 
35.84 
52.83 
(b) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr-lsLklhdu] and it has 
chi-square distribution with j-1 degrees of freedom. 
(c) The pseudo R-square is defined as l-[lnLklhdr/lnLklhdu] 
(d) The Akaike's Information Criteria is -lnLklhd+K where K 
is the number of estimated parameters. 
Table 8.12b Prediction Accuracy of M1 Logit Model for 1979 
------------------------------------------------------------
Cut-Off Point 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
------------------------------------------------------------
Type-I Error 
Failure Accuracy(%) 
Type-II Error 
Non-Failure Accuracy(%) 
1 
98.3 
15 
59.4 
5 
91.6 
16 
56.7 
12 
80.0 
20 
45.9 
37 
38.3 
21 
43.2 
------------------------------------------------------------
Overall Accuracy(%) 83.5 78.3 67.0 40.2 
------------------------------------------------------------
Predicted Num. Fails 
Actual Num. Failures 
Predicted Num.NonFails 
Actual Num. NonFails 
59 
60 
22 
37 
55 
60 
21 
37 
48 
60 
17 
37 
23 
60 
16 
37 
------------------------------------------------------------
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Now we turn to the prediction accuracy of HI where the 
model aims at minimising the misclassification errors. As we 
are aware from earlier discussions, one could make two types 
of errors. Type-I error occurs when the model predict a 
failed/problem bank as a nonfailed/nonproblem bank. In 
contrast, type-II error occurs when the model classifies a 
nonfailed/problem bank as a failure. 
The classification results from model HI are reported 
for each subsequent years in tables 9b-12b. In 
previous studies the assigned cut-off point of 
most 
the 
likelihood of failure/problem was 0.50 (50%). In the present 
study, I have assigned even more stringent cut-off points. 
The data provide some interesting findings and gives 
ample support to the conjecture tested here. 
Firstly, the overall accuracy of HI is superior to the 
other specifications at different cut-off points during 1983 
as shown in table 8b. For instance, the overall accuracy at 
0.5 in 1983 was nearly 85% with a failure and nonfailure 
accuracy of nearly 93% and 75% respectively. 
Secondly, the prediction accuracy of the model decreases 
only slightly as the cut-off point is raised. This is 
particularly evident in the years prior to the critical 
year of 1983. For example, in 1982 the overall accuracy went 
from 87% at 0.5 to 70.3% at 0.8 .. The prediction accuracy 
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also hold very well for the periods of 1981, 1980, and to a 
lesser extent but still quite impressive for the year of 
1979. 
Finally, the data indicate that the overall accuracy of 
the model has shown a minor deterioration in the 
classification accuracy. At a 0.5 cut-off point, the overall 
accuracy has fallen from 87% in 1982 to 85% and 83.5% in 
1980 and 1979 respectively. Even with a stricter 
classification criterion, the same conclusion applies in 
each case. This performance is superior to the model 
estimated in chapter 6 with simple accounting and financial 
ratios, particularly for the years of 1981,1980, and 1979. 
Recalling the findings from chapter 6 and tables 10-14 for 
E1 logit model, we notice that the overall accuracy at 0.5 
for the years 1981,1980, and 1979 were 80.4%, 79.4%, and 76% 
respectively. It is clear that these estimates are well 
below to the ones obtained from the M1 model. Similar 
conclusions are obtained at even stricter cut-off points. In 
consequence, the capability of the moral hazard model (M1) 
to predict failure/problems with data before the critical 
time is much superior to its counterpart model estimated 
with accounting and financial ratios (E1). 
All in all, the econometric evidences support the 
general assertion concerning the overwhelming importance of 
moral hazard on the likelihood of bank failures/problems in 
the Chilean banking system between 1979 and 1983. Moreover, 
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the data confirm the three basic conjectures which states 
the incidence of excessive risk-taking during the entire 
period of study, and particularly in the years of the 
collapse of the economy's output. Finally, the results also 
confirm the superiority of the logit model Ml estimated with 
proxies for risk-taking over its counterpart E1 as an early 
warning model. Indeed, the model was predicting the banking 
debacle with at least three years lead time. 
There are two issues which remain unanswered by the 
model. One involves the relative importance of the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic variables in the failures of 
financial institutions. The second is that the model does 
not not shed any light on the banks' performance under 
different scenarios such as a stable macroeconomy vis a vis 
an unregulated financial system and vice versa. These issues 
will be presented and assessed empirically in chapter 9. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the macro and the 
micro model are non-nested therefore the estimates should 
be treated with caution. According to the econometric theory 
the ommision of an explanatory variable could lead to an 
specification bias unless they are orthogonal. Specifically, 
if we have y= X B + X B + e 
1 1 2 2 
-1 
and we ommit X 
2 
then the 
E[bl=B + [X' X 1 X, X B . Unless X and X are orthogonal (i.e 
1 1 1 1 122 1 2 
B=O), b is biased upwards if B)O (downwards if B<O). 
2 1 2 2 
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Endnotes. 
(1) The optimal value is affected by both cyclical 
fluctuations and secular trends. Balance-sheet data capture 
cyclical fluctuations and the time trend captures the 
secular trend. 
(2) Wheelock (1992) found that the balance sheets of insured 
banks reflected greater risk-taking and the probit model 
estimates indicated that they were more likely to failed. It 
also included the age of the bank as proxy of bank 
management. 
(3) This general specification follows closely the model of 
bank failure introduced by Ho and Saunders (1980). Their 
model assumes the existence of small and large banks. In the 
context of the US banking system, the formers are fully 
insured by FDIC whereas the latter are insured only 
partially. In addition, large banking firms are member of 
the FED system so that they have access to the discount 
window (lender to the last resort facilities). One of the 
most important implicit assumption underlying the model is 
that bank failure is considered as a discontinuous or 
explosive event involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. 
(4) Guttentag and Herring (1986) argued that the economic 
net worth (ENW) is more accurate than the book net worth 
(BNW). In the latter method, the measurement of bank's 
assets includes only tangible assets and financial 
instruments (As) which appears in the standard bank balance 
sheet. In contrast, ENW includes not only As but also 
options (Af) such as lines of credits, acceptances, and 
forward contracts (Af), and intangible assets (Ag) such as 
bank's charter, customer relationship established over time, 
and expertise of bank's management. Thus, BNW differs from 
ENW mainly in the fact that it includes narrow definition of 
bank assets which will reflect the original cost of tangible 
assets and the face value of financial claims. They rarely 
will be recorded at a market value and Af and Ag will not 
appear at all. Changes in the value of assets and deposits 
resulting from changes in interest rates (volatile) would 
always be a source of difference between ENW and BNW. 
(5) Other authors have also conviniently measured 
management risk-taking by relying on other set of proxies. 
For instance, Wheelock (1992) included the number of years 
since a bank has been chartered to capture such intangible 
as management quality. The coefficient should be negative as 
older banks becomes more conservative in their management. 
Bovenzi, Marino, and McFadden (1983) use the bank examiners' 
report as a proxy for management capability. 
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Chapter 9. Some Predictions of the Logit Hodel for Chile. 
(9.1) Introduction. 
This chapter looks into the question concerning the 
relative importance of factors external to the banks 
(macroeconomic instability) and internal factors banks' 
risk-taking) on the likelihood of bank failure. Indeed, an 
overwhelming econometric evidence on the significance of 
these two hypothesis on the failures of the Chilean banks 
was presented in chapters 7 and 8. 
This chapter attempts to solve this empirical question 
based on the logit model specified in the two previous 
chapters by looking at the robustness of each model in turn. 
This chapter also presents and discusses the results 
from some simple prediction exercises conducted by assuming 
different scenarios. Specifically, I simulate the effect of 
changes in the macroeconomic environment, such as an 
improvement in the economy's GDP growth, on the probability 
of failure. 
Moreoever, the model will assess the impact of a change 
of a selected proxy for risk-taking on the probability of 
bank failure. It could be argued that if supervision had 
encouraged banks to behave more conservatively, the 
likelihood of failure would certainly have been certainly 
smaller. 
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All these questions will be verified by the statistical 
evaluation of the logit model by using a procedure for non-
nested model by evaluating any probability changes from the 
Prediction probabilities of the model whe th n e regressor 
changes. 
(9.2) The Econometric Testing of Non-Nested Logit Models: 
Macroeconomic Hypothesis ~ ~ Moral Hazard Hypothesis. 
As we have seen in chapter 5, the Akaike Information 
Criterion (A.I.C.) was one of the scalar criteria for model 
selection. According to Amemiya (1981), if two competing 
models are non-nested, the A.I.C. offers a useful and simple 
measure which is adjusted by the degrees of freedom. This 
scalar seeks to incorporate in model selection the divergent 
consideration of accuracy of estimation and the best 
approximation to reality. The Akaike statistic gives a 
measure of precision of the estimate and a measure of the 
parameterisation of the model. Clearly, the Akaike criterion 
(defined as AIC=-lnML+K where InML is the log likelihood and 
K the number of parameters) introduces a trade-off between 
precision and parameterisation, since increases in K involve 
a penalty in the value of the AIC. According to this 
criterion one chooses the model with the smallest AIC. 
Let's recall from chapter 7 and 8, the two general 
models which test the role of macroeconomic instability and 
moral hazard on the probability of bank failure 
respectively. 
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(1) H: P(Y =1)= F(x' 6) 
o it it (macro model El) 
In equation (1) the column vector Y contains the 
endogeneous dichotomous variable for each bank i in a given 
quarter t for the ordered group A and B, x is a K-vector of 
known macroeconomic variables (GDP, stock prices, real 
lending interest rates, and the real exchange rate), and 8 
is a k-vector of unknown parameters. 
( 2 ) H = P(Y =1) = 
1 
(moral hazard model M1) 
As before Y is a sequence of observations of an 
independent binary random variable. Also, z is a k-vector of 
known proxies for moral hazard (ratios for asset quality, 
provision for risky loans, liability quality, and growth of 
bank assets and liabilities) measured as deviation from its 
trend. « is a k-vector of unknown parameters. 
These two hypotheses are non-nested since the 
explanatory variables of H are not a subset of the 
o 
explanatory variables in the other model (i.e H ) 
1 
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Table 1 summarises the main results of these two 
general competing models (' 'f l.e specl ication E1 and M1) 
estimated in chapter 7 and 8 respectively. 
Table 9.1 Summary Statistics From the Two Competing Models. 
------------------------------------------------------------
H 
o 
H 
1 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ ; - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ - - - - - - - - - - ; - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ; - - - - - - - -
In Lklhd(-) 227.00 294.43 
Lklhd Ratio(a) 264.36 129.50 
AIC(-) (b) 236.00 312.43 
------------------------------------------------------------
(a) The likelihood ratio is -2[lnLklhdr-InLklhdu] and it has 
a chi-square distribution with (j-1) degrees of freedom. 
(b) The Akaike's Information Criterion is -lnLklhd + K where 
K is the number of estimated parameters. 
H : Macroeconomic model 
o 
H : Moral Hazard model 
1 
We observe from the table that both models are highly 
significant judging from the overall likelihood ratio test. 
However, model H (macro model) is superior to H (moral 
o 1 
hazard model) as the former exhibit a much lower AlC, This 
implies that macroeconomic factors explain the probability 
of bank failure in Chile better than the moral hazard 
factor, but it does not allow us to reject either of these 
hypotheses in favour of the other. For this, we need to 
apply some formal test of competing non-nested hypotheses, 
Davidson and Mackinnon (1981) have introduced a test 
for non-nested models which is easy to apply to either 
linear or non-linear models. The Davidson and Mackinnon's 
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test (DM) ac;c;e.::;c;ec; th ,- ~ . . 1-1 ~ I I toJ ....... e 
statistical significance of H against 
o H . Thus, the truth of H implies the falsity of 
1 0 H 
1 
and vice 
versa. 
The PM test consists of the following steps: Firstly, 
from the estimated
A 
model (2) we obtain the predicted value 
of Y, 
1 
given by Y = Z ~ . . These predicted values of 
1 Yare 
then included as a regressor in (1). That is, Y=F(x'8 +za) 
and test the hypothesis that a=O based on the t-statistics 
for Y . 
1 
If the hypothesis is not rejected, then H is not 
rejected by H. 
1 
o 
A test of H against H is analogous to the previous steps 
1 0 ,.. "'-
as we estimate the fitted value as Y=x8 and regress them 
o "'-
against Y in model (2), that is, Y=F(za+x8). Then, we test 
8=0 so that if the hypothesis is not rejected, then H is not 
1 
rejected by H. 
o 
Treating the DM as a one-tailed test since the fitted 
values are expected to have positive coefficients, the 
critical values for the t-statistic at 0.025 and 0.01 are 
2.03 and 2.44 respectively. Given that the t-statistics for 
~ ~ is 7.28 and for 8 is 10.9 then it follows that H is not 
o 
rejected by H and vice versa. This result implies that the 
1 
appropriate model is an encompassing model incorporating 
both Hand H, since each of the t-statistics cited can be 
o 1 
considered as a test of H or H against an encompassing model 
o 1 
incorporating the full set of regressors from Hand H. 
o 1 
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In my view this can be interpreted as indication that 
although moral hazard has been important in raising the 
likelihood of bank failure, macroeconomic instability 
(shock) also triggers bank failures. 
(9.3) Simple Aggregate Predictions from the Logit Models. 
One of the important use of the logit model once the 
structural parameters of the model have been estimated is to 
make predictions when the factors which determine the 
probability of an event change. In this study, I have 
estimated two competing models which explain the likelihood 
of bank failure. As we have seen in the previous section, 
the non-nested test has accepted both hypotheses as 
significant. 
It would be useful to assess the impact on the 
probability of bank failure if some macroeconomic variables 
(e.g. change in GDP), or some proxies measuring risk-taking 
(e.g. provision/total loan ratio) change at a particular 
point in time. This exercise will be useful for comparison 
purposes of the two competing models rather than prediction 
per se for the population. 
Let's consider the logistic models specified in 
expressions ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) • The predicted probability of the 
'" 
.... .... 
model is F(x'B) = F 
-
P(Y = 1 ) . If there is a small change 
it 
in one of the independent variables controlling the 
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probability of fai:ure of the ith bank in quarter t, the 
estimated change in F will be given by 
A 
(3) d(P ) = e P(l-P) d(x) 
where d(x) is the change in the explanatory variable for the 
~ ~
ith bank, B is an estimated coefficient from the model and 
d(P) is the estimated probability for bank ith. Given that 
the predicted change in the probability is not constant for 
all banks but depends on each original probability then we 
could extrapolate the estimated change in probability by 
taking the probability average of the group. 
It should be pointed out that this approximation is not 
desirable if we are interested in assessing the predictions 
per see Instead, given that each bank will have a different 
probability, the expected probability of an event can be 
found by aggregating individual p's by their relative 
frequency of occurrence in the population. (Westin 1974) 
Table 2 presents the estimated impact on the 
probability of bank failure of a change in some of the 
selected macroeconomic variables. I have assumed that the 
change in the macroeconomic variables is 5% (0.05) and the 
average probability of bank failure is 77.4% (0.774). 
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Table 9.2 Marginal Effects on the Macro-Model. 
------------------------------------------------------------
Variables Coefficient Marginal Effect 
------------------------------------------------------------
VPGA 
VIPAA 
TIAA2A 
VTCRIA 
0.13 
-0.01 
0.09 
-0.09 
0.001 
-0.0001 
0.0007 
-0.0007 
------------------------------------------------------------
VPGB= GDP 
VIPAA= stock Prices 
TIAA2A= Real Lending Rate 
VTCR1A= Real Exchange Rate 
For instance, a 5% increase in GDP growth (VPGBA) 
reduces the probability of bank failure by 0.1% (0.001). 
Similarly, the model also predicts that a 5% reduction in 
the rate of interest (TIAA2A) and an equal real devaluation 
(VTCR1A) reduces the likelihood of failure by 0.07% (0.0007) 
in each case. Finally, the effect of a rise in stock prices 
on the probability of failure is also very small. ( i . e . 
0.01%) 
In general, the predictions from the macro-model suggest 
that the impact of changes in macroeconomic variables is 
small in normal circumstances, particularly if we take into 
account the fact that these variables are not always moving 
in the same direction. How do we reconcile the small figures 
in the second column of table 9.2 with the importance of 
macroeconomic factors shown by the non-nested test ? 
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The explanation clearly lies in the abnormal 
macroeconomic circumstances of 1982-83. Most of the relevant 
macroeconomic variables moved sharply in an adverse 
direction - GDP and stock prices fell, real interest rates 
rose and the real exchange rate appreciated strongly - and 
the combined effect of these changes on the probability of 
bank failure was large. In this respect the crisis of 1982-
83 in Chile was comparable to the Great Depression in the 
United states, which also caused many banks to fail. 
Table 3 shows the impact on the probability of failure 
from changes in the proxies of moral hazard. The average 
probability of failure for this model is 61.09%. Again, I 
assume a 5% change in the proxy, expressed in terms of the 
deviation from the trend. A proxy smaller deviation from its 
trend will mean a more conservative bank's attitude towards 
risk-taking (moral hazard). 
Table 9.3 Marginal Effects on the Moral Hazard Model. 
Variables 
NPL/K 
Prv/TL 
LACTOT 
CARTINT 
Coefficient 
0.24 
-4.78 
0.22 
3.32 
NPL/K=non-performing loans-capital ratio 
Prv/TL=provisions-total loans ratio 
LACTOT=asset growth 
CARTINT= related portfolios. 
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Marginal Effect 
0.002 
-0.057 
0.002 
0.039 
The evidence from the selected variables is very robust. 
For instance, a 5% reduction of related portfolios (risk 
concentration) reduces the probability of bank failure by 
nearly 4%. Similarly, a rise in the provision-total loans 
ratio by 5% contributes to a reduction in the likelihood of 
failure by 5.7%. 
The effect of changes in the non-performing loans-
capital ratio and asset growth on the probability of failure 
is negligible (i.e. 0.2%). These results are surprising one 
would expect that rapid growth of bank assets should 
deteriorate the quality of bank portfolios, particularly at 
high interest rates. 
The predictions from the moral hazard model support the 
view that a reduction in moral hazard has a significant 
impact on the likelihood of failure. Regulation and 
effective supervision should encourage banks to make larger 
provisions for bad loans. Similarly, an effective monitoring 
of loan concentration among affiliates should also be a top 
priority in the banking authorities' agenda, particularly in 
a buoyant economy experiencing a rapid expansion of bank 
assets. 
All in all, the evidence from this chapter suggests that 
the presence of both macroeconomic instability and moral 
hazard have been significant in explaining bank failures in 
Chile. One could argue that macroeconomic shocks have 
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triggered the collapse of the already weak financial 
institutions. This conclusion can also be supported from the 
early warning model estimated in chapter 6 which signals 
bank failures with three years in advance. 
Furthermore, the evidence appears to suggest that from 
a policy stance prudential regulation and supervision should 
have a more immediate impact on reducing the average 
probability of failure than macroeconomic policy. Certainly, 
this does not mean that macroeconomic instability is 
unimportant since even financially healthy institutions will 
be unable to withstand a macroeconomic shock which entails a 
drop of output of the magnitude observed in Chile, and 
during the Great Depression. 
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Chapter ~ ~ Conclusions. 
(10.1) Summary of the Main Conclusions from the Study. 
As we have seen from chapter 2, the expected results 
from financial liberalisation in Chile were achieved only 
partially. Although there was a sUbstantial increase in 
financial deepening and an important increase in operative 
efficiency in the banking system, the level of saving and 
investment as well as its quality of allocation did not show 
an improvement. On the contrary, it appears that the banks 
were fostering a rapid loans expansion, a risky 
concentration of their loan portfolios with their affiliated 
firms, and financing stock market bubbles and the 
consolidation of large and powerful economic "groups". All 
this behaviour occurred in spite of high real interest rates 
during most of the liberalisation period, and a significant 
deterioration of the macroeconomy after several years of 
buoyant output growth. 
After 6 years of sustained financial growth and 
stability (i.e between 1976 and 1981), the banking system 
experienced one of the worst financial crises in the 
country's history in 1981, reaching its peak of intensity in 
1983. As we saw from chapter 3, by January 1983 5 banks had 
to be subject to interim management (intervened), among them 
the two largest commercial banks. Moreover, 2 banks and 1 
non-bank financial institution had to be liquidated. All in 
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all, they accounted for nearly 50% of the total loans of the 
system. However, the dimensions of the banking crisis were 
much wider if we also include those intermediaries which, 
although they were subject to no intervention, had to sell 
part of their nonperforming loans to the Central Bank. The 
intervention and the rehabilitation of the banking system 
avoided the total disruption of the intermediation and 
payment mechanism preventing a further deepening of the 
economic recession, and also acted as an aid to reactivate 
the economy. 
One of the most revealing results from this study is the 
fact that there were signals at least four years before the 
banking debacle that financial institutions were 
experiencing some difficulties. This empirical result was 
confirmed by the early warning model developed in chapter 6. 
Specifically, the econometric results confirm the view that 
the failure of some financial institutions in Chile might 
have been anticipated before its critical time in 1983 with 
an acceptable degree of confidence. 
The study has also lent support to two of the hypotheses 
stated in chapter 4 to explain bank failures in Chile. The 
logit model estimated in Chapter 7 provides econometric 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the episodes of bank 
failures in Chile reflected the impact of macroeconomic 
variables on the likelihood of bank failures. Particularly 
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significant variables were the growth . 1n GDP and real 
lending interest rates. 
Similarly, the econometric evidence from the logit model 
estimated in chapter 8 also supports the alternative 
hypothesis concerning the importance of moral hazard for 
the likelihood of bank failures in the Chilean banking 
system between 1979 and 1983. Moreover, it was proven that 
although moral hazard was present throughout the period 
1979-83, it was more severe during the years of 
macroeconomic instability. Finally, the results also 
confirmed the marginal superiority of the logit model 
estimated with proxies for risk-taking over its counterpart 
of chapter 6 as an early warning model. 
Finally, the non-nested tests of the two logit models 
(i.e. macro model and moral hazard model) conducted in 
chapter 9 suggest that neither of the two hypotheses 1s 
unambiguously superior in explaining the bank failures in 
Chile. Given that both competing hypotheses were found 
significant according to the Davidson and Mackinnon's test, 
the appropriate inference is that an encompassing model is 
preferred. That is, one needs both sets of variables to 
explain the phenomena of bank failures. In my view this can 
be interpreted as providing support to the assertion that 
although moral hazard was important throughout the period of 
study, macroeconomic instability (shocks) is the triggering 
factor of bank failures. 
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The prediction exercises of each of th t 
J e wo models 
suggest that under normal circumstances the average 
probability of failure is more sensitive to changes 
banks' attitudes towards risk-taking than changes in 
in 
some 
macroeconomic variables. From a policy-stance this could 
mean that the role of prudential regulation and supervision 
to reduce moral hazard should be more important than trying 
to ensure macroeconomic stability at all times. An unusually 
deep macroeconomic crisis is always likely to rise the 
probability of bank failure, but healthier banks will be 
more able to withstand macroeconomic shocks. 
(10.2) Limitations of This study and Further Research. 
One of the limitations of the study is that the banks' 
data from their balance sheet used in the ratio analysis and 
in the estimation of the models is expressed in historical 
cost rather than market value. For instance, the book value 
of an asset will reflect the original cost and few, if any, 
assets will be recorded at current market value. Similarly, 
on the right-hand side of the balance sheet, banks' 
liabilities (deposits) are also expressed in 
This should introduce a bias in the bank's 
book value. 
valuation and 
in the insolvency determination, particularly in the case 
of volatile interest rates. Thus, a further line of 
research should include balance-sheet data adjusted for 
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changes in their market value. The process of securitisation 
permits today the transformation of the banks' nonmarketable 
assets such as loans and mortagages into marketable 
securities. 
A second important limitation involves the absence of 
any stock market data for identifying banks with financial 
difficulties. The early warning model of chapter 6 was 
estimated using accounting data, given the limitations on 
the availibility of information on banks' equity prices. It 
was argued that if the market for actively-traded bank 
equities is efficient, information about potential problems 
at a bank will be translated into the bank's security price. 
Therefore, in any further research on early warning models, 
banks' equity prices will also provide a relatively 
efficient early-warning system. 
Finally, it would have been desirable to extend the 
period of study in order to assess the pattern of banks' 
behaviour before the period of financial liberalisation for 
comparison purposes. There are two advantages of doing this: 
Firstly, it will make it possible to test moral hazard 
during the pre-liberalisation period. And secondly, it 
should improve the estimation of the time t r ~ n d d used in 
chapter 8 by having a longer period as reference. This line 
of research would be possible so long as the data becomes 
available. 
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APPENDIX 2. Balance Sheet of ~ ~ Chilean Bank. 
Current Assets 
C:aE;h 
L t : t ~ 3 . n s s
With their own resources 
L ~ ? s s s than 1 year 
MCtre than 1 yee!r 
With resources from the Central Bank 
LE'ss than 1 yeal'" 
Man? than 1 yea r 
Mort9age 
Cord:; i ngent 
Less than 1 year 
"'1ore than 1 y € ~ a " r r
NCtnpelr foY"mi n ~ 1 1
Financial Investment 
Equ it i t:)S 
Financial instruments lssue by Central Bank 
Other investments 
Other Assets 
Notes issue Central Bank in return for NP & risky loans 
O t h ~ ? r r A s s ( ~ t s s
Realisable Guarantees 
Fixed Assets 
Losses 
Total 
Current Liabilities 
Deposits 
Less than 1 yeat-
More than 1 year 
Intermediation of Documents 
Less than 1 year 
Mori.:? than 1 y,:?ar 
Mort9age Obligations 
Contingent Obligations 
Loans Obtained in the Country 
Le-ss than 1 Yf2ar 
More than 1 yea 1'" 
Loans Obtained Abroad and Other Obligations 
Less than 1 year 
More t h,;:l.n 1 y ( ~ - : : H H
Other Liabilities (provisions) 
Capital and Reserves 
Profits 
Total 
4'94 
Income Statement of a Chilean Bank. 
(1) Inteyest eayned fyom loans and investment 
(2) Inteyest paid to deposits, debts, and othey obligations 
(3) Financial Maygin = (1) (2) 
(4) Othey Incomes 
(5) GyOSS Opeyating Maygin - (3) + (4) 
(6) Expenses on pYovisions and wYite off of Yisky assets 
(7) Administyative expenses (nonfinancial opeYating expense) 
(8) Othey expenses 
(9) GyOSS Pyofits = (5) - (6) - (7) - (8) 
Income and Expenses Accounts 
Nominal Income 
Opeyating Income 
Inteyest eayned fyom 
Loans in local cuyyency 
Loans in foYeign cuyyency 
Moytgage 
Contingent loans in local cuyysncy 
Contingent loans in foYeign cuyyency 
Financial investments in local cuyyency 
Financial investment in foYeign cuyyency 
( ) t h E ~ Y S S
Adjustments eayned fyom 
L o ~ - \ n s s
Financial Investment 
o t r · I E ~ ~ I'" So· 
Benefits from intermediation 
t d · t d bv I - _ · . e n l t · l r ~ l l B c : ~ I - l k kPromi ! : : ~ ~ : ~ O l r y y no es 1 scoun·:e J .... ,' 
Other financial opeyations 
Profits from curyency exchange 
Commissions eraned 
Other Income from 
Sale of fixed assets 
Recoveyy of nonperforming loans 
Recovery of expenses 
Ot helrs 
Monetary Correction 
Net Loss 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -
Total Income 
---------------------
------------
----------------
Nominal Expenses 
Operating Expenses 
Interest and discounts paid on 
Sight deposits 
Time deposits 
Saving accounts 
Loans from Central Bank 
Loans from other institutions 
Adjustments paid on 
Deposits 
Saving accounts 
Operations with Central Bank 
Others 
Price differences on intermediation 
Promissory notes descounted by Central Bank 
Other financial operations 
Losses from currency exchange 
Commissions paid on 
Operations in local currency 
Operations in foreign currency 
Fixed Expenses 
Wages and Salaries 
Employees wages and salaries 
National insurance contributions 
Directors salaries 
Profit sharing 
Salaries to professionals 
Administrative Expenses 
Materials, Repairs 
Rents 
Marketing 
Representation expenses 
Taxation 
Income tax 
Property tax 
Others 
Write-offs 
Loans & Financial investment 
Depreciations and Provisions 
Depreciations of physical assets 
Global provisions on loans 
Individual provisions on loans 
Other provisions 
Provisions for repurchase of loans from Central Bank 
Losses from branches abroad 
Other expenses 
Monetary Correction 
Net Profits 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Total Expenses 
------------------------------------------------------------
496 
BPPcNU 1 X 3 ~ . .
........ 
.. ~ - . ~ ~ ~ . . -, .... - -.. _--
ChTEGOIdES COUt 
.----- - - - ~ - - - - -
CAltGOkY 1: 1 
CAP I TAL ADEQUACY 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
CATEGORY 2: 
l l ~ U J JD III 2 
3 
4 
j 
6 
CATEGORY 3: I 
PROF ITABllI TV 2 
3 
4 
5 
CA TEGORY 4: 1 
ASSET RISK 2 
3 
4 
5 
b 
CA TEGORY 41: 
? 
.. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
CATEGURY 42: 
2 
3 
CATEGORY 5: 1 
EFFICIENCY 2 
3 
CHfEGORY f,: 
IIABIl i I V ~ U A L L ITV 2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Financia! Ratios . 
, .. ,._ ... _ .... _- ........ __ .. __ ... _ ..... _,,-_ ............... - ... ~ ~ .... , 
.. ...... ~ - - - - ... - -.,- .... _._-------
V A R H & L E S 
' .... _ .." ........ - ~ ~ .. , ... ", --.... - . ~ ~ .. - ......... ., .. ,-_ ... 
. - . - - ~ ~ ......... " .... - - - - . ~ ~ ·--ff .... __ ~ ~ ___ . _. __ ., 
t ~ p i t a l l dod Reserves I A 5 ~ t t ~ ~ 1 
Capital and R e s e r v ~ 5 5 / Total Aisets 
Total loans I C.:..pi tal and Rescl ib 
B:id LeHIIS / Capital and R e ~ i ! I ' y t : ; ; ;
Net Capital I A 5 5 e t ~ ~ 1 
Net Capital / T O ~ d l l liabilities 
r i n a n ( i ~ l l Inie5tment I A ~ S E t _ _ 1 
li4lJid tu;,J;; ( ' ~ E I , ) ) I AS;i;,;:L 1 
(financial I I ' l t ! s t ~ i t n t t t CdtJ ! AS;:)2tS 
finallcial llill:stilleltt I r'JLd L v i l l i ~ ~
Cash I T0tal L 0 ~ ~ ~ ~
(financial I f l V < ' : J t i l l ~ d t t t Cash) I T I ; t ~ 1 1 l'J.'l1l5 
Operating Ejrnings I Ope:riiting [ x p e n ~ e s s
Opwlating E3(oiogs / A 5 ~ t t ~ ~ 1 
6rU5s P f 0 i , t ~ ~ I A ~ 5 e t ~ ~ 1 
GlOSS Profits I Total Liabiliti2s 
6r05s Profits / Capital and R e s ~ l v e s s
Total loans I A 3 ~ e t 5 5 1 
financial I n v e ~ t ' l n t t I A s s ~ t s s
Provisions for B ~ d d Loans / Operating E ~ p e n s ~ s s
P r o ~ i : . i o l l s s for Bad Loalls I Total l.ualls 
Mortgage Loansl Total Loans 
Mortgage loans/ Assets 1 
Fixed Assets I Assets 1 
Fixed Assets I Total loans 
Total loans / Capital and Rese(ves 
Bdd loans / Capital dnd R e ~ e I V 2 ~ ~
Bad loans / T o t ~ l l loans 
Bad Lv"j!:) I As;;ds 1 
~ : 1 t ~ ~ of 6lv,Mi vI r'JL.! l.'jdli5 (O')IIIi:;ti:: UHI'l:ip.y) 
ILtl! of 6{l,',!ti. L,i TlitJl lJ·;\II': It:/I .. j;,li (lhitlil / ) 
l ~ t a l l LOinu \ ~ u ( ~ i ~ n n C J ( r a n ~ i J J I k i ~ ~ ' S S 1 
fixed hpenst;s / liitii} bpelises 
fixed £Xpe •• st:!S I <Total l.oans t Fihlildal I n \ " h t l b ~ l l t ) )
H;(ed L;Pl',,!Jt:5 / ( O p e r ~ t i n y y f : H n i l l ~ 5 5 - OjjE:!(i:ltlrIY b ~ l : i l ~ t : S ) )
Deposits ( L a ~ s s than a year) I l i J L i l i t l ~ ~ ~ 1 
o t: P ( ! ' ~ ~ i L (d LI e t h i1 il a y t! Ii d ILL b i iI t i i:::':' 1 
l'J L: I 0 ~ ~ fr>- j L J I! J bit i t L ,; 1 
l(dnS fiO", ALtoad (less thill, l ftar) I LiiJuilitit:s 
l:jjll;: f ( , ~ 1 t i i ,;LI.:·iJ (M';fi:: UD,! Ii j , ~ > i i ~ ~ i l t : l i J i l i t i ~ ~ ~
lilt." Le.",,:.. L . i I ~ ~ i H i l l ~ i l J J J l i : i b d . t j t ~ ~ 1 
j d ~ l l l . L ~ i j i L . . ! : i i ( f l . l r d ~ j l l Cldi ,,'-j) ; ,Lldlii.J 1 
" :)7 
CATEGORY b 1 : 
CAHGlikY '1: 
"lSMAlctllNG 
........ _ .... ---". ..... ~ ~ ~ ~ --~ ~ .. - ~ - -
DE r I NIT ION S: 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Rate of Growth of Total liabilities (Domestic CU(r[;IIC 
Rate of Growth of Total Liabilities (Foreign C U ( f 2 ~ ~ ; ;
1 1 , 1 ~ ! ! li>tlu j t l ~ : , , H'JI.:lgllldld.:Ii,,) 11uLd h ~ " d ~ ~
I ~ ~ ; , I I I / ("til h d h ~ ~
C dd. I Ii" L i111 i..:;, 1 
Ii if WI eLl k·/ i ; ~ ~ t Ii. ,; i itt C 1 ~ ~ h) I llJ b 11 It i ,;: ~ ~ 1 
(fi"dr,di:ll Illve"tult:d t c:.sid I hL,! IOllfl5! 
..... k" .... , .... ,, _______ ... _ •• __ .. _ •.••.• _.0 __ ., _ ..• _ ._ •.• __ .... __ ..... _ ... _____ .... , 
I) I01At. ASSETS::: Asset: 1 t fixed A5st!ts t Other Assets. 
W h ~ i t : i i Assets 1 ::: l a ~ 1 1 1 t ivt.d l..l.JIIS 1 financial Iflvlstoj,thL. 
Other Assets: - O,j(UUients fL,IJing f('j/li thi:! sale B·jJ L 0 d n ~ ~ t,i the C::f1tral b i l i ~ . .
- Guods R e ( ~ h e d d in P.:1jd.dltE:. 
- Others. 
2) TOTAL LIABILITIES::: Liabilies 1 t Other l i 2 b i l i l i ~ s . .
Where: lidbilities 1 ;; OepJ)sits t lnterllediatbjol I)f OOCUill::Jlts + l o a r l ~ ~ ({Jjill 11,,1>2 
i l 0 a n ~ ~ f r 0 ~ ~ Abruad. 
OHler Liiibilities .; PrOVi:dIJI1:l f.jr LUilliS and fiflll:d,ll I I I ' i i : d I i H ~ n t t
,t OU!:I LiJbilltib. 
4) NET CAPITAL:; Capital and ReservlJs - Bad l.oans. 
5J GROSS PROF LTS = Ti) tal Ear II i ngs - Tlj tal bpenses. 
I ,d 
APPENDIX 4. Testing Mean Differences - ~ ~ ~
....... --_ ....... _ ... _- .. _ ... _--. ~ - . . ... -- .. -- ...... -, .. -........ ~ ~... ~ ~
UPS SUPPOSE WE ARE Uti-It lNG ~ I l H H AN INDEPENDENT R i j l ~ D O M M SAtin E OF SllE Iii { ; t ~ u u Ii': Ft.Ui'i 
TWO /jut,HAl P O ~ U l A T l O N S S HAVING THE MEANS pi AND ~ 1 2 2 ANO VARIAlj:t;j d t MID .2 2, 
WE WISH 10 TEST THE NULL HYPOTHESIS 
HO: ~ 1 1 - ~ 2 2 :: d 
AGAINST THE AlTERNATIVE 
HI: ~ 1 1 - ~ 2 2 =/:: & 
HOWEVER iF WE HAVE THAT 01 AND n2 ARE SMAll, AND ALSO 011 AND r2 i ARE lH.J.'UGflH H I [ r ~ ~
fOR liiutFENDENT RANDml SAt-lPl E fRuh Hm NJKI1i'iL rOPUl.ATIGr. HAVING Hit: 50HE lJtHllljill'i VlikItllk:E, 
THAT [S 6 1 ~ = i 2 1 1 WE TEST bY MEANS Of t-STAI1STICS. 
(1) tt ::(XI-Xl-f)/(So '(1/nl).(I/n2)1 
WUERE: 
Sn :: [(nl-l)SPH2-1)S22)/(ni+n2·2) 
rHE ABOVE EXPRESSION fOR t IS A VALUE Of A Rf1NDOM VAI;lhbIE HIWljlG A t u!JlklBlJllOil 
WITH nlrliL-2 DEGREES Of fREEDOM, TlIUS, THE APPRUPRlrlTf Ckll h Ill. REGiON OF ~ l n n 'J. HII; h ~ 1 1 I 1 G G
HO: j 1 1 - ~ 2 : : ~ · · AGAINST Hl: p l - ~ L L =/::. S U N U E ~ ~ HIE bIV£N ASSUHPrWiJ3 l ~ , ,
(2) I hi ) tan, fit till -2. 
APPENDIX 5. Two Sepayate Regyessions. 
Logit Analysis foy Two Sepayate VaYiables 
------------------------------------------------------------
Vayiables Specifications 
81 
------------------------------------------------------------
Constant 
X13 
X43 
Log Likelihood 
-7.79 
(-2.56) 
0.81 
(2.73) 
-8.86 
t-statistics in Byackets 
500 
4.15 
(2.50) 
-0.94 
(-2.25) 
-10.38 
~ ~
, . ~ ' '
.... _ .... - -" ~ ~ Covariance-Correlation Matrix For 
Macroeconomic Variables. 
Da.te: 5--2'3-1'3'37 / Time: 11: 46 
SMF'L range: 1 521 
Number of observations: 521 
=======================:================================================= 
Variable Mean S.D. Minimum 
======================================================================== 
TINTA 1 .050501'3 1 • 1 785'3'38 3.6112600 
-0. 10'3'3624 
TINTB 0 .. 7211171 1.08'32717 3.6112600 -0.1099624 
TPASA 0.6305381 1 .. 06873'35 3.3882650 -0. '34422'32 
TPASB 0.4357481 o. '33370'31 3.3882650 -0.94422'32 
VIPAA ·-0 .. 3502787 10. '388682 38.6'37250 -16. '338010 
VIPAB -·-0 .. 3553186 '3.1753367 38.6'37250 -16.938010 
VPI3BA o . 2'3'33854 3.6046'337 '3.5566700 -7.41'361'30 
VPI3BB 0 .. 1'3457'38 2 .. '3656567 '3.5566700 -7.4196190 
VTCf:::A 0.1838377 !.5 • 7'321532 23.437500 -13.150810 
VTCF.:B 0.1114087 4.8203283 23.437500 --13 • 150810 
M1A 40'343.131 36762.683 102720.00 0.0000000 
MIB 28844.726 364'36. '343 102720.00 0.0000000 
M2A 1611'37.00 155748.87 411720.00 0.0000000 
M2B 11401'3.72 151777. '31 411720.00 0.0000000 
======================================================================== 
Covariance Correlation 
======================================================================== 
TINTA,TINTA 1.3864313 1.0000000 
TINTA,TINTB --0 • 757534'3 -0 .5'312000 
TINTA,TPASA 0.9'333622 0.7'301395 
TINTA,TF'ASB ·-0.4577542 -0.4167627 
TINTA,VIPAA -2.4684431 -0. 1 90'3614 
TINTA,VIPAB 0.373262'3 0.034582'3 
TINTA,VPI3BA -0.5588413 -0.1317917 
TINTA,VPI3BB ··-0 • 2044065 -0.0585'325 
T I NTA , VTC:f:::A -0.2640136 --0 • 0387484 
TINTA,VTCF.:B ··-0 .. 1170351 -0 .02063'3'3 
TINTA,M1A 31503.343 0.7284797 
TINTA,M1B -30301.438 --0. 7057888 
TINTA,M2A 136'328.48 0.7473721 
TINTA,M2B --11'3777 • '33 -0.6708667 
TINTB,TINTB 1.1842355 1.0000000 
TINTB,TPASA ·-0.4546'318 -0 . 3'313302 
TINTB,TPASB 0.8267582 0.8144513 
TINTB,VIPAA o . 2525'31 '3 0.0211433 
TINTB,VIPAB --·1 .. 8722736 -0.1876'319 
TINTB,VPI3BA --0 • 2158'31 '3 -0.05508'32 
TINTB,VPI3BB --0 • 3438823 -0.1066564 
T I NTB , VTCf:::A -0.1325685 -0.0210523 
T I NTB , VTCf:::B --0. 13'35646 -0.0266316 
TINTB,M1A ··-2'3524. 7'31 --0 . 7387165 
501 
TINTB,M1B 31167.074 0.7854846 TINTB,M2A 
-116241. '31 
-0.6864'328 TINTB,M2B 13182'3.17 0.7989160 TPASA,TPASA 1.1400118 1.0000000 TF'ASA,TPASB 
-0.2747558 
-0.2758658 TPASA,VIPAA 
--2.5268707 
-0.2155758 TPASA,VIPAB 0.2240419 0.0228913 TPASA , VPI3BA 
-0.0632187 
-0.0164414 TPASA , VPI3BB 
--0 D 1226'300 
-0.0387838 TPASA , VTCF.:A 
--0 . '3843641 
-0 . 15'3322'3 TPASA , VTCF.:B 
-0.0702475 
--0.0136621 TPASA,M1A 21'308.010 0.5586737 TPASA,M1B 
-·-18187 .6'37 
-0.46717'35 
TPASA,M2A '32867 .86'3 0.558'3888 
TPASA,M2B 
-718'33.774 
-0.4440637 
TPASB,TPASB 0.87013'33 1.0000000 
TPASB,VIPAA 0.1526333 0.0149048 
TPASB,VIPAB 
-1.7764651 
-0.207757'3 
TPASB,VPI3BA 
-·-0. 1304566 
-0.0388348 
TPASB,VPI3BB 0.02337'35 0.00845'33 
TPASB , VTCF.:A 
-··0. 080106'3 
-0.0148407 
TPASB , VTCF.:B 
-0.6465625 
-0.143'3318 
TPASB,M1A 
-···1 7840 • 893 
-0.5207535 
TPASB,M1B 20582.322 0.6051467 
TPASB,M2A 
-··70241 .2'35 
-0.483'3388 
TPASB,M2B 85412.885 0.603861'3 
VIPAA,VIPAA 120.51936 1.0000000 
VIPAA,VIPAB 
·-0 D 1244605 
-0.0012368 
VIPAA,VPI3BA 12. '367806 o . 32800'39 
VIPAA,VPI3BB 0.0681572 0.0020'355 
V I PAA , VTCF::A 
--21.173418 -0.3333034 
V I PAA , VTCF.:B o D 03'30241 0.0007382 
VIPAA,M1A -·9082'3 • 786 -c) . 2252734 
VIPAA,M1B 10103.6'32 0.0252413 
VIPAA,M2A --55536'3 D 81 -··0 • 3251 218 
VIPAA,M2B 3'39:38 • 674 o . 023'3'324 
VIPAB,VIPAB 84.025216 1.0000000 
VIPAB,VPI3BA (>.1063772 0.0032225 
V I PAB , VPl3BB 8 D 5'38'3'300 0.3166204 
V I PAB , VTCI:;':A 0.0653210 0.0012315 
V I PAB , VTCF.:B -14 • 5'3'3932 -0.33073'3'3 
VIPAB,M1A 14547.857 0.0432120 
VIPAB,M1B -72056.080 -0.2155890 
VIPAB,M2A 57276.2'38 0.0401571 
VIPAB,M2B --420612.60 -0.3026120 
VPI3BA,VPI3BA 12 D '368877 1.0000000 
VPI3BA,VPGBB --·0 . 0582544 -0.0054598 
VPGBA , VTCF.:A ··-11 D 147525 -0.534'33'32 
VPGBA , VTCF.:B -0.0333542 -0.0019233 
VPI3BA,M1A 4120.8713 0.0311564 
VPGBA,M1B -8635 D 68'3'3 -0.0657668 
VPGBA,M2A 
502 
-76323.238 
VPGBA,M2B -34135.841 
VPGBB,VPGBB 8.7782385 
VPGBB,VTCRA -0.0357711 
VPGBB,VTCRB -7.7394080 
VPGBB,MIA -7966.7075 
VPGBB,MIB 6361.1828 
VPGBB,M2A -31365.686 
VPGBB,M2B -38036.192 
VTCRA,VTCRA 33.484645 
VTCRA,VTCRB -0.0204811 
VTCRA,M1A 9116.2009 
VTCRA,MIB -5302.7488 
VTCRA,M2A 175926.06 
VTCRA,M2B -20961.127 
VTCRB,VTCRB 23.190967 
VTCRB,MIA -4561.4229 
VTCRB,M1B 7580.5316 
VTCRB,M2A -17958.756 
VTCRB,M2B 126276.31 
MIA,MIA 1.349E+09 
M1A,M1B -1.181E+09 
MIA,M2A 5.520E+09 
M1A,M2B -4.668E+09 
MIB,MIB 1.329E+09 
M1B,M2A -4. 650E+09 
MIB,M2B 5.393E+09 
M2A,M2A 2.421E+l0 
M2A,M2B -1.838E+l0 
??QQE+l(.) M2B,M2B _ _ JJ 
-0.1362065 
-0.0625127 
1.0000000 
-0.0020864 
-0.5424312 
-0.0732125 
0.0588837 
-0.0680367 
-0.0846646 
1.0000000 
-0.0007350 
0.0428944 
-0.0251327 
0.1953888 
-0.0238891 
1.0000000 
-0.0257900 
0.0431719 
-0.0239667 
0.1729303 
1.0000000 
-0.8818976 
0.9659890 
-0.8382617 
1.0000000 
-0.8195517 
0.9753994 
1.0000000 
-0.7790007 
1.0000000 
======================================================================== 
APPENDIX 7. Covarianre-Correlation Matrix for Proxies 
Moral Hazard. of 
Date: 5-2'3-1'3'37 / Time: 11: !S4 
SMPL range: 1 521 
Number of observations: 521 
======================================================================== 
Mean S.D. M a . ~ / ; ; i mum Minimum 
======================================================================== 
RAT33A 3.1281::-05 0.0074274 o . 041 '33E/3 -0.0366147 
F.:AT33B -1.118E--05 0.07111'34 1.3810690 
-0.34'3'3'370 
F.:AT413A (>.1458204 3.0127734 53.070'300 -11.474870 
r.::AT413B 0.0175053 0.5'313445 8.3736600 -2.0'3'3'3'350 
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